ISRAEL/DOCUMENTS OCTOBER 1948 – APRIL 1949 COMPANION VOLUME 2

STATE OF ISRAEL

DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, OCTOBER 1948 — APRIL 1949

COMPANION VOLUME

STATE OF ISRAEL
ISRAEL STATE ARCHIVES

DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL

VOLUME 2
OCTOBER 1948 — APRIL 1949

Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich

COMPANION VOLUME

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CONTENTS

FOREWORD

This volume is the second in the series relating to the foreign policy of Israel. It covers the period October 1948 to April 1949. From the chronological point of view, it runs, in part, concurrently with Volume 3, which deals with the armistice negotiations between Israel and the Arab states and which covers the period from December 1948 to July 1949. The editorial policy followed in the present volume is the same as that which governed the preparation of the previous volumes. The documents selected deal primarily with foreign policy, but a number of documents related to other matters closely bound up with the conduct of foreign policy have also been included. Among the subjects which fall under this category are immigration from Eastern European countries, financial aid to Israel and the relations between Israel and the Jewish diaspora.

The documents have been selected with a view towards providing extensive documentation of deliberations, discussions, the spectrum of opinions and the shaping of foreign policy. A number of documents were chosen with the aim of providing coverage on subjects which, though they cannot be classified with the major themes of foreign policy, were of some importance at the time and must not be entirely ignored. These documents also enable the reader to trace the files which hold further information on the issues in question.

The selection of documents was only marginally affected by considerations as to whether or not deliberations on a particular issue led to concrete results or were of more than transient significance. Nevertheless, this criterion cannot be entirely disregarded and the space devoted to a particular issue must obviously bear some relation to its importance in a historical perspective.

Documents recording discussions and consultations in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs relating to policy planning have been included whenever available, but there is only a relatively small number of documents of this type in the Ministry's files. This is not really surprising in view of the fact that Israel was engaged in a war for its very survival and that senior officials of the Foreign Ministry were preoccupied with urgent affairs and were unable to devote time and thought to long-range planning. It should also be borne in mind that questions relating to the long-range aims of foreign policy, to the extent that they were raised at all, were discussed at Cabinet level and by the executives of political parties rather than in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The minutes of Cabinet meetings have not yet been declassified and are not available for research purposes, but information derived from them has been used by the editors in the preparation of several notes and references.

The documents published in this volume derive mainly from the files of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the files of Israel's missions abroad. All these files are now in the custody of the Israel State Archives. A

number of documents derive from other archives, such as the Ben-Gurion Archives in Sde Boker and other record groups kept in the Israeli State Archives.

Arrangement of the documents. The documents are arranged in chronological order. Documents composed or sent out on more than one date are placed according to the earliest date. The position of telegrams in the chronological sequence is governed by the earliest known date, in the following order: date of drafting, date of dispatch, or — if neither of these is known — date of receipt. Reports of discussions and meetings appear under the date of writing, when known. When the date of writing is not known, the chronological location of the document in question is determined on the basis of the date of the recorded discussion or meeting (the latter date always appears in the main editorial heading).

The text. The text of the printed documents is identical with the original text except for the following editorial changes and corrections:

(a) Addresses of senders and addressees as well as dates in their original form have been deleted. In some of the reports, memoranda and minutes the original headings have also been omitted. The deleted information is incorporated in part in the editorial headings in standard form (see below).

(b) A number of passages which have no direct relevance to foreign policy have been omitted, as have a few offensive references to individuals as well as some passages referring to subjects and names which have not been declassified. All omissions are indicated in the body of the text and as a rule explained in footnotes.

(c) Minor errors have been corrected without comment and without indication in the body of the text.

(d) Common abbreviations and abbreviations whose meaning is not in doubt have been replaced by the full terms without comment and without indication in the body of the text. Abbreviations of proper names and abbreviations employed for reasons of secrecy have been expanded to full form in square brackets. However, abbreviations commonly pronounced as such and acronyms (e.g., U.N., UNO) have not been altered.

(e) Missing words have in some cases been added, either conjecturally (within square brackets and preceded by a question mark) or on the basis of a corresponding text of the same document (within square brackets and with an explanation in a footnote).

(f) English spelling has been standardized to conform with British usage except in documents originating in American institutions or written by Americans.

(g) Faulty punctuation has been corrected. Punctuation words used in telegrams (e.g., *stop, comma*) have been replaced by punctuation marks, and the words *quote* and *unquote* by quotation marks.

(h) The outgoing text of telegrams has been used when extant. In cases

of faulty deciphering in the incoming text (revealed through comparison with the outgoing text), the wrongly deciphered or missing words are identified by oblique strokes.

Editorial headings. The heading includes, *inter alia,* the file reference of the document. References to files of the Israel State Archives give only the reference numbers of the record group, the series, the box and the file. References to files of other archival institutions carry the full or abbreviated name of the institution. (See list of archives and abbreviations in references in the Companion Volume.)

The destination of a document is noted in the editorial heading except when the document is addressed to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs or other central government bodies.

Footnotes. The annotation consists mainly of numbered footnotes. The main purpose of the footnotes is to elucidate the text where necessary and to call attention to other relevant documents. There are a few references to documents and files which have not yet been declassified but which will eventually become available to researchers.

Biographical footnotes have been provided where necessary for a proper understanding of the text. Information on most persons mentioned in the documents is included in the index. The index does not provide information on persons mentioned only in the footnotes.

Appendices. There are seven appendices in the Main Volume, containing full texts of draft resolutions and resolutions relating to Palestine passed by the United Nations General Assembly and by the Security Council during the period covered by the volume, as well as a Central Truce Supervision Board decision and agreements between Israeli and Jordanian Military Commanders relating to Mount Scopus and the cease-fire in Jerusalem.

Map. The map in the Main Volume, facing p. 80, shows the front lines between Israel and Egypt in October–November 1948.

We would like to thank the following for their assistance: Mr. Moshe Erell and Dr. Aba Gefen, of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, who read the entire manuscript, for their assistance and advice; Mr. Joseph Elron, who supervised the copy-editing of the Main and Companion Volumes, translated some of the notes and summaries of the Hebrew documents into English and was in charge of the proof-reading of the entire manuscript; Mrs. Nehama Chalom, Director of the Weizmann Archives, for style-editing the Companion Volume; Mrs. Michal Engel, who prepared the index, the list of documents and part of the biographical notes; Miss Batsheva Taube, who prepared the English translation of the summaries of the Hebrew documents; Mrs. Evelyn Abel, who translated the intro-

duction; Mrs. Lou Kaddar, for proof-reading the French documents; Mr. and Mrs. Greenbaum, who prepared the map, and Mrs. Vera Eden, who prepared the typescripts of the documents and the annotations.

We are also indebted to all those who provided us with biographical information on themselves or on persons mentioned in the documents.

INTRODUCTION

The conclusion of the war in Palestine, the consolidation of Israel's international status, and her relations with the Arab states and the countries of Eastern Europe, are the major concern of this volume.

The Third Session of the United Nations General Assembly convened in Paris on September 21, 1948. This session posed a serious problem for Israel. The report of the U.N. Mediator, published on September 20, a few days following his assassination, called for the recognition of Israel as an existing fact, but included several recommendations which seriously undermined her political and military achievements. Particularly damaging were the recommendations to hand over to the Arabs the part of the Negev south of Majdal–Faluja, and to accord Jerusalem international status under U.N. supervision.[1] The fact that the United States and Britain had been involved in the drafting of the report,[2] and the tragic assassination of the Mediator just days before he could complete the formulation of his recommendations, lent the report political validity and the force of a last will and testament. The result was that at the U.N. Assembly, Israel found herself confronting a broad coalition which, in addition to the Arab states, included the United States, Britain, the countries of Western Europe and part of Latin America, who called for immediate and unqualified adoption of the Mediator's report.

Israel countered with a twofold argument, based on the provisions of the November 29 resolution as well as on the facts established in the field. Thus, in keeping with the November 29 resolution, she demanded the entire Negev, while also insisting on her right to retain other parts of Palestine, particularly the Galilee, by virtue of her military control, though these areas had not been allocated her by the November 29 resolution. With respect to Jerusalem, the argument was similarly grounded in the actual situation — the fact that Israel held most of the new city — with added emphasis on the impracticality of an internationalization programme, or other forms of international supervision over the city.

It is difficult to hazard how the Israeli argument would have fared at the U.N. The internal contradiction between a claim sustained by an international resolution and a claim sustained by force would undoubtedly have posed an obstacle. It is well to recall that the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries supported Israel as long as she adhered to the November 29 resolution, but hesitated to do so once her claims deviated from this framework. The clash, however, was averted, for two circumstances conspired to prevent the U.N. Assembly from adopting the Mediator's recommendations in full early in its deliberations. First, the American

1. See "Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine, 16 September 1948", U.N. Document A/648.
2. See No. 21, n. 7.

presidential campaign exposed the White House (and the Republican candidate) to Israeli and Zionist pressure;[3] secondly, Israel gained control, in Operations *Yoav* and *Hiram,* of considerable parts of the northern Negev and Upper Galilee which, according to the Mediator's programme, were to have been allotted to the Arabs. Discussion of the Mediator's report was postponed, and emphasis at the U.N. shifted from the question of a conclusive resolution of the Palestine issue to the problem of preserving the truce.

The truce, effective since July 18, had imposed unbearable military and economic burdens on Israel, who was obliged to maintain a large force under arms, and to contend with incessant infractions. In early October the Israeli government resolved to end the deadlock of neither peace nor war, and on October 6 the cabinet decided to launch a campaign on the southern front designed to push the Egyptian army out of Israeli territory and open the road to the besieged settlements in the Negev.[4] Operation *Yoav,* launched on October 15, only partially achieved its military objectives. Israel extended her control in the Negev, the siege was lifted, and the Egyptian army soundly beaten; however, most of the Egyptian force remained in the Gaza Strip and one unit was left trapped in what became known as the "Faluja Pocket".

Politically, the results of the operation were even less clear-cut and they embroiled Israel in an open conflict with the U.N. A series of Security Council resolutions, the last of which was adopted on November 16,[5] forced an Israeli pull-back to lines she had held on October 14, and the opening of negotiations, either directly or through the U.N. Mediator, in order to convert the truce arrangement into a more permanent armistice settlement. Unlike the political entanglement engendered by Operation *Yoav,* Israel's seizure of the Upper Galilee in Operation *Hiram* had no real political repercussions. Thus, at the conclusion of the operation, Israel found herself controlling all of the Galilee within the international border of Palestine.

By mid-November, when the First Committee of the General Assembly resumed its discussion of the Mediator's report, the political background and military situation had been considerably altered. To be sure, the British made an attempt to direct the discussion to the territorial question and insisted on an explicit reference to the Bernadotte Plan. However, the need to enlist majority support from the Committee, and particularly to coordinate positions with the American delegation, shifted the emphasis to other issues, such as the termination of the state of war in Palestine and the establishment of a Conciliation Commission, and also to the refugee problem and the status of Jerusalem. Thus the ensuing resolution, ratified

3. See Nos. 26, 48.
4. See Editorial Note, pp. 114–5.
5. See Editorial Notes, pp. 131–2, 139–40 and Appendix C, Main Volume, pp. 623–4.

by the General Assembly on December 11, 1948,[6] comprised three major elements: the establishment of a Conciliation Commission, charged with assisting the parties in putting an end to the state of war between them; the reaffirmation of the Security Council resolution of November 1947, with respect to the institution of an international regime in Jerusalem; and the call for Israel to repatriate those Arab refugees who so desired, or to compensate those who chose to remain in Arab countries.

Israel's reaction to the resolution was mixed. Disposal of the mediation process, and the stress on direct negotiations aimed at finally resolving the Palestine question, were undoubtedly to her liking; however, the renewed emphasis on the internationalization of Jerusalem, and the explicit reference to the refugee problem, focused attention on two issues which adversely affected Israel's foreign relations in the course of 1949.

Israel had accepted the Jerusalem clause of the 1947 Partition Plan of necessity. During the early months following the decision, ensuring the physical existence of the city's Jewish inhabitants had been the main preoccupation, relegating political considerations to the background. When the second truce came into effect, and Israel's control over most of the new city was assured, the government began to consider the political future of Jerusalem. It was decided to claim the new city and the corridor connecting it to the rest of the country, as an integral part of the State of Israel, whereas with respect to the Old City, consent would be given to the establishment of an international regime in collaboration with the relevant religious communities.[7] Initially, this position seemed to meet with favourable response by various countries, particularly when Israel suggested the appointment of a Christian Governor as head of the international regime over the Old City.[8] However, as time went on, this met with increasing opposition, chiefly from the Latin American and other Catholic countries. Nor were the the Soviets, or their allies, overly enthusiastic about this radical departure from the Assembly resolution of November 1947. They made their opposition felt both in the deliberations of the First Committee and in the final resolution adopted by the Assembly. Israel's response to the Assembly resolution was to reserve the right to submit the matter for re-examination by the U.N.[9] Meanwhile she began to take tangible steps to consolidate her hold over the city.[10] Jerusalem was to constitute a major stumbling block in Israel's international relations during 1949.

The question of the refugees, which began as a humanitarian problem, in the summer of 1948 assumed the proportions of a full-scale political problem. In the last phases of his mediation, Bernadotte had devoted

6. See Appendix G, Main Volume, pp. 639–41.
7. See No. 4; Vol. I, No. 502.
8. See, for example, Nos. 32, 45.
9. See No. 479.
10. See Nos. 205, 364.

increasing attention to the plight of the Arab refugees. In his final recommendations to the General Assembly, he sought to ensure the right of the Arab refugees to return to their places of residence, or be compensated should they choose not to.[11] During the U.N. General Assembly session, the Third and Fifth Committees dealt with the humanitarian aspects of the problem and, on the basis of their recommendations, the General Assembly resolved on November 19 to establish a special fund to assist the refugees.[12] The First Committee, on the other hand, deliberated more on the political aspects of the refugee problem, and the resolution adopted reiterated the Mediator's recommendations, i.e., repatriation of the refugees and compensation to those who preferred not to return. More important than the resolution itself, however, was the significance the Conciliation Commission attributed to it. When the Commission arrived in Israel in February 1949, its members, particularly the American one, seemed to view the refugee problem as the central issue in Israel–Arab relations, and they exerted twofold pressure on Israel, requesting from Israel some sort of gesture on behalf of the refugees, and a clarification of her policy in this matter as early as possible. Israel, wary of making any gestures prior to a detailed resolution of the entire problem, nevertheless formulated her policy clearly — the refugee problem was to be solved within the framework of a peace treaty with the Arab states, along the following lines: (a) reparations to be awarded to those refugees who had actually worked their land prior to the war; (b) agreement to the reunification of families; (c) cooperation with the Arabs in settling the refugees in Arab countries with the help of international aid.[13] Rejecting this policy, the Arabs demanded the return of all the refugees as a prerequisite for a peace treaty with Israel. As the Conciliation Commission began its work in Lausanne in May 1949, the refugee question loomed as the chief obstacle to a settlement between the parties.

Discussion on the Mediator's report undoubtedly reinforced Israel's international status. She took an active part in the deliberations of the General Assembly's First Committee, and the concluding resolution referred to her, albeit not by name, as a party to the conflict. The fact that Israel was not a member of the United Nations, and enjoyed only limited recognition, remained a source of concern to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs which insisted that Israel be regarded as an equal party in her contacts and dealings with the nations of the world. On November 29, 1948, the first anniversary of the adoption of the Partition Plan by the General Assembly, Israel submitted an application for admission to the U.N.,[14] timing it to coincide with the historic date, though there was no

11. *Op. cit., supra,* n. 1.
12. See No. 34, n. 11.
13. See No. 505.
14. See No. 204.

certainty that it would win the necessary majority at the Security Council.[15] And, indeed, in the deliberations which took place on the 15th and 17th of December, Israel's application was rejected, with only five members of the Security Council voting in support.[16] Israel's application was re-examined by the Security Council early in March 1949 and this time met with majority approval. Admission to the U.N. was ratified by the General Assembly on May 11, 1949.

Recognition by some dozen countries, including the United States and the Soviet Union, had immediately followed the establishment of the State. In the summer and autumn of 1948, several other countries recognized Israel, but these were chiefly Latin American countries and allies of the Soviet Union. Israel particularly needed the recognition of Western Europe, and primarily of Britain and France. The negotiations with France were protracted and arduous; France wished to ensure the rights of her religious and cultural institutions in Israel and insisted on the internationalization of Jerusalem. Recognition came only on January 24, 1949, following an exchange of memoranda between the two countries, whereby Israel endorsed the rights of the French institutions and reiterated her readiness to internationalize the Old City.[17] In the case of Britain, it was the latter who pressed for the normalization of relations between the two countries, with no conditions attached. British recognition was granted on January 29, 1949. Italy, the Benelux and the Scandinavian countries, and the members of the British Commonwealth followed in the wake of Britain and France. By April 1949, fifty-two countries had extended recognition.

In contrast to her improved relations with Western Europe, Israel's relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe reached a standstill, and even regressed. On the diplomatic level, and in their relations at the U.N., there was no marked change, with the Soviet Union continuing to lend effective diplomatic assistance in Israeli matters at the U.N., though carefully adhering to the formal framework of the November 1947 resolution on partition. Bilaterally, however, a clear coolness had crept in. Israel's attempts to obtain concrete military aid from the Soviet Union were unsuccessful,[18] economic ties remained circumscribed, and limitations were felt on the movements of Israel's Legation in Moscow.[19] The cooling in relations presumably followed on Israel's growing closeness to the United States, as reflected in the final approval of the loan from the Export and Import Bank, America's *de jure* recognition, and the upgrading of her relations with Israel to the ambassadorial level. The results of Israel's first elections, exposing the influence of the communist party to be

15. See No. 200.
16. See Editorial Note, pp. 163–4.
17. See Editorial Note, pp. 180–1.
18. See No. 9.
19. See No. 399.

minimal and confuting Mapam's claim to preferential status among the Labour parties, may also have contributed to the change in the Soviet position. However, as evidenced by the fact that the cooling in relations was accompanied by restrictions on Jewish cultural and national activity in the Soviet Union, and restrictions on immigration to Israel from several countries in Eastern Europe, the chief reason must have been the unexpectedly enthusiastic response of the Jews in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc to the establishment of the state.

It was in the area of Israel's relations with the Arab states that the most significant changes were registered. Israel had maintained that the termination of war, and the regulation of relations with the Arabs, should be left to direct negotiations between the parties. Direct contacts with Egypt began in September and continued more intensively in October,[20] but produced no real results. They were broken off by Operation *Yoav,* and resumed again only after the fighting ceased, and subsequent to the Security Council's resolution of November 16 calling on the parties to negotiate directly.[21] These contacts were evidently premature, and moreover complicated by the besieged Egyptian unit in the Faluja Pocket. In any case, it was only the further military losses suffered in Operation *Horev* that prompted Egypt to engage on armistice talks with Israel. These talks were conducted under the auspices of the U.N., but a large part of their success must be attributed to the cordial atmosphere that developed in the personal dealings between the two delegations.

Direct negotiations, though of a somewhat different nature, were also held with Jordan, whose shared interests with Israel made cooperation necessary. Israel wished to ensure access to Mount Scopus and the operation of the hydro-electric works at Naharayim and the potash works at Kallia, all of which entailed resolving the problems created by the war and the tortuous front lines. The Jordanians, for their parts, aspired to attain Israel's acquiescence in their hold over those parts of Palestine originally intended for the Arab State by the Partition Plan. Opinion in Israel was divided over this matter. Sharett felt that the partition framework, including the establishment of an Arab state alongside Israel, should be adhered to as closely as possible. Other members of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, led by E. Sasson, saw the advantages in Jordanian annexation of the Arab-populated areas.[22] Ultimately, Abdallah's control over parts of the "Triangle" and the Judean Hills determined the future of this territory. The armistice treaty, signed with the Jordanians on April 3, 1949, was primarily the result of direct dealings between the parties. It confirmed Jordan's sovereignty over those parts of Israel occupied by the Arab Legion and the Iraqi army, but answered only partially Israel's demands

20. See No. 8.
21. See Nos. 176, 207.
22. See, for instance, Nos. 92, 282.

for practical arrangements with the Jordanians. Most of the problems were left in abeyance pending consideration by a special commission appointed by the two governments.[23]

The armistice treaties signed with Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon put an end to the state of war with the Arab countries (with the exception of Syria, who signed a treaty with Israel only on July 20, 1949), and restored calm to a region that in effect had been at war since December 1947. Israel emerged from the war militarily stronger and territorially more consolidated. The Partition Plan borders, winding and almost indefensible, were replaced by more reasonable ones, assuring a territorial continuum between all parts of the country, including Jewish Jerusalem. Nonetheless, the armistice settlements signed with the countries which had fought against Israel were no more than temporary settlements, meant to be replaced by a permanent peace. When the Conciliation Commission commenced its work in Lausanne it was clear that the road to true peace between Israel and the Arabs would be long and arduous.

Israel's military victories during the last months of the War of Independence upset the balance between the military and political leadership. To the extent that a lesson could be gleaned from these developments, it was on the overriding importance of military victories. For, in the final analysis, Israel's possession of the Negev, the Upper Galilee, and prime sections of Wadi Ara had been achieved only through military victory or the threat of resort to force. Ben-Gurion's admonition to a senior forum of military men and Foreign Affairs personnel, urging the abandonment of further territorial expansion, consolidation of the *Status quo* and absorption of immigration,[24] stands as evidence that the state leadership was aware of the inherent dangers of exclusive reliance on military strength.

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23. See Nos. 508, 518.
24. See No. 490.

LIST OF DOCUMENTS AND MAIN SUBJECTS

ABBREVIATIONS

CZA	Central Zionist Archives
Inc.	Incoming text
Orig.	Original
Outg.	Outgoing text
Recd	Received
Tel.	Telegram

Note: References which do not include the name of the archives apply to documents in possession of the Israel State Archives.

1948

9. 6 Oct. **Y. Ratner to D. Ben-Gurion**
Coded Tel. Pi18; Recd 7 Oct.; Inc. 130.09/2325/4. (Hebrew)
U.S.S.R. arms supply and military assistance to Israel.

10. 7 Oct. **Meeting of the Israeli Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly**
Minutes. 93.03/131/18. (Hebrew)
Meeting with Ross and Wilkins of the U.S.A. delegation; meeting with Parodi and Bonneau of the French delegation: French request for resumption of the operation of the Haifa Oil Refineries; Sasson's review of the intentions and activity of the Arab delegations to the U.N.; legal clarifications by J. Robinson of the Israeli delegation.

11. 7 Oct. **L. Kohn to E. Elath**
Tel. MH1533. Outg. 130.02/2443/2.
Arguments against an international regime for Jerusalem.

12. 7 Oct. **D. B. Joseph to the Security Council Truce Commission in Jerusalem**
Copy. 130.02/2427/10.
Israel's responsibility for the safety of U.N. personnel in Jerusalem and her relations with the U.N. Truce Commission.

13. 7 Oct. **J. Herzog to M. Sharett**
Tel. 304; Recd 8 Oct.; Inc. 93.02/186/2. (Hebrew)
Israel's relations with the Vatican.

14. 7 Oct. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Tel. SUN545; Outg. 93.02/183/10.
Invitation of Israel to the UNESCO conference in Beirut.

15. 8 Oct. **A. Eban to the President of the Security Council**
Copy. 93.02/186/15.
Breaches of the truce by Arab states: water supply to Jerusalem, supply convoys to the Negev, occupation of Bir Asluj, Syrian incursion in the vicinity of Mishmar Hayarden; breaches of the truce in Jerusalem, convoys to Mount Scopus.

16. 8 Oct. **E. Elath to A. H. Silver**
Copy. 93.08/376/6.
President Truman's statement on his policy towards Israel; loan from the Export–Import Bank.

17. 8 Oct. **D. Ben-Gurion to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. U58; Outg. 130.09/2344/1; Inc. 93.02/182/3.
Negotiations with Egypt on the termination of the state of war.

18. 8 Oct. **M. Sharett to R. Shiloah**
Coded Tel. U6; Outg. 93.02/182/3.
Information on British pressure on Egypt to withdraw from Palestine; news of the military flare-up in the Negev.

19. 10 Oct. **M. Sharett to E. Elath**
Coded Tel.; Inc. 93.01/2180/30.
Meeting with Dulles of the U.S.A. delegation.

20. 10 Oct. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. U7; Sent 12 Oct.; Recd 13 Oct.; Outg. 93.02/182/7; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Meeting with Vyshinsky and Malik of the U.S.S.R. delegation.

21. 11 Oct. **Meeting of the Israeli Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly**
Minutes. 93.03/131/18. (Hebrew)
Meetings with Marshall and Dulles of the U.S.A. delegation; meeting with Vyshinsky and Malik of the U.S.S.R. delegation; meeting with Bunche.

22. 11 Oct. **M. Sharett to D. Ben-Gurion**
Coded Tel. U9; Sent 12 Oct.; Recd 13 Oct.; Outg. 93.02/182/7; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Negotiations with Egypt on the termination of the state of war.

23. 11 Oct. **Meeting: R. Bunche — D. Horowitz**
Report. 130.02/2446/2.
Background of the drafting of the Mediator's report; Israel's prospects at the U.N. General Assembly.

24. 14 Oct. **W. Eytan to M. Fischer**
Coded Tel. QP6; Outg. 130.09/2344/1.
Plan for the demilitarization of Jerusalem formulated by the Mediator's staff.

25. 14 Oct. **R. Shiloah to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. U68; Outg. 130.09/2344/1.
Advance notice of attempt by Israeli convoy to break the Negev blockade.

26. 14 Oct. **E. Elath to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. W19T; Inc. 130.09/2308/7.
President Truman and Israel; Dewey's attitude towards Israel; presidential elections in the U.S.A. and the policy of the American delegation to the U.N.

27. 14 Oct. **E. Elath to D. Ben-Gurion and E. Kaplan**
Coded Tel. W20T; Inc. 130.09/2308/7.
Resumption of the operation of the Haifa Oil Refineries.

28. 15 Oct. **Meeting of the Israeli Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly**
Minutes. 93.03/131/18. (Hebrew)
Meetings with Tsaldaris (Greece), Spaak (Belgium), Undén (Sweden), Tsarapkin (U.S.S.R.), Pandit (India), Sobolev (U.N. Secretariat); Security Council meeting of 14 October.

29. 15 Oct. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Tel. SUN577; Outg. 93.02/186/7.
Israel's relations with the Vatican.

30. 16 Oct. **W. Eytan to W. Iversen**
Copy. 130.02/2426/12.
Israel's conditions for cessation of hostilities in the Negev.

31. 17 Oct. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Tel. SUN582; Outg. 93.02/181/10.
Meeting with Bunche: attempts to achieve a cease-fire in the Negev.

32. 18 Oct. **Meeting of the Israeli Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly**
Minutes. 93.02/183/1. (Hebrew)
Meeting with Evatt (Australia); consultation on the forthcoming debate in the First Committee.

33. 18 Oct. **M. Sharett to R. Shiloah**
Coded Tel. U14; Recd 19 Oct.; Outg. 93.02/182/3; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Israel's conditions for a cease-fire in the Negev.

34. 18 Oct. **R. Shiloah to M. Sharett**
Tel. MH1632; Inc. 93.02/185/3.
Israel's reaction to Egyptian charges regarding non-compliance with truce provisions in the Negev.

35. 18 Oct. **W. Iversen to W. Eytan**
Orig. 130.02/2425/2.
Proposal for a 4 days cease-fire in the Negev.

36. 19 Oct. **A. Eban to W. Eytan**
Tel. UN242; Recd 20 Oct.; Outg. 93.02/182/4; Inc. Ben-Gurion Archives 1520.
Security Council decision on the cease-fire in the Negev.

37. 19 Oct. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. U15; Outg. 93.02/182/7.
U.S.A. proposal for a trusteeship regime in Jerusalem.

38. 20 Oct. **E. Elath to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. WP10; Inc. 93.02/181/8.
President Truman's statement on his policy towards Israel; support in U.S.A. military circles for the Bernadotte Report.

39. 20 Oct. **A. Eban to A. Lourie**
Tel. UN252; Outg. 93.02/186/4; Inc. 93.03/130/5.
Presidential elections in the U.S.A. and the attitude of the American delegation to the U.N.

40. 20 Oct. **A. Eban to E. Elath**
Tel. UN253; Outg. 93.02/186/4; Inc. 93.01/2220/8.
Bunche's pessimism regarding the outcome of the U.N. debate on Palestine.

41. 20 Oct. **A. Eban to E. Elath**
Tel. UN256; Outg. 93.02/182/4; Inc. Ben-Gurion Archives 1520.
Positions of China, India, Canada and Norway on the Bernadotte Report.

42. 20 Oct. **M. Sharett to D. Ben-Gurion**
Coded Tel. U15; Recd 21 Oct.; Outg. 93.02/182/3; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Israel's compliance with the Security Council decision on the Negev.

43. 20 Oct. **P. Mohn to W. Eytan**
Orig. 130.02/2426/12.
Date and hour of the cease-fire in the Negev.

44. 21 Oct. **W. Eytan to P. Mohn**
Copy. 130.02/2426/12.
Date and hour of the cease-fire in the Negev.

45. 21 Oct. **Meeting of the Israeli Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly**
Minutes. 93.02/183/1. (Hebrew)
Meetings with Schuman (France), Bunche and Lie (U.N.), Katz-Suchy (Poland), Lange (Norway), Malik (U.S.S.R.).

46. 21 Oct. **R. Shiloah to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. U82; Outg. 130.09/2344/1; Inc. 93.02/182/3.
Israel postpones its reply on the cease-fire in view of the collapse of the Egyptian front.

47. 21 Oct. **R. Shiloah to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. U83; Outg. 130.09/2344/1; Inc. 93.02/182/3.
Military situation in the Negev and in the Bethlehem–Hebron area.

48. 21 Oct. **E. Elath to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. W23T; Recd 22 Oct.; Inc. 130.09/2308/7.
President Truman and U.S.A. policy on Palestine; impact of Israel's military success in the Negev.

49. 22 Oct. **A. Eban to W. Eytan**
Tel. SUN603; Outg. 93.02/186/7; Inc. 130.02/2414/32.
Meeting with the American delegation to the U.N.: opinions within the delegation; Israel's admission to the U.N.; the status of Jerusalem.

50. 22 Oct. **P. Mohn to W. Eytan**
Copy. 130.02/2425/2.
Date and hour of the cease-fire in the Negev.

51. 23 Oct. **M. Sharett to E. Elath**
Coded Tel. PW4; Outg. 93.02/182/7.
Postponement of the Palestine debate in the First Committee; suggests concentrating efforts on inducing the U.S.A. to oppose the Bernadotte Report and to support Israel's admission to the U.N.

52. 23 Oct. **A. Eban to E. Elath**
Tel. SUN618; Recd 24 Oct.; Outg. 93.02/186/7; Inc. 93.01/2220/12.
Postponement of the Palestine debate in the First Committee.

53. 24 Oct. **R. Shiloah to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. U140; Outg. 130.09/2344/1; Inc. 93.02/181/8.
Ben-Gurion sums up the military campaign in the Negev.

54. 25 Oct. **A. Eban to E. Elath**
Tel. UN283; Recd 26 Oct.; Outg. 93.02/186/4; Inc. 93.01/2220/8.
Appraisal of President Truman's statement on his policy towards Israel; opinions within the American delegation to the U.N.; lines of action of the Israeli delegation to the U.N.

55. [25 Oct.] **G. Rafael to G. Meyerson**
Tel. UN291; Outg. 93.02/186/4.
Reasons behind Sharett's return to Israel.

56. 25 Oct. **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Tel. UN298; Recd 26 Oct.; Outg. 93.02/186/4; Inc. 130.02/2414/22.
Meeting with Rusk and Ross of the American delegation: signs of flexibility in the American position; meeting with Beeley of the British delegation: Britain still adheres to the Bernadotte Report, Israel's position with regard to the Conciliation Commission.

57. 25 Oct. **A. Eban to T. Lie**
Copy. 93.02/186/15.
British draft resolution in the First Committee.

58. 25 Oct. **G. Rafael to A. Lourie**
Copy. 93.02/186/8.

72. 28 Oct. **W. Eytan to the Israeli Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly in Paris**
Tel. MH1786; Inc. 93.02/185/4.
Instructions to the Israeli delegation for the Security Council meeting of 29 October.

73. 28 Oct. **E. Elath and O. Gass to E. Kaplan and M. Sharett**
Tel. 422; Outg. 93.03/87/18; Inc. Ben-Gurion Archives 1520.
Recent developments in the matter of Israel's application for a loan from the Export–Import Bank.

74. 28 Oct. **E. Sasson to Tawfiq Abu al-Huda**
Tel.; Outg. 93.02/186/4.
Passage of convoys to Mount Scopus.

75. 29 Oct. **M. Sharett to G. Marshall**
Tel. MH1795; Outg. 130.02/2414/26.
Rejection of a unilateral withdrawal in the Negev.

76. 29 Oct. **E. Elath to M. Sharett**
Tel. W29T; Recd 30 Oct.; Inc. 130.09/2308/7.
President Truman's instructions to oppose the Anglo-Chinese resolution in the Security Council.

77. 29 Oct. **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Tel. UN329; Outg. 93.02/186/4.
Israeli activity in anticipation of the Security Council meeting of 29 October.

78. 29 Oct. **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Tel. UN328; Outg. 93.02/182/4.
Security Council meeting of 29 October; draft resolution by Bunche to the Security Council Sub-Committee.

79. 29 Oct. **W. Eytan to A. Eban**
Coded Tel. U180; Outg. 130.09/2344/1; Inc. 93.02/182/3.
Israel's response to King Abdallah's communication regarding negotiations.

80. 29 Oct. **A. Lourie to A. Eban**
Copy. 93.03/69/16.
Meeting of Canadian Zionists with Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs.

81. 30 Oct. **W. Eytan to A. Eban**
Coded Tel. U190; Outg. 130.09/2344/1; Inc. 93.02/182/3.
Egyptian contingent under siege in the Faluja pocket.

82. 30 Oct. **E. Elath and O. Gass to M. Sharett and E. Kaplan**
Coded Tel. W30T; Recd 31 Oct.; Inc. 130.09/2308/7.
Loan from the Export–Import Bank.

83. 31 Oct. **A. Eban to A. Lourie**
Tel. UN340; Outg. 93.02/182/4.
Draft resolution by Bunche in the Security Council Sub-Committee.

84. 1 Nov. **A. Eban and G. Rafael to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. U22; Recd 2 Nov.; Outg. 93.02/182/3; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Absence of adverse reaction in the U.N. to Operation *Hiram;* recommends military activity in future only in face of blatant provocation.

85. 1 Nov. **A. Eban to W. Eytan**
Tel. UN344; Outg. 93.02/182/1.
Importance of direct contacts between Israel and Jordan.

86. 1 Nov. **I. Barzilai to M. Sharett**
Orig. 130.02/2381/12. (Hebrew)
Israel's relations with Poland; immigration from Poland.

87. 2 Nov. **A. Eban to R. Bunche**
Copy. 93.02/186/15.
Deliberations of the Security Council Sub-Committee.

88. 2 Nov. **A. Eban to E. Elath**
Tel. UN354; Outg. 93.02/186/5; Inc. 93.08/377/8.
American position in the Security Council Sub-Committee.

89. 2 Nov. **M. Sharett to A. Eban**
Coded Tel. U24; Recd 3 Nov.; Outg. 93.02/182/7; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Morgenthau's declaration on "Israel as barrier against communism".

90. 2 Nov. **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. U24; Recd 3 Nov.; Outg. 93.02/182/7; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Morgenthau's statement on "Israel as barrier against Communism".

91. 2 Nov. **E. Sasson to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. 021, 022, 023; Recd 3 Nov.; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Direct negotiations with Egypt; Egyptian conditions for armistice.

92. 2 Nov. **Y. Shimoni to E. Sasson**
Orig. 130.15/2570/11. (Hebrew)
Israel's policy on the Arabs parts of Palestine.

93. 3 Nov. **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Tel. UN369; Outg. 93.02/182/4.
Meeting with McNeil of the British delegation: Britain's demand for Israel's withdrawal in the Negev.

94. 3 Nov. **E. Elath to A. Eban**
Tel. 2; Outg. 93.08/377/8; Inc. 93.02/185/4.
Meeting with Lovett, U.S. Under-Secretary of State: request for American opposition in the Security Council Sub-Committee to the Anglo-Chinese draft resolution.

95. 3 Nov. **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Tel. UN370; Recd 4 Nov.; Outg. 93.02/186/5; Inc. 130.02/2414/2.
Discussions with the American delegation on resolution emerging in the Security Council Sub-Committee.

96. 4 Nov. **R. Bunche to A. Eban**
Orig. 93.03/71/25.
Deliberations of the Security Council Sub-Committee.

97. 4 Nov. **M. Comay to R. G. Riddell**
Copy. 93.02/186/10.
Criticism of the Anglo-Chinese draft resolution in the Security Council.

98. 4 Nov. **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Tel. SUN627; Outg. 93.02/186/7.
Israel's reaction to Security Council resolution of 4 November.

99. 4 Nov. **E. Elath to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. W7; Recd 5 Nov.; Inc. 130.09/2308/7.
Activity in the U.S.A. to change the American delegation's stand in the Security Council.

100. 4 Nov. **A. Eban to G. Marshall**
Copy. 93.02/186/10.
Direct contacts between Israel and Egypt; Israel's objections to unilateral withdrawal in the Negev.

101. 4 Nov. **M. Sharett to A. Eban**
Coded Tel. U260; Outg. 130.09/2344/1; Inc. 93.02/182/3.
Instructions for further contacts with the Egyptians.

102. 5 Nov. **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Tel. SUN631; Outg. 93.02/182/1.
Suggested reply to the Security Council resolution.

103. 5 Nov. **J. Robinson to M. Sharett**
Tel. UN383; Outg. 93.02/186/5; Inc. 130.02/2425/2.
Legal comments on the Security Council resolution.

104. 5 Nov. **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Tel. UN386; Outg. 93.02/186/5; Inc. 130.02/2425/2.
Background of Security Council resolution; conversation with Bunche on the implementation of the resolution.

105. 5 Nov. **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. U27; Sent and Recd 6 Nov.; Outg. 93.02/182/7; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Riley's report on Egyptian military collapse.

106. 5 Nov. **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. U26; Recd 6 Nov.; Outg. 93.02/182/7; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Bunche's proposal to substitute police units for I.D.F. contingents in the Negev.

107. 5 Nov. **M. Sharett to G. Meyerson**
Coded Tel. IP26–28, 31–33; Outg. 130.09/2325/3. (Hebrew)
General survey of the situation in the U.N.

108. 5 Nov. **Ch. Weizmann to President Truman**
Copy. 130.02/2391/70.
Greetings on Truman's reelection; urges Truman to oppose severance of the Negev from Israel.

109. 5 Nov. **E. Elath to A. Eban**
Coded Tel. WP20; Inc. 93.02/181/8.
President Truman misled on the American position in the Security Council; lack of effective communication between American Jewry and President Truman.

110. 5 Nov. **M. Sharett to A. Eban**
Coded Tel. U280; Outg. 130.09/2344/1; Inc. 93.02/182/3.
Instructions for further negotiations with the Egyptians.

111. 5 Nov. **W. Eytan to P. Mohn**
Copy 130.02/2425/2.
Cease-fire observance in the Negev by Israel.

112. 6 Nov. **E. Elath to A. Eban**
Coded Tel. WP22; Inc. 93.02/181/8.
Meeting with Satterthwaite of the Department of State on the Security Council resolution and on contacts with the Egyptians.

113. 7 Nov. **A. Eban to E. Elath**
Coded Tel. PW7; Outg. 93.02/182/7.
Meeting with Elinor Roosevelt of the American delegation: differences of opinion within the American delegation touching the Security Council resolution of 4 November.

114. 7 Nov. **W. Eytan to A. Eban**
Coded Tel. U290; Outg. 130.09/2344/1.
Lebanese villages surrender to the I.D.F.

115. 8 Nov. **A. Eban to A. Parodi**
Copy. 93.02/186/10.
Comments on Bunche's draft resolution to replace the truce by an armistice.

116. 9 Nov. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Tel. SUN640; Outg. 93.02/181/10.
Supply convoys to the Faluja pocket.

117. 9 Nov. **E. Elath to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. WP23; Inc. 93.02/181/8.
President Truman's attitude to Israel.

118. 9 Nov. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. U30; Sent and Recd 10 Nov.; Outg. 93.02/182/3; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Message from King Abdallah.

119. 9 Nov. **G. Meyerson to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. PI39; Recd 10 Nov.; Inc. 130.09/2325. (Hebrew)
Participation of Israeli diplomats in Moscow in Revolution Day events.

120. 10 Nov. **R. Shiloah to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. U33; Recd 11 Nov.; Outg. 93.02/182/3; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Proposal for an Israeli partial withdrawal in the Negev to avoid a direct clash with the U.N.

121. 10 Nov. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. U34; Recd 11 Nov.; Outg. 93.02/182/4; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Meeting with Parodi of the French delegation: urges a "token withdrawal" on the part of Israel in the Negev.

122. 10 Nov. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. U35; Recd 11 Nov.; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Continuation of military activity around the Faluja pocket compromises Israel's position in the U.N.

123. 10 Nov. **A. Eban to P. Jessup**
Copy. 130.02/2414/22.
Israeli draft resolution to replace the truce with an armistice.

124. 10 Nov. **A. Eban to E. Elath**
Tel. UN424; Recd 11 Nov.; Outg. 93.02/182/4; Inc. (New York) 93.03/86/15.
Meeting with Jessup of the American delegation: transition from truce to armistice.

125. 10 Nov. **M. Sharett to E. Elath**
Tel. SUN643; Outg. 93.02/186/7; Inc. 93.08/377/3.
Instructions for meeting with Lovett: Israel's objections to the establishment of demilitarized zones in the Negev; inacceptability of the Security Council resolution of 4 November.

126. 10 Nov. **E. Sasson to Y. Shimoni**
Copy. 93.03/64/14. (Hebrew)
Contacts with King Abdallah's emissary.

127. 10 Nov. **E. Avriel to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel.; Inc. 93.02/186/1. (Hebrew)
Egyptian and Iraqi protests against Czechoslovak arms supply to Israel.

128. 10 Nov. **M. Agami to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. 24.; Inc. 130.09/2296/8. (Hebrew)
Immigration from Rumania.

129. 11 Nov. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. U36; Recd 12 Nov.; Outg. 93.02/182/3; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Disapproval of Israel's incursion into Lebanon.

130. 11 Nov. **Meeting: E. Elath and M. Comay — R. Lovett**
Note for the record. 93.08/377/19.
Implementation of Security Council resolution of 4 November; maintenance of the truce; direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab states.

131. 11 Nov. **E. Avriel to G. Meyerson**
Copy. 130.11/2503/8. (Hebrew)
Immigration from Eastern Europe; relations of Israel with Eastern European countries.

132. [11 Nov.] **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. U38; Sent 12 Nov.; Recd 13 Nov.; Outg. 93.02/182/3; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Proposes direct approach to the U.S.S.R. in the matter of immigration and the situation of the Jews in Eastern Europe.

133. 12 Nov. **A. Eban to E. Elath**
Coded Tel. PW9; Outg. 93.02/182/7.
Meeting with Ross of the American delegation: American draft resolution in the Security Council; American position in the First Committee.

134. 12 Nov. **A. Eban to A. Lourie**
Tel. UN437; Outg. 93.02/186/5; Inc. 93.03/86/15.
Requests not to implement the Security Council 4 November resolution prior to the passage of an armistice resolution.

135. [14 Nov.] **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. U40; Recd 15 Nov.; Outg. 93.02/182/3; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Objection to extending area under Israel's occupation in south Lebanon.

136. 14 Nov. **Meeting of the Israeli Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly**
Minutes. 93.02/183/1. (Hebrew)
Meeting with Secretary of State Marshall; discussion of Israel's response to Security Council resolution of 4 November.

137. 14 Nov. **P. Mohn to W. Eytan**
Orig. 130.02/2425/3.
Provisional demarcation lines in the Negev for Israeli and Egyptian withdrawal.

138. 14 Nov. **W. Eytan to E. Elath**
Tel. MH2000; Inc. (Paris) 93.02/186/1.
Instructions to enlist public opinion in the U.S.A. in view of Security Council's withdrawal order.

139. 15 Nov. **A. Lourie to A. Eban**
Orig. 93.02/186/8.
Activity in the U.S.A. to change the attitude of the American delegation to the U.N.

140. 15 Nov. **A. Eban to W. Eytan**
Tel. UN452; Outg. 93.02/185/5.
Meeting with Jessup of the American delegation: American position in the Security Council's deliberations.

141. 15 Nov. **A. Eban to E. Elath**
Tel. UN455; Outg. 93.02/186/5; Inc. 93.08/377/8.
Canadian draft resolution in the Security Council.

142. 15 Nov. **Note by M. Comay**
Note. 93.03/126/3.
Report on meetings in the U.S.A.

143. 15 Nov. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. U550; Sent and Recd 16 Nov.; Outg. 93.02/182/3; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Proposes a temperate reply and token withdrawal following Security Council resolution.

144. 15 Nov. **A. Uchmani to S. Friedman**
Coded Tel. 14; Recd 16 Nov.; Inc. 130.09/2306/4. (Hebrew)
Immigration from Poland; closing down of the Palestine Office in Poland.

145. 15 Nov. **E. Avriel to V. Clementis**
Copy. 130.02/2457/22.
Immigration from Czechoslovakia.

146. 15 Nov. **M. Agami to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs**
Coded Tel. 27; Recd 16 Nov.; Inc. (Paris) 93.02/186/1. (Hebrew)
Immigration from Rumania.

147. 16 Nov. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Tel. SUN666; Outg.93.02/182/1.
Evaluation of Security Council resolution of 16 November.

148. 16 Nov. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. U560; Sent and Recd 17 Nov.; Outg. 93.02/182/7; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Guiding lines for Israel's reply to Security Council's withdrawal order.

149. 17 Nov. **R. Bunche to M. Sharett**
Copy. 130.02/2424/22.
Conveys Security Council's resolution of 16 November; urges the commencement of negotiations towards an armistice.

150. 17 Nov. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. U580; Recd 18 Nov.; Outg. 93.02/182/3; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Urges effectuation of Israeli sovereignty in the southern Negev; guiding lines for Israel's reply to Security Council's withdrawal order.

151. 17 Nov. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Tel. UN477; Outg. 93.02/182/1.
Informal conversation with Bunche and Reedman on the First Committee's deliberations; Bunche's evaluation of the Security Council resolution of 16 November.

152. 17 Nov. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. U590; Sent and Recd 18 Nov.; Outg. 93.02/182/7; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Future of the Arab part of Palestine.

153. 17 Nov. **Meeting of the Israeli Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly**
Minutes. 93.03/131/3. (Hebrew)
Discussion of Security Council resolution of 16 November; report on the deliberations of the First Committee.

154. 17 Nov. **E. Avriel to S. Friedman**
Copy. 130.02/2457/19. (Hebrew)
Immigration from Rumania and Hungary; establishment of diplomatic relations with Hungary.

155. 18 Nov. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. U600; Recd 19 Nov.; Outg. 93.02/182/7; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Israel's reply to the Security Council's withdrawal order.

156. 18 Nov. **A. Eban to W. Eytan**
Tel.; Outg. 93.02/182/1.
Urges a temperate reaction to the Security Council's resolution.

157. 18 Nov. **A. Eban to E. Elath**
Tel. UN480; Outg. 93.02/186/5.
American delegation's position in First Committee's deliberations.

158. 18 Nov. **M. Sharett to E. Elath**
Coded Tel. PW10; Outg. 93.02/182/7.
Israel's attitude towards the Security Council resolution of 4 November; Israel's admission to the U.N.

159. 18 Nov. **W. Eytan to E. Sasson**
Coded Tel. QP23; Recd 19 Nov.; Outg. 130.09/2344/1; Inc. 93.02/182/3.
British policy in the Palestine conflict.

160. 18 Nov. **W. Eytan to P. Mohn**
Copy. 93.03/130/4.
Israel's reply to the Security Council resolutions.

161. 19 Nov. **M. Comay to J. Ross**
Copy. 93.02/186/10.
Guiding lines suggested by Israel to a draft resolution in the First Committee.

162. 19 Nov. **A. Eban to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. U640; Sent and Recd 20 Nov.; Outg. 93.02/182/7; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Meeting with Ross of the American delegation: approval of Israel's reply to the Security Council resolution; U.S.A. position in the First Committee.

163. 19 Nov. **M. Sharett to E. Elath**
Coded Tel. PW11; Outg. 93.02/182/7.
Summarizes Israel's position in the U.N. in anticipation of a meeting between President Truman and Secretary of State Marshall.

164. 19 Nov. **M. Sharett to E. Elath**
Coded Tel. PW13; Outg. 93.02/182/7.
Meeting with Marshall: Israel between East and West; Marshall's criticism of Zionist lobby activities in the U.S.A.

165. 19 Nov. **Meeting of the Israeli Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly**
Minutes. 93.03/131/3. (Hebrew)
Meeting with Fraser, Prime Minister of New Zealand; meeting with Pearson, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs; meeting with Ross of the American delegation; discussion of an Israeli draft resolution for the First Committee.

166. 19 Nov. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. U630; Recd 20 Nov.; Outg. 93.02/182/7; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Reports on various meetings in the U.N.; instructions on contacts with Jordan.

167. 20 Nov. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Tel. SUN679; Outg. 93.02/186/7; Inc. 130.02/2414/22.
Positive and negative elements in the U.S.A. statement in the First Committee.

168. 20 Nov. **R. Shiloah to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. U470; Outg. 130.09/2344/1; Inc. 93.02/182/3.
Ben-Gurion's position on the boundaries with Jordan.

169. 20 Nov. **R. Shiloah to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. U460; Outg. 130.09/2344/1.
Meeting with Riley: supervision and withdrawal arrangements in the Negev; the Faluja pocket.

170. 20 Nov. **R. Shiloah to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. U480; Outg. 130.09/2344/1; Inc. 93.02/182/3.
Action against the Faluja pocket.

171. 21 Nov. **S. Friedman to M. Sharett and G. Meyerson**
Orig. 130.11/2514/1. (Hebrew)
Meeting with the Soviet Minister in Israel.

172. 22 Nov. **Secretary of the Government of Jordan to E. Sasson**
Tel.; Inc. (copy) 93.03/64/14.
Practical arrangements between Israel and Jordan.

173. 22 Nov. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Tel. SUN688; Outg. 93.02/186/7; Inc. 130.02/2414/22.
Meeting with Jessup of the American delegation: American amendments to the British draft resolution in the First Committee; Israel's admission to the U.N.

174. 23 Nov. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Tel. SUN701; Outg. 93.02/181/10; Inc. Ben-Gurion Archives 1509.
Meeting with Bunche: food supply to the Faluja pocket; withdrawal in the Negev.

175. 23 Nov. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. U710; Recd 24 Nov.; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Food supply to the Faluja pocket.

176. 23 Nov. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. U700; Recd 24 Nov.; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Approach from an Arab state to negotiate on peace with Israel.

177. 24 Nov. **M. Comay to J. Ross**
Copy. 93.02/186/10.
Comments on U.S.A. amendments to the British draft resolution in the First Committee.

178. 24 Nov. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. PW17; Inc. 130.02/2424/22.
Meeting with Jessup of the American delegation: Israel's admission to the U.N.

179. 24 Nov. **R. Shiloah to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. U520; Outg. 130.09/2344/1; Inc. 93.02/182/3.
Meeting with Riley: supervision and withdrawal arrangements in the Negev.

180. 24 Nov. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. U530; Outg. 130.09/2344/1; Inc. 93.02/182/3.
Supplies to the Faluja pocket.

181. 24 Nov. **S. Friedman to M. Sharett**
Copy. 130.11/2513/11. (Hebrew)
Situation of the Jews in Eastern Europe.

182. 24 Nov. **M. Sharett to S. Friedman**
Tel. SUN709; Outg. 93.02/181/10. (Hebrew)
Immigration from Poland.

183. 25 Nov. **E. Elath to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. W16; Recd 25 Nov.; Inc. 130.09/2308/7.

British pressure on the American delegation to the U.N.; relations between the President and the Department of State touching the Palestine problem.

184. 25 Nov. **M. Sharett to E. Elath**
Coded Tel. PW19; Outg. 93.02/182/7.
Israel's admission to the U.N.

185. 25 Nov. **Memorandum by M. Fischer**
93.02/186/10.
Meetings with Parodi and René Mayer (France): Israel's admission to the U.N.

186. 25 Nov. **Meeting of the Israeli Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly**
Minutes. 93.03/131/3. (Hebrew)
Meeting with Dulles of the American delegation: U.S.A. position in the First Committee; meetings with representatives of the U.S.S.R., Luxembourg and Canada.

187. 25 Nov. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett**
Tel. MH2125; Outg. Ben-Gurion Archives 3212; Inc. 93.02/185/6. (Hebrew)
Supplies to the Faluja pocket.

188. 25 Nov. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. U750; Sent and Recd 26 Nov.; Outg. 93.02/182/3. Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Supplies to the Faluja pocket.

189. 25 Nov. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Tel. SUN723; Outg. 93.02/181/10.
Release of the Cyprus detainees.

190. 26 Nov. **M. Sharett to R. Shiloah**
Tel. SUN724; Inc. Ben-Gurion Archives 1509. (Hebrew)
Supplies to the Faluja pocket.

191. 26 Nov. **M. Sharett to M. Namir**
Tel. SUN729; Outg. 93.02/186/7. (Hebrew)
Summing-up of the situation in the First Committee.

192. 26 Nov. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Tel. SUN728; Outg. 93.02/181/10.
Meeting with Jessup of the American delegation: truce arrangements in the Negev; the Faluja pocket.

193. 26 Nov. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Tel. SUN733; Outg. 93.02/181/10.
Meeting of the Security Council Sub-Committee to discuss the Faluja pocket problem.

194. 26 Nov. **R. Shiloah to M. Sharett**
Tel. MH2132; Outg. Ben-Gurion Archives 1532. (Hebrew)
Supplies to the Faluja pocket.

195. 26 Nov. **R. Shiloah to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. F4; Inc. 93.02/182/3.
Explains Israel's position on the Faluja pocket.

196. 27 Nov. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Tel. SUN736; Outg. 93.02/186/7; Inc. Ben-Gurion Archives 1532. (Hebrew)
Meeting of the Security Council Sub-Committee to discuss the Faluja pocket problem.

197. 27 Nov. **E. Elath to M. Sharett**
Tel. N38; Outg. 93.03/86/15; Inc. 93.02/185/7.
American position in the First Committee's deliberations.

198. 28 Nov. **M. Sharett to E. Elath**
Coded Tel.; Outg. 93.02/182/7.
Israel's admission to the U.N.

199. 28 Nov. **M. Fischer to R. Mayer**
Copy. 93.02/183/2.
Israel's admission to the U.N.

200. 28 Nov. **Meeting of the Israeli Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly**
Minutes. 93.03/131/3. (Hebrew)
Israel's admission to the U.N.

201. 28 Nov. **E. Sasson to Y. Shimoni**
Copy. 130.15/3749/1. (Hebrew)
Israel's policy towards the Arab states.

202. 29 Nov. **A. Eban to W. Eytan**
Tel. UN1064; Outg. 93.02/182/2.
Meeting with Reedman of the U.N. Secretariat: truce supervision arrangements in the Negev and the Faluja pocket issue.

203. 29 Nov. **A. Eban to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. F8; Recd 30 Nov.; Outg. 93.02/182/7; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
U.S.S.R. position in the First Committee.

204. 29 Nov. **M. Sharett to T. Lie**
Copy. 93.02/186/15.
Israel's application to be admitted to the U.N.

205. 29 Nov. **D. Ben-Gurion to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. F6; Outg. 130.09/2344/1; Inc. 93.02/181/8.
Transfer of Government offices to Jerusalem.

206. 29 Nov. **President Truman to Ch. Weizmann**
Copy. 130.02/2391/70.
Truman's adherence to the Democratic party plank on Israel; loan from the Export–Import Bank; U.S.A. recognition *de jure* of Israel.

207. 30 Nov. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. U770; Sent and Recd 1 Dec.; Outg. 92.02/182/3; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Egypt's and Jordan's proposals to terminate the war.

208. 30 Nov. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. U780; Sent and Recd 1 Dec.; Outg. 93.02/182/3; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Meeting with Jessup of the American delegation: Israel's admission to the U.N.

209. 30 Nov. **R. Shiloah to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. F11; Outg. 130.09/2344/1; Inc. 93.02/181/8.
Dayan's meeting with Abdallah al-Tall: cease-fire in Jerusalem and practical arrangements between Israel and Jordan.

210. 30 Nov. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. U760; Sent and Recd 1 Dec.; Outg. 93.02/182/3; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Sasson's meeting with the Lebanese Prime Minister.

211. 1 Dec. **M. Sharett to E. Elath**
Coded Tel. PW24; Outg. 93.02/182/7.
U.S. position in the First Committee.

212. 1 Dec. **E. Elath to the Israeli Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly**
Coded Tel. WP33; Inc. 93.02/181/8.
Israel's admission to the U.N.

213. 1 Dec. **E. Elath to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. WP36; Inc. 93.02/181/8.
Meeting with the French Ambassador to Washington: Israel's admission to the U.N.

214. 1 Dec. **Meeting of the Israeli Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly**
Minutes. 93.03/131/3. (Hebrew)
Meeting with Dulles of the American delegation: developments in the First Committee's deliberations; Israel's admission to the U.N.

215. 2 Dec. **R. Shiloah to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. F12; Outg. 130.09/2344/1; Inc. 93.02/182/3.
Ben-Gurion's instructions on negotiations with Egypt and Jordan.

216. 2 Dec. **M. Namir to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. PI46; Recd 3 Dec.; Inc. 130.09/2325/4.
Meeting with I. Ehrenburg.

217. 3 Dec. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Tel. SUN764; Outg. 93.02/186/7; Inc. 130.02/2414/22.
Meeting with Dulles of the American delegation: U.S.A. position in the First Committee.

218. 3 Dec. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Tel. SUN766; Outg. 93.02/186/7; Inc. 130.02/2424/23.
Voting in the First Committee on the draft resolution to conclude the debate on the Mediator's report; Israel's admission to the U.N.

219. 3 Dec. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. U820; Recd 4 Dec.; Outg. 93.02/182/7; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Briefing of U.S.A. representatives in the Conciliation Commission on Israel's boundaries.

220. 3 Dec. **G. Hirsch and W. Eytan to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. F14; Outg. 130.09/2344/1; Inc. 93.02/181/8.
Meeting with the French Consul: safety of Holy Places and evacuation of French institutions.

221. 3 Dec. **E. Elath to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. WP40; Inc. 93.02/181/8.
Meeting with Congressman Celler: Israel's admission to the U.N.

234. 6 Dec. **W. Eytan to R. Bunche**
Copy. Ben-Gurion Archives 1532.
Supplies to the Faluja pocket; evacuation of the besieged Egyptian contingent.

235. 6 Dec. **G. Rafael to M. Sharett**
Memorandum. 130.02/2413/8. (Hebrew)
Vatican's position on Jerusalem; French attitude towards Israel and suggested political activity in France.

236. 6 Dec. **M. Sharett to S. Friedman**
Copy. 130.02/2397/21. (Hebrew)
Crisis in the immigration from Rumania.

237. 7 Dec. **E. Elath to the Israeli Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly**
Coded Tel. NP24; Inc. 93.02/181/8.
Israel's admission to the U.N.

238. 7 Dec. **D. Ben-Gurion to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. F22; Outg. 130.09/2344/1; Inc. 93.02/181/8.
Israel's admission to the U.N.; First Committee's resolution; composition of Conciliation Commission.

239. 7 Dec. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. U890; Recd 8 Dec.; Outg. 93.02/182/7; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Supplies to the Faluja pocket.

240. 9 Dec. **A. Eban to W. Eytan**
Tel. UN1133; Outg. 93.02/182/2.
Meeting of the Security Council Sub-Committee. The Faluja pocket issue.

241. 9 Dec. **P. Mohn to D. Ben-Gurion**
Copy. 93.03/130/4.
Observance of Security Council resolutions of 4 and 16 November; evacuation of the Egyptian contingent from Faluja.

242. 9 Dec. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Tel. UN1132; Outg. 93.02/182/2.
Observance of Security Council resolutions of 4 and 16 November; evacuation of the Egyptians from Faluja.

243. 9 Dec., **A. Eban to W. Eytan**
Tel. UN1135; Outg. 93.02/182/2.
Evacuation of the Egyptians from Faluja.

244. 9 Dec. **W. Eytan to P. Mohn**
Copy. 93.03/103/4.
Israel's readiness to negotiate an armistice with Egypt.

245. 9 Dec. **E. Elath to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. NP25; Inc. 93.02/181/8.
Anti-Israeli attitude of the American National Security Council; expected personnel changes in the American administration.

246. 9 Dec. **Note: Meeting between J. Herzog and R. Neuville**
130.04/1835/14. (Hebrew)
French demand to secure the privileges of their institutions in Israel.

247. 10 Dec. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Tel. SUN912; Outg. 93.02/186/7; Inc. 130.02/2403/25.
General Assembly's resolution at the conclusion of the Palestine debate; composition of the Conciliation Commission.

248. 10 Dec. **M. Sharett to I. J. Linton**
Copy. 130.02/2398/10.
Regulations on immigration from the British occupation zone in Germany.

249. 12 Dec. **Meeting: M. Sharett — A. Vishinsky**
Report 130.11/2502/8. (Hebrew)
Immigration from Eastern European countries.

250. 13 Dec. **A. Eban to E. Elath**
Tel. UN1168; Outg. 93.02/186/6; Inc. 93.08/377/8.
Israel's admission to the U.N. — the French position.

251. 13 Dec. **M. Sharett to E. Elath**
Coded Tel. PW30; Outg. 93.02/182/7.
Composition of the Conciliation Commission.

252. 13 Dec. **E. Elath to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. WP44; Inc. 93.02/181/8.
Dulles's report on the activities and attitudes of the U.S.A. delegation to the U.N.

253. 13 Dec. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. U920; Recd 14 Dec.; Outg. 93.02/182/7; Inc; 130.09/2344/4.
Establishment of diplomatic relations with Britain.

254. 14 Dec. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett**
Tel.; Outg. 130.02/2403/25.
Weizmann's approach of the French Foreign Minister concerning Israel's admission to the U.N.

255. 14 Dec. **Meeting: M. Comay — H. Evatt**
Report. 130.02/2391/35.
Activities and attitudes of various delegations in the U.N.; recognition by Australia.

256. 14 Dec. **R. Shiloah to A. Eban**
Coded Tel. F31; Outg. 130.09/2344/1; Inc. 93.02/181/8.
Evacuation of the Faluja pocket; armistice negotiations with Jordan; evacuation of villages in south Lebanon.

257. 15 Dec. **A. Eban to E. Elath**
Tel. UN1180; Outg. 93.02/186/6; Inc. 93.08/377/8.
Israel's admission to the U.N. — the French position.

258. 15 Dec. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Tel. SUN936; Outg. 93.02/181/10.
Establishment of diplomatic relations with Britain.

259. 16 Dec. **M. Sharett to N. Goldmann**
Tel. SUN941; Outg. 93.02/181/10.
Establishment of diplomatic relations with Britain.

260. 16 Dec. **M. Sharett to E. Elath**
Coded Tel. PW33; Outg. 93.02/182/7.
French Foreign Minister's speech in the U.N. General Assembly; Israel's admission to the U.N. — the French position.

261. 16 Dec. **G. Hirsch to M. Fischer**
Coded Tel. 58/116; Outg. 130.09/2344/1.
Evacuation of French institutions in Israel; Israel's policy with regard to the Holy Places; the status of Jerusalem.

262. 16 Dec. **D. Ben-Gurion to Ch. Weizmann**
Copy. Ben-Gurion Archives 3212. (Hebrew)
Israel's admission to the U.N.; the Holy Places; the status of Jerusalem.

263. 16 Dec. **M. Namir to G. Meyerson and S. Friedmann**
Coded Tel. Pi58; Recd 18 Dec.; Inc. 130.09/2325/4. (Hebrew)
Attack on Israel in Soviet newspaper.

264. 17 Dec. **Meetings: I. J. Linton — B. Burrows of the Foreign Office and L. Jones of the American Embassy in London**
Report. 93.04/37/12.
Establishment of diplomatic relations with Britain; the Cyprus detainees; Jewish D.P.s in the British occupation zone in Germany; Israel's relations with the U.S.A.

265. 17 Dec. **M. Sharett to R. Rubin**
Copy. 130.02/2381/16. (Hebrew)
Relations between the Israeli Minister in Rumania and the Zionist Organization there.

266. 19 Dec. **E. Sasson to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. F40/116; Outg. 130.09/2344/1; Inc. 93.02/181/8.
Ben-Gurion's view on the future of the Arab parts of Palestine; contacts with Arab states.

267. 19 Dec. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. 41/74; Recd 20 Dec.; Outg. 93.02/182/7; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Establishment of diplomatic relations with Britain.

268. 19 Dec. **M. Fischer to G. Hirsch**
Orig. 130.10/2516/9.
French vote on Israel's admission to the U.N.; France's recognition of Israel; the French representative on the Conciliation Commission.

269. 20 Dec. **A. Eban to T. Lie**
Copy. 93.02/186/15.
Israel's admission to the U.N.

270. 20 Dec. **O. Gass to E. Kaplan**
Coded Tel. W41; Recd 21 Dec.; Inc. 130.09/2308/7.
Loan from the Export–Import Bank.

271. 21 Dec. **E. Elath to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. W45; Recd 22 Dec.; Outg. 93.01/2180/32; Inc. 130.09/2308/7.
Meeting with Lovett: *de jure* recognition by the U.S.A.; American

support for Israel in the Conciliation Commission; French and Canadian positions on Israel's admission to the U.N.

272. 22 Dec. **W. Eytan to W. Riley**
Copy. 93.03/130/4.
Deterioration in Israeli–Egyptian relations.

273. 24 Dec. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. U5; Recd 25 Dec.; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
Meeting of the Security Council on the hostilities in the Negev.

274. 24 Dec. **W. Eytan to M. Fischer**
Coded Tel. 64; Outg. 130.09/2344/1.
Instructions for the Security Council meeting on the hostilities in the Negev.

275. 26 Dec. **A. Lourie to A. Eban and M. Comay**
Tel. 1075; Outg. 93.03/86/15.
Recognition by Canada; Canadian position on Israel's admission to the U.N.

276. 27 Dec. **Meeting: D. Ben-Gurion — P. Yershov**
Report. 130.02/2410/20. (Hebrew)
Military situation in the Negev; immigration from Eastern Europe; international affairs.

277. 28 Dec. **M. Fischer to E. Elath**
Tel. UN1268; Inc. 93.08/377/8.
Debate in Security Council on the situation in the Negev.

278. 29 Dec. **R. Shiloah to T. Arazi**
Tel. MH2460; Inc. 93.02/182/2.
Meeting with the Lebanese Chief of Staff: evacuation of Lebanese villages; armistice talks with Lebanon.

279. 29 Dec. **E. Sasson to T. Arazi**
Coded Tel. 065; Outg. 130.09/2344/1.
Evacuation of Lebanese villages: armistice talks with Lebanon.

280. 30 Dec. **U. Heyd to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. W53; Recd 31 Dec.; Inc. 130.09/2308/7.
U.S.A. President's concern over the situation in the Negev.

281. 30 Dec. **M. Fischer to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. 46; Recd 31 Dec.; Inc. 130.09/2344/4.
France's recognition of Israel.

282. 30 Dec. **Political Consultation**
Minutes. I.M. D.E.A. 230/72/896. (Hebrew)
Israel's position in the Middle East; Israel and the future of the Arab parts of Palestine; working arrangements with Jordan.

283. 31 Dec. **J. G. McDonald to M. Sharett**
Copy. 93.04/36/12.
American demand for the evacuation of Egyptian territory.

284. 31 Dec. **S. Friedman to M. Namir**
Orig. 130.11/2514/1. (Hebrew)
Meeting with the Soviet Minister in Israel: the hostilities in the Negev; contacts with Arab states.

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285. 1 Jan. **I. J. Linton to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. 100; Recd 2 Jan.; Inc. 130.09/2318/5.
American–British contacts on the hostilities in the Negev.

286. 3 Jan. **M. Sharett to J. G. McDonald**
Copy. 130.02/2414/26.
Withdrawal of the I.D.F. from Egypt; Israel's protest over Britain's threats; Israel's demand for the evacuation of the Egyptian army from Palestine; armistice talks with Jordan.

287. 3 Jan. **Ch. Weizmann to President Truman**
Copy. 93.08/377/16.
Withdrawal of the I.D.F. from Egypt; Egyptian refusal to commence armistice talks with Israel.

288. 3 Jan. **D. Ginsburg to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. W57; Recd 4 Jan.; Inc. 130.09/2308/8.
Repercussions in the U.S.A. over the Negev events.

289. 3 Jan. **E. Elath and E. Ben-Arzi to D. Ben-Gurion and M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. W59; Recd 4 Jan.; Inc. 130.09/2308/8.
Information on British military moves against Israel.

290. 4 Jan. **J. G. McDonald to M. Sharett**
Note. 130.02/2414/26.
Explanation of U.S.A. steps during the Negev crisis.

291. 4 Jan. **M. Fischer to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. 47; Recd 5 Jan.; Inc. 130.09/2344/5.
France's recognition of Israel; evacuation of Lebanese villages by the I.D.F.

292. 4 Jan. **Meeting: I. J. Linton — H. McNeil**
Report. 93.04/37/12.
Establishment of diplomatic relations with Britain; Britain's recognition of Israel; events in the Negev.

293. 5 Jan. **E. Elath to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel.W63; Recd 6 Jan.; Inc. 130.09/2308/8.
Influence of the situation in the Negev on Israel's relations with the U.S.A.

294. 6 Jan. **W. Eytan to A. Lourie**
Tel. MH2550; Outg. 130.09/2328/6; Inc. 93.03/74/6.
Instructions for the Security Council meeting on the situation in the Negev.

295. 6 Jan. **A. Lourie to M. Sharett**
Tel. 1097; Outg. 93.03/79/7; Inc. 130.09/2328/5.
Meeting with Bunche: Israel's agreement to cease fire and negotiate; suggestions for the forthcoming meeting of the Security Council Sub-Committee.

296. 6 Jan. **E. Elath to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. W65; W66; Recd 7 Jan.; Outg. 93.01/2180/32; Inc. 130.09/2308/8.
Criticism of Israel in public opinion and in official circles in the U.S.A.

297. 7 Jan. **M. Sharett to I. J. Linton**
Coded Tel. 67; Outg. 130.09/2318/2.
Reasons behind Egyptian readiness to negotiate on armistice; Israel's position in the negotiations with Egypt.

298. 8 Jan. **C. Marriott to H. Beilin**
Memorandum. 130.02/2457/4.
British protest over the downing of five British fighter planes by Israel.

299. 9 Jan. **W. Eytan to E. Elath**
Coded Tel. W45T; Outg. 130.09/2308/2.
American representations over the continuation of hostilities in the Negev after cease-fire.

300. 9 Jan. **W. Eytan to A. Lourie**
Tel. MH2579; Outg. 130.09/2328/6.
Observance of cease-fire by Israel.

301. 9 Jan. **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. 14; Recd 10 Jan.; Inc. 130.09/2318/5.
Proposes to protest and to convene the Security Council on anti-Israel moves by Britain.

302. 9 Jan. **M. Sharett to A. Eban**
Coded Tel. IN58; Recd 10 Jan.; Outg. 130.09/2329/3; Inc. 93.01/2180/31.
Protest to the Security Council on anti-Israel moves by Britain.

303. 10 Jan. **A. Lourie to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. NI94; Recd 11 Jan.; Outg. 93.01/2180/31; Inc. 130.09/2329/5.
T. Lie's attempts at mediation between Israel and Britain.

304. 10 Jan. **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Tel. 1110; Outg. 93.03/79/17; Inc. 130.09/2328/5.
Demand to convene the Security Council on the Negev crisis.

305. 10 Jan. **G. Rafael to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. X182; Outg. 93.01/2180/31.
British motivations in the recent Negev crisis.

306. 10 Jan. **E. Elath to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. W73; Recd 11 Jan.; Inc. 130.09/2308/8.
Meetings in the U.S.A.: American policy during the Negev crisis.

307. 11 Jan. **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Tel. 1115; Outg. 93.03/70/5; Inc. 130.09/2328/5.
Submission by Israel of a formal complaint to the Security Council over the Negev crisis.

308. 11 Jan. **E. Eban to the President of the Security Council**
Stencilled Copy. 93.08/377/8.
Israel's complaint against Britain.

309. 11 Jan. **I. J. Linton to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. 19; Recd 12 Jan.; Inc. 130.09/2318/5.
American pressure on Britain to terminate the Negev crisis; rumours concerning the despatch of British troops to Gaza.

310. 11 Jan. **E. Elath to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. W77; Recd 12 Jan.; Inc. 130.09/2308/8.
Benjamin Cohen's meeting with Truman: the Negev crisis.

311. 11 Jan. **W. Eytan to A. Eban**
Coded Tel. IN60; Outg. 130.09/2329/3.
Views of the French representative on the Conciliation Commission on the Arab–Israeli conflict.

312. 11 Jan. **Meeting: S. Friedman — M. Mukhin**
Report. 130.02/2410/20. (Hebrew)
Briefing of the Soviet Counsellor in Israel on the Negev crisis.

313. 11 Jan. **E. Avriel to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. 78; Inc. 130.09/2342/7. (Hebrew)
Czechoslovak arms supply to Israel.

314. 11 Jan. **K. Levin to G. Hirsch**
Orig. 130.10/2517/10. (Hebrew)
Austria's recognition of Israel.

315. 12 Jan. **M. Sharett to A. Eban**
Coded Tel. Y71; Outg. 130.09/2329/12; Inc. 93.01/2180/31.
Demands the convening of the Security Council to deal with the Negev crisis.

316. 12 Jan. **M. Comay to A. Eban**
Coded Tel. Y73; Inc. 93.01/2180/31.
Briefing of British Commonwealth representatives on the situation in the Negev.

317. 12 Jan. **M. Comay to A. Eban**
Tel. MH2621; Outg. 130.02/2384/21.
Briefing of British Commonwealth heads of states on the situation in the Negev.

318. 12 Jan. **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. NI97; Recd 13 Jan.; Outg. 93.01/2180/22; Inc. 130.09/2329/5.
Israel's admission to the U.N.

319. 12 Jan. **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. NI97; Recd 13 Jan.; Outg. 93.01/2180/22; Inc. 130.09/2329/5.
U.S.A. foresees difficulties in the armistice negotiations with Egypt.

320. 12 Jan. **E. Elath to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. W80; Recd 13 Jan.; Inc. 130.09/2308/8.
Meeting with Lovett: tension in British–Israeli relations; meeting of the Security Council on the Negev crisis.

321. 12 Jan. **E. Elath to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. W87; Recd 13 Jan.; Inc. 130.09/2308/8.
Meeting of the Security Council on the Negev crisis.

322. 13 Jan. **J. G. McDonald to M. Sharett**
Note. 130.02/2414/26.
The Negev crisis.

336. 17 Jan. **M. Fischer to J. Binoche**
Copy. 93.02/183/2.
Withdrawal of the I.D.F. from Lebanon.

337. 17 Jan. **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Tel. 1131; Inc. 130.09/2328/5.
New Zealand's reaction to the Negev crisis; recognition by New Zealand.

338. 17 Jan. **Meeting: E. Ben-Horin — Cardinal Tisserant**
Memorandum. 130.02/2396/15.
Israel's relations with the Vatican.

339. 18 Jan. **A. Eban to T. Lie**
Copy. 130.02/2412/28.
Downing of five British fighter planes by Israel.

340. 18 Jan. **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. X189; Recd 19 Jan.; Outg. 93.01/2180/31; Inc. 130.09/2329/5.
Israel's admission to the U.N.

341. 18 Jan. **I. J. Linton to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. 29; Recd 19 Jan.; Inc. 130.09/2318/5.
British Cabinet decisions on Israel: shift in British policy, recognition of Israel, release of Cyprus detainees.

342. 19 Jan. **E. Elath to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. W92; Inc. 130.09/2779/2.
Information on the British Ambassador's in the U.S.A. (Franks) meeting with Lovett.

343. 19 Jan. **M. Fischer to G. Hirsch**
Orig. 130.10/2516/9.
France's recognition of Israel.

344. 20 Jan. **M. Fischer to G. Hirsch**
Orig. 130.10/2516/9.
France's recognition of Israel.

345. 21 Jan. **E. Elath to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. W100; Recd 22 Jan.; Outg. 93.01/2180/32; Inc. 130.09/2308/8.
Joint Anglo-American policy in the Middle East.

346. 21 Jan. **E. Elath to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. W102; Recd 22 Jan.; Outg. 93.01/2180/32; Inc. 130.09/2308/8.
Improvement in U.S.A. Administration and public opinion concerning Israel.

347. 21 Jan. **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Tel. 1162; Outg. 93.03/70/8; Inc. 130.09/2328/5.
Inclusion of Israel in the Middle East Commission of ECOSOC.

348. 22 Jan. **G. Hirsch to M. Fischer**
Coded Tel. 74; Outg. 130.09/2344/2.
Withdrawal of the I.D.F. from Lebanon; France's recognition of Israel.

349. 22 Jan. **I. J. Linton to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. 38, 39; Inc. 130.09/2318/5.
Background of Britain's recognition and the change in policy towards Israel.

350. 22 Jan. **R. Rubin to S. Friedman**
Coded Tel. Ri2; Recd 24 Jan.; Inc. 130.09/2296/9. (Hebrew)
Meeting with Ana Pauker; immigration from Rumania; commercial agreement.

351. 24 Jan. **E. Elath to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. W106; Recd 25 Jan.; Outg. 93.01/2180/32; Inc. 130.09/2308/8.
Meeting with Forrestal, U.S.A. Secretary of Defence: Israel's position in the Middle East.

352. 24 Jan. **A. Eban to E. Elath**
Orig. 93.08/375/4.
Inclusion of Israel in the Middle East Commission of ECOSOC.

353. 24 Jan. **E. Elath to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. W108; Recd 25 Jan.; Inc. 130.09/2308/8.
U.S.A. recognition *de jure* of Israel.

354. 24 Jan. **R. Schuman to M. Fischer**
Orig. 130.02/2391/24.
France's recognition of Israel.

355. 26 Jan. **Y. Gaulan to M. Sharett**
Orig. 130.02/2447/10. (Hebrew)
Meeting with Azcarate, Secretary to the Conciliation Commission: procedure and substance of the deliberations of the Conciliation Commission.

356. 26 Jan. **S. Friedman to G. Meyerson**
Copy. 130.11/2513/12. (Hebrew)
Meeting with the Soviet Minister in Israel: armistice negotiations; British–Israeli relations; the American loan to Israel.

357. 28 Jan. **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. X192; Recd 29 Jan.; Outg. 93.01/2180/31; Inc. 130.09/2337/11.
Meeting with the American delegation to the U.N.: the armistice talks; Israel's inclusion in the Middle East Commission of ECOSOC; Israel's admission to the U.N.; the Conciliation Commission.

358. 28 Jan. **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. X193; Sent 29 Jan.; Recd 30 Jan.; Outg. 93.01/2180/31; Inc. 130.09/2329/5.
Meeting with representatives of the Eastern Bloc in the U.N.: Israel's position in the global conflict; Israel and the Marshall Plan; Israel's inclusion in the Middle East Commission of ECOSOC.

359. 31 Jan. **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. X196; Outg. 93.01/2180/31.
Israel and the Marshall Plan.

360. 31 Jan. **E. Elath to M. Sharett**
Tel. 744; Outg. 93.08/374/1.
U.S.A. recognition *de jure* of Israel.

375. 8 Feb. **G. Rafael to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. NI14; Recd 9 Feb.; Outg. 93.01/2180/33; Inc. 130.09/2329/5.
Complaints by the Conciliation Commission on unilateral steps by Israel in Jerusalem.

376. 8 Feb. **U. Heyd to E. Herlitz**
Coded Tel. W60T; Sent 9 Feb.; Recd 10 Feb.; Outg. 93.01/2180/32; Inc. 130.09/2308/8.
Restriction on the immigration from American occupation zones in Germany and Austria.

377. 8 Feb. **S. Friedman to G. Meyerson**
Orig. 130.11/2514/1. (Hebrew)
Meeting with the Soviet Minister in Israel: anti-Israeli publications in the U.S.S.R.

378. 9 Feb. **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. X208; Recd 10 Feb.; Outg. 93.01/2180/33; Inc. 130.09/2329/5.
Israel's admission to the U.N.

379. 9–10 Feb. **M. Sharett to A. Eban**
Coded Tel. Y92, Y93; Outg. 130.09/2329/3; Inc. 93.01/2180/33.
Meeting with the Conciliation Commission: the Jerusalem problem; negotiations with the Arab states; the refugee problem; Israel's borders.

380. 9 Feb. **E. Elath to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. W62T; Sent 10 Feb.; Recd 11 Feb.; Outg. 93.01/2180/32; Inc. 130.09/2308/8.
Meeting with the Soviet ambassador to the U.S.A.: Israel's position between the blocs.

381. 11 Feb. **A. Eban to E. Elath**
Copy. 93.03/86/11.
Meeting with Ross of the American delegation: Israel's admission to the U.N.

382. 11 Feb. **M. Sharett to E. Elath**
Coded Tel. T20W; Outg. 130.09/2308/2; Inc. 93.01/2180/32.
Attendance of the American representative at the opening ceremony of the Constituent Assembly in Jerusalem.

383. 11 Feb. **M. Sharett to A. Eban**
Coded Tel. Y97; Outg. 130.09/2329/12; Inc. 93.01/2180/33.
Meeting with the Conciliation Commission: the opening ceremony of the Constituent Assembly in Jerusalem; Jerusalem municipal elections.

384. 12 Feb. **E. Elath to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. W68T; Recd 13 Feb.; Outg. 93.01/2180/32; Inc. 130.09/2308/8.
Attendance of the American representative at the opening ceremony of the Constituent Assembly in Jerusalem.

385. 13 Feb. **E. Herlitz to E. Elath**
Coded Tel. T26W; Recd 14 Feb.; Outg. 130.09/2308/2; Inc. 93.01/2180/32.

Attendance of the American representative at the opening ceremony of the Constituent Assembly in Jerusalem.

386. 14 Feb. **R. Rubin to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. Ri20; Recd 15 Feb.; Inc. 130.09/2296/9. (Hebrew)
Immigration from Rumania.

387. 15 Feb. **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. X213; Recd 16 Feb.; Outg. 93.01/2180/33; Inc. 130.09/2329/5.
Opening ceremony of the Constituent Assembly in Jerusalem; Israel's admission to the U.N.

388. 15 Feb. **U. Heyd to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs**
Report. 130.20/2460/9. (Hebrew)
Report on the activities of the Israeli Mission in the U.S.A.

389. 15 Feb. **E. Elath to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. W77T; Sent 16 Feb.; Recd 17 Feb.; Outg. 93.01/2180/32; Inc. 130.09/2308/8.
Israel's relations with Spain.

390. 16 Feb. **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. X214; Recd 17 Feb.; Outg. 93.01/2180/33; Inc. 130.09/2329/5.
Attendance of the American representative at the opening ceremony of the Constituent Assembly in Jerusalem; Jerusalem's future status; Israel's admission to the U.N.

391. 16 Feb. **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. X217; Recd 17 Feb.; Outg. 93.01/2180/33; Inc. 130.09/2329/5.
Jerusalem's future status.

392. 17 Feb. **R. Rubin to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. Ri24; Recd 18 Feb.; Inc. 130.09/2296/9. (Hebrew)
Immigration from Rumania.

393. 19 Feb. **R. Rubin to S. Friedman**
Coded Tel. Ri25; Recd 20 Feb.; Inc. 130.09/2296/9. (Hebrew)
Immigration from Rumania.

394. 21 Feb. **M. Sharett to A. Eban**
Coded Tel Y111; Outg. 93.01/2180/33; Inc. 130.09/2329/12.
Jerusalem's future status.

395. 21 Feb. **E. Avriel to S. Friedman**
Coded Tel. 24; Sent 22 Feb.; Recd 23 Feb.; Inc. 130.09/2344/12. (Hebrew)
Immigration from Hungary.

396. 22 Feb. **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. X222; Recd 23 Feb.; Outg. 93.01/2180/33; Inc. 130.09/2329/5.
Meeting with Malik of the Soviet delegation to the U.N.: difficulties in the armistice talks; Israel's admission to the U.N.; Soviet policy in the Middle East.

397. 22 Feb. **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. X223; Recd 23 Feb.; Outg. 93.01/2180/33; Inc. 130.09/2329/5.
Israel's admission to the U.N.

398. 22 Feb. **S. Friedman to M. Namir**
Orig. 130.11/2514/1. (Hebrew)
Immigration from Eastern European countries.

399. 23 Feb. **S. Friedman to E. Avriel**
Copy. 130.11/2492/7. (Hebrew)
Restrictions on the staff of the Israeli Legation in Moscow.

400. 24 Feb. **Meeting with Members of the Conciliation Commission**
Minutes. 130.02/2447/10.
Peace settlements with the Arab states; the Arab refugees; Jerusalem's future status.

401. 24 Feb. **E. Elath to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel.; Recd 25 Feb.; Outg. 93.01/2180/32; Inc. 130.09/2308/8.
Meeting with Benard of the French Embassy in Washington: internationalization of Jerusalem.

402. 24 Feb. **A. Eban to I. J. Linton**
Coded Tel. 34; Outg. 93.01/2180/33.
Meeting with Shone of the British delegation to the U.N.: Israel's admission to the U.N.

403. 24 Feb. **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. NI20; Recd 25 Feb.; Outg. 93.01/2180/33; Inc. 130.09/2329/5.
Meeting with Tsiang of the Chinese delegation to the U.N.: Israel's admission to the U.N.; China's recognition of Israel.

404. 24 Feb. **E. Herlitz to E. Elath**
Coded Tel. IW33; Outg. 130.09/2308/2; Inc. 93.01/2180/32.
The Arab refugees.

405. 25 Feb. **E. Elath to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. WI38; Recd 26 Feb.; Outg. 93.01/2180/32; Inc. 130.09/2308/8.
Israel's admission to the U.N.

406. 25 Feb. **Meeting: E. Danin — J. G. McDonald**
Aide-mémoire. 130.15/2570/11.
The Arab refugees.

407. 27 Feb. **R. Rubin to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. Ri32; Recd 28 Feb.; Inc. 130.09/2296/9. (Hebrew)
Situation of Rumanian Jewry; immigration from Rumania.

408. 28 Feb. **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. X227; Recd 1 March; Outg. 93.01/2180/33; Inc. 130.09/2329/5.
Meeting with Tsiang of the Chinese delegation to the U.N.: Israel's admission to the U.N.; China's recognition of Israel.

409. 28 Feb. **G. Hirsch to M. Fischer**
Coded Tel. 77; Outg.130.09/2344/2.
Israel's relations with Turkey.

410. 1 March **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. X229; Recd 2 March; Outg. 93.01/2180/34; Inc. 130.09/2329/5.
Ratification of the cease-fire agreement with Egypt by the Security Council; Israel's admission to the U.N.

411. 1 March **A. Eban to T. F. Tsiang**
Copy. 93.03/70/23.
China's recognition of Israel.

412. 1 March **R. Rubin to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. Ri33; Inc. 130.09/2296/8. (Hebrew)
Immigration from Rumania.

413. 2 March **A. Oron to G. Hirsch**
Orig. 130.10/2523/17. (Hebrew)
Guido Mendes' meeting with the Pope: the status of Jerusalem.

414. 3 March **I. J. Linton to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. 89; Recd 4 March; Inc. 130.09/2318/5.
Meeting with Burrows of the British Foreign Office: Israel's admission to the U.N.; the Sterling balances.

415. 3 March **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Tel.; Inc. 130.09/2328/5.
Israel's admission to the U.N.

416. 3 March **M. Sharett to R. Rubin**
Coded Tel. IR18; Outg. 130.09/2296/8. (Hebrew)
Situation of Rumanian Jewry; immigration from Rumania.

417. 3 March **R. Rubin to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. Ri36; Recd 4 March; Inc. 130.09/2296/9. (Hebrew)
Situation of Rumanian Jewry; immigration from Rumania.

418. 6 March **M. Sharett to Y. Dori**
Copy. 130.02/2436/5. (Hebrew)
The Arab inhabitants of Faluja and Iraq al-Manshiya.

419. 7 March **A. Eban to W. Eytan**
Copy. 72/9/687/7.
Israel's admission to the U.N.

420. 7 March **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. X233; Recd 8 March; Outg. 93.01/2180/34; Inc. 130.09/2329/5.
Israel's participation in the forthcoming U.N. General Assembly.

421. 7 March **E. Avriel to S. Friedman**
Coded Tel.; Recd 8 March; Inc. 130.09/2342/12. (Hebrew)
Situation of Eastern European Jewry.

422. 7 March **M. Comay to E. Elath**
Orig. 93.08/369/27.
Israel's relations with India.

423. 8 March **S. Friedman to R. Rubin**
Copy. 130.11/2493/1. (Hebrew)
Situation of Rumanian Jewry; working procedures in the Israeli Legation in Bucharest.

424. 9 March **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. X235; Recd 10 March; Outg. 93.01/2180/34; Inc. 130.09/2329/5.
Syria's and Iraq's refusal to negotiate an armistice with Israel.

425. 10 March **Meeting: I. J. Linton — M. Wright**
Report. 93.04/37/12.
British protests against operation *Uvdah.*

426. 10 March **E. Elath to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. W155; Recd 11 March; Inc. 130.09/2308/8.
Repercussions in the U.S.A. on operation *Uvdah.*

427. 10 March **W. Eytan to E. Elath**
Coded Tel. IW38; Outg. 130.09/2308/3.
American protest against contemplated Israeli military action in the "Triangle".

428. 10 March **M. Namir to S. Friedman**
Tel.; Outg. 130.11/2516/16.
Proposes to negotiate directly with the Russians on immigration from Eastern Europe.

429. 10 March **Monthly Report of the Israeli Legation in Prague**
Report. 93.05/523/3. (Hebrew)
Immigration from Czechoslovakia; Israel's relations with Czechoslovakia.

430. 11 March **M. Sharett to A. Eban**
Coded Tel. Y123; Outg. 130.09/2329/12; Inc. 93.01/2180/34.
Syria's and Iraq's refusal to negotiate an armistice with Israel; contemplated Israeli military action in the "Triangle".

431. 11 March **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. NI22; Recd 12 March; Outg. 93.01/2180/34; Inc. 130.09/2329/5.
Syria's and Iraq's refusal to negotiate an armistice with Israel; contemplated Israeli military action in the "Triangle".

432. 11 March **Acting Israeli Representative in London to the British Foreign Office**
Note. 93.04/38/1.
Operation *Uvdah* — Israel's reaction to the British protest.

433. 11 March **M. Sharett to Ana Pauker**
Copy. 130.02/2411/7.
Israel's relations with Rumania.

434. 12 March **M. Sharett to E. Elath**
Coded Tel. IW40; Outg. 130.09/2308/3.
Operation *Uvdah.*

435. 12 March **E. Sasson to A. Lourie**
Copy. 93.08/366/32.
Criticism of the Conciliation Commission's line of action.

436. 14 March **W. Eytan to A. Eban**
Coded Tel. Y125; Outg. 130.09/2329/12; Inc. 93.01/2180/34.
Security Council meeting on Operation *Uvdah;* contemplated Israeli military action in the "Triangle".

437. 14 March **A. Eban to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. X243; Recd 15 March; Outg. 93.01/2180/34; Inc. 130.09/2329/5.
Military action in the "Triangle".

438. 14 March **A. Eban to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. X244; Recd 15 March; Outg. 93.01/2180/34; Inc. 130.09/2329/5.
Political limitations of a military action in the "Triangle".

439. 14 March **A. Eban to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. X245; Outg. 93.01/2180/34.
Security Council meeting on Operation *Uvdah.*

440. 14 March **I. J. Linton to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel.; Recd 15 March; Inc. 130.09/2318/5.
British motivation to create a crisis around Operation *Uvdah.*

441. 15 March **A. Eban to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. X246; Recd 16 March; Outg. 93.01/2180/34; Inc. 130.09/2329/5.
Political limitations of a military action in the "Triangle".

442. 15 March **E. Elath to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. IW158; Recd 16 March; Inc. 130.09/2308/8.
American position on Operation *Uvdah;* press criticism in the U.S.A. over the Jerusalem and the Arab refugee problems.

443. 16 March **Memorandum on the Refugee Problem**
Memorandum. 130.02/2441/9.
The Arab refugees.

444. 17 March **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. X248; Recd 18 March; Outg. 93.01/2180/34; Inc. 130.09/2329/5.
Presence of British troops in Aqaba.

445. 17 March **M. Comay to A. Eban**
Tel. MH3587; Outg. 130.09/2328/6.
Meeting with the Conciliation Commission Sub-Committee on Jerusalem: Israel's position on Jerusalem.

446. 17 March **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. X249; Recd 18 March; Outg. 93.01/2180/34; Inc. 130.09/2329/5.
Death sentences on Iraqi Jews for Zionist activities.

447. 18 March **W. Eytan to A. Eban**
Coded Tel. Y140; Outg. 130.09/2329/12; Inc. 93.01/2180/34.
Israel's negotiations with Jordan on border demarcation lines in the "Triangle".

448. 18 March **W. Eytan to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. IW48; Outg. 130.09/2308/3.
Ben-Gurion's stand on the refugee problem: compensation, family reunions.

449. 18 March **R. Rubin to S. Friedman**
Coded Tel. Ri43; Recd 21 March; Inc. 130.09/2296/9. (Hebrew)
Israel's relations with Rumania; immigration from Rumania.

450. 18 March **Meeting: R. Rubin — Ana Pauker**
Report. 130.11/2493/4. (Hebrew)
Israel's relations with Rumania; immigration from Rumania.

451. 18 March **M. Agami to S. Friedman**
Orig. 130.11/2493/11. (Hebrew)
Israel's relations with Rumania; immigration from Rumania.

452. 19 March **W. Eytan to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. Y142; Outg. 130.09/2329/12; Inc. 93.01/2180/34.
Presence of British troops in Aqaba.

453. 20 March **W. Eytan to A. Eban**
Coded Tel. Y144; Outg. 130.09/2329/12; Inc. 93.01/2180/34.
Military action in the "Triangle".

454. 22 March **G. Rafael to I. J. Linton**
Coded Tel. 37; Outg. 93.01/2180/34.
Presence of British troops in Aqaba.

455. 22 March **I. J. Linton to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. 6; Recd 23 March; Inc. (Tel Aviv) 130.09/2318/5.
Presence of British troops in Aqaba.

456. 22 March **S. Friedman to E. Avriel**
Orig. 93.05/523/4. (Hebrew)
Political and public activity in the matter of immigration from Rumania; situation of Czechoslovak and Hungarian Jewry.

457. 24 March **S. Friedman to the Israeli Legation in Bucharest**
Coded Tel. IR25; Outg. 130.09/2296/8. (Hebrew)
Political and public activity in the matter of immigration from Rumania.

458. 25 March **E. Elath to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. W172; Inc. 130.09/2308/8.
Sharett's meeting with Acheson: Israel's global policy; the armistice talks; the Arab refugees; military experts for Israel from the U.S.A.

459. 27 March **W. Eytan to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. Y163; Recd 28 March; Outg. 130.09/2329/12; Inc. 93.01/2180/34.
Jordanian proposal to commence peace talks after the conclusion of the armistice agreement.

460. 28 March **G. Rafael to A. Eban**
Memorandum. 93.02/71/19.
Guiding lines on Israel's participation in the forthcoming U.N. General Assembly.

461. 29 March **S. Friedman to E. Avriel**
Orig. 93.05/523/4. (Hebrew)
Immigration from Eastern Europe.

462. 30 March **Meeting: I. J. Linton — B. A. Burrows**
Report. 130.13/2583/4.
Establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and Britain; reinforcement of British troops in Aqaba; the Arab refugees.

463. 30 March **M. Fischer to G. Bonneau**
Note verbale. 93.02/183/2.
Establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and France; problems in French–Israeli relations.

464. 30 March **S. Friedman to the Israeli Legation in Warsaw**
Orig. 93.07/506/12. (Hebrew)
Political and public activity to ease restrictions on immigration from Eastern Europe.

465. 31 March **I. Barzilai to M. Sharett**
Orig. 130.11/2492/20. (Hebrew)
Difficulties in the immigration from Eastern Europe; unbalance in Israel's global policy; Israel's commercial relations with Poland.

466. 1 Apr. **A. Eban to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. X262; Outg. 93.01/2180/35.
Israel's admission to the U.N.

467. 1 Apr. **S. Friedman to the Israeli Legation in Moscow**
Coded Tel. 117; Outg. 130.09/2325/3. (Hebrew)
Soviet Minister's audience with President Weizmann; immigration from Eastern Europe.

468. 2 Apr. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. X264; Recd 3 Apr.; Inc. 130.09/2329/6.
Tense relations with the Conciliation Commission and their influence on Israel's admission to the U.N.

469. 2 Apr. **A. Eban to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. X266; Recd 3 Apr.; Inc. 130.09/2329/6.
Tense relations with the Conciliation Commission and their influence on Israel's admission to the U.N.

470. 2 Apr. **A. Eban to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. X267; Outg. 93.01/2180/35; Inc. 130.09/2329/6.
Meeting with Chauvel of the French delegation: the procedures of the Conciliation Commission; Israel's admission to the U.N.; the military *coup* in Syria.

471. 2 Apr. **A. Eban to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. X263; Recd 3 Apr.; Inc. 130.09/2329/6.
Turkey's recognition of Israel; Israel's relations with Turkey.

472. 3 Apr. **W. Eytan to A. Eban**
Coded Tel. IN72; Outg. 130.09/2329/12; Inc. 93.01/2180/35.
Latest developments in the relations with the American members of the Conciliation Commission: repatriation and resettlement of Arab refugees.

473. 4 Apr. **W. Eytan to C. de Boisanger**
Copy. 130.02/2442/2.
Transfer of Government departments to Jerusalem.

474. 4 Apr. **Memorandum by A. Eban**
Memorandum. 93.03/74/18.
Israel's position on global matters in the forthcoming U.N. General Assembly.

475. 4 April **E. Sasson to M. Sharett**
Orig. 130.02/2408/22.
Israel's attitude to the new regime in Syria.

476. 5 Apr. **A. Eban to W. Eytan**
Tel. 1529; Outg. 93.01/2180/35; Inc. 130.02/2403/25.
Israel's admission to the U.N.

477. 5 Apr. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. X274; Sent and Recd 6 Apr.; Outg. 93.01/2180/35; Inc. 130.09/2337/11.
Meeting with Acheson: Israel's borders; Jerusalem; the Arab refugees.

478. 6 Apr. **E. Sasson to W. Eytan**
Copy. 93.03/87/24.
Form and substance of the Israeli position in anticipation of the forthcoming negotiations with the Conciliation Commission.

479. 7 Apr. **Meeting of the Conciliation Commission with the Prime Minister and Officials of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs**
Minutes. 130.02/2441/1. (Hebrew)
Venue of the Commission's meetings; status of the delegations; the Arab refugees; the Jerusalem issue.

480. 7 Apr. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. Y190; Outg. 130.09/2329/12.
Meeting with the Conciliation Commission: venue of the Commission's meetings; status of the delegations; the Arab refugees; the Jerusalem issue.

481. 7 Apr. **E. Sasson to M.H. Haykal Pasha**
Copy. 93.03/87/24.
Necessity of face-to-face meetings with Egyptian leaders.

482. 8 Apr. **E. Herlitz to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. Y196; Outg. 130.09/2329/12; Inc. 93.01/2180/35.
Meeting Ben-Gurion–McDonald: Israel's borders; the Jerusalem issue; the Arab refugees.

483. 8 Apr. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. X295; Recd 9 Apr.; Outg. 93.01/2180/35; Inc. 130.09/2329/6.
Border rectifications in the Dead Sea area.

484. 10 Apr. **L. Kohn to A. Eban**
Orig. 93.03/86/8.
Relations of Israel with Jewish communities abroad.

485. 11 Apr. **Memorandum by the Conciliation Commission**
Memorandum. 130.09/2441/9 (U.N. Document IS/9).
The Arab refugees.

486. 11 Apr. **R. Shiloah to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. Y203; Outg. 130.09/2329/12; Inc. 93.01/2180/35.
The "McGhee Plan" — development plan for the Middle East; France's lack of interest in the refugee problem.

487. 11 Apr. **E. Herlitz to E. Elath**
Coded Tel. IW70; Outg. 130.09/2308/3.
Flight of Arab villagers from the Wadi Ara area.

488. 11 Apr. **W. Eytan to A. Eban**
Coded Tel. Y204; Outg. 130.09/2329/3.
Egyptian measures against passage of ships and cargo bound for Israel.

489. 11 Apr. **A. Eban to M. Eliash**
Coded Tel. U2; Outg. 93.01/2180/35.
Meeting with McNeil of the British delegation: the Arab refugees; the Jerusalem issue; Israel's admission to the U.N.

490. 12 Apr. **D. Ben-Gurion Speaking at a Political Consultation at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs**
Minutes. 130.02/2447/3. (Hebrew)
Absorption of immigrants; peace with the Arab states.

491. 13 Apr. **W. Eytan to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. Y211; Outg. 130.09/2329/12.
Political consultation at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs: absorption of immigrants; non-dependence of the Arab states; the "Israeli" orientation; commercial relations with the Arab states; practical arrangements with Jordan.

492. 13 Apr. **A. Eban to W. Eytan**
Tel. 1574; Inc. 130.02/2403/25.
Israel's admission to the U.N.

493. 15 Apr. **A. Eban to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. X302; Recd 16 Apr.; Inc. 130.09/2329/6.
Israel's admission to the U.N.

494. 15 Apr. **M. Comay to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. Y113; Outg. 130.09/2329/12.
The McGhee plan for the settlement of the refugees and regional development in the Middle East.

495. 16 Apr. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Tel. MS10; Inc. 130.02/2403/25.
Postponement of the Lausanne Conference until after Israel's admission to the U.N.

496. 16 Apr. **G. Meyerson to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. 136; Recd 17 Apr.; Inc. 130.09/2325/4. (Hebrew)
Meeting with Vyshinsky: Israel's neutrality in the global conflict; immigration from Eastern Europe; arms supply from Eastern Europe.

497. 16 Apr. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Tel.; Recd 17 Apr.; Outg. 93.03/87/11; Inc. 130.02/2396/15.
Israel's response to the Pope's encyclical on Jerusalem and the Holy Places.

498. 19 Apr. **Report by E. Sasson**
Minutes. 130.02/2447/3. (Hebrew)
Meeting with King Abdallah.

499. 19 Apr. **A. Eban to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. X306; Recd 20 Apr.; Outg. 93.01/2180/35; Inc. 130.09/2329/6.
Postponement of the Lausanne Conference until after Israel's admission to the U.N.

512. 27 Apr. **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. X325; Outg. 93.01/2180/35.
Opening statement by Israel at the Lausanne Conference.

513. 27 Apr. **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. X326; Sent 28 Apr.; Recd 29 Apr.; Outg. 93.01/2180/35; Inc. 130.09/2329/6.
Israel's admission to the U.N.; opening statement by Israel at the Lausanne Conference.

514. 27 Apr. **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Tel. 1638; Recd 28 Apr.; Outg. 93.01/2180/35; Inc. 130.02/2447/2.
Opening statement by Israel at the Lausanne Conference; the Arab refugees.

515. 27 Apr. **G. Hirsch to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. ET1; Outg. 130.02/2442/5. (Hebrew)
First meeting of the Conciliation Commission in Lausanne: the procedure of the Conference; the Arab refugees; Israel's borders; the issue of Jerusalem.

516. 28 Apr. **L. Kohn to M. Sharett**
Orig. 130.02/2443/3. (Hebrew)
Future of Jerusalem.

517. 28 Apr. **M. Sharett to G. Hirsch**
Tel. LS/339; Outg. 130.02/2441/1.
Opening statement by Israel of the Lausanne Conference.

518. 28 Apr. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan**
Coded Tel. TE1; Recd 29 Apr.; Outg. 130.02/2442/7. (Hebrew)
Negotiations on practical arrangements between Israel and Jordan.

519. 28 Apr. **E. Sasson to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. ET2; Inc. 130.02/2442/5. (Hebrew)
Meeting with Boisanger, the French representative on the Conciliation Commission: Syria's territorial claims; peace agreement with the Lebanon; Israel's admission to the U.N.

520. 28 Apr. **E. Sasson to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. ET5; Inc. 130.02/2442/5. (Hebrew)
Procedure and substance at the Lausanne Conference.

521. 29 Apr. **A. Eban to G. Hirsch**
Tel. 1654; Outg. 93.03/72/17; Inc. 130.02/2441/1.
Interference by the Conciliation Commission with Israel's admission to the U.N.

522. 29 Apr. **A. Eban to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. X331; Outg. 93.01/2180/35.
Opening statement by Israel at the Lausanne Conference.

523. 29 Apr. **G. Hirsch to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. ET7; Inc. 130.02/2442/5. (Hebrew)
Meeting with Ethridge: the Arab refugees; the McGhee plan for regional development in the Middle East.

524. 29 Apr. **E. Elath to M. Sharett**
Coded Tel. W203; Recd 30 Apr.; Inc. 130.09/2308/9.
Meeting with Satterthwaite: Israel's admission to the U.N.; opening

APPENDICES

LISTS OF ARCHIVES AND ABBREVIATIONS IN REFERENCES

Israel State Archives

93. *Record Group: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Israel Missions Abroad*
    - 93.01 Coded telegrams
    - 93.02 Paris
    - 93.03 New York
    - 93.04 London
    - 93.05 Prague
    - 93.07 Warsaw
    - 93.08 Washington

130. *Record Group: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Head Office*
    - 130.02 Offices of Minister and Director-General
    - 130.04 Legal Division
    - 130.09 Coded telegrams
    - 130.10 West European Division
    - 130.11 East European Division
    - 130.13 British Commonwealth Division
    - 130.15 Middle East Division
    - 130.20 United States Division

43. *Military Governor of Jerusalem*

72.9 *Mordecai Eliash Papers*

Central Zionist Archives (Abbreviated reference: **C.Z.A.**)

Ben-Gurion Archives

Israel Military and Defence Establishment Archives (Abbreviated reference: **I.M.D.E.A.**)

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS IN REFERENCES

Note: The list includes only books and publications mentioned in the annotation.

A. *General*

Namir, Mordecai, *Israeli Mission to Moscow* [Tel Aviv 1971] [Hebrew]

Ratner, Yohanan, *My Life and Myself*, Jerusalem 1979 [Hebrew]

Weizmann, Chaim, *Trial and Error*, London 1950

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Vol. V, Washington 1971
(Abbreviated reference: **FRUS, 1947, V**)

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Vol. V, Washington 1976
(Abbreviated reference: **FRUS, 1948, V**)

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Vol. VI, Washington 1977
(Abbreviated reference: **FRUS, 1949, VI**)

Israel State Archives/Central Zionist Archives, *Political and Diplomatic Documents, December 1947–May 1948*, Jerusalem 1979
(Abbreviated reference: **Documents, December 1947 – May 1948**)

Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol. 460
(Abbreviated reference: **460 H.C. Deb. 5s**)

Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol. 463
(Abbreviated reference: **463 H.C. Deb. 5s**)

Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Lords, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol. 161
(Abbreviated reference: **161 H.L. Deb. 5s**)

State of Israel, Israel State Archives, *Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel*, Vol. I, Jerusalem 1981
(Abbreviated reference: **Vol. I**)

State of Israel, Israel State Archives, *Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel*, Vol. 3, Jerusalem 1983
(Abbreviated reference: **Vol. 3**)

State of Israel, *National Council, Provisional Council of State, Record of Discussions*, Vol. I [Hebrew]

B. *United Nations Publications*

United Nations. *Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part I, Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, Summary Records of Meetings, 21 September – 12 December 1948*
(Abbreviated reference: **GAOR, 3rd Sess., Pt. 1**)

United Nations. *Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part I, First Committee, Summary Records of Meetings, 21 September–8 December 1948*
(Abbreviated reference: **GAOR, 3rd Sess., Pt. 1, First Committee)**

United Nations. *Official Record of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part II, Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, Summary Records of Meetings, 5 April–18 May 1949*
(Abbreviated reference: **GAOR, 3rd Sess., Pt. 2**)

United Nations. *Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part II, Ad Hoc Political Committee, Summary Records of Meetings, 6 April – 10 May 1949*
(Abbreviated reference: **GAOR, 3rd Sess., Pt. 2,** Ad Hoc Political Committee)

United Nations, *Security Council Official Records,* Third Year
(Abbreviated reference: **SCOR, Third Year**)

United Nations, *Security Council Official Records,* Fourth Year
(Abbreviated reference: **SCOR, Fourth Year**)

Yearbook of the United Nations 1948–49, New York 1950

SUMMARIES OF HEBREW DOCUMENTS

References to English and French documents (e.g., "See No. 42") are to the Main Volume. All other references (to notes, editorial notes and summaries of Hebrew documents) are to the Companion Volume.

3. I. Barzilai (Warsaw) to S. Friedman. 2 October 1948

Barzilai reports on his first days in Warsaw following his presentation of credentials as Israeli Minister to Poland: the occasion was impressive and moving and the atmosphere was cordial. This should be borne in mind when the Poles in their turn come to present their credentials in Israel.

The problems confronting the Israeli Legation in Poland are complex, although the attitude of the host country is sympathetic and friendly. Two matters are engaging his attention at the moment: the statutory paying of respects to the heads of the government, and the establishment of day-to-day routine at the Legation. The lack of close contact with Israel hampers him greatly, and he requests that informative matter, such as newspapers, bulletins and telegrams, be sent more frequently.

4. Meeting of the Israeli Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly (Paris, 3 October 1948)

Sharett defines the status and the functions of the delegation to the Assembly as distinct from those of the Jewish Agency delegation to the preceding Assembly. While the previous one enjoyed status equal to that of the Jewish Agency Executive in Palestine and was empowered to propose and formulate lines of policy, the powers of the present delegation are much more circumscribed: it may only execute policy as laid down by the Government in Israel. Nevertheless, the delegation is not just a blind instrument in the hands of the Government, and, in the event of difficulty in carrying out the policy, it is duty bound to advise the Government accordingly and to propose modifications.

The Government's policy was adopted in stages at two separate meetings — the first prior and the second subsequent to receipt of the Mediator's report.

Had the Bernadotte Report not intervened and had Israel been allowed to take the initiative, efforts would have concentrated on three issues: (1) Israel's admission to the U.N.; (2) a resolution enjoining the two parties to negotiate directly; (3) the termination of the mediation, or at the least a modification of its function to that of bringing the parties closer to negotiations rather than submitting solutions, which in any case have to be at

Israel's expense. Israel need not have raised the issue of the boundaries at all.

Presentation of the British and American backed report now makes imperative a definition of Israel's attitudes. Israel has not rejected the Report *in toto;* it has to be gone into in detail to determine which of its provisions are entirely unacceptable.

Israel's options regarding the borders are: strict acceptance of the 29 November boundaries, or reopening of the whole issue. Each individual alternative has a logic of its own; not so a compromise between the two. Israel has reached the following conclusion: the 29 November borders cannot be rejected in their entirety, mainly because of the Negev; on the other hand, the actual situation militates against acquiescence in their original form.

The 29 November resolution was predicated on the assumption that the partition would be carried out peacefully, that a separate Arab state would be established in Palestine and enter into an economic union with the Jewish State, that Jerusalem would be internationalized, and that the U.N. would intervene if the partition did not eventuate peacefully. None of these assumptions materialized. Israel should consequently demand modifications in the proposed boundaries, justifying this demand by the fact that the borders were irrational, unnatural and untenable. Israel rejects the notion that the Negev can be exchanged for the Galilee, presently under Israeli rule. The 29 November boundary for the Galilee proved itself untenable.

The situation in the Negev is different. This region is not under Israeli control, and while there are Jewish settlements in the northern Negev and access to them is free, the Negev as a whole remains cut off from the rest of the country. At the U.N. Israel will insist on sovereignty over the entire Negev — this is essential both tactically and materially: tactically, because any inclination to compromise will provoke a crisis with the U.S.S.R., while a steadfast attitude will increase chances of attaining the desired ends; materially, because the Negev will provide an outlet to the Red Sea, this being of particular importance to the Dead Sea potash industry, and because there are prospects of finding oil in that region.

No valid argument can be advanced by any Arab country to justify the severance of the Negev from Israel. Israel does not desire a British or any other military base on its borders, and neither do the Arabs. The argument that an Israeli Negev would constitute a wedge driven into the midst of the Arab world does not hold water either: Israel should lay emphasis on its being an integral part of the Middle East, and not an alien body, and attempts to reduce her size or ignore her presence will not contribute to the stability of the region.

Summing up, Sharett considers that a firm stand on the Negev would reduce the likelihood of Israel being compelled to yield in this matter, and would also inhibit the British from publicly raising their demand for

military bases there. In the event that no choice is left but to yield, Israel should then insist on adequate compensation. The question of the Galilee should not be overstressed so as not to encourage the notion of an exchange. The Bernadotte Report grants the Galilee to Israel by reason of its actual hold on it, and not out of any desire to give Israel its "due"; it is a coming to terms with a bad situation and passing it off as a concession.

On the subject of Jerusalem, the Government has decided to put forth a claim on the New City and the road connecting it with the coastal plain. International regime in the Old City would be acceptable. An acute problem would arise should a U.N. majority declare for the internationalization of the whole city, or, alternatively, for a division between the Arabs and the Jews. In this eventuality the Government has opted for the second alternative as the lesser of two evils. This does not mean that Israel is opposed to an international regime in principle. But in the light of past experience both in Jerusalem and in other parts of the world, there is absolute skepticism about the feasibility or practicability of such a regime. Israel could never rely on a foreign army to defend Jerusalem, and the experience of the city's inhabitants during the siege has been such that they would never agree to international rule. The Jerusalem issue is for Israel a matter of life and death: at stake is not only the safety of its 100,000 Jewish inhabitants but also cultural and historical factors. Israel will thus insist on the presence of effective Jewish forces within the city, and on a territorial link with the State of Israel. Israel will not settle for a single point of contact between the city and the state, and will not employ the term "corridor" which has historically notorious connotations: Israel will insist with equal firmness on the possession of both Jerusalem and the road leading to it.

If part of Jerusalem goes to the Arabs, Israel should insist that it is not turned into a governmental centre — and Israel will likewise refrain from similar action in the Jewish section. In any event government offices will not be transferred to Jerusalem, though the Knesset might possibly sit there part of the time and, indeed, the High Court of Justice is already located there. Sharett emphasizes that this is his personal opinion and that there has been no government decision on this subject.

In the matter of the refugees, the various delegations must be won over to Israel's view that the refugees ought to be resettled in Arab countries. In the long run it will be to the advantage of the Arab states, of the refugees themselves and of the Middle East as a whole to reduce the areas of friction between Israel and the Arabs. This need not mean that no Arab refugee would ever be allowed to return, but repatriation on any scale would become possible only when peace is attained. Bernadotte's approach was wrong in as much as this is a matter not of individual rights of innocent people, but a political problem to be discussed only in the context of peace talks. One should remember that it was the Arabs who, in

defiance of the U.N. resolution, sent their invading armies and affirmed they came at the behest of the Arabs of Palestine.

In the matter of the Arab part of Palestine, no position has yet been taken by the Government, which expects us here also to voice our opinions. The Arab state envisaged by the 29 November resolution did not materialize, nor is any attempt to establish such a state evident, and there is no group of public figures able to constitute the nucleus of a Palestinian Arab government. At present there are two likely contenders for that part of Palestine not occupied by Israel — King Abdallah and the Mufti. Basically, it is in Israel's interest that a separate Palestinian government and an Arab state be set up in Palestine, but an explicit declaration to that effect, accompanying the publication of the Bernadotte Report, might be interpreted as support of the Mufti and of the Palestinian Gaza Government. Conversely, open rejection of that government is not possible because this might be interpreted as support of Abdallah. As to the Gaza Government, it has not been set up in order to put into effect the 29 November resolution: it is a political creation of the Mufti's, nothing but an empty manifestation, as it has no say whatsoever in Nablus, where the Iraqis are in control, nor in Hebron, ruled by Abdallah. There is also the possibility that the coastal strip of Gaza will be annexed by the Egyptians, who would not object to such a solution. Syria, on the other hand, cannot annex the northern part of Palestine because it is not contiguous to her territory, while the Lebanon has no wish to do so and thereby absorb an additional 80,000 Muslims.

In Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's view, there are three possible solutions to this problem: (1) Israel to take over the remaining parts of western Palestine, calling as a consequence for the establishment of a Jewish state in the whole country; (2) acquiescence in the 29 November borders, with minor modifications; (3) peace with the Arab states, for which Israel would have to pay a price.

* * *

A. Eban reports on his meetings with Dean Rusk of the American delegation and with Katz-Suchy of the Polish delegation. Rusk informed him of the proposal to institute Jewish and Arab trusteeships over the respective parts of Jerusalem (see No. 1). He said that the American government did not necessarily support this plan, and sought only to ascertain Israel's response. Eban did not react and said he would pass on this proposal to his government. In his opinion the American proposal betrays general impotence with regard to the Jerusalem issue — nobody believes in the feasibility of an international regime, and everybody is searching for a way out which would leave the Jews and the Arabs in effective administration of the city under the guise of international supervision.

Rusk showed flexibility in the matter of the Negev, and was able to

differentiate Israel's claim in the northern Negev, including free access to the Dead Sea, and the claim to the southern Negev. He had mistakenly assumed the southern Negev to be densely populated and that it would cause a new refugee problem for Israel.

He advised Israel to postpone its application for admission to the U.N.: no majority for this was yet in sight, notwithstanding American support. He also referred to the Secretary of State's speech at the Assembly, in which Israel's admission was linked with that of Transjordan; there is no actual connection between the two, though it is clear that Transjordan's admission to the U.N. would bind it not to attempt to solve by force the Palestinian problem. He concluded by stressing that the U.S. had no interests in the Middle East and that their only stipulation was that under no circumstances should there be a renewal of hostilities.

The talk with Katz-Suchy was friendly and open, with no attempt to threaten or to put pressure on Israel. He required Israeli adherence to the 29 November resolution as the price for Poland's support. However, once it was made clear to him that the 29 November borders implied U.S., French and Belgian rule in Jerusalem, he relented, saying that their position was not so rigidly uncompromising. In general it would seem that the Poles have not budged an inch since the November 1947 resolution — what, for Israel, is the point of departure for them is the ultimate objective.

Eban comments on some tactical aspects of the contacts with the various delegations:

— In emphasizing the importance of the Negev, Israel must avoid creating the impression that the Galilee is of lesser importance.

— Regarding Jerusalem's link with Israel, it must be pointed out that three out of the four roads to the city are under Arab control, thus strengthening Israel's claim to the fourth artery.

— The difference in the standing of the U.N. Assembly *vis-à-vis* Israel from last year to this should be emphasized: the Assembly then dealt with a territory about to become no-man's-land with the termination of the British mandate, and it thus had absolute authority over its future. Now it is confronted by a sovereign state of which the Negev is an integral part, and the U.N. has about as much right to detach it from Israel as it has to detach the county of Sussex from England.

— Deferment of the debate on Palestine played into Israel's hands: Britain had planned to push through the Bernadotte Report with all despatch, but the respite has now given Israel time enough to present her position to the various delegations.

D. Liwszyc proposes that Israel expressly declare its outright rejection of the Bernadotte Plan. Sharett sees here three points to decide on: (1) whether a declaration is advisable; (2) what to say to the various delegations; (3) what line should be adopted before the First Committee. As to (1), his opinion is that a declaration is not advisable; in respect of (2),

Israel should lay before the delegations her reasons for rejecting the report; and the time has not yet arrived to discuss point (3).

5. Meeting of the Israeli Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly (Paris, 4 October 1948)

M. Toff reports on his journey to South America. In Brazil he met and discussed with Oswaldo Aranha Brazil's recognition of Israel. In Aranha's view formal recognition is unnecessary, as the resolution of 29 November carries implicit recognition of Israel; confusion on this issue arose only out of America's haste to recognize Israel. Last year's vigorous Arab activity has now abated owing to the realization that the Arabs of Palestine in fact did not fight.

In Uruguay Toff found appreciable British influence as well as Arab propaganda. The local apostolic nuncio expressed his sympathy for Israel.

In Argentina Toff met members of the Senate Foreign Committee who expressed interest in economic relations with Israel. At a press conference, the Foreign Minister voiced the hope that his government would soon respond to Israel's request for recognition. Bramuglia's forthcoming inauguration as President of the U.N. Assembly, which depends also on Arab votes, is apparently delaying Argentina's recognition.

Paraguay has recognized Israel. Ecuador was about to do so when Bernadotte's assassination occurred.

M. Fischer reviews relations between France and Israel. The general attitude is sympathetic and it is commonly acknowledged that Israel did a service to France by weakening the Arab League and by lowering British prestige in the Middle East.

Israel has many friends in the French delegation to the U.N., whose opinion is that Israel should be supported behind the scenes. The French Foreign Minister enjoys great latitude. One of the reasons given for the delay in French recognition was the attitude of the North African Muslims; this is now of lesser importance, as the Muslim delegates themselves told the Prime Minister that they acknowledged the necessity of recognizing Israel, but advised him to act circumspectly.

As regards the Bernadotte Plan, the French would agree to back Abdallah providing he renounces his "Greater Syria" scheme, since France still hopes to increase her influence in Syria and the Lebanon; this is the reason for their support of Israel's claim to the whole of Galilee.

When it comes to the issue of Jerusalem, Schuman is against any regime not of an international character. He understands that this implies

the establishment of an international force, but he believes this to be entirely feasible. In Fischer's opinion the positions of France and Israel on Jerusalem are so at variance that it would be advisable for Israel to avoid an open clash by letting others present Israel's views, or by using the known opinions of other delegations to bolster Israel's arguments. For instance, instead of voicing Israel's objection to an international regime in Jerusalem it is preferable to point to the Americans' unwillingness to participate in an international force. Despite all this, there is at the Quai d'Orsay a definite inclination towards connecting Jerusalem to the State of Israel by means of a corridor.

Strong French support for the inclusion of the entire Negev in Israel is to be expected, insofar as this constitutes an anti-British measure.

De Gaulle's attitude towards Israel is favourable, both because of his dislike of the British and because he considers this to be the correct policy *vis-à-vis* the Arabs.

Bernadotte's assassination had less of an effect in France than Israel had anticipated.

In the matter of the refugees, the French have a good understanding of the situation but are keeping their own counsel.

M. Weissman reports on the positions of the Belgians. Spaak, the head of the delegation, is the sole arbiter there, and though there is a great deal of sympathy for Israel among the members it is negated by Spaak's unrelenting hostility. A Jewish state rejected by the Arabs is in his opinion a menace to peace. He is also apprehensive of possible Israeli expansion. Regarding recognition, he wishes to await the Mediator's report and he thinks that in any case Belgium should not rush to be the first — an intimation that he is awaiting France's decision. Spaak's attitude is not influenced by the Catholic element in his country. Weissman failed in his attempt to meet the Apostolic representative in Belgium: he was requested to present his views in writing.

Holland and Luxembourg are coordinating their stand with Belgium, though Holland is itself prepared to recognize Israel.

E. Sasson reports on Arab activity at the U.N. Nine delegations are now in Paris, six of which are members of the U.N., one represents the Arab Higher Committee, and two come from the Sudan. Transjordan is not represented. The Saudi-Arabian, Yemenite and Iraqi delegations do not show any activity except for voting in the Assembly. The Lebanese delegation is quite active; apart from its head, all its members are Christians, speak fluent French and conduct themselves as Europeans. The Syrian delegation is active, though not hopeful of a successful outcome; their tactics are therefore to delay the debate as much as possible. They are apprehensive of the Bernadotte Plan because it implies recognition of Israel and because it would considerably strengthen Abdallah. The Egyptian delegation has been instructed to inform the Americans that Egypt will do nothing which might lead to renewal of hostilities. The British

have advised them not to boycott the commission which will settle the boundaries if they do not wish their interests to suffer.

8. M. Sharett (Paris) to W. Eytan. 5 October 1948

Important material on Sasson's negotiations with the Egyptians is enclosed; Eytan is asked to show it to Shiloah and Shimoni. The material comprises four documents: (a) plan drafted by Sasson and handed to the Egyptians (see Main Volume, Appendix I, pp. 23–5); (b) "Elucidations and Observations", being the Egyptian emissary's comments on the plan (Appendix II); (c) resumé of Sasson's conversation with the Egyptian emissary and his observations (Appendix III); (d) the Israeli reply to the Egyptians emissary's observations (see Main Volume, Appendix IV, pp. 28–9). The first three documents were drafted in Paris, while the fourth was drafted by Sharett himself in consultation with members of the delegation.

The importance of Appendix II lies not only in its contents but rather in what it leaves unsaid, with these omissions implying tacit agreement to recognize Israel, not to engage in subversive activity against her, to evacuate occupied Israeli territory, not to demand the return of the Arab refugees, and to assent to changing the name of the Arab League. The big question, of course, is to what extent does this tacit agreement of the negotiators reflect the intentions of the Egyptian government.

The main element of Appendix II is the clear evidence it gives of Egypt's desire to annex the Gaza Strip and the border zone of the southern Negev. Israel's response on this point (Appendix IV, pp. 28–9) was very carefully formulated by Sharett, to avoid either an irrevocable commitment or an outright refusal which might lead to a breakdown of the negotiations. In Sharett's opinion the key issue in the relations between Egypt and Israel is the question of annexation, and a definite reply to it cannot long be evaded. His view is that a decision should be taken soon and the answer should be in the affirmative, but with the proviso that Israel's agreement to the annexation must not involve it in difficulties with Transjordan or Britain. Sharett emphasizes that this is the only *quid pro quo* Israel can offer Egypt and all mention of economic cooperation and such is just empty talk.

Sharett requests that the entire matter be urgently put before Ben-Gurion and that his opinion be cabled to Paris. He also solicits Leo Kohn's opinion.

Appendix II

Elucidations and Observations

1

Paragraph 3: The Jewish areas only are to be evacuated; as to the Arab areas — these would remain under Egyptian occupation and administration utnil their future is finally decided.

Paragraph 4: The amendments in Para. 3 render the entire paragraph redundant.

Paragraph 5: This is impractical, first, because Egypt, as a bordering country, cannot remain indifferent to the occupation by an unfriendly power of a contested region constituting a potential strategic threat; and second, since Egypt's ultimate intention is to incorporate this area into her territory, she must continue to occupy it and thus be able to mould public opinion there in favour of this eventual annexation.

Paragraph 6: Phrasing should be confined to the resettlement of refugees in the Arab parts of Palestine with the proviso that Israel will pay compensation to owners of property in Israel.

Paragraph 7: The guarantees given should be defined, and international guarantees should also be provided.

Paragraph 8: This is not explicit enough and the nature of the interests should be clearly stated: are they economic? social? political?

Paragraph 12: The second and third sections appear in the constitution of the Arab League and are thus redundant here and should be omitted.

Paragraph 13: Should be taken out of this context and included in separate agreements; in this connection, it is advisable that Israel submit proofs that she will not engage in economic competition and also suggest ways of cooperation with its accruing benefits.

Paragraph 14: Should be replaced by a different paragraph: "The rights of minorities in Israel holding Egyptian citizenship and of minorities in Egypt holding Israeli citizenship should be mutually respected". No discussion of population exchange is possible at this stage.

2

1. *Haifa Port* — will the Jews consent to make it a free port? If so, will they agree to a corridor linking it with the Arab part of Palestine?
2. *Expansion* — this is an issue of vital importance to the Arab world and must be discussed in the plan.
3. *Immigration and its dimensions* — this question is also of great interest to the Arab world and it should be discussed in the plan.
4. *Jerusalem and its Holy Places* — it is imperative that Israel define her position on this subject in the plan.
5. *Communism* — will it be possible to discuss a secret treaty against Communism in the Middle East?

Appendix III

Conversation with the Egyptian emissary

The meeting with Sasson took place on 30 September. The emissary

said he had received a coded telegram from the aide to the Major-domo, Hasan Yusuf, requesting that Sasson's plan of 22 September (see Vol. I, No. 541, Appendix) be submitted to the military and political advisers of the Egyptian delegation to the U.N. for their opinion. The advisers duly examined the plan in detail and gave to Sasson the observations and queries contained in Appendix II. Sasson's impression is that the matter has now acquired a serious character and he encloses the elucidations of the Egyptian emissary to the queries of the Egyptian delegation's advisers.

(a) The Egyptians are in earnest about planning to annex the Arab part of southern Palestine, which they need for two purposes: (1) in case of an armed conflict with Israel, battles would be fought on Palestinian and not on Egyptian soil; (2) to deny it to Transjordan, which would hand it over to the British for use as a military base. This is the rationale for Egyptian support of the Palestinian Gaza Government and for their demand of a free port at Haifa, which would become the sole outlet for the Arab parts of Palestine following Egyptian annexation of Gaza and the inclusion of Jaffa and Acre in Israel.

(b) As an Arab Muslim country, Egypt has an interest in Jerusalem and in the Old City in particular. Further, for internal reasons Egypt cannot acquiesce in having the Muslim Holy Places under Jewish supervision. (N.B.: the Egyptian emissary could not say what form of supervision Egypt would agree to — Jordanian? international? He nevertheless stressed that his government had no claims on Jerusalem or the Hebron area.)

(c) Egypt is apprehensive about Israel on three scores: (1) territorial expansion; (2) economic domination; (3) communist infiltration. The Egyptian emissary wanted detailed and convincing answers on these three points, and especially on the problem of immigration, in order to allay Egyptian apprehensions.

In conclusion the Egyptian emissary requested expediting the negotiations as much as possible and also stressed that these meetings were to be regarded not as official talks but merely as preliminary overtures. To his knowledge, Egypt desired a speedy disengagement from the Palestinian affair, though with dignity and without prejudice to her interests.

9. Y. Ratner (Moscow) to D. Ben-Gurion. 6 October 1948

Ratner reports on his meeting with General Antonov, the Deputy to General Vasilevsky, Chief of the Soviet Army's General Staff. Conversations of this sort with a military attaché are definitely out of the ordinary and he was thus requested to keep it in strict secrecy. The subjects discussed were the military situation in Israel, the likelihood of a renewal of hostilities, the Arab armies, ethnic minorities in the Middle East, the importance of the Negev and of Jerusalem, and the quality of the Israeli army and its commanders. In the context of possible Soviet aid to Israel

the following points were discussed: short- and long-term officer training programmes; supply of German spoils of war; sea and air shipment bases. These subjects will now be turned over for decision to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, and Ratner therefore urgently requires detailed lists of equipment and the quantities Israel wishes to obtain from the Soviet Union.

10. Meeting of the Israeli Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly (Paris, 7 October 1948)

Eban reports on his and Comay's meeting with Ross and Wilkins of the American delegation, at which a new note was sounded. The Americans admitted that the Bernadotte Plan might be approved at the current Session in stages rather than as a whole: the points on which there was a general consensus would be approved immediately, while those in dispute would be deferred to a later date. They would not commit themselves to details, although Israel believes that her admission to the U.N. and the termination of the Truce were two issues on which general agreement could be expected.

The Americans thought that Arab forces could be evacuated from Palestine only gradually and under the supervision of the Conciliation Commission, even if the Security Council passed the requisite resolution. Nor would the U.N. Truce Supervision machinery be dismantled all at once: it would continue to function alongside of the Conciliation Commission and would disband gradually, as would the Palestine Truce Commission.

Concerning the Negev, Eban's impression was that the Americans were working for a territorial compromise: they apparently doubted their ability to achieve a comprehensive settlement at this Session. They also conceded the existence of some reservations about the Bernadotte Plan among the various delegations.

They sought Israel's reaction to their proposal for dual trusteeship in Jerusalem (see No. 1). In their opinion, one member of the Commission would deal exclusively with the Jerusalem issue, basing himself on the existing situation. Eban queried whether states not on the Trusteeship Council, such as Jordan and Israel, could serve as Trustees over Jerusalem; the Americans contended there was no reason why Israel should not be a member of that Council.

A meeting with Bonneau and Parodi from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs also took place. The Frenchmen doubted whether this Session would provide the requisite two-thirds majority for any sort of territorial settlement, since both the Soviets and the Arabs would be in opposition. Eban observes that the French tended to support the Israeli position on the Negev. Sharett, however, feels that French assent was prompted by a realistic evaluation of the situation and by the moral

authority of Israel's claim to settle this region. Nonetheless, the French are very much aware of British plans for a land bridge from Gaza to Transjordan. Bonneau also emphasized that, in the event of renewed hostilities, Israel must be prepared for very active British support of the Arabs.

Towards the end the French raised the problem of the resumption of the operation of the Haifa refineries, and proposed that Israel transfer to France all the oil pumped by the Iraqis, in return for a French guarantee to supply Israel with all its crude oil needs from other sources. Their tone was practically that of supplicants; they stated that France's oil reserves would not last for more than a month.

M. Toff reports on his conversation with Bramuglia, the Argentine Foreign Minister and Representative on the Security Council. He had instructions from Perón to vote for internationalization of the Old City, and he asked for a memorandum on Israel's position *vis-à-vis* the Bernadotte Plan.

Comay's reports on his talks with members of the Dominions delegations. As long as there was coordination between Britain and the United States on the Israeli question, there was no prospect of the Dominions taking an independent stand. A public opinion poll in Canada showed a majority of 58% in favour of recognition of Israel.

Sasson reports on the tactics of the Arab delegations. The Arabs want to delay the debate until after the elections in the United States. The Americans are looking for a way out of the stalemate in their relations with the Arabs. If the Arabs succeed in blocking approval of the Bernadotte Report, they will vote in favour of the Conciliation Commission, and would then be able to tell their people that there has been no change in favour of the Jews; they would thus be in a position to guarantee to the Americans that hostilities would not be resumed.

Robinson explains a number of legal points:

(1) Stress must be placed on the fact that it is the Bernadotte Report and not the Palestine issue that was on the U.N. agenda.

(2) Concerning the Negev, in addition to the political arguments, it must be emphasized that it is part of a sovereign state, not to be detached from it by force.

(3) The Galilee and the Jerusalem Corridor are a different matter because Israel's claim to these areas does not impinge on the rights of any sovereign state. Jordan's right to annex parts of Palestine has no legal sanction; moreover, the existing boundaries do not encroach on its sovereignty.

(4) The 29 November resolution no longer applies with regard to Jerusalem, as the relevant clause was contingent on the establishment of the Economic Union by 29 April 1948. In the absence of a development, the legal validity of the relevant section of the resolution has been nullified.

Bernadotte acknowledged in his report that there was no prospect of the Economic Union's materializing.

(5) As for the 'Free Port' in Haifa, this term can be interpreted very broadly: the world boasts many ports enjoying varying degrees of freedom. This concept will have to be clarified in negotiations with the Arabs.

(6) The concept of a 'Free Airport' for Lydda is entirely new, but it transpires that, according to the Chicago Convention for Civilian Air Transport, all airports are to enjoy some degree of 'freedom'.

(7) As to the Conciliation Commission, its establishment would merely mean the transfer of the mediation process from one person to a body consisting of several members: the essential process would remain unchanged. In general, a mediating commission is set up as follows: each of the two parties assigns its representatives and these in turn appoint a third member to be the moderator, or else the moderator is appointed by the international body. Underlying such a commission is recognition of the existence of both parties and reciprocal recognition by the parties themselves. The Bernadotte Report, however, proposes something entirely different. There are three focal points: (a) the composition of the commission, (b) its positive, and particularly its negative, powers, (c) the advance setting of a termination date for its mandate. All in all, there are overmany authorities functioning in Palestine: the State of Israel, the Palestine Truce Commission, the Mediator and the U.N. Authority; the abolishment of the external authorities should be laid down as a condition.

Summing up by Sharett: Israel's position is grounded not on the Bernadotte Report but on the 29 November resolution, which however should be modified in the light of the past year's experiences. Israel is retaining hold of the areas it has occupied because others attempted to undermine the 29 November resolution. Israel will be prepared to discuss this matter when the stage of peace talks is reached.

13. J. Herzog [Rome] to M. Sharett (Paris). 7 October 1948

Herzog reports on his parting talk with Sigismondi of the Vatican Secretariat of State. (For previous conversations see Vol. I, Nos. 512, 554.) Sigismondi had given an account of the earlier talks to the Pope, who remains neutral on the Palestine issue and who recognizes the rights of the Jews, as he in fact declared to the Arab delegation two years ago.

According to Sigismondi, the Arabs are disillusioned with the Vatican and consider themselves betrayed. However, the Vatican's attitude has really not changed and the Arabs are wrong to equate diplomatic relations with friendship. Israel should understand the special position of the Church, which is conducting talks with Israel as a mark of good will.

As for the future, contacts with Testa (the Apostolic Delegate to Palestine) and with Vergani (Vicar-General of the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem for Galilee) should continue, but dealings with Rome itself should be kep

secret. The Vatican is studying Israel's attitude to the values upheld by the Church. It appreciates Sharett's views on the internationalization of Jerusalem and is of the opinion that the plan to hand it over to Abdallah was ill-conceived.

Herzog concludes that the Vatican has a positive attitude to Israel.

21. Meeting of the Israeli Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly (Paris, 11 October 1948)

Sharett reports on his talk with Secretary of State Marshall. He began by reminding Marshall of their last meeting on 8 May 1948, on the eve of the declaration of statehood (see *Documents, December 1947–May 1948,* No. 483), when the latter warned Sharett to beware of relying on ephemeral successes. Marshall now admitted the success was quite solid. When Sharett, with the aid of a map, explained to him Israel's stand on the Negev, he studied the map with interest, but then asked about the Galilee. Sharett explained that Israel had always claimed the Galilee; the lesson of the past year was that the 29 November boundaries as drawn up in the Galilee were untenable and Israel is now in occupation of this region. The conversation was brief, as Marshall was pressed for time, and they parted on the understanding that they would meet again.

A further talk, with Eban also present, was held with Dulles. Sharett had carefully pondered this step before approaching Dulles: having met the head of the U.S. delegation, it might be unadvisable to create the impression that Israel was courting the members of the delegation one by one. He finally decided to proceed, given Dulles' special standing in the delegation — he had been personally nominated by Truman but his appointment also had Dewey's endorsement. The talk was businesslike and exhaustive. (See No. 30.)

Sharett and Liwszyc met Vyshinsky and Malik of the Soviet delegation. Sharett gave an exposé on the background and on the course of events in Palestine, explaining in detail Israel's position on the Bernadotte Report and the 29 November boundaries. When he concluded, Vyshinsky turned to Malik and said: "All this sounds very reasonable". He nevertheless warned Sharett of the danger inherent in the Israeli arguments, because any deviation from the 29 November resolution opens the way to extortion. Sharett countered that the resolution had been duly accepted by Israel, but rejected by the other side — and this resulted in Israel's occupation of the Galilee and the question is whether anybody can now come and take it away from Israel. Vyshinsky saw no problem there, but did raise, together with Malik, numerous questions concerning Jerusalem. Sharett replied that experience has shown that a military force must be stationed in Jerusalem; the Americans will not despatch such a force and would moreover object if others did so. Besides, the Jewish population of

Jerusalem would not trust a foreign army, and the Israeli forces there will not withdraw. The conversation then turned to the American proposal regarding Jerusalem (see No. 1). Vyshinsky enquired whether the plan called for supervision over the city, and Sharett replied that it would be under the supervision of the Trusteeship Council; this satisfied Vyshinsky, since the U.S.S.R. is a member of the Trusteeship Council. Sharett hinted that he would be interested to learn the U.S.S.R.'s reaction to this plan, but received no information on this point. Sharett stressed that Israel would not agree to Arab trusteeship over the Old City, which should be internationalized; Israel, however, would assent to Arab trusteeship over part of the New City.

Vyshinsky asked whether Israel saw any prospect of peace with the Arabs, and Sharett replied that the Arabs were ready for peace but under conditions unacceptable to Israel. Both Egypt and Transjordan would be prepared to make peace if they were given at least a part of the Negev. Vyshinsky enquired about Abdallah, and Sharett explained that the latter's desire for peace did not spring from British initiative but from his own wish to be rid of British domination. Israel would prefer an independent Arab state in the Arab part of Palestine, but there was no prospective nucleus of public figures around which this could be established. Israel can find no common language with the Gaza Government owing to its political and social character, and thus other possibilities have to be explored.

Vyshinsky advised Israel to prepare a draft of the resolution it would wish to see approved at the First Committee, and asked to see a copy of this draft. He asked whether Israel was growing stronger and whether its population was increasing; Sharett replied in the affirmative. (This point could serve in future to initiate a discussion on immigration to Israel.) Sharett also touched on the subject of the oil concessions and explained that a young state could not start off by abrogating concessions.

Eban reports on his meetings with Bunche, who had just arrived in Paris. At the first meeting Bunche dwelt mainly on a report he had received from Israel about danger to the lives of U.N. personnel stationed there, and he barely touched on the political issues. He said he had been told Israel was making no distinction between the southern and the northern parts of the Negev and was claiming the entire Negev.

Following this meeting the Israeli delegation discovered that Bunche was giving currency to the notion that the Negev was not of primary importance to Israel, and that her insistence on it was just a bargaining ploy. An additional meeting with Bunche was therefore sought, with Eban and Comay vigorously defending the delegation's stand on the Negev, and emphasizing Israel's rejection of the Assembly's right to detach the Negev from Israel: should such a resolution be passed, Israel would react by putting up additional settlements in this area. Bunche replied that the impression he received in Tel Aviv was that Israel did not

stand by the 29 November resolution and favoured a revision. It was explained to him that Israel stood by the 29 November boundaries delimiting those areas over which she had control; the Galilee, Jerusalem and the Corridor, however, did not constitute a part of any sovereign state.

Bunche was told that Israel's criticism of the Bernadotte Report meets with sympathetic responses on the part of other delegations to the U.N., many asking how the severance of the Negev from Israel could possibly be justified. Bunche took this opportunity to relate his version of how this proposal came about: after a sleepless night Bernadotte called on Bunche at 5 a.m. and told him that while he had previously considered giving the Arabs only the part of the Negev south of the 31st parallel, he had now decided to win them over by detaching the Negev in its entirety from the State of Israel. The truth of the matter, as well known to Israel, was that Bernadotte's proposals were elaborated jointly by the British and the Americans and the part dealing with the Negev originated with the British.

Bunche represents an effective reinforcement to supporters of the Bernadotte Plan, though he himself perceives that the effect produced by the Mediator's murder is gradually waning. The Israeli delegation has been told that he had prepared a draft resolution for the Assembly while still at Rhodes, whereby the Report was accepted as a basis for settlement and a commission was appointed to fix the boundaries, supervise their integrity and deal with related matters. Bunche suggested a special meeting on the subject of Jerusalem.

Comay relates that during the conversation, when asked whether the British had any special interest in the Negev, Bunche reacted so violently as to arouse suspicion. At the end of that meeting he asked whether Israel was interested in some other demarcation line. He repeated his argument that relinquishing part of the Negev would move the Arabs to commensurate concessions.

Weissman reports on his meeting with the Dutch delegation. The reasons advanced for the Negev's importance to Israel met with understanding and sympathy, as did the argument for the Galilee. Not so in the matter of Jerusalem: the Dutch view the Israeli position as a radical departure from the 29 November resolution; they asked for a detailed memorandum on this issue and said they were awaiting instructions from The Hague. The Dutch did not raise the refugee problem. They said they had already overcome the inclination to identify the entire people of Israel with the murderers of Bernadotte, but that other delegations were still affected by that deed.

At the conclusion of the meeting Sharett reads out the draft resolution which it was proposed to submit to the First Committee (untraced, but see No. 7 — an earlier version drawn up by Comay). Sharett suggests that the refugee issue be omitted from the draft; Robinson counters that this issue cannot be ignored. It would be better for Israel to state explicitly

that the solution lies in resettlement, especially as both Bernadotte and Bevin were of the same opinion.

28. Meeting of the Israeli Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly (Paris, 15 October 1948)

Sharett reports on his conversation with Tsaldaris, the Greek Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, at which the Greek Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was also present. Tsaldaris had apparently intended to persuade Israel to agree to a postponement of the debate on Palestine, but as the matter had already been resolved he did not broach it at all. The conversation that ensued was quite pertinent. There was a discernible desire on their part to make amends for their vote the previous year, but they are finding it somewhat of a problem because of their relations with the Arabs and particularly with Egypt, which has a large community of Greek extraction. Tsaldaris urged Israel to smooth the way for the Arabs to make peace; he took for granted that they must be offered the Bernadotte Plan. In the course of the conversation he openly admitted that he had erred in his evaluation of the situation, never imagining that Israel would be able to hold its own.

Sharett turns to his discussion with Spaak, in which Weissman also took part. It was not an easy meeting. Spaak inquired whether Israel had applied for participation in the meetings of the First Committee, and advised that this be done forthwith. His wording suggested that Transjordan had been invited. When asked whether Transjordan would represent the Palestinian Arabs, and what would happen if the Palestinian Gaza Government requested permission to attend, he was unable to reply: this question apparently took him unawares.

Sharett said that Israel's admission to the U.N. and an invitation to both sides to hold talks would promote peace as this would afford the Arab governments a justification *vis-á-vis* their people. Spaak concurred on the need for such a justification but contended that Israel's admission to the U.N. and an invitation to hold talks would not suffice: in his opinion what was required was an effective guarantee against expansion. Sharett replied that Israel was prepared to give such guarantees and on admission to the U.N. would give an undertaking not to seek alteration of the boundaries by force. Spaak stated that his main apprehension concerned immigration; he wanted assurances that Israel would not spill over and extend beyond its borders. Sharett explained that immigration was the *raison d-être* of the State of Israel and not just a matter of prestige. Here Spaak said he was arguing with Sharett as one socialist with another; he said he understood that Israel was now passing through a phase of nationalism, but as socialists the Israelis ought to recognize the limits. Sharett replied that a "Weltanschauung" was not something abstract but

the sum total of a country's interests, and so it was for Israel. Israel would not sacrifice itself for the world's sake but would accept its authority when admitted to take its place as an equal among the nations. When asked what made the Arabs so afraid of a new and small state, Spaak replied that Israel had proved itself able to withstand the combined onslaught of the Arab states; Sharett explained that the secret of Israel's resolute stand lay not only in that her soldiers were better but mainly in the fact that they were fighting for their country and their freedom. Sharett also referred to Israel's position between the East and the West and pointed out that adverse Western policy was the surest way to drive Israel into the arms of the East. Israel for her part was interested in maintaining a balance between the two sides, as was in fact the present situation despite the attitude of the Western states; this argument made an impression on Spaak. The conversation also turned on the Jewish people and their position in the world. Spaak said that the whole world was open to the Jews, who are a very talented people and so on. Sharett gave him a short lecture on Zionism, explaining that its aim was not to disperse the Jews but to bring them together and to construct an independent social structure. Throughout the conversation Spaak kept reiterating his acceptance of the State of Israel as a fact — he may have wanted to extract a price for such acceptance.

Sharett went alone to meet Undén, the Swedish Foreign Minister. The talk was trying. Undén is a man of few words, rough and unbending. The conversation began with the Bernadotte assassination, Undén stating that Sweden lays part of the blame on Israel; he maintained that no escort had been provided for the Count's entourage although its route lay close to a Lehi encampment, that the Israeli liaison officer had abandoned the Count, and that in general Israel had shown too much leniency to the terrorists.

To begin with, Sharett asked that "responsibility" be substituted for "blame". Then he dwelt on what the affair had meant for Israel and for himself personally, particularly in view of Israel's feelings towards the Swedish people and their behaviour during and after the Second World War. He proceeded to address Undén's accusations: Israel had duly offered to furnish a bodyguard for U.N. personnel but this was turned down, presumably for fear of surveillance over their activities; the liaison officer was unarmed, but he had rushed to help the Count, and even received a letter of commendation — Sharett would furnish further details on this; and concerning the dissidents — a legacy from the Mandatory regime — whether or not to disband them forcibly was not an easy decision, involving as it did possible bloodshed.

The talk then turned to political issues: Israel's admission to the U.N., the Negev, Jerusalem. Sharett had the impression that regarding Jerusalem Undén admitted the weight of Israel's arguments, but not so in respect of the Negev: he argued that Bernadotte's very proposal indicated

his belief that the two sides would reach a compromise. Sharett replied that the 29 November boundaries in themselves were a compromise for Israel, which she had accepted and the Arabs had rejected, and now Israel was being further pressed to compromise on a compromise.

Sharett and David Liwszyc met Tsarapkin, the U.S.S.R. representative on the Trusteeship Council, and discussed in detail all the territorial aspects of the Bernadotte Plan. Tsarapkin dwelt in particular on the subject of the Galilee and declared he could not reconcile Israel's insistence on the 29 November borders with her demand for their modification in the Galilee. Sharett replied that Israel would herself raise only the Negev issue, but would answer with respect to the Galilee if someone else introduced the subject. To Tsarapkin's contention that Israel's claim to the Galilee denies this area to the Palestinian Arab State envisaged in the 29 November resolution, Sharett replied that, in the event such a state were established and then entered into a treaty with Israel, Israel would be prepared to negotiate on the boundaries and perhaps even make some concessions. (Sharett remarks here that perhaps he had gone too far in giving this assurance.)

Regarding Jerusalem Sharett gave an account of the American proposal for a trusteeship, and explained that Israel's reaction was not totally negative; rather, Israel sought to confine the trusteeship to the Old City.

In the light of his conversation with Tsarapkin, Sharett formulated the following plan of action: Israel will demand recognition of its existence in accordance with the 29 November resolution; she will demand the evacuation of the invading forces; and will demand that the parties be required to enter on peace negotiations and that a commission be set up to further this aim.

Sharett and Eban saw Mrs Pandit, the Indian Ambassador to Moscow and Head of the Indian delegation to the U.N. General Assembly. Mrs Pandit is a woman of an extremely impressive appearance and great personal charm. The conversation remained mainly on a personal plane and was very friendly.

Sharett and Liwszyc had a meeting with Sobolev, the Assistant Secretary-General of the U.N. in charge of Security Council Affairs. In Sobolev's estimate, the Security Council meeting of 14 October (see No. 28, n. 14) had been intended to produce a climate detrimental to Israel, and this was indeed achieved. As regards the forthcoming debate in the First Committee, the first problem will be the issue of invitations to the contending parties to appear at the sessions. Israel has already submitted an application and the Arabs will clearly register an objection. The decision to invite Jordan will probably also elicit Arab objection. There is also the problem of the Arab Gaza Government: Sharett pointed out that this government defied the authority of the U.N. Assembly and it is inconceivable that it should be invited to attend. The Arabs of Palestine will thus end up with no representation, as the Arab Higher Committee, which had

hitherto been invited to attend, has been absorbed by the Gaza Government.

Sobolev assumed that Israel would be the first, or among the first, to address the Committee. Bunche need not open the debate because the Bernadotte Report speaks for itself. Sobolev was certain that following the debate a sub-committee would be elected.

Sobolev has a very realistic perception of the fate awaiting the Arab part of Palestine. His reactions are interesting: he is 101% Soviet but not bound by the stricture of Soviet diplomacy; he realizes that this is not an ideological problem and that its solution does not lie with Israel; he openly stated that the future of that region would be decided in a confrontation between Transjordan and Egypt. He also accepts the following principles: the recognition of Israel, an injunction on the parties to negotiate, and the establishment of a good offices commission. In addition, Sobolev opposes Tsarapkin's idea of reviving the United Nations Palestine Commission (see No. 28, n. 18).

Regarding the boundaries, he pointed out that Israel's arguments were self-contradictory: the declared readiness to enter into peace negotiations with the hostile nations and the assertion that the boundaries question will be settled in the course of such negotiations are an implicit acknowledgement of the enemy states' right to territorial claims. In his opinion Israel should declare itself for a separate Arab state with which she would be prepared to negotiate on the boundaries. He concedes that a settlement cannot be enforced but should be sought through mutual accord and negotiations. If no agreement is in sight, the services of a mediator would be required and this is where the commission comes in.

Eban concurred with Sobolev's estimate of what the 14 October Security Council meeting aimed to achieve, but in his opinion the evaluation of its results is a matter for psychology. His personal view is that no fundamental change has occurred — an attempt was made to bring up the past and to revive the impact created by the assassination; it would seem the move came too late.

32. Meeting of the Israeli Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly (Paris, 18 October 1948)

Sharett opens by saying that the meeting will be devoted to a discussion on the line to be taken by Israel at the First Committee, but in this connection he would like first to report on the conversation he had with Evatt, the Australian Foreign Minister and President of the U.N. General Assembly.

The talk was friendly and cordial. Evatt agrees that Israel's admission to the U.N. should be carried at this session of the Assembly. The unsettled boundaries are irrelevant, as there is a stable government. In his

opinion the boundaries issue will not be settled at this Assembly. A commission will probably be appointed which will not only function as a "good offices committee" but will also be empowered to submit recommendations on the boundaries to the next Assembly, if the parties cannot reach an agreement. This conception differs from Sobolev's, who sees in the commission a mediating body and would give it wider powers. Sharett told Evatt he agreed with his approach: Israel would thereby risk nothing and gain her admission to the U.N., and in the course of the coming year can consolidate her position as she is now doing in the Negev.

As to Australia's non-recognition of Israel, Sharett's impression was that Evatt felt uncomfortable about it and the matter weighed on him.

The discussion then turned to Israel's appearance before the First Committee. In Sharett's opinion action should now be directed to focusing public opinion along specific lines.

In the matter of Israel's admission to the U.N., there is a specific resolution of the Government to submit such an application, but the timing has been left to the discretion of the delegation. Obviously, the delegation will be taking a great responsibility on itself if the application is not submitted before the conclusion of the Assembly's sessions. In Sharett's opinion this matter should now be forcefully pursued, without linking it to a comprehensive settlement. In discussions with other delegations Israel should point out that there are five Arab states members of the U.N. with the right to vote on crucial issues for Israel, while Israel disposes of not even a single vote. Sasson would not regard it as a catastrophe if Israel's application is rejected. He thinks the other delegations should be told that Israel's admission to the U.N. would make it easier for the Arab governments to enter on peace talks. Eban agrees that concentrating on the subject of admission might prove successful in sidetracking the Assembly from the issue of the boundaries: there is a general tendency to settle points on which there is a consensus, such as the existence of the State of Israel, and to defer a decision on complex points. Weissman is also in favour of submitting the application, even at the risk of rejection. Sharett sums up: approaches on this subject to the members of the Security Council must be vigorously pursued, starting already this week.

Robinson reverts to Evatt's analysis and wonders whether it is preferable for this proposal to be submitted in advance or whether it should emerge in the course of the debate. He does not think it practical to work in that direction from the start, as this would alert Israel's adversaries who would be joined by supporters of the Bernadotte Plan. It would be better to mobilize Israel's supporters against those sections of the Report unfavourable to Israel: this will result in a stalemate, with events developing as outlined by Evatt.

Goldmann suggests that one of Israel's supporters propose the appointment of a good offices commission even prior to the nomination of the sub-committee: this proposal has no prospect of adoption but will be

confronting the sub-committee when it starts its deliberations, and might thus divert attention from the problem of the boundaries. This idea appeals to Sharett.

Sasson asserts that Israel has two goals for this Assembly: first, that the Bernadotte Plan be neither approved nor rejected but simply fade away; this will not be difficult to achieve since the Arabs have the same objective. Second, that Israel secure a resolution on the establishment of a Conciliation Commission before the nomination of the sub-committee.

Robinson points out that the tactics of the delegation should take cognizance of the fact that the aim at this Assembly is not only to thwart unfavourable resolutions but also to promote favourable ones. He comments that the problem of the armistice in Palestine is not a matter for the Assembly but for the Security Council.

D. Liwszyc sees three areas in which Israel must draw lines of departure and of retreat — the political, the military and the territorial. With regard to Israel's admission to the U.N., no retreat is possible and he is in no doubt whatsoever that the application must be submitted. In the military sphere, Israel must demand the evacuation of the invading armies: the East European states are particularly insistent on this point. There is no guarantee that it is in the Assembly's power to achieve this aim, but the demand should nonetheless be presented by Israel herself. The truce must be replaced by a peace settlement; Israel should draft a broad declaration which could also be adopted by the Assembly. The idea of a Conciliation Commission is advantageous to Israel, as it would result in a reduction of the Truce Supervision apparatus and as more than one party would be represented on it. The contending parties themselves should not be members of the commission: the advantage of an Israeli member there would be offset by the disadvantage of the corresponding presence of an Arab member. Liwszyc does not expect notable achievements in the territorial issue, but it is vital that Israel's voice be heard. He can perceive advantages in the American proposal for a trusteeship for Jerusalem: it would give Israel the status of a trustee, that is membership in the Trusteeship Council, and would in no way weaken Israel's actual position in Jerusalem. This proposal might also bring about U.S.–U.S.S.R. cooperation.

Sharett refers to the American trusteeship proposal, which he mentioned to Evatt, who reacted with caution. He asked what the status of the Christians would be should the city be divided between the Jews and the Arabs, and Sharett explained that Israel would prefer to have the Old City under an international regime, with a Christian governor. This met with Evatt's approval.

Sasson reverts to the question of representation of the parties on the Conciliation Commission and, unlike Liwszyc, considers it a move towards mutual recognition and negotiation.

Sharett sums up the debate. Six points have been brought up: (1) Is-

rael's admission to the U.N.; (2) withdrawal of the invading armies; (3) summoning of the two parties to peace negotiations; (4) the Conciliation Commission; (5) settlement of the boundaries; (6) the status of Jerusalem.

The first four points can and should be dealt with by the Assembly; the last two must be brought before the Commission.

The question of the representation of the parties on the Commission (point 4) remains open: participation of the parties could expedite Israel's admission to the U.N., but it could also create complications and bickering within the Commission which, in the long run, might result in its failure.

As regards the fifth point, the most favourable outcome would be the absence of any resolution.

In the matter of the sixth point, too, Israel is not eager for a resolution to be adopted. Sharett expects the Americans to be content with establishing the principle of international supervision and not to attempt to put their own proposal through. Israel will exploit this opportunity to demonstrate the impracticability of an international regime.

In general, Sharett believes that during the first stage of the proceedings Israel should allow her supporters to criticize, to oppose, and thus to cause a stalemate, so that the need for a commission to deal with the issue becomes obvious.

Liwszyc again raises the question of the Arab part of Palestine. Sharett replies that Israel would prefer an independent Arab state to annexation by Transjordan.

At the conclusion of the meeting Sharett reads out his telegram on the events in the Negev (see Main Volume, No. 31, and also Editorial Note, pp. 114–15 below) and outlines Israel's line of argumentation on this matter.

45. Meeting of the Israeli Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly (Paris, 21 October 1948)

Kenen opens the meeting by reading out Israel's reply to the Security Council's call for a cease-fire (see No. 44) and announcing that Beersheba has been taken. Sharett reads out a telegram dated 20 October describing the military situation (see No. 45, n. 2), and then proceeds to report on his meeting with French Foreign Minister Schuman. The talk was businesslike and open; on its conclusion Schuman acknowledged the importance of the subjects discussed.

France has not yet made up her mind on the Palestinian problem: usually they confer with Britain and the U.S. on this matter, but Bevin has not arrived yet and Schuman has still not met Marshall. In any case, France is under no obligation to accept the advice of these countries.

Sharett raised the subject of the Negev and Jewish settlement there, the Dead Sea, and an outlet to the Red Sea at Aqaba. Schuman said he only

now realized the importance of these matters and asked the reason for the Mediator's proposals. Sharett replied that the Bernadotte Plan was devised in collusion with the British and the Americans, and gave Schuman the details of its conception as disclosed to Israel (see No. 21, n. 7). The British had at first attempted to bring about the destruction of Israel and once this failed, they were now trying to deprive Israel of its means of existence. The Americans are actually not overly enthusiastic about the Bernadotte Plan but they support it to please their British allies; this is why they are less inflexible than the British and are seeking a compromise. Israel, on the other hand, cannot compromise on the Negev because it is the only area left for expansion and development.

Schuman asked whether the Galilee would not compensate for the loss of the Negev, and Sharett replied that Israel had always claimed the Galilee and now in fact held it. Occupation of the Galilee, moreover, gives Israel a common border with the Lebanon; Schuman agreeed that Israeli cooperation with the Lebanese Maronites was a future possibility.

Regarding Jerusalem Sharett informed Schuman of the American trusteeship proposal (see No. 1), which Israel considers interesting, as she does not believe in the practicability of international rule for the whole city. On the other hand, Israel insists on international rule for the Old City and the Holy Places and on the need to appoint a Christian governor for this zone. This explanation seemed to satisfy and relieve Schuman.

Sharett then raised the subject of Israel's admission to the U.N., and suggested that it would be easier for France to support this in the context of international politics than to act as an individual country in the matter of recognition. Schuman thereupon asked whether there was a precedent for supporting admission to the U.N. prior to recognition, and Sharett cited the Yemen, which has been recognized by fewer states than has Israel but is a member of the U.N. Fischer — who took part in the conversation — reminded Schuman of France's support for the admission of Jordan though she has not recognized that state so far. Sharett described as intolerable the state of affairs whereby Arab states members of the U.N. debate and vote on the Palestinian issue while Israel has not a single vote there. Israel's admission would also be conducive to peace negotiations as it would provide the Arab states with justification to negotiate with Israel. Moreover, if Israel is denied admission owing to pressure from Western countries, this would strengthen those elements in Israel favouring an understanding with the East. This last argument seemed to have made an impression on Schuman.

Schuman raised the refugee problem, and apparently somebody had spoken to him about it. Sharett explained that Israel could not permit the return of refugees while the state of war persisted. When asked whether the refugees could return once peace was attained, he replied that the best solution would be their resettlement in the Arab countries, and this is a historic opportunity to achieve this end.

Schuman then asked what was Israel's estimate on the prospects for peace and on the Arab state most positively inclined to it. He was told that peace was possible and that Jordan was the most amenable country, although Abdallah's position creates complications. It was not inconceivable that under certain circumstances Egypt would also be prepared to negotiate for peace, but in both instances everything depended on British policy.

Schuman stressed repeatedly during the conversation that France did not concur with British policy in the Middle East, and Sharett also inferred that France was not a party to the Anglo-American collusion.

Schuman expressed thanks for Israel's aid to France in the matter of the oil from the Haifa refineries.

Eban reports on his meeting with Bunche, held at the latter's request. After a conciliatory preamble, Bunche admitted pessimism regarding his mission as well as the U.N.'s ability to function effectively. He was not certain that the Assembly could stabilize the situation in Palestine. Eban's impression was that while Bunche had not yet quite given up the Bernadotte Plan and was still attempting to revive it, he was also considering to recommend direct negotiations between the parties. Eban encouraged him in this direction and also sustained his general pessimism. Bunche promised to prepare a draft resolution and to show it to the Israeli delegation.

Eban also met Trygve Lie, who was delighted with the news about the Negev and was in a jovial mood. Lie gathered from British sources that they, too, were pleased with the events, and though they would have preferred the Negev to go to Abdallah, if he could not have it they would then rather see Israel there than the Egyptians. Lie said that the Anglo-Americans were preparing a draft resolution for the First Committee which would express general support for the Bernadotte Plan and would propose a conciliation commission.

Liwszyc had a long and difficult talk with Katz-Suchy about Israel's position between the East and the West. Katz-Suchy said that their support for Israel had previously been wholehearted, but at present they were not sure of Israel's attitude. When Liwszyc inquired whether they had formerly supported Israel in the hope she would join the Eastern Bloc, he replied in the negative, but warned that their attitude would henceforth depend on Israel's foreign policy. Liwszyc noted that this worked both ways. In the course of the conversation Katz-Suchy put many questions about life in Israel, about political parties, the budget, the army etc. Liwszyc carried away the impression that the meeting had improved mutual understanding.

Liwszyc also met Lange, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, with whom he had a thorough and exhausting talk. Lange evinced interest in the welfare and future of the refugees and in Israel's relations with the Arab states. In this connection Liwszyc reports that Yakov Malik, the U.S.S.R.

Permanent Representative at the U.N., warned him that Israel should not rely too much on the smaller countries, such as Norway, who will in any case do what the Anglo-Saxons tell them to, and in particular must not depend on Evatt, the President of the Assembly.

Fischer reports on his talk with Parodi, the French representative at the U.N., who finds it difficult to support Israel in public.

Toff says of the Latin Americans that they are "O.K.".

Kahany reports on the debate on the refugees at the Third Committee (see No. 45, n. 11).

Sharett reads out a draft of the Anglo-American proposal (see Main Volume, Appendix B; No. 57).

69. Y. Shimoni (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (Paris). 27 October 1948

Shimoni raises the question of Israel's relations with Turkey and Iran. He suggests that Eban, or some other member of the Israeli delegation, meet the Turkish representatives to the U.N. Assembly and sound them out on the possibility of the despatch of a diplomatic or an economic mission to Turkey, which would lay the groundwork for a permanent office there. He would prefer this indirect approach to a direct one. Israel would also be prepared to consider sending a delegation of a less formal character, or even under a different guise, should the Turkish authorities insist on it.

Israel is also interested in establishing relations with Iran. Failing any other overtures, it has been suggested that Israel offer moral and political support to Iran in their border dispute with Iraq over Shatt al-Arab, or in any other political disagreement Iran might have with any Arab country. Such an approach is fraught with the obvious danger that Iran might report it to the Iraqis. Moreover, it is a moot question whether Israel should commit herself to definite anti-Arab acts prior to ascertaining that there is no hope of peace with the Arab states. Shimoni knows that Eban would prefer to keep the door open to the Arab world and not to ally oneself with anti-Arab forces.

86. I. Barzilai (Warsaw) to M. Sharett. 1 November 1948

The Israeli Minister in Poland reports on the situation there.

There is nothing new politically. Poland's attitude is friendly, and so is the press and public opinion. The campaign in Palestine is being covered in detail, with open satisfaction at every Israeli achievement. Some of the leaders of the regime, several ministers and the Deputy Speaker of the Sejm spoke at a reception given by the Committee for Polish-Israeli Friendship. When meeting various officials Barzilai finds a great deal of interest and understanding for Israel's complex political situation. It is true that not everything is accepted at its face value and fundamental

explanations are necessary, but these meet with a receptive attitude. He is forging ties with the diplomatic corps which are especially friendly in the case of the countries which have recognized Israel.

The problems of the emigration to Israel are more complicated. A combination of various events has worked lately to intensify the drive for *aliya:* the Berlin crisis; economic developments in Poland caused by the change-over to a socialist economy; Israel's military victories; the opening of the Legation and the possibility of obtaining a visa to Israel. The Jews are very sensitive to these happenings and when their strongly aroused urge was not afforded an immediate outlet there appeared manifestations of agitation and panic which had an unfavourable influence on the government. There is no clear policy on emigration. The enlistment of pioneers and the training camps programme are coming to an end. The agreement at the time was for the enlistment of 1500 men, but actually more than 2000 enrolled, and the balance of some 5–600 should leave in November. Some 1500 Jews in possession of *aliya* passports will also be able to emigrate as soon as the transit problems are solved. The situation is not clear in regard to other prospective emigrants. Hopefully the door will not close, but the number of those who will be permitted to leave is uncertain and is probably dependent on international events and also on developments around Israel. The emigrants' impatience is understandable, but Barzilai urges that the entire affair not be given publicity, particularly not in the press, as this would harm the efforts being made on the spot.

Poland is very much interested in commercial relations with us, Israel's needs and possible exports to Poland to be given due consideration. It is hoped here that Israel will soon be able to submit a detailed proposal.

The Legation is active in the sphere of information. Many people wish to maintain contact with the Legation, which has begun to issue a bulletin; there are various proposals for reciprocal publicity and information agreements.

The consular office here is under heavy pressure. There is the problem of transit visas for immigrants going through France and Czechoslovakia. There are other problems of organization and funds. Barzilai urges that the monthly budget be transferred on time.

92. Y. Shimoni (Tel Aviv) to E. Sasson (Paris). 2 November 1948

Shimoni briefs Sasson on the relations and contacts with Arabs in the Arab part of Palestine. At the time Sharett instructed the Middle East Division in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to find ways to bring these Arabs to set up an independent government, to urge them to other acts of defiance against the dominant extremist line and to persuade them to sign a pact with Israel. Several emissaries were sent over and the answers they

brought back were favourable and very optimistic; this was especially the case with one emissary who had contacted two Arab personalities [the names have been omitted here] who told him that the Arabs, the people as well as the notables, had become disillusioned with the entire leadership — the Arab League, the Arab states, the Mufti, the Palestinian Gaza Government, and Abdallah; they wanted to negotiate with Israel on a peace agreement. Similar reports arrived from another source.

This development has given rise to an entire complex of considerations: what should we demand of the Arabs — that they set up an overt Palestinian government? with Abdallah? against Abdallah? a government-in-exile in Israel? that they rise against Abdallah? form a resistance movement? lay the ground for an Israeli takeover? — In this connection the issue also arises of our boundaries with the Arab part. And meanwhile the military situation is changing daily: the I.D.F. is occupying more and more of the Arab parts of Palestine, setting up *faits accomplis* and making the political plans obsolete before they have crystallized. In addition, Ben-Gurion himself is highly sceptical — almost scornful — of all these political schemes and the impression is that he prefers to solve all these problems by force of arms.

The day before Shimoni had a meeting with Sharett on these issues but they came to no agreement. In his opinion the idea of urging the Arabs of the Arab part of Palestine to set up a government in open defiance of the Mufti, Abdallah, Egypt and the Arab League — is an illusion; the possible solutions are: they should organize a resistance movement (and there is only a slight chance of success for these people to organize an effective underground), or they should set up a government-in-exile, or Israel should come to an agreement with one of the Arab governments and then the Palestinian Arabs could act in concord both with Israel and with that Arab government. It stands to reason that for the parts bordering on Transjordan the Arab government in question would be that of Abdallah, though for other reasons it would be preferable to concentrate the efforts on an agreement with Egypt. Sharett's main apprehension was that Iraq might annex Transjordan some time in the future and if the Arab parts of Palestine were now to be annexed to Transjordan then Israel would have Iraq on her doorstep.

Shimoni himself attaches no great importance to this last argument. The danger of Iraq annexing Transjordan is ever present, and if that happens then Iraq could very easily take over also the Arab Palestinian state whatever its regime or its relations with Transjordan. Sharett has apparently been convinced on this point, but he is still of the opinion that the threat of an independent Arab state and purposeful activity in that direction would give Israel a decided advantage in the negotiations with Abdallah and with Egypt. In that event, in Shimoni's opinion, Israel's approach to the negotiations should be completely different.

To sum up: Sharett came to no definite conclusion in the course of that

discussion and has issued no definite instructions; the deliberations and consultations will continue. In the meantime the Middle East Division is taking no action in this matter and has suspended the negotiations with the people in the Arab parts of Palestine.

[The last part of the letter is omitted here.]

107. M. Sharett [Tel Aviv] to G. Meyerson (Moscow). 5 November 1948

Sharett gives a résumé of Israel's position in the United Nations General Assembly:

(1) The Bernadotte Report was formulated in concert by Britain and the United States.

(2) Britain's main purpose in attempting to detach the Negev from Israel is to create a land bridge from Gaza as far as Basra, consisting of Transjordan and Iraq, under continuous British hegemony, as a substitute for the positions evacuated and as a defence zone towards the east. The defence of the Suez Canal and of the oil sources is of secondary importance. It is possible that a Gaza-Elath canal to replace the Suez Canal is also under consideration.

(3) With that aim in view, Britain is prepared to reward Egypt with the southern Negev as long as the northern Negev with Gaza go to Transjordan.

(4) The United States, on the other hand, is not committed to handing over the northern Negev and Gaza to Transjordan, and is prepared to come to a compromise with Israel on the 31st parallel as long as the southern Negev is given up to ensure the unbroken continuity of Arab territories and to provide air bases for the protection of the Persian oilfields.

(5) Israel has not responded to the U.S. invitation to negotiate on a compromise and is standing firm on the Negev in its entirety — both in earnest and as a tactical move *vis-à-vis* the Russians: if the decision goes against Israel it will be an act of constraint and not the result of a compromise.

(6) At the beginning of the debate on the Negev at the Assembly, Israel's position was weak — even as regarded the northern Negev — because of the Egyptian blockade, on which the Mediator also based his proposal that the Negba–Jatt line be Israel's southern boundary. Israel's principal argument then depended on the 29 November resolution and on the existence of 25 Jewish settlements south of the proposed line. Paradoxically, it is the present change in the situation that underlines the fact that Israel is not in possession of the southern triangle of the Negev and of Elath. Sharett therefore considers that Israel should make every effort to become entrenched in Elath and in the stations *en route.*

(7) Israel's strong position on the Galilee results from her effective

occupation of this area, which has been recently completed. The Russians had accepted Israel's claim even before the last victory, some with and some without pointing out the danger that the 29 November resolution might become undermined: they agreed that the course of events necessarily called for border revision in the Galilee. Vyshinsky expressly said that the Galilee constituted no problem. To Tsarapkin's contention that the projected Arab state had no living room left, Sharett replied that if such a state were to be set up, Israel would be prepared to negotiate a border settlement, but the establishment of such a state is beyond Israel's control.

(8) The Americans showed some flexibility in the matter of Jerusalem relative to the Bernadotte Report, as they also did on the northern Negev. They put forward a private plan of their own for Israeli–Arab trusteeship over Jerusalem (see No. 1), arguing that an international force was quite impractical and that in the absence of the projected Economic Union (between Israel and the Arab state) Jerusalem lacked a viable economic basis. Israel has not given her consent to this proposal but has implied that it would be given favourable consideration, except for the Old City which, Israel insists, must be under direct U.N. rule. Several countries have been informed by Israel of this American proposal. The Russians viewed it favourably, because they saw in the annexation of Jerusalem to Israel the most serious infraction of the 29 November resolution, and because the plan would accord a certain jurisdiction over Jerusalem to the Trusteeship Council of the U.N., of which the U.S.S.R. is a member. The French and the Australians welcomed Israel's proposal regarding the Old City, as it would call for a Christian governor over the walled area, and were inclined to agree to Israeli trusteeship for the New City. The Russians, too, were in favour of U.N. rule over the Old City and did not object to Arab trusteeship over part of the New City. In all the talks with the delegations it was stressed that for reasons of security it was imperative that a land bridge be established between Jewish Jerusalem and the State of Israel.

(9) To sum up: it is not in Israel's interest that the boundary issues be resolved in the Assembly, because (a) there is no prospect of a 2/3 majority for the 29 November borders including the revisions demanded by Israel, (b) because Israel is anyway in occupation of most of the areas she is claiming, and (c) because the only area she is claiming and which is not under her control is the southern Negev — and here the basis for her claim is exactly the 29 November resolution. Prior to the military successes in the Negev a 2/3 majority for the Mediator's proposals was not in view, but now, following the Arab defeat, there is at least the theoretical possibility that the Arabs would seize on the Report as a last resort and then the voting balance would shift in their favour. Notwithstanding this risk, the very fact of Israel's possession of the territories in question is a powerful argument against the possibility of an attempt to evict her by force. The main danger lies in a possible proposal for a compromise

which might attract a voting majority, in particular if Israel is not by then in effective possession of Elath.

(10) On the other hand, Israel is interested in a resolution affirming her existence, and demanding the evacuation of the invading Arab forces, the termination of hostilities and the initiation of peace negotiations; the appointment of a conciliation commission is probably unavoidable, and Israel is therefore making every effort to broaden its base and to limit its powers, so that it would be in effect a good offices commission only, would not interfere and would not arbitrate, and in the lack of an agreement would at most submit its recommendations to the next Assembly. In any case, a commission is preferable to a single mediator. As to the issue of Jerusalem with its complex of trusteeship problems — this should preferably be debated by a commission and not in the Assembly.

(11) Israel's declared position in negotiating with the Arabs is in favour of a separate Arab state, but in the meantime the area available for this state is steadily shrinking and its population is increasing — these factors working for its annexation by Transjordan. The political weakness of the projected state and the menace of the Mufti are also powerful motives for the annexation. Though the annexation may be unavoidable, Israel will not now start negotiating on it in order not to weaken her position in the talks with Abdallah and also in consideration of the Russian touchiness. Another candidate for negotiations is Egypt. The Egyptian court's emissary contacted the Israeli representatives in Paris and opened informal and noncommittal talks. They are mainly interested in the annexation of Gaza and other areas in the Negev, and they proposed the partition of the Negev between Israel and Egypt. Israel did not voice an objection to Egypt's taking over the desert part of the Negev which had been awarded to the Arab state by the Partition resolution, and which adjoins the Egyptian boundary, but opposed the annexation of Gaza, which is the only outlet to the sea of the Arab state. It is not clear which is the dominating element in the Egyptian policy — antagonism towards Israel or objection to British bases in the Negev, and on this would depend Egypt's decision — whether to come to a compromise with Israel or with Britain and Transjordan.

(12) There is a definite impression that the Russians have a realistic approach to the Palestine issue. They judge Israel by her attitude and not by the outcome, which they know is not always in Israel's control. David Liwszyc of the Mapam (United Workers' Party) participates in the meetings with the Russians; he hears there many things which should be quite instructive considering his party's attitude — such as readiness to accept any material and convincing argument, complete lack of interest in the fate of the Arab refugees, contempt for the progressive elements in the Arab countries, and so on.

(13) Israel is making efforts to isolate the question of her admission to the U.N. from the entire political tangle and to present it as a precondi-

tion to any progress towards a settlement and eventual peace. Sharett pointed out to the Western countries that Israel's non-admission would undermine the standing of the West in Israel and would make his own position in the forthcoming electioneering campaign difficult. This argument impressed Schuman, Spaak and the Americans. The latter asked whether Israel would be prepared to declare that her admission to the U.N. would not prejudice the issue of the boundaries and that it was not her intention to create *faits accomplis* by force of arms — unless she herself were attacked. Some such formula is now being considered which would satisfy the Americans and would not be prejudicial to Israel's interests.

119. G. Meyerson (Moscow) to W. Eytan. 9 November 1948

The senior officials in the Israeli Legation in Moscow were present at the Revolution Day parade and were then invited to a reception at Molotov's residence, where they were the object of special attention. Ben-Gurion's congratulatory telegram was published verbatim in all the newspapers. From here on not for publication: Foreign diplomats consider Israel to have been the centre of attention at Molotov's reception. Golda spoke with Molotov, and when she expressed her admiration of the parade, voicing her wish that Israel had only a small part of what had been displayed, Molotov replied: "You will have, the Soviet Union also started very modestly". Molotov's wife conversed at length in Yiddish with the personnel of the Legation, and other conversations also took place. During the parade the Deputy Soviet Chief of Staff spoke with Ratner — Israel's Military Attaché — while he held no conversation with any other military attaché.

126. E. Sasson (Paris) to Y. Shimoni. 10 November 1948

(1) Abd al-Ghani al-Karmi, member of King Abdallah's entourage, arrived on that day in Paris. He reported that the King was under pressure both of public opinion and of the establishment to put an end to the war, not by signing a truce or an armistice but by resigning himself to the existing situation and saving whatever can still be saved from the Arab parts of Palestine; the British, though, are holding him back and not letting him open formal, direct and immediate negotiations as long as Israel has not agreed to cede part of the Negev required by Britain for strategic reasons. The Iraqis are also interested in ending the war one way or another; they are afraid of the coming winter, of possible repercussions at home, and of the might of the I.D.F. Al-Karmi denied the reports on new arms shipments by the British to the Arab Legion and on the arrival of new British forces in Transjordan. The reports on the intended forma-

tion of an air force for Transjordan are correct, but these are long-range plans not having any connection with the war in Palestine.

(2) Al-Karmi came to Paris at Sasson's invitation to discuss problems of land ownership, but the King charged him also with negotiating on the termination of the conflict with Israel. He brought with him a letter from Abdallah to Abd al-Majid Haydar, Transjordan's Minister in London, setting out Transjordan's terms and empowering al-Karmi and Haydar to initiate immediate talks with Israel. Al-Karmi begged Sasson not to try to draw him out on Transjordan's terms but to wait until he had met Haydar; he only said that the King was very much set on the return of the "good people" — i.e., those loyal to the King and willing to accept Israel — of Lydda and Ramle to their former homes.

(3) Al-Karmi reported that the Belgian Consul, who had formerly mediated between Israel and Transjordan, had not made a particular effort to succeed in his task and his aim had only been to gain time and to block possible negotiations between Israel and other Arab states; in al-Karmi's opinion the Consul had been acting under British instructions.

(4) Al-Karmi reported on bad relations between the King and Tawfiq Abd al-Huda, his Prime Minister, and Fawzi al-Mulki, his Defence Minister: these two are afraid of the Husseinis, and they tried to persuade Abdallah to recognize the Palestine Gaza Government and to give military and political aid to Egypt; they had attempted to persuade the British to put pressure on the King and had tried to organize public demonstrations of solidarity with Egypt in Amman and other towns. Al-Karmi thinks that their days in the government are numbered.

(5) The King requests that the attacks on him in the Voice of Israel be stopped; Sharett has already cabled in this matter (see No. 118). The broadcasts of the Voice of Israel are received very well throughout Transjordan and are the accepted authority on the military events in Palestine. The Voice of Israel commentaries are the subject of arguments and discussions. Al-Karmi's advice is to put out more information on British scheming in the Negev and to show how this threatens Arab independence, and also to devote special broadcasts for the refugees which would not make them despair of ever returning to their homes but would prove to them that the Arab states are using them as a bargaining card and are blocking any solution to their problem. Such broadcasts could also incite the refugees to rise and to topple the present leaders of the Arab world.

127. E. Avriel (Prague) to M. Sharett (Paris). 10 November 1948

1. Egypt and Iraq have submitted to the Czechoslovak government a strongly worded protest against the sale of arms to Israel.
2. The Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry is pleased with the statement by the Israel Government's spokesman about the acquisition of arms by Israel in various countries.

3. The Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry requests that Israel officially condemn British arms supply to the Arab states in contravention of the truce agreement.

128. M. Agami [Bucharest] to M. Sharett (Tel Aviv). 10 November 1948

The previous day Agami met Ana Toma, Secretary-General of the Rumanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who told him that there was no question of an additional group of emigrants being organized prior to the departure of the group selected by them. This was also the attitude of the Foreign Minister. Agami replied that he agreed to the departure of the present group on condition that an undertaking be given that this was only the beginning of the *aliya* and that people selected by the Zionists would be added to this group. Ana Toma agreed to that and also confirmed that this was only the beginning of the *aliya.* Agami hopes that following this conversation there will be some progress in this matter.

131. E. Avriel [Prague] to G. Meyerson (Moscow). 11 November 1948

Avriel submits the report on the situation in Eastern Europe, as requested by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

1. *Bulgaria.* The agreement on the emigration of 20,000 Jews is being implemented. Eight thousand have left so far, and the remaining 12,000 are expected to leave by the end of December. The Bulgarian government is in favour of a rapid evacuation of all the Bulgarian Jews, some 35,000 in all.
2. *Rumania.* The government's attitude has not changed, though Agami is bringing pressure to bear on them (see No. 128). There is incitement and plotting against the Zionist Organization. The directors of the Zionist Funds have been arrested on the charge of connections with international money smugglers. The appointment of the Israeli Minister has been confirmed and the staff of the Legation is due to leave for Rumania at the end of the month.
3. *Yugoslavia.* Jewish emigration to Israel is unrestricted. The first group of 5000 emigrants is being organized to embark at the beginning of December. There are commercial relations, but the Yugoslavs are making further commercial cooperation conditional on Israel undertaking to sell Yugoslav products abroad and to purchase foreign merchandise for Yugoslavia.
4. *Hungary.* Following the socialization of all small trade there has been a large increase in the pressure for emigration to Israel. Talks are being initiated with the Hungarian government on general permission for large-scale emigration.

5. *Czechoslovakia.* In spite of constant Arab protests against the sale of arms to Israel and the training of Israeli soldiers, the relations are proper and there is a great deal of sympathy for Israel. A communist organization has been set up for the advancement of friendship with Israel which is intended to replace the Zionist Organization in Jewish public life. Negotiations have started on the immediate emigration of 20,000 people. A military unit of 1500 strength which has been thoroughly trained here is due to leave for Israel at the end of the month, accompanied by some 1500 members of their families.

136. Meeting of the Israeli Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly (Paris, 14 November 1948)

Sharett reports on his meeting with Marshall, at which he began by explaining the importance of the *aliya* both for Israel and for the immigrants themselves, for whom in many cases it was not less than salvation. He described the immigration from Bulgaria and that of the Jewish refugees in China, and gave a short exposition on the Jewry of Eastern Europe and its pioneering role in Israel, and on the Jews of the Orient.

He then passed on to matters touching the U.N. and here he dwelt on three points: (1) Regarding the issues at present before the Security Council, Sharett emphasized that Israel could not agree to Bunche's proposals and that the Security Council must expressly call for an armistice and for peace talks. (2) As to Israel's admission to the U.N., Sharett added to the usual arguments that Israel would find it difficult to appear before the Conciliation Commission when it was inferior to the Arabs not only in numbers but also in international status. In that connection he also explained Israel's policy of non-alignment against the East owing to the great help received from them so far and because of the many Jews living there who were potential hostages and with whom it was unthinkable to sever connections. Obviously Israel would not grant bases to the East but neither would it do so to the West so as to preserve its relations with the East. (3) In the matter of arms supply, Sharett admitted that Israel had acquired munitions from Czechoslovakia, but so also from other countries in the East and in the West, and had paid for them in full. It was the U.S.A. that Israel had approached first but had been turned down; it had then been explained to the Americans that the arms were a matter of life and death for Israel and that it would be necessary to go for them elsewhere. The Israeli army, in contrast, is made up wholly of Israeli citizens and of some volunteers — mainly from the West but some also from Eastern Europe.

Marshall referred first to the matter of the arms supply. He was apprehensive of the intentions of the U.S.S.R. to employ arms supply to the

Middle East as a means of fomenting trouble in that region. It is true that Israel's military power has grown, but this also gives way to some apprehension lest she turn to force as a means of solving all the problems. Stability in the region should be attained by accord; here he hinted that he did not much mind what sort of agreement were to be achieved as long as stability were attained. His impression was that the Arabs were ready for peace. In the matter of Israel's admission to the U.N., he promised to give it his consideration but stressed that it depended on Israel's complying with the resolutions of the Security Council.

Sharett replied that if Israel were faced with the alternatives of rejection or of admission at the price of ceding sovereignty and territory, she would opt for the first alternative. Israel would welcome any American initiative to stabilize the region, but the problem is not Israeli agression but British intransigence. The British persistently demand Israel's dispossession of the Negev, and the Security Council resolution of 4 November was inspired by them for this very reason. This is why, Sharett emphasized, all mention of the Negev should be omitted from the resolution about to be put before the Security Council.

Marshall took no position and did not commit himself on this point. In the matter of arms supply by the British, he remarked that he had very reliable information that the British were not supplying the Arabs with arms and he also had documentary evidence on the sources to which the Arabs were turning for munitions. Sharett replied that it was not his intention to impugn the reliability of Marshall's information, but Israel had trustworthy intelligence on arms supply by the British. e.g., the formation of the Jordanian air force with British aid (see No. 126).

Eban reports on the deliberations of the Security Council Sub-Committee, which has decided that Bunche's draft was acceptable and that it would be submitted to both parties. One emendation was that the Egyptians must evacuate Bir Asluj, and another — the deletion of any mention of "demilitarized zones", but the "evacuated aras" have been left in. (For Bunche's draft see No. 137.)

Liwszyc attempts to characterize the U.S. policy versus Israel. In his view Israel has been misled by the U.S., and she has also erred in pinning her hopes on differences of opinion within the American delegation and between the Department of State and the President. It was now clear that American policy was one in its support of the 4 November resolution. In his opinion, the extremism of the American proposals should make it easy for Israel to reject them. There were now only three factors left on which Israel could rely: the I.D.F., American Jewry, and the Soviets' right of veto.

Shiloah stresses that the delegation is united in its opinion that Israel must not retreat; the question is only *in what manner* to defy the Security Council, and whether this is the time for an open conflict with it. In his opinion Israel has not yet exploited all the options — pressure on the

U.S., pressure by the American Jews and pressure here in Paris. The delegation should recommend to the Government not to retreat but to formulate its response so that it would not sound as a bare refusal but would eventually make the whole affair come to nothing. It would be very undesirable if the Security Council had on its agenda Israeli defiance and a proposal for sanctions: one must not put wavering friends to the test.

Sharett replies that this discussion should take place in the Cabinet and not in the delegation to the U.N., but nevertheless he would like to state his opinion.

Israel is on the brink of a serious conflict with the U.N. The question is, do we want to start this dispute now or to avoid it as long as possible; his opinin is that the conflict should be put off as much as possible and perhaps even avoided altogether — on condition that vital interests are not affected.

As to the Soviet veto, he would not like to be dogmatic, but he can see three problems in this connection: (1) using the veto is a matter of no little importance to the Russians themselves; (2) should Israel find herself in need of a Soviet veto, that would be like confessing that she was in desperate straits and was down to her last resources; (3) using the Soviet veto would mean complete identification with the Soviet Bloc, and this is not what Israel wants. At his last meeting with Malik, the Soviet representative at the U.N., Sharett told him, while expressing his appreciation of the Soviet stand, that Israel did not know how things would turn out but at the moment she understood that the Russians had not voted against the resolution because that would have been like using the veto. Malik did not react, but from his expression Sharett understood that he had touched a sensitive spot.

As to the American Jewry, Marshall had told Sharett Israel must stop using the Jews of the U.S. as a lever to put pressure to bear on the Administration.

144. A. Ukhmani [Warsaw] to S. Friedman. 15 November 1948

1. Following negotiations, the Poles have allowed 550 enlisted personnel to sail at the end of the month for Israel.

2. The Palestine Office of the Zionist Organization, whose function is to organize immigration to Israel, is about to be closed down. The officials of this bureau were called to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and were informed that the existence of normal diplomatic relations between Poland and Israel made the Office unnecessary, and they had a month to close down. The Zionist parties will not be banned. Minister Barzilai will request an urgent audience with the authorities on this matter. It is suggested that the press in Israel refrain for the time being from publishing the news about the closing down of the Office.

146 M. Agami [Prague] to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 15 November 1948

Notification has been received from the Rumanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that they will not allow a second group of emigrants to Israel to be organized as long as the first group has not left. They can promise that members of the Zionist parties will be allowed to register for departure with the second group, but the final approval of the list of emigrants will be given by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in conjunction with the local Jewish communities.

153. Meeting of the Israeli Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly. (Paris, 17 November 1948)

Eban reports on the Security Council's resolution of November 16 (see Editorial Note, p. 139–40 below). The resolution was based on Bunche's proposal which, following negotiations, had been amended to accord with all the changes Israel sought: shifting the emphasis from the conditions of cease-fire to actual negotiations; deletion of the term "demilitarized zones", and its replacement by "demarcation lines"; explicit decision on the termination of the truce and its replacement by an armistice. The reference to the Security Council resolution of November 4 was apparently the price extracted by the British from the Americans. Furthermore, the Americans had indicated that they would be unable to help Israel unless she withdrew her objection to negotiating with Bunche. The Arabs had shown signs of panic at the Security Council debate. They apparently feared that the resolution would put them on an equal footing with Israel: Israel would not comply with the November 4th resolution, while they would not comply with the present one, which had been adopted with explicit reference to Article 40 of the U.N. Charter. The British, too, appeared to have paid a price for Anglo-American cooperation: they had withdrawn their demand to have the November 4th resolution include the Galilee. The Soviets had evidently not wished to oppose the resolution on principle, and had attempted instead to introduce several fundamental changes, such as: an official peace rather than an armistice, and the emphasis on direct negotiations, with mediation only as a last resort. In a discussion following the adoption of the resolution, Bunche admitted that his future hinged on the fate of the resolution. Should the Arabs prove unwilling to negotiate, he would argue at the Security Council that Arab refusal was unacceptable.

Eban feels that most of the pressure will now be exerted on the Arabs, to enter into negotiations. Nevertheless, Israel might still expect pressure from several delegations — including the French and the Australian — to

state her position, in principle, on the November 4th resolution. Even sympathetic elements in the American delegation were urging this course.

Liwszyc points out that the Soviets are not keen on amendment procedures, and prefer to express their opinion in resolutions of their own. They saw no purpose in the present resolution since it did not supersede that of November 4. Moreover, they rejected the concept of an armistice which was no more than an extension of the truce, and did not mean peace.

Sharett notes that Israel did not seek an armistice, but the withdrawal of the invading armies. Nevertheless, an armistice was not undesirable, as it would release Israel from the imposed truce she was bound to violate. Even if the resolution came to nought, it would benefit Israel, since it would place the Arabs in defiance of U.N. resolutions. Should negotiations ensue, Arab recognition of the State of Israel would be implicit. Whatever the case, the resolution put an end to the truce and blunted the impact of the November 4th resolution, though it did not eliminate it altogether. Sharett did not believe that it would come to sanctions; however, on no account was Israel to clash openly with the U.N., both because of her special relationship with that body, and because of the international situation.

He would advise the government not to give a comprehensive answer, but to deal with each and every point separately. For example, Israel could agree to the return of the Egyptians to Deir Suneid, thereby demonstrating compliance with the Security Council resolutions. The same was true of the Egyptians trapped in the Faluja pocket: if Israel failed to take the pocket before the Security Council ruling went into effect, it would be preferable to allow them to leave. Some clauses, on the other hand, brooked no compromise. Israel could not withdraw from Beit Jubrin, Dawayima, and Beersheba because a retreat from these areas, won by the I.D.F. in the course of battle, unlike Deir Suneid which the Egyptians had evacuated of their own free will, would leave a vacuum for irregular forces, either Jewish or Arab. In any case, it had to be made clear that Israel would be prepared to negotiate, and in the course of negotiations, deal also with the question of borders.

Liwszyc fears that any sign of readiness to withdraw would be misinterpreted. Fischer recalls the aid Israel had received from France. Even Parodi, who was friendly, advised compliance with the resolution, if only in part, rather than openly defying the Security Council.

Sharett reports on the deliberations of the General Assembly's First Committee. Protracted and tiresome discussion regarding the format of the invitation to the Arab Higher Committee preceded the final decision to invite them, without allusion to their claim that they represented the Government of Palestine. The Arabs had tried to hinder Sharett from participating in the discussion, but had been silenced by the Chairman. The second meeting started off with the Arabs on the offensive: Ahmad

Shuqeiri delivered quite an effective and creditable speech which included a direct assault on Bernadotte for approving the partition of Palestine. He was followed by Adil Arslan, the Syrian representative; and Khashaba Pasha, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, who devoted particular attention to the issue of immigration to Israel. He seemed to imply that if this issue could be resolved, all others would follow suit.

154. E. Avriel (Prague) to S. Friedman. 17 November 1948

1. The situation in Rumania (see No. 146) is deteriorating and approaching crisis. Agami appealed to the Rumanian Foreign Ministry to include Zionist Pioneers in the first contingent of emigrants chosen by the Jewish community. In accordance with his instructions, he explained that Israel regarded this first group as only a beginning, and wished to open negotiations on further immigration. Within a few days, he was notified that Zionists could not be included in the initial contingent; that emigration was for the moment confined to this one group, and that they could not commit themselves in advance regarding future arrangements. Agami maintains telephone contact with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and is acting on his instructions.

2. The Hungarian government refused passports to 500 persons who had filed applications through the Palestine Office in Budapest. This was done on the grounds they did not wish to discuss immigration with the Zionist Organization which they viewed as an undesirable body; they were prepared to deal only with the Israeli Legation. Avriel was to discuss the matter the following day with the Hungarian Minister in Prague. It was imperative that an Israeli diplomatic representative for Hungary be appointed immediately. He suggests Peterfy as Consul-General in Budapest.

165. Meeting of the Israeli Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly (Paris, 19 November 1948)

Sharett reports on his talks with the delegates from New Zealand and Canada. Fraser, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, told him that his address before the First Committee, while good, had been marred by two flaws: its attack on Britain, and its arrogant claim to rule by reason of conquest. He wished to know Israel's position regarding the Negev, Jerusalem, and the Galilee, made no allusion to the refugee problem, and spoke as a true friend. He criticized British policy in Palestine in recent years, and said he was opposed to the Bernadotte Plan. He spoke of the Arabs with utter contempt, declared that he had been confident of Israel's victory, but had nevertheless been stunned by the magnitude of the Arab defeat.

For the sake of congeniality, Sharett had accepted Fraser's reservations, but pointed out that in light of the facts, his criticism of Britain had been mild; and given the Israeli people's feelings, extremely so. As for "arrogance", Israel's demands were not, after all, based on the facts of conquest but on long-standing claims, reinforced by the events of the past year.

He explained the problem of the Negev, about which Fraser was most understanding — though he had difficulty accepting the Israeli position on Jerusalem. Sharett informed him of the American trusteeship proposal (see No. 1), which he welcomed enthusiastically, particularly on hearing that Israel was suggesting a Christian Governor for the Old City. Sharett stressed the need for direct negotiations with the Arabs and stated that within the framework of negotiations leading to peace, Israel would even be prepared to make certain adjustments in her borders. He emphasized that Arab fears of Israeli expansionism were totally unfounded.

Following the discussion with Fraser, Sharett met with Pearson, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs. Pearson did not regret Canada's support of the U.N. Partition Plan the previous year, but advised Israel against becoming so dazzled by her might that she attempt to seize the remainder of western Palestine by force. Sharett replied that Israel would not be the first to violate the truce. However, the present situation could not last and should a peace settlement fail to materialize, the current truce would collapse and the war resume. Sharett pointed out that Israel faced two choices: a peace treaty resulting from negotiations, or a settlement imposed by the U.N. Israel was prepared to pay a price for a peace treaty, but Arab refusal to negotiate even an armistice gave this little hope of realization. The parties were therefore dependent on a U.N. solution, and in such eventuality Israel could not be expected to make even the slightest concession.

As the discussion proceeded, talk turned to the Negev. Pearson said that a compromise had to be found between Israel's demands for the Negev and the British position. Sharett stated that as far as the Arabs were concerned no compromise was required since both Egypt and Jordan were simply claiming their share under the U.N. Paritition Plan, to which Israel had no objection. The British, on the other hand, wanted the Israeli Negev, and compromising with them would not bring Israel peace.

Pearson had three conclusions regarding the present U.N. session: (1) there was no need to finalize the borders during this session; (2) the Conciliation Commission should be a Good Offices Committee; (3) Israel should be admitted to the U.N. during this session, so that she might enjoy equal status with the Arabs before the Commission.

Both Fraser and Pearson apologized for the fact that their governments had not recognized Israel. Pearson even confessed that he, personally, was in favour of recognition, but that the majority of the Cabinet wished to avoid a clash with Britain.

Sharett also met with Yakov Malik of the Soviet delegation. He explained the Israeli position at the Security Council, as well as her refusal to play into Britain's hands.

Eban reports on the talk he and Comay had with the American delegate, Ross (see No. 162).

Sharett reads the draft resolution worked out by Israel, which she hoped to have her friends submit to the First Committee (No. 161).

In this connection, Liwszyc points out that a distinction had to be made between the November 29th resolution, and the other resolutions on Palestine subsequently adopted by the Security Council. The Israeli draft resolution intimated Israeli support of Jordan's annexation of the Arab sector of Palestine. This was unwise, as in his opinion the establishment of a separate Arab state in western Palestine was precisely one of the topics to be negotiated with the Arabs — notwithstanding the impracticality of this suggestion.

Sharett notes that both the object and the nature of the negotiations with the Arabs remain ambiguous. This was not the case with respect to negotiations on the end of war: the warring parties were the negotiators, and the object was the termination of hostilities. In negotiating borders, he was prepared to talk only with immediate neighbours, and only about common borders.

Robinson suggests that a clause relating to the cessation of hostilities be added to the resolution. Regarding the borders, Israel should demand that this question be settled in negotiation by the interested parties. He maintains that there is no difference between mediation, conciliation, or good offices, all of which meant sound advice, not coercion.

Comay reports that Hood, the Australian, would like to enlist several other delegates to present the resolution collectively.

Toff suggests that a list be prepared of the members for the proposed Conciliation Commission.

171. S. Friedman (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett and G. Meyerson (Paris). 21 November 1948

Friedman reports on two meetings with the Soviet Minister. At the first, on 10 November, the Minister was briefed on the military situation on the northern and southern fronts as well as on the political situation. He was also informed about the penetration of the Israeli army into Lebanese territory, the peculiar composition of that area's population, and Israel's intention to occupy this territory out of strategic considerations and not for any design of territorial expansion. The Minister was given details about the Negev front, about Gaza being cut off from the south and about indications of Egyptian evacuation by sea. The complete rout of the Egyptian air force was described, and opportunity was taken to mention the formation of the Jordanian air force (see No. 136).

The Minister enquired why Abdallah had not come to the aid of the Egyptians, and was told that the King had no interest in the outcome of that campaign, his main concern being the safety of his own kingdom; his intention was presumably to reach an arrangement with Israel and reduce his dependence on the British.

In the political sphere the Minister was told about the British intentions to create a vacuum in the Negev and indications of British forces' infiltration into Israel. He asked what, in Israel's view, would be the outcome of the current Paris negotiations and what exactly was the attitude of the U.S.; he was then given an explanation of the differences of opinion between the President and the Department of State.

At the second meeting, on 19 November, a request was submitted for U.S.S.R. release in Israel's favour of some 40–50 thousand tons of irrigation pipes manufactured in Czechoslovakia for the Soviet Union. The Czechs are prepared to sell these pipes to Israel, but Moscow's approval is necessary. Friedman had been apprehensive of a cool reception at the Legation following certain incidents (see, e.g., n. 7, p. 146) and was pleasantly surprised at the Minister's cordial reception and his promise to deal with the matter promptly. Israel's response to the resolutions of the Security Council had just been published (see No. 160) and the Minister commended this reply for its prudence, and enquired whether the Galilee was still liable to be detached from Israel, and whether it was true that at a certain moment prior to the present truce Israel had contemplated operations against Abdallah in the "Triangle". Having previously consulted Eytan on this matter, Friedman told the Minister that the British were presumably unaware of the negotiations with Abdallah, and also told him of British pressure on Abdallah to occupy the "Triangle".

Regarding Sharett's proposal to hold a frank and overall talk with the Russians on immigration from Eastern Europe (see No. 132), Friedman is ready, if so instructed, to explore the pertinent possibilities in Israel, but doubts whether Russia itself can be ignored in such contacts.

181. S. Friedman (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett (Paris). 24 November 1948

Friedman reports on the distressing situation of the Jewish communities in Eastern Europe and on the crisis in emigration to Israel from these countries.

Rumania. The arrest of the directors of the Zionist funds in Rumania (see No. 131) has caused great anxiety in Israel. Information has been received that heavy sentences are anticipated unless there is outside intervention. The Zionist Organization Executive should have dealt with this problem, but its members are all abroad and there is nobody to turn to. The possible despatch of a special envoy to Rumania is being explored, the name of S. Adler-Rudel, Director of the Section for Relations with

International Organizations in the London Office of the Jewish Agency, being mentioned in this connection, but there are serious doubts about the efficacy of such a mission.

It is not known how the first group of emigrants has turned out (see No. 154). Some hold that Israel's insistence on a united Zionist front in the selection of immigrants is a grave mistake; it may be preferable to set up a "Labour front" without the religious and the right-wing parties, which could more effectively influence the selection of immigrants in cooperation with local Jewish communists. Friedman asks for Sharett's opinion on this proposal.

In *Poland* there is imminent danger that emigration will be stopped, and the Polish government has demanded that the Palestine Office be closed down. Several emissaries from Israel have been compelled to leave Poland becaue their residence permits were not renewed.

Hungary. A cable has just been received from Budapest to the effect that emigration to Israel has been discontinued. Local Jews and Jewish Agency emissaries demand the establishment of an official Israeli mission in Hungary. This is presently being dealt with, and the Hungarian government will shortly be approached with the proposal that Ehud Avriel, the Minister in Prague, be accredited Non-Resident Minister in Budapest, S. Peterfy to be nominated Resident Consul.

Albania. Some 50 Jewish families have expressed their wish to emigrate to Israel but have not received exit permits. There is no direct communication with this country, but Friedman will seek to renew his acquaintance with a delegate from the Albanian Trades Union whom he had met the previous year in Rumania.

Berlin. The Soviet authorities do not recognize the credentials of the local Israeli immigration officer.

In contrast, there is some good news from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The first 4000 immigrants have arrived from Bulgaria, and 4500 will soon arrive from Yugoslavia. The Bulgarians are deferring recognition of Israel pending the departure of all local Jews. The Yugoslavs are also interested in official relations, preferably at Legation level.

In view of this situation, Friedman favours Sharett's suggestion of a frank and overall talk with the Russians on the future of Zionism in and immigration from Eastern European countries.

182. M. Sharett (Paris) to S. Friedman. 24 November 1948

Barzilai, the Israeli Minister in Warsaw, had a serious confrontation with the Poles but was unable to prevent the closure of the Palestine Office (see No. 181). They contend it was an administrative routine following the opening of the Legation, which renders the Palestine Office superfluous. Jewish communists may have been behind this decision. The Poles stressed that this act should not be interpreted as a shift in their emigra-

tion policy: Jews will be allowed to leave for Israel as before, except for those whom Poland needs or those whose activities might be detrimental to Poland.

186. Meeting of the Israeli Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly (Paris, 25 November 1948)

Sharett reports on the lengthy discussion he had with Dulles, at which he sharply criticized American policy at the First Committee for leaving initiative to the British and making do with amendments to the British draft resolutions (see Editorial Note, p. 143–4 below).

By way of reply, Dulles surveyed American political thinking on the Arab-Israeli conflict. In organization, discipline, and readiness for sacrifice, Israel had exceeded all expectations, whereas the Arabs had suffered a defeat far greater than anticipated. He had no doubt that Israel would flourish and prosper, that peace and stability would reign in the Middle East within ten years, and that thanks to Israel, the inhabitants of the region would enjoy a better life. However, to achieve peace, British cooperation was necessary, with Anglo-American cooperation a prerequisite. He was convinced that Israel and the United States were basically in agreement as to the ends, and differed only with respect to the means. He believed it would be wiser to retain the framework of the British resolution and make the required changes, deletions, and additions. America, meanwhile, continues to exert pressure on the British.

Sharett expressed appreciation for Dulles' praise and gratification at his faith in eventual peace; nevertheless, Israel was concerned about a number of matters. Israel was a U.N. creation and would like to remain true to that organization. This was not simply a moral obligation, but a political consideration as well, for in a strife-ridden world, this was the only way to exist. The course taken by the Americans, however, in collusion with the British, was propelling Israel towards a confrontation with the U.N.

Dulles criticized the British severely. Their entire policy had proved mistaken, their assessments wrong, and their obstinacy excessive, particularly that of the Foreign Office. He thought that public opinion might modify the British position.

Liwszyc reports on his talk with Tsarapkin of the Soviet delegation. Faced with a strong Anglo-American front, the Russians naturally tended to range themselves in a broad counter-front, comprising all the remaining countries, from Australia to Latin America.

Weissman reports on his talk with the Luxembourg delegate. The members of the Western Union (Benelux countries, France and Britain) had met for consultation. France, Holland and Luxembourg supported Israel; the Belgian was awaiting further instructions from his government

— his standing instructions being to support Israel's admission to the U.N. at the Security Council, but not to deliver an address. France supported Israel, but only behind the scenes.

Robinson urges the Israeli delegation to come out clearly in favour of a five-member Conciliation Commission, as proposed by the Americans, and to demand the appointment of national representatives, rather than individuals selected by the Chairman or U.N. Secretary. Israel's friends had to rally around the Australian draft resolution which, from the Israeli point of view, was the most advantageous.

187. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett (Paris). 25 November 1948

Eytan relays Ben-Gurion's response to Eban's telegram of November 24 (see n. 1, p. 149–50 below). "To Moshe Sharett: after serious deliberation on the Faluja question, I have reached the definite conclusion that there is to be no talk of convoys to Faluja so long as the Egyptians refuse to discuss armistice with us. We cannot permit a third of the enemy forces, now under siege by us, to go free and resume fighting us at will. Bunche's assurances on this matter are insubstantial, as were all the resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly pertaining to Palestine. Bunche did not threaten Egypt when she refused to allow us food convoys for three months. Egypt's rights to the Negev are not greater than ours. Our settlement of the Negev was in accordance with the law, and our army was deployed in the Negev on May 15, conforming to the U.N. resolution. The Egyptians are invaders. We would rather not be admitted to the U.N. than consent to this unfair discrimination on Bunche's part: allowing convoys to the Egyptian army in Faluja while they denied us food convoys for our settlements and army in the south, and are liable to attack us again at any time. Only if the Egyptians discuss peace with us, will we discuss Faluja with them. Without Egyptian guarantees that their belligerence has ended, the besieged army in Faluja cannot go free, nor can their situation be alleviated." Eytan advises Sharett to play down the Faluja issue and relegate it to the context of armistice negotiations.

190. M. Sharett (Paris) to R. Shiloah. 26 November 1948

Sharett resumes the arguments advanced in No. 188, regarding food supplies to the beleaguered Faluja pocket. He met with Reedman and explained the leverage the pocket could provide in inducing the Egyptians to agree to an armistice. Reedman countered just as Sharett had anticipated — that the Egyptians claimed the exact opposite: they would not discuss an armistice until the besieged men were released. The Security Council Sub-Committee for Supervising the Implementation of the No-

vember 4th Resolution was to convene the following day, and would discuss the situation of the Faluja pocket.

With respect to Ben-Gurion's message, No. 187: release of the besieged men was not in dispute. He had merely asked permission for food convoys to the pocket. To claim that Bunche's attitude was discriminatory because he had not sanctioned food convoys for the besieged Israeli Negev prior to October 14, was invalid, since there had then been no Security Council resolution to that effect, and the fact that Bunche himself had initiated the resolution was irrelevant. Considering the probable and almost inevitable collision with the Security Council, Israel had to make a token effort to minimize the friction and retreat from an untenable position. It was not simply a matter of admission to the U.N., but of all the consequences for Israel of the General Assembly session. Any open clash with the Security Council in the course of the session would weaken Israel's position in general. He could not understand the logic whereby the disparity between a siege with food and a siege without food would justify taking such serious risks.

191. M. Sharett (Paris) to M. Namir (Moscow). 26 November 1948

Sharett reports on the situation at the First Committee: (1) The Americans supported the British draft resolution as a basis, but with certain amendments — particularly with respect to the outright endorsement of the Bernadotte Plan. The British rejected this demand and agreed to slight changes only. Efforts on both sides to reach an agreement continue. (2) The amendments proposed by the Americans omitted the following: recognition of Israel's existence; demand for her admission to the U.N.; emphasis on the positive aspects of the November 29 resolution; and establishment of the principle that the territory of the state could not be reduced without her consent. Points sustained by the American version, on the other hand, included: retention of the Bernadotte Plan as a guideline for the Conciliation Commission, and empowerment of the Commission not only to mediate, but also to determine borders and hand over the Arab sector of Palestine to neighbouring countries; full confirmation of the November 29 resolution with respect to Jerusalem, including the demand for unrestricted access to the city; and authorizing the Commission to instal an administration in the city and appoint a U.N. governor — all pending the submission of the programme to the next Assembly session for ratification. The Israeli delegation was taking steps to counteract this policy both in Washington and *vis-à-vis* the delegations in Paris. (3) There were several draft resolutions before the First Committee, presented by various countries. Israel was trying to rally a united anti-British front around the Australian one. This emphasized the supremacy of the November 29 resolution, reaffirmed the existence of Israel, and demanded her admission to the U.N. It made mention of the Bernadotte Plan, but

only as one proposal among others to be considered together with the November 29 resolution. It provided for a Conciliation Commission, which was however devoid of administrative authority. On the refugee question, it stipulated only consultation and raised the possibility of repatriation or resettlement in other countries. The U.S.S.R. was prepared to support the Australian draft resolution, albeit with some reservations. Israel had to work towards the creation of a drafting committee, in collaboration with all the proponents of resolutions and amendments, in order to defeat the British resolution. Israel assumed that on an issue unrelated to the East–West conflict, it might well be possible to muster a majority of the Eastern Bloc and part of the West.

A crisis was brewing at the Security Council over the Faluja question, the demand for Israel's withdrawal from Beersheba, and the restriction of the I.D.F.'s freedom of movement throughout the Negev. Regarding Faluja, Sharett disagreed with his colleagues in Tel Aviv, maintaining that, while no release of the Egyptians trapped in the pocket could be considered, they might be permitted food supplies. Israel had accepted the November 16 cease-fire resolution without reservation, and had complied as far as possible with the November 4 resolution: evacuating the coastal strip, pulling back reinforcements that arrived in the Negev after October 14, and consenting to U.N. supervision along the lines. She could not, however, evacuate the inland area and leave a vacuum for irregular forces; she would not assent to a political and military status in the Negev different from other areas; and she would not release an enemy force to be free to attack her again. Should the Egyptians agree to an armistice, the situation would of course change.

194. R. Shiloah (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett (Paris). 26 November 1948

Relaying a note from Ben-Gurion: Israel will allow one supply convoy to the besieged forces in Faluja, though this is not to be taken as a precedent for further convoys and is permitted only on the clear understanding that continued Egyptian refusal to enter into armistice negotiations will free Israel to act as she sees fit on the Faluja pocket. Ben-Gurion wants Sharett to cable Bunche's or Reedman's reaction. As to Sharett's argument that he favours not the lifting of the siege but the delivery of food (see No. 190), Ben-Gurion points out that a siege with food supply is pointless.

196. M. Sharett (Paris) to W. Eytan. 27 November 1948

Refers to No. 194, which arrived late, after the Security Council Sub-Committee meeting had opened. Word of Israel's concession was immediately relayed to the Americans, who expressed pleasure at the easing of

the tension, praised the Israeli decision, and affirmed they had no desire for a crisis. The news was transmitted to Bunche in mid-meeting; he noted that negotiations on the I.D.F.'s freedom of movement in the Negev would proceed. Bunche also hinted that had the Israeli decision been received earlier — it would have been unnecessary for the Sub-Committee to convene. In answer to the Soviet representative's query on reaction to the November 16th resolution, Bunche said that Israel had replied in the affirmative whereas the Arabs were withholding their response. Eban, representing Israel, forcefully defended Israel's position on the Faluja pocket and her freedom of movement in the Negev. He did not refer to the Beersheba question as it had not been raised by Bunche. At the end, the chairman concluded that there was no decision to be taken. Following the meeting, Parodi, the French delegate, expressed satisfaction at Israel's concessions. Reedman said that if news of Israel's concession had come earlier, the meeting would have been cancelled. Sharett remarks that Israel's obstinacy had almost caused a crisis, averted only by a last-minute concession.

200. Meeting of the Israeli Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly (Paris, 28 November 1948)

Eban reports on his survey of Security Council members regarding Israel's admission to the U.N. The American delegation was urging Israel to submit her application and promised to support it at the Security Council. They were, however, undecided about the General Assembly.

The Soviet Bloc was similarly hesitant about introducing a clause into the General Assembly's resolution with respect to Israel's admission to the U.N. Argentina had undertaken to support Israel, and the address delivered by the Colombian representative to the Assembly denoted some improvement in Colombia's position. Summing up: on the basis of pledges received, five delegations could be counted on to vote in favour. The decisions of France and Canada remained open. The Canadian Pearson was favourably disposed, but unsure as to the appropriate timing.

Fischer reports on the French position. The officials at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs were for French support of the proposal at the Security Council, but left the decision regarding the Assembly to the ministerial level. The Minister of Foreign Affairs himself had not made up his mind.

Eban points out that he had explored the matter before Israel submitted any formal application — the very application being a form of pressure, and before American influence could come to bear.

Weissman has learned from the Belgian delegation that Brussels is still undecided, but anticipates a favourable decision.

Sharett summarizes the results: three of the 11 Security Council

members can be discounted outright: Britain, Syria and China. Belgium is extremely doubtful. Of the remaining seven, only four are certain: the United States, the Soviet Union, Argentina and Colombia. Were France's vote equally assured, Canada would eschew sole responsibility for blocking Israel; on the other hand, she would gladly share that responsibility with France if that were possible. The matter therefore hinged on France.

Fischer remarks that the merest of hints from the United States could very well tip the scales.

Eban recalls that the Americans had intimated that Israel need not despair of China's vote.

Kenen urges Israel not to miss the opportunity afforded by the historic date of November 29. The press assured Israel of seven votes, and the application should be submitted on the anniversary of the partition resolution.

Eban proposes that America be advised of the results of Israel's findings, and be formally notified of Israel's imminent application, relying on her help.

Rafael emphasizes the importance of submitting the application on November 29. He is convinced that Israel will receive more than seven votes. Trygve Lie had to be duly informed, since Israel had embarked on this course in consultation with him.

Comay points out that advance notice to the delegations is necessary, to avert their feeling that their votes are being extorted from them.

Sasson notes that the delegations had to be made to realize that the Arab threats to leave the U.N. were mere bluster.

201. E. Sasson (Paris) to Y. Shimoni. 28 November 1948

Sasson is replying to Shimoni's letter of November 23. Shimoni had mentioned hearing that Yadin, the General Staff's Chief of Operations, had claimed during the Israeli delegation deliberations in Paris that the I.D.F. penetration into Lebanon had been based on the recommendations of the Middle East Division of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Shimoni had refuted this assertion.

Sasson states that at the Paris talks, Yadin had explained that the recommendations of the Middle East Division had been to seize Lebanese territory as far as the Litani. Further, he had given the Division's reasons, as formulated in the memorandum (see n. 2, pp. 151–2 below), and added that though he had taken due note of the Division's suggestions, he had not carried them through.

Sasson, on his part, had advised against the penetration of Lebanon for the following reasons: (1) he did not believe that any oppositionist Christian faction could rise up against the government or seize power by force, even if the I.D.F. did reach Saida, or beyond; (2) moreover, any such action by the I.D.F. would not bring Israel closer to peace or an under-

standing with Lebanon; and (3) he totally rejected the assumption that Israel's path to peace with the Arab world lay in the dictation of terms.

Sasson thinks that the Middle East Division of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs ought to refrain from advising, directing, or making recommendations with respect to Lebanon, the Christians in the Galilee, or the Bedouin in the Negev, pending clarification of Israel's policy on peace or war. Such clarifications must originate at the political level — the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs — it is not for the Middle East Division to maintain contact with, or advise, the army. The period of war and conquest is by and large over, and the problem is now political. The Middle East Division has to take its place at the forefront of the political activity and chart a course of peace with the Arab states.

214. Meeting of the Israeli Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly (Paris, 1 December 1948)

Sharett reports on his talk with Dulles, who told him that the Americans had reached an agreement with the British as to the formulation of the resolution to be submitted to the First Committee (see Editorial Note, pp. 153–4 below). The draft was not yet final and remained unsatisfactory on several points. However, important progress had been made in that the British no longer insisted that the Bernadotte Report be binding. Dulles revealed that the British had encouraged Arab opposition in order to preserve their position in the Arab world. He had tried to persuade them against this reasoning, and even thought he had succeeded. He knew that Israel would not regard the agreement as an achievement, because of her deep-set suspicions of the British, some of which were justified. Nevertheless, this was the draft that had been agreed upon following dramatic negotiations at the end of the week.

He subsequently spoke of Israel's admission to the U.N. Sharett reviewed the situation. At the moment, there were three definite positive votes — the United States, the U.S.S.R. and the Ukraine. Argentina had given an explicit promise, but Israel was not yet experienced in Argentinian promises. The Colombian claimed that he was in favour, though he had not yet received instructions from his government. France and Belgium were wavering, as was Canada: her representative was personally in favour, but was awaiting instructions from his government. Belgium would apparently abstain, though she was unlikely to take the responsibility of failing Israel by withholding the seventh vote. As far as the United States was concerned, Sharett said that it was well known that she would vote in favour; however, the public impression seemed to be that she was not interested in resolving the matter during the current Assembly session. Dulles replied that the United States aimed at having Israel's admission to the U.N. conclusively approved during this session.

With regard to the draft resolution before the First Committee, Sharett questioned the substance of the British concession and wondered if it was not a concession in form only. On a number of points, Israel remained firm, such as the Negev, for example, and it was unlikely that the British had shelved their plans for this area. Dulles replied that the Conciliation Commission to be appointed would not have coercive authority. Sharett pointed out that in the matter of Jerusalem the commission was to be invested with administrative authority. Dulles said that a more flexible draft would be drawn up. On the refugee question, Sharett stressed that the problem could not be solved without a peace treaty.

Rafael asks whether Israel was to strive to defeat the draft resolution, or have it amended. According to Dulles, there was ample room for amendments. Israel had to have her friends submit as many amendments as possible so that the British resolution would correspond more closely to the Australian one, and perhaps be defeated altogether.

Sharett notes that he would like the current session to conclude with Israel's admission to the U.N. and no other political resolutions. If, at the last moment, there would be no option but to appoint a Conciliation Commission — so be it. However, Israel also had to allow for the possibility that a resolution would be adopted, in which case she had to ensure that it was the least damaging.

216. M. Namir (Moscow) to W. Eytan. 2 December 1948

Namir reports on his discussion with Ehrenburg, the Soviet Jewish author. Ehrenburg referred to the attacks on him in the Israeli press. He persisted in his view that Israel should absorb only oppressed Jews. There was no Jewish problem in the Soviet Union, and he advised Israel not to attempt to foster immigration from the U.S.S.R. because this would provoke the government, also against local Jewry. On the other hand, he indirectly hinted at a softening in his attitude toward immigration from other Eastern European countries. He claimed that Israel's geopolitical situation held out the danger of subjugation to the United States, and in the case of a third world war, Soviet Jewry and Israeli Jewry could find themselves in opposing camps.

The discussion was subdued and indicated a deeply rooted anti-Zionism, and an insoluble conflict between the duty to support Israel and the fear that Zionism would infiltrate Soviet Jewry, voicing perhaps the views of government circles. He said he was prepared to visit Israel, though not in the near future when it might be construed as a political act.

225. Meeting of the Israeli Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly (Paris, 5 December 1948)

Sharett reports on his talk with Bunche. Bunche informed him that the Egyptians hoped to receive the entire Negev, up to the Faluja line. Sharett replied that Israel would make no concessions in this matter. As for those parts of the Negev set aside by the Partition Plan of November 1947 for an Arab state, Israel distinguished between the strip of desert bordering on Egypt, and the Gaza Strip. Israel opposed the annexation of the Gaza Strip by Egypt, as control of this area would give Egypt access to the inhabited part of Palestine, and pave the way for the transfer of population from Egypt to Palestine. On the whole, in the interest of future Egyptian–Israeli relations it was best that a desert separate the two states. Further, the fate of the Arab sector of Palestine has not yet been determined and presenting Gaza to the Egyptians would deprive the region of an outlet to the sea.

Robinson analyses the resolution approved by the First Committee (see Editorial Note, pp. 153–4 below). This resolution differed from the British drafts, and was detrimental to Israel on five counts: (1) the subordination of the Conciliation Commission to the Security Council; (2) the clause on Jerusalem, particularly the reaffirmation of the principles of internationalization and demilitarization; (3) the provision for universal access to Jerusalem; (4) the reference in the economic clause to the Mediator's conclusions; and (5) the refugee question. Given the fact that a 2/3 majority was necessary for a resolution to be approved, if Israel could assume that the voting breakdown would not fluctuate, and that the Assembly would vote clause by clause, then there was hope that the clauses referring to the Security Council would be rejected by the Assembly. Most of the other clauses, however, would be approved with the possible exception of the one dealing with the demilitarization of Jerusalem. With the help of the French, this clause could perhaps be amended to charge the Conciliation Commission with studying the question of demilitarization. In his opinion, the vote showed that Israel had failed in her attempts to win over her friends at the U.N. The votes had been based on political interests, not on the arguments Israel had put forth.

Eban says that, according to Rusk, it was highly unlikely that the resolution would gain a majority in the Assembly. The Americans hoped that the Arabs would either abstain, or quit the hall in demonstration. They had hoped the same of the vote in the First Committee. Nonetheless, they had not despaired of having the important sections of the resolution approved. Rusk thought it better to have some resolution adopted, rather than none, thereby robbing the French and the Canadians of any pretext to vote against Israel's admission to the U.N. He also thought it would be most useful, once the resolution was adopted, if Israel were to issue a

positive statement, without however specifically committing herself. It would help in the matter of her admission to the U.N.

Sharett notes the shift in positions of several of the delegations: in the end New Zealand had joined the British, Australia had voted for the resolution *in toto,* and some of the Latin American delegations had chosen to leave the hall. He was certain that the absence of a resolution would seriously hamper Israel's chances of admission to the U.N., but he was prepared to pay the price provided that certain clauses, such as the one on Jerusalem, remained unapproved. At the same time, there was a danger that the resolution would be adopted, in which case it was necessary to have it amended.

Rosenne cautions against minimizing the Syrian initiative to transfer the issue to the International Court at The Hague. The vote had been deadlocked, and steps had to be taken to have the entire idea dropped.

226. R. Shiloah (Tel Aviv) to W. Eytan. 5 December 1948

Israel will permit another food convoy of three vehicles to reach Faluja on condition that it is checked more carefully. Should the Egyptians again attempt to smuggle in contraband, Israel will consider herself released from her commitment and reserve the right to act freely. The decision was based on instructions from the Prime Minister.

235. G. Rafael (Paris) to M. Sharett (Paris). 6 December 1948

Rafael analyses France's position toward Israel. France was cautious and hesitant, for two reasons: (1) the situation in North Africa; (2) the Vatican's stand on Jerusalem.

France was pleased that the Arab countries were preoccupied with the question of Palestine. The resolution of this conflict would revive Arab interest in the national movement in North Africa. This situation recalls the French stand in 1936–1939, when the Arab Revolt had concentrated Arab efforts on Palestine, and diverted them from the French-Arab conflict in the Levant.

With respect to Jerusalem, France was one of the principal agents of Vatican policy. The Vatican had recently formulated its position on Jerusalem and was pressing for the internationalization of the city, as expressed in the latest papal encyclical, *In multiplicibus curis,* published on October 24. France linked the demilitarization plan to the Vatican internationalization plan. She intended to use her participation in the international force, which was to be organized to supervise the demilitarization of the city, as a lever to establish herself in Jerusalem and in the Middle East as a whole.

The way to influence France, therefore, was through Rome. Efforts had

to be made to reach a compromise between the Vatican and Israel. The Vatican had interests in Palestine and would perhaps be amenable to compromise in order to protect these.

Direct action had to be taken in France as well. It had to be impressed upon the French that the lack of a clear position, favouring neither Israel nor the Arabs, would only harm French interests. This position, which she took in 1936–1939, had merely weakened her status in Syria and hastened her departure. She had to be made to understand that she could regain her importance in the Middle East only by relying on a true friend in this part of the world.

236. M. Sharett (Paris) to S. Friedman. 6 December 1948

Sharett writes of the reports he has received on the crisis in Rumanian immigration. In one instance, prospective emigrants had burst into the offices of the Zionist parties, taken over the buildings, and virtually sealed them off from Zionist activity. There had also been alarmed appeals for outside intervention.

To date he has received two suggestions for dealing with the situation. One was to meet the Rumanian Minister in Paris, which he was not inclined to do: he saw no value in Israel directly involving herself in the conflict. The second was to despatch two envoys, one from Mapai (the Israel Labour Party), and the other from Mapam (the United Workers' Party). The latter suggestion raised two questions: on whose behalf were they to appear, and what agreement were they to negotiate? As regarded the first question, the proposal was that the envoys be invested with the joint authority of the Zionist Executive and the Government of Israel. Sharett rejected this proposal out of hand, because he objected to the jumbling of authority, and because he did not think that Israel should officially intervene in the internal affairs of Rumania. Furthermore, there already was an Israeli Legation in Rumania and there was no point in duplicating functions. He felt that the envoys should appear only on behalf of the Zionist Executive, though should the need arise in the course of negotiations, they could declare that they were entitled to act in the name, and with the approval, of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs as well.

A far more difficult question was the target of the negotiations. Mapam offered two proposals: (1) that the two Labour parties aim at recognition that they constitute the Zionist Organization and be allowed to operate undisturbed; (2) that the two parties be permitted to act separately, if the Rumanians refused to deal with this type of umbrella organization. In both cases, the two parties would undertake not to prejudice the immigration of members of other Zionist parties. Mapam further noted that the primary objective obviously had to be the continued existence of the Zionist Organization in Rumania, and the second proposal was to be broached only if the first one failed. They thought that the Rumanians

were sure to reject the first proposal, and the only chance of avoiding utter defeat lay in the continued activities of the two Labour parties. According to them, the Mapai people in Bucharest were of the same opinion.

Sharett was doubtful and apprehensive of this proposal. In principle, he was prepared to compromise, but only if there was a real possibility of salvaging the Zionist work in Rumania. He felt that the Zionist Organization might be sacrificing the principles of equality and solidarity between the diverse elements in the movement, and gain nothing in return. Initially, the Rumanians would accept the proposal; then they would disqualify Mapai; and finally, they would demand that Mapam declare itself a communist party in all respects or it too would be disqualified. Nevertheless, he emphasized, if he were on the scene and convinced that there was no alternative but to adopt the two-party arrangement in order to prevent the collapse of Zionist activity in Rumania, he might well choose this course, of necessity. However, since he was far removed from the arena, he suggested that the decision be left to Mapai in Israel, and the matter be brought before the Zionist Executive.

Whatever the case, time was short and it was essential to act quickly. He asked that Friedman present the issue to Ben-Gurion and other members of Mapai, both in, and outside, the government. He, on his part, would attempt to meet in Paris with Andrei Vyshinsky, the Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, to discuss the question of immigration from Eastern Europe in general. Even if the discussion showed results, however, they would have no immediate effect on the situation in Rumania.

246. Note: Meeting between J. Herzog and R. Neuville. 9 December 1948

French Cultural and Religious Institutions in Israel

Neuville reported that France would not forgo the privileges accruing to her from the Mytilene Treaty signed with Turkey in 1903. The British Mandate had, in fact, abided by the agreement, despite the attempts made to circumvent it.

The French demands could actually be summarized in three points: (1) the right to expand, and add to, existing institutions; (2) the exemption of these institutions from any supervision over pedagogic matters, teaching appointments, and internal administrative affairs; (3) the exemption of these institutions from taxes and customs duties.

Regarding the first point, the French demand was purely theoretical, for they intended, not to expand their institutions in Israel, but indeed to curtail their activities since most of the applicants for their services had been Arabs and their numbers had dwindled. Regarding the second point, they asked that Jewish students be allowed to study at their institutions and that they themselves be exempted from studying or teaching in He-

brew. Regarding the third point, the reference was to goods and necessities destined for internal consumption by the institutions. The goods produced by the institutions, on the other hand, and destined to be sold, would of course be liable to taxes and customs duty.

In general, Neuville wished to establish that the existence and activities of the French institutions in Israel would not be affected by any future changes in the state constitution.

249. Meeting: M. Sharett — A. Vyshinsky (Paris, 12 December 1948)

This meeting was the continuation of the previous one (see No. 20), which had concluded with Vyshinsky raising the question of immigration to Israel. Sharett had seized upon this point to request a special conference on immigration from Eastern Europe. Vyshinsky had originally set aside half an hour for the discussion, but it actually lasted much longer.

Sharett began by expressing Israel's profound appreciation for Soviet support. As was well known, the Soviet Union did not adopt positions lightly, without carefully examining the facts. It could be assumed therefore that, prior to determining her stand on the Palestine question, the Soviet Union had studied the facts, concluded that the Jewish issue was just, and that it conformed with her image of the future of the world.

The establishment of the State of Israel was a historical process of immigration, and ingathering, of dispersed Jewry. This meant that the Jewish people had no security as long as it was dispersed throughout the countries of the world. But the establishment of the State of Israel was not the conclusion of this process. On the contrary, Israel had been established to lend it impetus. The mere fact of existence, however, did not yet gurarantee the state's independence. The State of Israel could not survive within it present population limits, and required massive immigration in order to grow stronger. The Soviet Union had chosen to support Israel and therefore had to draw the necessary conclusions, and understand that the country could not continue to exist within its present dimensions. It had to grow, and first of all, in the numerical sense. The Negev was a case in point. Israel had stood up to the political and military campaigns and had succeeded in thwarting the Bernadotte Plan, but these victories would not ensure her possession of the Negev unless she settled and developed it. In order to do so, immigration was imperative.

Israel was most interested in having all the Jews immigrate. She obviously had to bring the Jews from D.P. camps, and she wanted the Jews from North Africa, even though these were not ideal material for pioneering work. Primarily, however, she was interested in the immigration of Eastern European Jewry who in the past had been the backbone of the pioneering enterprise in Palestine, and who continued to constitute the most important reservoir of pioneer immigration.

Sharett went on to review the situation of immigration from various

countries in Eastern Europe. It was no problem for the Jews of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to emigrate. Yugoslavia allowed every Jew who defined himself a member of the State of Israel, to leave the country. About half of Yugoslavia's 8,000 Jews would probably immigrate. Bulgaria, too, was permitting all Jews who described themselves Zionists, to emigrate. The Jewish community in Bulgaria numbered approximately 35,000–40,000 people, some of whom were already on the way to Israel. Poland had between 70,000–80,000 Jews and she had declared that all those who so desired could immigrate to Israel, apart from persons necesary to Poland, or persons liable to harm her once they left the country. In principle, Israel was satisfied with this arrangement, although she was waiting to see how it worked in practice. Hungary had about 200,000 Jews, tens of thousands of whom undoubtedly wished to immigrate, but their situation was unclear.

Chiefly, however, Sharett wished to relate to the problem of Rumanian Jewry. Numbering about 350,000, this was the largest and most important Jewish community, with a long tradition of pioneering immigration. Yet it was precisely here that Israel encountered two types of resistance: the difficulties posed by the Rumanian authorities, who had apparently not drawn the obvious conclusions from the Soviet support of Israel; and the difficulties posed by the Jewish communists, who perhaps had had an excuse to oppose Zionism and immigration in the past, but no longer did, now that the U.S.S.R. supported Israel. Israel claimed the right to bring to her shores all the Jews who wished to come, and she assumed responsibility for them.

Vyshinsky replied that he understood Israel's position and saw the justice of it from her point of view. Nevertheless, it was essentially a question of international relations — of Israel's demands of other countries — and in this context, there could well be a conflict of interests. In the case of Rumania, perhaps the people necessary to Israel were also necessary to Rumania.

Sharett said that firstly, Israel wished the Soviet Union to understand her position; and if she could see her way to helping in the matter, it would be most welcome. Vyshinsky replied that the countries under discussion were all young and small, and sensitive of their honour, and it was therefore not always easy to influence them. Large countries could make concessions — not so small ones. There was also the question of anti-Rumanian activity on the part of Jews who had left Rumania. Sharett said that the Rumanian Jews who would immigrate to Israel would accept the state's laws, and Israel wholeheartedly desired Soviet friendship. And inasmuch as the discussion referred to the Rumanian Jewish community as a whole, and not to individuals, it had to be seen that this was a broken and uprooted people who would not easily strike new roots in Rumania, whereas in Israel they would immediately become part of the creative effort.

In summation, Vyshinsky said that he could not give an official answer on behalf of his government. And personally, he had to admit that he had not yet reached a conclusion. The issues raised required thought, and a policy decision. They would be relayed to the government, to Molotov, and perhaps even higher. It would be possible to discuss it further. Sharett said that if the Soviets had an answer, they could reply through the Legations in either Moscow or Israel. Vyshinsky replied that Golda Meyerson, Israel's Minister, could also act in the matter.

The discussion then turned to the U.N. resolution, and Vyshinsky pointed out that there were latent dangers in the relations between Israel and the United States. Sharett replied that this was a risk Israel had to take. Vyshinsky mentioned American-Jewish aid, and wondered if this help was not prompted purely by Jewish national feelings, but was also a tool in the hands of the American administration. Sharett replied that it stemmed only from Jewish national feelings; if, through it, Israel was in danger of subjugation to the United States, Israel would know how to counteract this trend, and build a free and independent country. Vyshinsky summed up the procedures in the General Assembly: the Soviet Union and Israel had won a great victory in defeating the Bernadotte Plan and the first British-American draft; however, the resolution to establish a Conciliation Commission was a failure. It was, in effect, an American commission. Sharett replied that Israel would meet the danger. Vyshinsky retorted that Israel was not to be too optimistic about that. Sharett said that American help was essential to Israel; without it, she would fall. Vyshinsky replied that he was aware of the situation.

Tsarapkin, who was present at the meeting, made a careful record of what was said, particularly of Vyshinsky's statements. No further discussion was tabled, and when Sharett remarked that he would be pleased to receive an answer through Golda Meyerson or other channels, Vyshinsky did not reply.

262. D. Ben-Gurion [Tel Aviv] to Ch. Weizmann (Rehovot). 16 December 1948

Ben-Gurion approves of Weizmann's intervention with the French Consul about Israel's admission to the U.N. (see No. 254, n. 3, p. 163 below). He was certain Israel could furnish adequate guarantees to protect the Holy Places, but he did not think that Israel could agree to the internationalization of Jerusalem, and it would be better not to leave the French with any illusions on this point. The Jews of Jerusalem would not agree, and rightly so, to foreign rule; international regime meant endless intrigue, and there was no reason for Jewish Jerusalem to be wrenched from the State of Israel.

263. M. Namir (Moscow) to G. Meyerson and S. Friedman (Tel Aviv). 16 December 1948

Namir reports on an anti-Israel article in the 51st issue of the Soviet paper, *Novoya Vremia.* The article attacked specific groups and part of the Israeli press for openly taking an unfriendly stand toward the U.S.S.R., despite the latter's consistent assistance to Israel. Mentioned were: an article in *Beterem,* by Harry Schwartz, criticizing the treatment of the Jewish minority in the U.S.S.R.; a report in *Hamashkif,* on the alleged curfew violation by the Soviet Minister; and an article in the *Haboker* newspaper, on the purported difficult situation of the Israeli Legation in Moscow. The paper writes that the reactionary course adopted by the Israeli press made it difficult for the Soviet Union to defend Israel during the U.N. session, and underscored America's influence on Israel.

Namir notes that he had immediately refuted the article in *Haboker,* and suggested that the Foreign Ministry staff explain to the Soviets the oppositionist nature and limited influence of *Haboker* and the two other papers. He proposed that a similar explanation be given also by the Legation in Moscow.

265. M. Sharett (Paris) to R. Rubin (Bucharest). 17 December 1948

Sharett congratulates Rubin on the assumption of his duties as Israel's Minister to Rumania. He repeats Eytan's instructions not to become involved in the controversies between the Rumanian government and the Rumanian Jews. Nevertheless, he assumes that after carefully studying the background, Rubin would find a way to help the Rumanian Zionist Organization in sound advice and moral support, in a manner that would not be construed as Israeli intervention in the internal affairs of Rumania.

276. Meeting: D. Ben-Gurion — P. Yershov (Tel Aviv, 27 December 1948)

The discussion was private and lasted about an hour and a half. At first it revolved around the Negev. Ben-Gurion explained the military situation, and related to Britain's policy and the motives of her opposition to giving Israel the Negev. He emphasized that Israel would not be able to hold the Negev long on military strength alone, and it was consequently necessary to settle the region with close to a million Jews as quickly as possible. Yershov asked if the Negev's importance was connected with oil. Ben-Gurion replied that for Israel, water was more important than oil, that there were irrigation plans, and that the Negev had to be settled with a million inhabitants, to come chiefly from Eastern Europe. He further explained why no mass immigration could be expected from the United States in the near future, and he reminded Yershov of Sharett's talk with

Vyshinsky regarding immigration (see No. 249). Yershov asked if he referred to the Jews of the U.S.S.R. Ben-Gurion said that at the moment he referred to the Jews in Eastern Europe, particularly in Rumania, and that apart from Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, difficulties had recently arisen in the immigration of Jews from these countries. Yershov took no position on the issue, although Ben-Gurion returned to it several times.

The discussion then moved on to the prospects of peace. Yershov expressed the opinion that Abdallah would undoubtedly make peace, were it not for British interference. He spoke disparagingly of King Faruq of Egypt. Ben-Gurion informed him of the coming meeting with Lebanese representatives (see No. 278).

From regional affairs, the talk turned to global matters — Britain, the United States, and Turkey. Yershov complained of the instability in American policy, both in general and with respect to Israel. Ben-Gurion explained what the situation had been in the United States prior to the elections — a weak President who had not been elected, and a State Department which knew what it wanted and conducted a policy different from that of the President. Further on, Yershov expressed a surprising opinion: he was certain that all the disputes between the U.S.S.R. and the United States would soon be settled, and should not be taken too seriously. He was very positive and firm about this. In speaking of Britain, there was a note of contempt in his voice. He felt the British were weak, and totally dependent on the United States. He spoke at greater length of Turkey, and here he and Ben-Gurion found common ground, for he had served in Ankara several years, and Ben-Gurion had lived in Turkey a number of years. He voiced astonishment at Turkey's utter dependence on the United States since, in case of war, the Soviets could overrun the country in two–three days. He noted that in the past the Soviet Union had greatly supported Ataturk's Turkey, and now the situation was so altered. He mentioned this to illustrate the fact that the Soviet Union also sometimes changed her political positions.

282. Political Consultation. 30 December 1948

With David Ben-Gurion, Walter Eytan, Yaacov Dori, Moshe Dayan, Yigael Yadin, David Horowitz, Shabtai Rosenne, Reuven Shiloah and Eliahu Sasson participating.

Sasson began with a survey of the developments in Arab countries (not printed here). His assessment was that recent developments had weakened the Arab regimes and raised the danger of their overdependence on, and subjugation to, European powers. This state of affairs left Israel two options: to withdraw within herself, sever all contact with the Arab states, and maintain no political or economic ties with them; or, on the other hand, to forge a network of ties and cooperation with the Arab world. In

his view, logic favoured the second course because it alone could prevent the subjection of the Arab countries to powers outside the region.

The key country, in this case, was Jordan, and the key question was the annexation of the Arab sectors of Palestine. In Sasson's opinion, Israel had to commit herself to the annexation of these territories to Jordan. This would divert Abdallah from his plans to gain control of Syria, and thereby facilitate the negotiations between Israel and Syria; it would decrease his dependence on Britain and pave the way for a solution to the refugee problem by settling the 200,000 refugees presently in this sector, in Jordan, or in the parts of western Palestine to be annexed to Jordan.

As the meeting proceeded, debate opened on Sasson's proposals. Yigael Yadin raised the question of the boundary between Israel and Abdallah's extended state. He stressed the necessity for a defensible border, situating it along the first chain of hills; i.e., Wadi Ara, Umm al-Fahm, Tulkarm and Qalqiliya would all be under Israeli control.

David Horowitz enlarged upon the discussion, relating to the economic aspects of the annexation. Annexation would increase Abdallah's dependence on Israel. He would purchase industrial products from her, and supply some of her agricultural needs.

Ben-Gurion brought up the possibility of Iraq's annexation to Jordan, or vice versa. This would create a territorial continuum between Israel and Iraq which was very close to the Soviet border. Logically, therefore, it was not difficult to imagine Soviet influence in Nablus. Sasson replied that there was no danger of such an annexation, and moreover, the Eastern-oriented elements in Iraq had little power. Ben-Gurion raised further reservations regarding Sasson's proposal: why not negotiate with Syria on the basis of opposing the annexation of parts of Arab Palestine to Jordan? Sasson asked what would then become of the hilltop region? Ben-Gurion suggested establishing an autonomous regime.

The deliberations turned to the position Israel was to take in the negotiations with Jordan scheduled for later that day. The subjects on the agenda included: the fate of the Old City; the border in the "Triangle", particularly in Wadi Ara; the Etzion Bloc settlements; the release of prisoners; reparations; the Naharayim power station; and the resumption of work at the potash factories in the south of the Dead Sea.

Ben-Gurion stressed that the major issue was the border in the "Triangle", and here Israel could not adopt a definite stand until the conclusion of the military activity in the Negev. Abdallah would obviously not willingly accept border changes in this area, but he would accept them *ex post facto* as a result of Israeli pressure. Whatever the case, nothing was to be done in haste, and certainly not before the U.N. had concluded its political deliberations on the Negev.

Dayan proposed interim arrangements to protect the truce during, and until the end of the period of negotiations. Abdallah, too, had proposed that the truce arrangements in the interim apply to Jerusalem and the

entire front line in the "Triangle", held by the Jordanians, i.e., up to Budrus in the Latrun sector. Here the question arose of the territory held by the Egyptians in the Hebron Hills. Abdallah had at one point committed himself, also on behalf of the Egyptians, to maintain the truce.

Ben-Gurion insisted that Israel had to reserve the right to act with respect to Egypt. Israel would not launch an assault against the Egyptians in the Hebron Hills, but she regarded them as an enemy and desired to be rid of them. Yadin and Dayan summarized the situation: to extend the truce to the entire region of the Hebron Hills, but to reserve the right to act with respect to the Egyptians.

Shiloah raised the question of the border in the Arava. Ben-Gurion demanded that the International Border be retained. Dayan asked what was to become of the Jordanian units situated within the demarcation line, in Israeli territory. Ben-Gurion replied that Israel's demand for the international border was a matter of principle, but she had no intention of initiating any action against these forces.

Shabtai Rosenne related to various aspects of the peace-making process between Israel and Jordan. In general, there were two stages to peace-making: the cessation of hostilities, an armistice, which was more or less a military stage, followed by the forging of the treaty itself, which included not only military matters, but also political and economic conditions. What Israel had to do with respect to Jordan, depended on her political forecast of the future. If it could be assumed that an actual peace treaty would follow within, say, six months of the armistice settlement, then the armistice talks could be confined to purely military matters. If, on the other hand, there was no such prospect in sight, then the framework of the settlement had to be broadened to serve, if need be, as a *de facto* peace agreement to endure several years.

Certain questions regarding the peace talks could not be overlooked: the question of reparations for property and war damages; the prisoners; the rights of Jews in Arab countries, the refugee problem, the relations between Israel and the Arab league, and the treaty between Jordan and Britain.

284. S. Friedman (Tel Aviv) to M. Namir (Moscow). 31 December 1948

Friedman reports on two meetings with the Soviet Minister. The first, which was of an unofficial nature, was held on the evening of December 22, i.e., just prior to Operation *Horev* (see Editorial Note, p. 167 below). The Minister was well informed and knew that an action was about to start. He claimed to have obtained the information from an unofficial source. Friedman notes that it was important to take into account the fact that Soviet representatives in Israel had their own sources of information.

The second meeting, official this time, was held after the outbreak of

fighting. The Minister was told of the situation at the front, and that the Lebanese had agreed to negotiate but had been deterred at the last minute (see No. 278). The Syrian army presence in Lebanon was emphasized, as was Syria's refusal to pull back her forces and the resultant tension between the two countries. He was informed that Israel was under pressure to evacuate the 14 villages under occupation in Lebanese territory, that Israel held these points for strategic purposes only, and that she would be prepared to withdraw when serious armistice and peace negotiations began.

With respect to the Negev, the Minister was told of the developments which preceded the military action: Israel's consent to release the Egyptian troops in Faluja by stages, concomitant with the negotiation process; Egypt's initial agreement to this programme, and subsequent retraction. The Minister was further informed of the content of Israel's letter to Riley of December 22 (No. 272).

The Minister had a number of questions: what type of negotiations did Israel seek? Had the evacuation of Faluja begun? What was her assessment of the Conciliation Commission, and how did she appraise her international situation following the U.N. Assembly session? The reply to the last question stressed that Israel's international situation was to a large extent due to her own internal consolidation, with particular reference to the growing number of immigrants.

The Minister received a report on Sasson's activities in Paris, and was told that despite Egyptian, Lebanese, and Jordanian readiness to negotiate, there was little prospect of achieving tangible results, apart from local agreements. This was due to both the mutual fear in which the Arab states held one another, and the atmosphere on the eve of the convention of the Arab League.

Aqaba's political and geographical situation was explained to the Minister, as was the British subterfuge in declaring that Israel had penetrated territory not belonging to her. The Minister asked the reason for the French position on Jerusalem, and was told that France aspired to return to the Middle East through her former role as the protector of the Christians in the East.

312. Meeting: S. Friedman — M. Moukhine (Tel Aviv, 10 January 1949)

The meeting was originally scheduled with the Minister himself, but he took ill and Friedman therefore met with M. Moukhine, the Counsellor of the Soviet Legation.

The Counsellor was given details of Operation *Horev,* the British ultimatum, and Israel's information regarding Britain's suply of weapons to the Arabs (see Editorial Note, p. 173 below, No. 302). Friedman pointed out the differences between the British and American positions on this

matter, and discussed the press reports of a Soviet proposal to furnish military aid to Israel (see n. 2, p. 175 below).

The Counsellor listened attentively, made notes, and posed a series of questions: had Israel really decided to lodge a complaint against Britain at the U.N.? On what basis had Israel concluded that there was a discrepancy between the American and British positions? Had the British Consul instructed British subjects to leave Israel? Was it true that Israel held a number of British pilots prisoner? Was it true that British warships had received orders to change course and remain within proximity of Israel? Had the Israeli press refuted or contradicted the matter of proposed aid from the U.S.S.R.? What was Jordan's role in the incident?

The Counsellor noted that the Legation highly appreciated the information it received, even if part of it had already appeared in the press, because it had learned from experience not to rely on the Israeli press. He was full of praise for Israel's operational ability, as demonstrated in the latest campaign, asked about the mood in Israel, and whether it was firm enough in the conflict with Britain. In his opinion, he said, the U.N. would treat Israel's claims seriously, even though the complaint was directed against a great power.

313. E. Avriel (Prague) to M. Sharett. 11 January 1949

Avriel reports on a long and friendly meeting with Clementis, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister. The meeting took place after Britain, in wake of the incident between Israel and herself published details of Czech arms supplies to Israel. Clementis said he had instructed the Czech representative at the U.N. to inform the Security Council that the Czechoslovak government viewed the supply of arms to Israel as a detail in the overall struggle for the Middle East, and as the implementation of the November 29 resolution. He asked that this information be relayed to Eban, in order to coordinate positions.

314. K. Levin (Salzburg) to G. Hirsch. 11 January 1949

Levin, the Israeli Vice-Consul and Immigration Officer in Austria, reports on a talk with Erhardt, the American ambassador in Vienna. The talk was held at Erhardt's initiative and was most friendly. Erhardt said that as soon as Israel was interested in Austrian recognition, she was to apply to him, for he had been told by responsible sources in Austria that they would recognize Israel whenever the Americans requested it, even in the face of British opposition. Levin had also received a promise to support recognition of Israel in the talks he was conducting with the Soviets.

In the light of these talks, Levin wished to reclarify Israel's stand in the matter of recognition. He had been told in the past not to act in this direction. If this position remained unchanged, he would like instructions

on how to explain Israel's refusal to the Americans and the Soviets. Until now he had replied as he saw fit, non-committally. Should there be a change, however, he would ask that the timing of the official request be coordinated with him.

In general, he found in Austria a great deal of respect for the State of Israel and her achievements, both in the press and among the public. Nevertheless, the truth was that the anti-semitism of the people had not lessened; it simply found no public expression. Official circles, on the other hand, were anti-Nazi, even anti-German.

Trade relations between Austria and Israel were developing even without mutual recognition. According to his information, Israel was not interested in these ties either. However, since they existed in any case, and could not be stopped, it would be wiser to channel them. He proposed that someone be despatched to Austria to organize these matters, and should this prove useful after a three-month trial period, the appointment could become permanent.

332. R. Benshalom (Prague) to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 14 January 1949

Information has been received from members of the Czech Communist Party that at a recent discussion it was resolved to abandon the friendly party line towards Israel in view of Israel's pro-American shift in her policy. Public opinion is already being prepared for this, as may be seen from the two enclosed articles — one from the *Rude Pravo,* the Czech Communist Party's daily, and the other from the *Svetovy Rozhled,* the Party's monthly.

350. R. Rubin (Bucharest) to S. Friedman. 22 January 1949

The Israeli Minister to Rumania had just had an hour-long meeting with Ana Pauker, at which he raised the following issues: (1) Immigration to Israel, which is essential to the settlement of the Negev and to Israeli independence in general; he pointed to the aid given by the Soviet Union and by Czechoslovakia and requested that Rumania, too, as the main reservoir of Jewish immigration, extend her help. The reply was: the matter will be submitted to the Council of Ministers. (2) Rubin asked for the exit permits for the trained pioneers which had been promised by the authorities and had not been issued so far. (3) The same for the families of Israeli soldiers and others. The Foreign Minister made a note on this subject. (4) In return Rubin offered an extensive trade agreement and Israel's eventual help in obtaining the goods necessary for the execution of the Rumanian economic plan. The Foreign Minister said she would introduce Rubin to the Minister of Foreign Trade on his return from

Moscow. (5) Rubin demanded that an inquiry be made into the affair of the four detained emissaries and proposed that they be returned to Israel.

The meeting was very cordial, and the Minister gave Rubin her personal telephone number for future direct contact.

355. Y. Gaulan (Jerusalem) to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 26 January 1949

Gaulan, the Foreign Ministry's representative in Jerusalem, reports on his meeting with Pablo Azcarate, the Principal Secretary to the Conciliation Commission. Azcarate opened the conversation by showing him a telegram received from Rhodes containing the text of the cease-fire agreement between Israel and Egypt (see Vol. 3, No. 48), and Gaulan voiced his opinion that this was only a preliminary understanding paving the way to an armistice agreement.

Azcarate reported on the plans of the Conciliation Commission. They had had several idle days in Geneva owing to the absence of the American members. He will propose that they stay in Jerusalem for a while to get acquainted and to get used to working together, after which they will leave for their tour of the Arab capitals.

As for himself, he was very happy about this assignment: in the course of his lengthy sojourn in Jerusalem and in Egypt he had acquired a great deal of experience in the problems of this region. From his connections in Egypt he knows how eager they are to terminate the war in Palestine. This applies in particular to the military, as the politicians are still finding it difficult to adapt to the idea which in their view implies recognition of Israel. He does not see the forthcoming negotiations between Israel and the Arab states as bilateral talks, with a united Arab front facing Israel; the Arab states are pulling in different directions and the talks will have a different character in each case.

From his contacts with the Arabs he has learned that they are inclined favourably towards the Commission, but are afraid that it will share the fate of all the other commissions of inquiry on Palestine. Azcarate stressed that neither he nor the members of the Commission consider it to be a body of inquiry whose task is to delve into the origins of the problem and to lay before the U.N. a definitive report — certain to be rejected by both sides. In his opinion — and, as far as he is aware, the members of the Commission share it with him — the events which brought about the Arab–Israeli conflict could not have been prevented and controlled by any given body, but they have now reached a stage where outside factors can influence the natural completion of the process — though not to shape it in opposition to its inherent forces. It is not their intention to issue reports but to encourage the parties to come to an agreement. This attitude is of particular importance *vis-à-vis* the Arabs, who are the losing

side and who moreover are not methodical, are not used to routine and lack spirit.

Gaulan pointed out that the Foreign Ministry has not yet established the framework of its dealings with the Commission. If the Commission decides to do its work while touring the various countries, then the Foreign Ministry will appoint one or two liaison officers in Jerusalem. If, however, the Commission will sit permanently in Jerusalem, then a larger delegation will have to be organized. Azcarate replied that the method of work of the Commission would depend on the governments concerned: if they insist on head office ratification at every stage of the negotiations, then frequent journeys will be unavoidable, but if the delegations are given wider powers then the center of activity will probably be in Jerusalem.

Boisanger and Fraser Wilkins, the respective French and American representatives on the Commission, arrived during the conversation. Boisanger expressed his earnest desire for the success of the armistice talks at Rhodes.

356. S. Friedman (Tel Aviv) to G. Meyerson (Moscow). 26 January 1949

The Soviet Minister was invited to see Sharett to be briefed on current affairs, and on the Rhodes talks in particular. At the start of the talks the Egyptians had declared that they considered themselves a free agent and that they had accumulated a great deal of bitterness against the British. The Minister was also informed of Eban's mistrust of the motives of the Egyptians in joining the Rhodes talks — they might be interested not in achieving an agreement but in manoeuvring Israel into a position where she would appear to be acting in defiance of the U.N. resolutions. (See No. 319.)

The Minister was informed about the contacts with the Lebanon. There were preliminary talks, but Israel demanded of the Lebanese representatives that they procure official credentials from their government and from the Chief of the General Staff. Israel has allowed the Lebanese to occupy several positions in no-man's-land; the other places will be evacuated gradually by Israel, who will on her part demand the evacuation by the Lebanese of Rosh Haniqra.

At the start of the meeting the Minister was informed of the British reinforcement of their garrison at Aqaba and of Israel's suspicions that the British had infringed on Israeli territory at a certain place. He was also told of a message from a Transjordanian source, claiming that the landing at Aqaba had taken place without their prior agreement, and they had been forced to declare *post factum* that the landing had been made at their request.

The Minister put several questions to Sharett: (1) Were there any

strings attached to the American loan, and was it to be given in money or in kind; the answer to the first question was in the negative, and to the second — in kind. (2) Has France stipulated her recognition of Israel on the evacuation of the Lebanese villages; the answer was, that that had indeed been the case, but that Israel had rejected this condition, making clear to the French that this was a matter purely between Israel and the Lebanon. (3) What was the significance of the release of the Cyprus detainees; the Minister was told that it was not clear whether this step signified a change in the British attitude towards Israel or whether it was designed merely to ease the tension between the two countries and to make it easier to continue with the present policy.

362. Meeting of the Paris Section of the Middle East Division in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 31 January 1949

On the inferences to be drawn from the "Paris mission" and on future lines of action in Israel's policy towards the Arabs.

1. *The objects of the Paris mission and to what extent they have been achieved.*

The objects of the Paris mission were as follows:

(a) To establish contacts with the Arab states and to follow continuously and systematically the processes and the main factors active in these countries, in order to understand fully the developments.
(b) To attempt to contact the Arab governments with a view to direct negotiations towards the termination of hostilities and the attainment of a peaceful solution.
(c) To assess the practicability and the effectiveness of initiating relations with oppositionary bodies in the Arab countries with the aim of disrupting the Arab war efforts.
(d) To initiate and to renew contacts with influential Arab circles in order to make clear Israel's position and to pave the way for understanding and for a peaceful settlement between the Jews and the Arabs.

After five months' work in Paris the time has come to find out whether the aims of the mission have been realized.

With regard to the contacts with the Arab countries, it would seem that the frequent conversations with Arab persons of influence guarantee for Israel some modicum of understanding of and orientation in what is happening in the Arab countries.

The effort to initiate practical talks or negotiations has been effective only with Egypt and Transjordan.

The assessment of the practicability and usefulness of contacting oppo-

sitionary bodies (which was carried out thoroughly in the case of the Lebanon only) has been negative.

As to the initiation and renewal of contacts, it may be stated that these have been exploited for laying groundwork, for correcting misapprehensions and for promoting the idea of the existence of common interests between Israel and the Arabs.

2. *The lesson of the peace efforts*

After having assessed briefly the practicability of cooperation with oppositionary bodies it was decided to attempt a settlement with the existing Arab governments. Today, in view of Israel's political and military achievements, following a vigorous information campaign and after certain segments of the Arab people and their leaders have come to know the true state of affairs, it is worth while to estimate the prospects of a peaceful settlement with the existing Arab governments. The question is whether the talks with Transjordan and with Egypt are a stage in the process towards a final settlement or whether they are merely, on one hand, a noncommittal attempt on the part of the Egyptian court to sound out the possibilities, and on the other, the sign of a more genuine but less untrammelled desire for peace on the part of Abdallah.

One view has it that the day of peace is still distant, in spite of the Arab defeats and in spite of the growing realization on the part of the Arab rulers of the logic and the benefits of Arab–Israeli cooperation — because the drive for power and for survival of the Arab governments compels them to keep to the present line. Nor must one ignore the influence of Britain, which encourages the Arab states in their intransigence towards Israel. If this assumption is valid, then special attention should be paid to all the elements in opposition to the present regimes in order to find possible allies in the cause of peace.

A warning has been sounded on overtures to oppositionary bodies against possible risks and disillusionment due to the likelihood of the oppositions adopting the anti-Israel line of their predecessors after they come to power. In any event, the conclusion is that, even if no allies in the cause of peace are found among the oppositions, one should cultivate the principai ones, as the Wafd in Egypt and the Jawahiry group in Iraq.

3. *Lines of action in Israel's Arab policy*

The following three lines of action have emerged from the discussion:

(a) A continuing effort to arrive at an early settlement with the Arab governments, in spite of all the difficulties and on the basis of the hope that the realities of the situation will force the Arab leaders to change their attitude.
(b) Further attempts to find allies among the various oppositions, to be

conducted very circumspectly, so as not to prejudice the contacts with the people in power.

(c) Simultaneously with the above two lines of action, and on the assumption that early results in these directions are unlikely, an effort is called for to come to a speedy conclusion of the war as an intermediate stage on the way to peace, so as to lighten the economic and financial burden on the state. In this connection the idea of taking over the Triangle has been put forward, possibly even with Abdallah's consent and while encouraging the inhabitants to organize local self-rule.

4. *Various*

(a) The "field work" of the Middle East Division abroad should continue, under the supervision and instruction of the head of the department.

(b) The Arabic broadcasts of the Voice of Israel should be intensified and made more effective.

(c) The possibility should be examined of setting up in Europe a centre for printed propaganda for distribution in the Arab countries.

363. E. Avriel (Prague) to M. Sharett. January 1949

Avriel saw Clementis, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, on the subject of British statements on the sale of Czech munitions to Israel. To Clementis' enquiry on how Israel intended to react, Avriel replied that Israel will treat the subject of arms supply in the context of a wide variety of problems, will point out that Britain is still supplying the Arabs with arms, and will not confirm the details of the British accusations. Clementis replied that he had instructed his representative at the U.N. to act similarly, and he requested that Israel's Foreign Minister be informed of this so that the Czechoslovak and the Israeli reactions could be coordinated. Avriel personally does not attach much importance to the British accusations and regards them as not more than a nuisance.

Further on Clementis asked whether Israel was apprehensive of possible British armed intervention. Avriel replied that Israel had downed the five British planes (see Editorial Note, p. 173) supposing them to be Egyptian, as the Egyptians are using the same sort of planes, but possibly the same action would have been taken had it been known that they were British. In any case it is not Israel's intention to become involved in a war with Britain and she wishes for a speedy termination of the dispute. Clementis asked whether Israel had really crossed the border into Egypt, and Avriel replied that the border had indeed been crossed by the Israeli forces in pursuit of the enemy but it was not Israel's intention to annex any part of Egyptian territory. Clementis asked again whether there was

any danger of an armed clash between Britain and Israel, and Avriel replied that he had no detailed information on the situation but it seemed to him that such an eventuality was possible: Britain is vitally interested in the Negev, does not rely on Israel as a possible ally and has lost hopes of the Arab states taking over the Negev by force. Clementis asked whether Israel was hoping for a peace agreement with Egypt and Transjordan without having to make any territorial concessions in the Negev, and Avriel replied that Israel had categorically declared that she would make no more concessions in any region; when the Arabs accept this reality, peace will be attained.

Avriel raised the problem of the supply of heavy armaments, as artillery and tanks, which are urgently needed by Israel, and which have not been so far available from Czechoslovakia. Clementis promised to make enquiries, but pointed out that Czechoslovakia's output in heavy armament was not large enough for immediate delivery; if the Czechoslovak army decides it can do without some of this equipment — it will relinquish it in Israel's favour. He stressed that his attitude to this problem was not from the commercial point of view but from the aspect of Israel's military needs.

365. D. B. Joseph (Jerusalem) to M. Sharett. 1 February 1949

Joseph reports on his meeting with the Conciliation Commission, where he talked mainly with the French representative, Boisanger. The latter started by talking about the Arabs, and then turned to the problem of the refugees, emphasizing how important it was to Israel to assist the Commission in finding a solution. Joseph replied that Israel understood the anxiety felt for the refugees on humanitarian grounds, but what has happened cannot be undone as many things have changed since. Boisanger replied that he understood that the solution must lie in the resettlement of the refugees in neighbouring countries some distance from the Israeli borders and this implied the expenditure of great sums of money, large credits and so forth. He stressed how important it was that Israel demonstrate her good will in helping to solve this problem and this would be of assistance to her in solving other problems, such as that of Jerusalem.

In the course of the conversation Boisanger emphasized that their intention was solely to find some means of bringing the parties to sign a peace agreement, which would be of great importance to Israel as she will have to live with the Arabs in future.

Boisanger did not discuss the issue of Jerusalem at length nor did Joseph bring it up, except for remarking — when Boisanger mentioned the city — that this would be a most difficult problem for the Commission.

370. Meeting: S. Friedman — P. Yershov (Tel Aviv, 1 February 1949)

The main topic of this meeting was the various recent Soviet publications hostile to Israel — Ganin's pamphlet "The Palestinian Problem" and the news items in *Trud* and on the Moscow Radio about the elections in Israel (see n. 1, p. 184). Friedman stated that these publications were surprising and distressing, and also incomprehensible — in view of the Soviet Union's political support of Israel. He emphasized that the information about Israel's alleged *rapprochement* to the West as one of the results of the elections was entirely without foundation; nor was such significance to be attached to the recent wave of recognitions of Israel by Western states, as the Soviet Union itself wants the entire world to recognize Israel — *vide* its support of Israel's admission to the U.N. Also, the Israel Labour Party (Mapai) cannot be described as "bourgeois" as stated in *Trud.* Friedman added that in his opinion the sources responsible for the publications wished to mislead the Soviet Union, and they could most probably be identified with the Israel Communist Party. When the Minister asked whether Israel wished him to transmit these words to his government, Friedman replied that he would be glad if this were done — if the Minister agreed with him that what was stated in the said publications did not accord with reality.

The Minister replied that neither Ganin nor his pamphlet were known to him. He did not think the pamphlet should be accorded particular importance and it was quite possible that other publications have appeared expressing quite different opinions. Then he turned to the Israeli press and pointed out that it also occasionally published unfriendly items about the Soviet Union. Friedman in reply stressed the partisan character of the Israeli press and its independence of the Government, in contrast to the official press of the Soviet Union.

The conversation then turned to the results of the elections in Israel. The Minister asked what were the causes of the defeat of the Communist Party. Friedman dwelt at length on the negative attitude of the Israeli Communists towards all constructive enterprise here and added that there was no similarity between this party in Israel and communist parties in other countries, just as it was not possible to compare the Israeli Labour Party with Social Democratic parties in other countries.

The problem of Russian property in Israel was also discussed (see n. 6, p. 184), and the Minister requested that this issue be settled as soon as possible.

372. Meeting: S. Friedman — P. Yershov (Tel Aviv, 3 February 1949)

The subject was the raising of the level of the diplomatic mission of the U.S. in Israel to that of an Embassy. Friedman emphasized that the

initiative in this matter had come from the U.S. and added that the American missions in three neighbouring countries were also at the level of embassies. The Soviet Minister pointed out that the initiative for upgrading the Soviet mission in Israel should come from Israel. When Friedman replied that he would transmit this opinion to the Foreign Minister, the Soviet Minister said that that was not necessary as their conversation was of a private character.

Towards the end the Minister denied the reports in the Israeli press that he was about to leave for Moscow, and asked whether the reports on Golda Meyerson's impending return to Israel were true. Friedman replied that no decision had yet been taken on this.

377. S. Friedman (Tel Aviv) to G. Meyerson (Moscow). 8 February 1949

Friedman reports on his conversation with the Soviet Minister regarding publications in the Soviet Union hostile to Israel (see No. 370), and adds that the Minister's reply had an apologetic note and it implied a wish to minimize the importance that Israel should attach to their publications. Friedman thinks it would be of advantage if the Israeli representatives in the Soviet Union and in other Eastern European countries also raised this subject; Israel should turn to the attack in this matter, and the defeat of the Communists — who are apparently the source of these reports — in the last elections strengthens the claim that they should not be regarded as a factor of any importance in Israel.

386. R. Rubin (Bucharest) to M. Sharett. 14 February 1949

Rubin reports on the gathering of thousands of Jews near the Legation in Bucharest demanding to be allowed to immigrate to Israel. Twenty thousand applications have so far been handed in. He requested an urgent audience with the Foreign Minister and the Minister of the Interior but received no reply. Rubin's opinion is that an intervention with the Russians is necessary and he requests an immediate answer to his telegram.

388. U. Heyd (Washington) to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 15 February 1949

Report No. 2 on the operation of the Israeli mission in Washington

1. *The political activity and the dealings with the Department of State*

The political activity has been lately concentrated on the following subjects: blocking the efforts of the British to involve the U.S. in moves against Israel during the last period of tension in the Negev; the American

loan; U. S. recognition *de jure* of Israel; the Rhodes talks; the emigration of Jews of military age from the American zones of occupation in Germany and Austria; the Meeting of the International Refugee Organization and the International Wheat Conference in Washington.

2. Change of climate at the Department of State

In the wake of Acheson's appointment as Secretary of State and with the extension of full recognition and the exchange of ambassadors between the two countries, an improvement in the attitude of the Department of State has become noticeable. Both the White House and the Department of State have intimated to Israel on various occasions that the differences of opinion between them on the Palestine issue were no more. It is still too early to ascertain whether that traditional rift has indeed finally disappeared, but in any case Israel should act very circumspectly to avoid any impression that she is trying to enlist the aid of the White House against the Department of State.

In addition, the Department of State is noticeably more willing to come to Israel's help in various matters, such as in the case of the American delegation for the development of civil aviation.

3. Political problems in the near future

(a) The position of the U.S. on Israel's borders: apparently both the Department of State and the White House are of the opinion that Israel should not be allowed to annex areas not included in the 29 November resolution unless she gives up other areas in return. The Department of State is keeping an eye particularly anxiously on Israel's plans regarding Jerusalem.

(b) The problem of the Arab refugees has become a weapon in the hands of Israel's enemies and even friendly circles evince some confusion. Israel's supporters have made efforts to prevent an undesirable debate during the discussions in Congress on the American grant for the Palestinian refugees.

(c) American aid for the development of the Middle East: Point 4 in the President's inaugural speech about American aid to underdeveloped regions aroused considerable interest in the Administration and in the press. The Middle East is considered one of the principal regions to be in need of such aid and the drafting of an appropriate plan for development will require the utmost attention on the part of the mission in the near future.

392. R. Rubin (Bucharest) to M. Sharett. 17 February 1949

Rubin reports on a Jewish demonstration outside the Legation following a rumour that the Rumanian government had agreed to the emigration of 100,000 Jews. He himself had been requested to see the Deputy

Foreign Minister, who stated that the Government suspected the demonstrations to have been instigated by the Legation. Rubin denied this and argued that the Legation saw no profit in the demonstrations, which could only harm Israel's interests; in his opinion they had been organized by Israel's enemies.

Further on, when he requested a reply on the matter of the emigration of the Zionists, he was told that the Rumanian government could not make decisions under mob pressure. Rubin thinks that the Jewish population was provoked and their agitation was then exploited in order to put obstacles in the way of Zionist emigration and to have a pretext for the arrest of the Zionist leaders on the charge of inciting the people to demonstrations and riots.

393. R. Rubin (Bucharest) to S. Friedman. 19 February 1949

Rubin reports further demonstrations in the vicinity of the Legation, of an extent and character which is detrimental to the negotiations on emigration. The Legation wants to put a stop to the demonstrations but has no way of communicating with the crowds as the Zionist Organization has been disbanded. Rubin requests that the Voice of Israel broadcast the following announcement, which however should not be attributed to the Legation:

"The Legation in Bùcharest is very concerned about the demonstrations of Jews outside its offices, on the problem of the *aliya.* The Israeli Minister has presented the appeal for *aliya* to the Rumanian Government and a positive response is to be hoped for. The demonstrations are regarded as having been staged. During a demonstration on the 17th the officials of the Legation came out and asked the crowd to disperse. The Legation hopes that the Jewish community will ignore the rumours and that the demonstrations will not recur."

Rubin also requests that the Voice of Israel refrain in the future from giving news items about Rumania without the Legation's official approval.

395. E. Avriel (Prague) to S. Friedman. 21 February 1949

Avriel discussed the problem of *aliya* with Rakosi, the Secretary-General of the Hungarian Communist Party, stressing the necessity of *aliya* from Hungary and asking for 50,000 exit permits within six months, promising in exchange to put a stop to the illegal emigration and to use his influence to pacify the Jewish public.

Rakosi refused the request, claiming that the Jews were an integral and useful component of the Hungarian nation. They included many professionals, whose emigration would harm the stability of the state. He nevertheless agreed on the need for some sort of compromise and promised to

have the problem discussed anew in the Cabinet and to consult the neighbouring countries. He intimated that the result would be to Israel's satisfaction.

Avriel requested the immediate emigration of 2000 persons as a gesture of good will and in order to refute the rumours about the stoppage of *aliya.* Rakosi promised to give this request favourable consideration and asked for a detailed memorandum.

The Hungarian government is putting pressure on the Zionist Organization to dissolve of itself. Emissaries from Israel are being deported on the charge of Zionist activities. Avriel advised the Zionist leaders not to dissolve the organization but also not to indulge in provocative acts. The emissaries will leave Hungary only if forced to do so.

In Avriel's opinion direct negotiations with the Eastern European countries will produce no results; the only way to deal with this problem is to have the Foreign Minister pay a special visit to Moscow and to the Cominform headquarters.

398. S. Friedman (Tel Aviv) to M. Namir (Moscow). 22 February 1949

Friedman reports on the situation in Eastern Europe.

In Rumania the situation is deteriorating. The emissaries have not been released and three more have been detained. The directors of the Zionist Funds are still under arrest and awaiting trial. The Rumanians have refused to receive a delegation from the Jewish Agency. The Israeli representatives in Rumania are of the opinion that Communist personalities the world over should be approached to have them exert their influence on the Rumanian government on behalf of Zionism. Some steps have already been taken in this direction, and if Namir finds it possible he should try and contact embassies of countries close to Rumania with that end in view — though Friedman himself does not pin much hope on this.

The negotiations on *aliya* from Rumania have had no results. The Jewish community is on the verge of panic and thousands have been gathering near the Legation in Bucharest demanding to be allowed to emigrate. The Israeli Minister was summoned to the Deputy Foreign Minister and asked to put a halt to the demonstrations, to which he replied that the Legation had no hand in their organization. The Legation people think that the demonstrations are being organized as a provocation to hamper *aliya* and to create a climate favourable to the arrest of additional Zionist leaders. The Minister in Rumania wishes to contact the Russians in this matter, but Golda Meyerson thinks there is no possibility of holding talks of such sort in Moscow.

In Poland the situation is also difficult. The Palestine Office, which dealt with immigration to Israel, has been closed down and its functions have been transferred to the Legation, whose staff is consequently under

great pressure. The Polish government allows only a small number to emigrate, as it sees fit. Apparently only those are permitted to leave who have relatives in Israel, who are over 50 and who are not in an essential occupation. The report which has recently appeared in an Israeli newspaper that there would be great concessions in the matter of emigration is apparently groundless. The Israeli Minister in Warsaw finds it difficult to reconcile himself to this state of affairs and transmits continuous reports on "friendly" negotiations, on an unclear situation and on possible developments in either direction.

There are good prospects of *aliya* from Czechoslovakia.

There is a complete stalemate in Hungary, and E. Avriel is continuing his negotiations.

In Bulgaria, on the other hand, emigration is continuing. The Bulgarians have requested to postpone the dispatch of an official representative from Israel till the end of March, when the emigration of the Jews will have been completed.

There have been some developments in the diplomatic relations with Eastern European countries. Poland has appointed a minister to Israel but has not yet published his identity. A Polish commercial attaché has also arrived recently. The Yugoslavs have also appointed a minister to Israel. Hungary has sent a commercial attaché, without there being any official body to which he could be considered attached.

399. S. Friedman (Tel Aviv) to E. Avriel (Prague). 23 February 1949

There have been discouraging developments in the Soviet Union. The Israeli representatives have been forbidden to have any contact with Soviet citizens, whom they have been accused of encouraging to renounce their nationality and to emigrate to Israel. The Legation has been forbidden to distribute its Bulletin to institutions, to kolkhozes, and to Jewish communities, and has been ordered to transmit messages to Soviet citizens solely through the intermediacy of the Foreign Ministry, while the Bulletin may be distributed only to members of the diplomatic corps and to the Foreign Ministry.

The Legation has moved from its temporary quarters in the hotel to a permanent residence, which has probably put an end to the visits by local Jews who used to come to the hotel.

407. R. Rubin (Bucharest) to M. Sharett. 27 February 1949

1. For the last four days the entire local press has been attacking with growing intensity the Zionist enterprise in Israel and the *aliya.*
2. No reply has been received from the authorities on the *aliya;* on the

contrary, pressure has increased on the Jews to take employment and be absorbed in the Rumanian economy.

3. The pressure to close down the preparatory training farms is continuing and all the children's homes maintained by the Zionist Organization have been taken over by the government.
4. There has been no progress on the release of the directors of the Zionist Funds.
5. There has been no response to Israel's protest over the detention of the emissaries.
6. The leaders of the regime refuse to meet the Minister and refer him to second or third grade officials.

In the Minister's estimate the situation has reached a critical stage and there is a feeling of an impending catastrophe. The impression is that there is no prospect of a solution locally and it is suggested that the Russians be energetically approached in this matter. Rubin proposes an urgent meeting in Israel of all the ministers to the Eastern European countries.

412. R. Rubin (Bucharest) to M. Sharett. 1 March 1949

Rubin has been received by the Deputy Foreign Minister from whom he demanded the release of the seven emissaries and requested an answer on the *aliya*. The Deputy Minister replied that the emissaries were under interrogation on the charge of interfering with internal affairs of the Rumanian state. He also said he had no reply on the *aliya*. When Rubin asked whether this should be construed as a reply, he said: "As you wish". Rubin replied that he would have to go back to Israel to report. The Deputy Minister responded only by asking when Rubin was planning to leave. In the course of the conversation Rubin implied that the commercial agreement between Rumania and Israel was tied up with the issue of the *aliya*. The Deputy Minister replied that Rumania was interested in commercial relations but that these had nothing to do with the *aliya*. In Rubin's opinion further negotiations on the *aliya* are of no use as an unfavourable decision on this matter has apparently already been taken. The content and the tone of the conversation seem to underline this state of affairs. Rubin thinks he should be recalled to Israel for consultations.

413. A. Oron (Rome) to G. Hirsch. 2 March 1949

Oron reports on Professor Guido Mendes's audience with Pope Pius XII. Mendes, who is a specialist for lung diseases and a resident of Israel, was for many years director of a hospital in Rome and was a childhood friend of the Pope.

Prior to the audience, it had been agreed between Oron and Mendes

that the latter should try and direct the conversation mainly to the subject of Jerusalem and that Israel's position should be presented in accordance with previous statements by the Foreign Minister. The intention was to stress the Jews' refusal to renounce the New City, and also Israel's willingness to internationalize the Old City with its Holy Places.

At the audience itself the Pope listened attentively to Mendes's exposition, nodded several times as if in agreement, but did not say a word for or against the proposal. When Mendes raised the idea of handing over the Old City to one mandatory Catholic state (this had not been mentioned in the preliminary talk with Oron), the Pope responded: "Why should it not be Italy?" Mendes had the impression that the Pope was not well briefed on the problem of Jerusalem and the various proposed solutions.

416. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to R. Rubin (Bucharest). 3 March 1949

Replying to Rubin's request to be recalled to Israel for consultations. A protest gesture would be pointless. His coming to Israel would serve a purpose only if it was followed by a firm and significant move on the part of the Israeli Government. At the moment there were no plans for such a move. Israel was working on Moscow directly, and through contacts in the United States. He asked Rubin to be patient.

417. R. Rubin (Bucharest) to M. Sharett. 3 March 1949

Reporting on a meeting between the Minister of the Interior, the Deputy Minister, and 20 Zionist leaders. According to the Minister: the Zionist Organization had to be abolished. The State of Israel was a lackey of the United States. Israeli emissaries in Rumania had engaged in subversive activity, organized demonstrations, and agitated against the government. The agricultural training farms had to be shut down, and the youth movements disbanded. No promise had been given that Zionists would be permitted to emigrate to Israel — this had simply been the Zionists' interpretation. To the extent that *aliya* would be feasible in the future, it was the government which would determine who would be allowed to leave. All other Jews would have to take their place in the labour force. Thus far, the Minister's statement.

418. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to Y. Dori. 6 March 1949

Sharett relates to Israel's commitments *vis-à-vis* the civilian population in Faluja and Iraq al-Manshiya, in connection with the signing of the armistice agreement with Egypt (see Vol. 3, Appendix F). These commitments guaranteed to the villagers that "All of those civilians shall be fully secured in their persons, abodes, property and personal effects".

It was particularly important to abide strictly by these commitments for two reasons:

(1) This pledge was part of the first direct agreement between Israel and a neighbouring Arab state, and at stake here was Israel's credibility as a party to an international treaty, and her capability as a government to fulfil the terms of the treaty. Egypt was likely to be especially sensitive in the matter, since her forces had been responsible for the civilians in question. Moreover, any injury done to these civilians was liable to be reflected in the attitude towards the Jews in Egypt. Of specific concern were the Zionists imprisoned in Egypt, since their release had not been made a condition of the agreement, but depended on an unofficial promise.

(2) Israel was embroiled in a serious controversy with the U.N. institutions as to her responsibility for the problem of the Arab refugees. Israel disclaimed all responsibility, for the problem had been created by the offensive war the Arabs had waged against her. She denied the accusation that she had initiated the expulsion of Arabs from their homes, except in those instances where they had been uprooted as a direct result of battle. The two villages under consideration fell into Israeli hands without a battle, and any attempt to dislodge the inhabitants would undermine Israel's credibility, and cast doubt on her declarations with respect to the refugees.

For these reasons, he viewed the harm done to the Faluja Arabs as a most serious matter (see Vol. 3, No. 246). True, the Mediator's information had been exaggerated. Nevertheless, the incident should never have come to pass. Even more serious were the steps now being taken to encourage the same population to abandon Faluja in the direction of Hebron, ostensibly of their own free will. This sort of conduct courted severe repercussions: firstly, internally — it was the unauthorized intervention of a local military command in a matter relating to the policy of the government of Israel; and secondly, the attempt to stage a "voluntary" mass exit, as it were, was apt to fail since theArabs would tell of the threats which had impelled them to remove.

It was mandatory that the supreme military authorities intervene immediately and firmly, in order to prevent developments which could only lead to the gravest of consequences.

421. E. Avriel (Prague) to S. Friedman. 7 March 1949

Avriel plans to set out for Hungary later that day in order to expedite the reply to the proposal that 2000 people emigrate (see No. 395). In Rumania, defeat was total. He thinks direct negotiations with the Rumanians will prove fruitless, and he suggests that the Minister for Foreign Affairs travel to Moscow to clarify the problem thoroughly. The journey would also serve to soften the harsh impression created in Eastern Europe

by President Weizmann's imminent visit to the United States, which featured in various talks as evidence of Israel's pro-Western orientation, and complicated the negotiations on *aliya.*

423. S. Friedman [Tel Aviv] to R. Rubin (Bucharest). 8 March 1949

Friedman reports on Israel's handling of the problems with Rumania. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs had devoted three meetings to the matter, with the participation of the Minister, Golda Meyerson, Walter Eytan, and Raday. Agami had also reported on the position to the Cabinet, and to the Jewish Agency Executive. No decisions had been taken apart from the Jewish Agency decision to allot specific sums for legal assistance and compensation for the personnel of the Zionist Funds. The proposal to call a conference of all Israeli ministers in Eastern Europe had not been approved. Outwardly, this sort of gathering carried a great deal of political significance, and it would undoubtedly give rise to various conjectures which were not to Israel's advantage. Practical results and reactions would be expected, and it was unlikely that Israel could respond effectively.

The idea to recall the Minister to Israel for consultation had also been rejected. Such a summons was a gesture of protest and it was not certain that the circumstances justified it. Furthermore, the fact that Agami, the Legation Counsellor, was already in Israel for consultations, would imbue the summons with even more portent.

It has been decided to prepare a Verbal Note on the subject of the emissaries, to be transmitted by cable and relayed to the Rumanians. After further consideration, it had been decided to draw up a longer and more detailed note dealing with all the problems between Israel and Rumania. This was now being drafted (see No. 433).

In addition, the course of action to be pursued in other countries had been determined. Details of this would be related by Agami, orally. No immediate results could, however, be expected from these activities, and Friedman asked the Minister to be patient.

The remainder of the letter deals with the postal, reporting, and working procedures of the Legation in Bucharest. In general, Friedman commended these arrangements, though he asked the Minister not to attend meetings with the state leadership unaccompanied, but to take along a senior staff member of the Legation, so that another key person would always be *au courant.*

429. Monthly Report of the Israeli Legation in Prague. 10 March 1949

Immigration. Despite all efforts, it was impossible to increase the rate of immigration. About 2000 immigrants left in February, and no more were

likely to leave this month. The reason was twofold: firstly, arranging an exit permit was a lengthy process, and many people with passports in hand were still waiting for exit visas; secondly, many people were hesitant and, consequently, delaying their departure. To surmount this second obstacle, the Palestine Office, which handled immigration to Israel, had, on the recommendation of the Legation, published an order obliging applicants to register immediately and leave no later than May 15. This ruling had caused panic among the Jews and for several days subsequently hundreds of people had registered for immigration, and even for immediate departure. They had thought that the dates were connected with government orders and, to avoid unpleasantness, the Legation had published an appropriate clarification. In any case, immigration had been stepped up considerably and there would be about 4000 immigrants next month. The Czech government was equally satisfied with this arrangement, although difficulties were anticipated regarding the departure of physicians, and perhaps engineers as well.

With respect to *aliya* from Eastern Europe in general, the Legation had learned that the Hungarian Communist Party had lodged a complaint with the Cominform against the Czechoslovak Communist Party concerning immigration from Czechoslovakia, asking for a uniform decision in this field. This report had not been corroborated by other sources.

The Attitude towards Israel. There has been a definite change in the Czech attitude since the elections in Israel. The press hardly mentioned Israel, and an employee of the Government Information Office had informed the Legation that orders had been given to minimize the publications on Israel since her overall trend had deviated from "line". Various circles continued to support Israel, but when it came to practical action, everyone added that "it was difficult to deal with the matter now, following recent developments in Israel".

Clementis, the Czech Foreign Minister, had lectured before a closed forum of local journalists a few days ago. Asked about Czechoslovakia's attitude to Israel, he said that there was as yet no change, but that in future, her attitude would be determined by the nature of the relationship between Israel and the United States. In conclusion, it could be said that there has been a change and in place of the former enthusiastic, at times even exaggerated, support, there was today a measure of reserve.

449. R. Rubin (Bucharest) to S. Friedman. 18 March 1949

Rubin had been granted an interview with Ana Pauker, the Rumanian Foreign Minister, and had delivered the letter from Israel's Minister for Foreign Affairs — No. 433. They had discussed the problems of *aliya,* the imprisonment of the emissaries, and trade relations. The emissaries were to be released and sent back to Israel. Rubin asked that all public meet-

ings relating to the emissaries be postponed, and that the press be muted on the matter. With respect to immigration, there was a possibility that negotiations would be resumed; nevertheless, the action agreed upon with Agami should not be deferred at this stage (see n. 3, p. 199). Israel's purchases in Rumania should certainly be expedited, and a meeting had already been arranged for him with the Minister of Commerce.

450. Meeting: R. Rubin — Ana Pauker (Bucharest, 18 March 1949)

Ana Pauker received the letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs (No. 433) and read it in Rubin's presence.

She said that she had initiated steps to have the imprisoned emissaries released, but the demonstrations outside the Legation had sabotaged her efforts. They had also interfered with further work on the question of immigration. In her opinion, the demonstrations had been planned, and were detrimental to both Israeli and Rumanian interests. The Rumanian government could not act under pressure, and it was unreasonable to suppose that Jews who had lived in Rumania for decades, would suddenly rise up as one man and wish to leave for Israel. If the Rumanian government succumbed to Jewish pressure, it would invite similar pressure from the Gentiles; as it was, it was already being accused of being a government of Jews.

Rubin replied that the roots of the Rumanian Zionist movement went back two generations and that the Jews had merely been waiting for the establishment of the State of Israel in order to immigrate. Because of a few reactionary Zionists, the mass of Rumanian Jewry, most of whom were working class, and thousands of whom had relatives in Israel, need not be made to suffer. Ana Pauker said that some settlement could still be reached on the emigration issue, but not under pressure.

Rubin returned to the matter of the emissaries and was assured of their immediate release.

Ana Pauker raised the question of trade between Rumania and Israel. Rubin replied that he had requested an interview with the Minister of Commerce, but had met with no response. She telephoned the Minister then and there, and the interview was arranged.

In the matter of the arrest of the directors of the Zionist Funds, she promised to consider a meeting between Rubin and the Rumanian Finance Minister, in order to reach some financial arrangement. Rubin proposed the sum of $400,000 to resolve the dispute between the Funds and the Rumanian government. He also suggested that a special meeting be called between officials of the Israeli Legation and the Rumanian government commission dealing with immigration to Israel, so that Israel could present her views more clearly. She said that she would study the question.

In Rubin's opinion, the Rumanian government was divided in its atti-

tude towards Israel, with Ana Pauker, among others, being in favour of permitting emigration to Israel.

451. M. Agami (Bucharest) to S. Friedman. 18 March 1949

Agami reports on the situation in Rumania since his return from Israel three days earlier. The mood of the Jewish community, and even of the Legation, was one of despair and impotence. Nevertheless, after analyzing the Minister's interviews with various members of the Rumanian government, including Ana Pauker, he himself felt that there was still hope and that the Rumanians had left themselves a way out on the immigration issue. Agami ascribed this to the influence of the public campaign and the press publicity, as well as to the fact that Rumania could not adopt a different policy on the Jewish question from the rest of the Eastern Bloc. Agami's conclusion was that the public pressure had to be maintained. Israel could not remain silent in the face of Rumanian press attacks on her, and on the Zionist movement, and had to respond, though not by attacking the Rumanian government.

From Rubin's most recent talks, it was clear that the Rumanians were very interested in trade relations with Israel. This, Agami felt, was the key to breaking the deadlock on the *aliya* issue and he asked Friedman to give it his attention.

456. S. Friedman (Tel Aviv) to E. Avriel (Prague). 22 March 1949

Friedman relates to Avriel's proposal that the Minister for Foreign Affairs visit Moscow for direct negotiations on the question of immigration from Eastern Europe (see No. 421). Such a trip was not feasible at the present time, as explained in detail in Namir's telegram to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (see No. 428). Sharett would initiate contact with the Soviet representatives at the U.N., and Golda Meyerson would attempt to meet with the Soviet Foreign Minister upon her return to Moscow. It would be most useful, however, to confer with "fellow travellers" in different countries, such as with Isabelle Blume, whom Meyerson would try and see in Brussels, or with Zilliacus. Israel had asked her various Legations to endeavour to reach the appropriate people in their respective countries of service. It had also been suggested that a mission of Jewish notables call on the Soviet embassy in the United States, or that Henry Wallace or Einstein, intervene.

With respect to action in Israel, after a long period of suppressing the issue the Ministry for Foreign Affairs had decided to publicize it. It had called a press conference, the matter had been broadcast on the "Voice of Israel" and also relayed to foreign correspondents. The government in-

tended to continue in this direction, and he asked Avriel to see that this action be publicized in Czechoslovakia.

The Cominform was to convene on April 21 and would apparently discuss immigration to Israel. It might prove helpful to speak with the national representatives of the participating countries whose views differed from that of the Rumanians. Israel knew, for instance, from various sources that the Bulgarians disagreed with Rumanian policy on immigration. Talks should be held with the Czechs and the Poles as well.

Friedman complained that the information arriving from Prague was both deficient and tardy. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs sometimes received reports from other sources which were not corroborated by the Legation, and there was no way of checking their reliability. He asked that the reporting be regulated.

457. S. Friedman (Tel Aviv) to the Israeli Legation in Bucharest. 24 March 1949

Friedman acknowledged receipt of Rubin's telegram on the release of the emissaries, and the possibility of renewed negotiations on immigration (No. 449). He wondered whether the press conference planned by the Legation should not now be postponed, in view of the prospect that the deadlock was broken. Should the Legation nevertheless decide to hold it, most of the necessary information could be found in the Minister's letter to Ana Pauker (No. 433). In any case, he asked that the Legation emphasize Rumania's past help to Israel, and stress Israel's need for immigration not simply for defence purposes, but in order to build a progressive society capable of countering the reactionary Arab societies surrounding her. Their close knowledge of suffering, and their spiritual affinity for the ideas of freedom and progress, made Eastern European Jewry eminently suited for the task.

461. S. Friedman (Tel Aviv) to E. Avriel (Prague). 29 March 1949

Friedman acknowledged receipt of Avriel's report on the meeting with Rakosi (No. 395). He doubted whether it was possible, at the present time, to think in terms of a uniform and comprehensive East European policy with respect to Israel in general, and to immigration in particular. As far as he knew, there were different trends in every country and no inferences could be drawn from one to the other. Nor was it certain that the opposition to immigration stemmed from Moscow. There was some hint that the Soviet Union actually favoured a certain amount of immigration from her satellite states, rather than deal with immigration from the Soviet Union itself.

He thought that everything possible should be done to ensure that all the varying opinions of the East European countries were voiced at the

Cominform meeting. Israel had to act through her Legations in the countries connected with the Cominform, and of course in Moscow, as well as through her Foreign Minister at the U.N. General Assembly session. Personally, he was not optimistic about the talks in Moscow, and he doubted whether the Soviets would even be prepared to discuss the matter. Approaches made to the Soviets in Israel had also proved fruitless. Meaningful negotiations with the Soviets were possible only at the U.N. General Asembly, and it was there that Israel had to ascertain the desirability of Sharett's visiting Moscow. The idea of Sharett travelling to the Cominform headquarters did not appeal to him. No one knew the exact nature of this body, or with whom he would have occasion to speak. He did not wish to get involved in anything which might not be altogether respectable.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs was aware of the impression caused by both the Foreign Minister and the President visiting the United States. However, Israel was not to assume the defensive, nor resort to apologetics. These visits were to American Jewry, not to America as a whole, and the fate of the State of Israel depended on them. Israeli dignitaries would travel to any country which had millions of Jews, in order to solicit assistance for the Jewish State. It was only unfortunate that such a visit could not be arranged to Soviet Jewry.

464. S. Friedman (Tel Aviv) to the Israeli Legation in Warsaw. 30 March 1949

The Cominform was to convene at the end of April and, among other issues, would discuss the question of immigration to Israel. In anticipation of this meeting, active steps were being taken by the Jewish Democratic Committee in Rumania which strove to have the other countries adopt the Rumanian procedures regarding *aliya.* It was known, for example, that Feldman, the Committee Chairman, had visited Hungary immediately prior to the abolishment of the Zionist Organization in that country. Israel had to try and thwart these efforts by appealing to the representatives of the Eastern European countries. The Bulgarian representatives, for instance, had on several occasions spoken out against what was happening in Rumania, and had even indicated that they were willing to exert their influence. The Czech representatives vould be expected to behave similarly. Friedman had only yesterday met with the new Czech Consul in Israel who favoured immigration from his country, and was puzzled by the Rumanian attitude.

All this meant that Israel had to act without delay to convince the Eastern Bloc representatives, including the Russian Minister, of the justice of her claims. Sharett would work in this direction at the U.N., and Golda Meyerson would attempt to meet with the Soviet Foreign Minister in Moscow. The effect of these talks could obviously not be predicted.

However, Friedman felt that there was as yet no uniform stand on the question of immigration in the Eastern Bloc, and that the Rumanian situation derived from internal factors specific to Rumania, rather than from external directives. He had reason to suspect that the Soviet Union was interested in some stream of immigration from her neighbouring countries, in order to divert attention from her own shores. There was also some speculation that the Eastern Bloc countries — including Rumania — approved of small scale immigration in order to foster good relations with Israel.

Regarding the visits of Israel's Foreign Minister and President to the United States, which were being used to condemn Israel's supposedly pro-Western global policy, Friedman asked to stress in talks with Polish state officials that these visits were primarily to American Jewry, for fund-raising purposes. If only permitted, she would be prepared to despatch emissaries to Soviet Jewry as well.

465. I. Barzilai (Warsaw) to M. Sharett. 31 March 1949

Barzilai relates to the state of immigration from Eastern Europe. Three chief factors were involved: (a) the progression of these countries towards a socialist regime; (b) the international political situation and the relations between the superpowers; (c) the processes at work in the moulding of Israel's internal character and foreign policy. In particular, he wished to relate to the third factor.

Eastern Europe kept a close watch on developments in Israel, and recently certain events had aroused its concern: (a) the American loan; (b) the composition of the Israeli government; (c) the visits of the heads of state to the U.S.; (d) the reports of a Mediterranean pact; and (e) the rumours of discrimination against the Israeli Communist Party.

(a) News of the American loan had caused a great deal of consternation. The Poles felt that the terms of the loan restricted the uses of the funds in a manner not unconnected with political considerations. Barzilai did not wish to go into detail on the explanations and clarifications made to the Poles. Suffice it to say that the report of the loan had brought about a cooling in relations.

(b) Poland had carefully followed the elections to the Knesset and the establishment of the government. The failure to include Mapam, the United Workers' Party, in the government was seen here as a dangerous symptom of Israel's shift to the right. Poland regarded Mapai, the Israel Labour Party, as a Social Democratic party after the fashion of Western Europe and all that this entailed. He had discussed the matter with Ehud Avriel in Prague, and tended to agree with him that while it was not sure that Israel's relations with Eastern Europe would improve as a result of Mapam's inclusion in the government, there could be no doubt that they would suffer as a result of Mapam's exclusion.

(c) Demonstrative importance was being attributed to Israel's Foreign Minister and President visiting the United States, so close on the heels of one another. He was well aware of the financial motives involved, but he nevertheless questioned the urgency of both these trips, especially the Presidential one, so soon after his appointment. Whatever the case, he thought it necessary that the Foreign Minister make a parallel visit to Eastern Europe.

(d) Rumour of Israel's joining a Mediterranean pact, even though refuted, had given rise to serious concern and doubts. Israeli denials had not been believed, and there was an air of distrust surrounding Israel's intentions. The lack of information material regarding Israel's political aims made it difficult for him to dispel these suspicions.

(e) He had learned that the Israeli Communist Party was not to be included in the important committees of the Knesset. He hoped this report was untrue, for it sabotaged the work in Poland and was liable to have an adverse effect on the attitude of the Eastern Bloc to Israel.

With respect to developments in Poland as a whole, within the Jewish community, and on the question of immigration to Israel, there were varying trends and fluctuations. It was inconceivable that a single-party state, for instance, would permit a broad spectrum of political parties to prevail in the Jewish community. This was the reason for the Zionist downfall in Rumania. In Poland, on the other hand, there were still several political parties and therefore a range of opinion in the Jewish world as well. However, processes in Poland were following the Rumanian trend, and one could but try and delay the pace of events which had come to such a disastrous conclusion in Rumania.

Regarding immigration, the Jewish community fluctuated between inordinate optimism and exaggerated despair. During the past half year, an average of 700–800 had emigrated every month. The Legation waged a constant struggle to keep open, and expand, this breach in the restrictions, and recent developments had been encouraging: according to one press report, Poland would permit emigration to Israel for family reunification and other reasons, and new passports were again being issued. The trade agreement about to be signed was obviously a contributing factor, as Polish officials had explicitly told him. Within the framework of the trade agreement, immigrants from Poland would also be allowed to take out a specified sum of money.

Barzilai summed up by saying that despite the hazards threatening Israeli–Polish relations, there was still prospect of improvement, and room for Israel to show initiative. He asked for more detailed information on events in Israel because his only source, at present, was what appeared in the press.

467. S. Friedman (Tel Aviv) to the Israeli Legation in Moscow. 1 April 1949

(a) Together with Yershov, the Soviet Minister, and Moukhine, the Legation Counsellor, Friedman had called on President Weizmann, prior to the latter's departure for the United States. The President had emphasized that the visit was not to be interpreted as his being a Westerner, but simply an emissary to the Jewish community, as he had often been in the past.

(b) He had learned in confidence that Yershov had told the Czechoslovak Consul the following: he did not believe the Israeli Communists that Israel would adopt an Eastern orientation; that Eastern Bloc countries would shortly receive instructions with respect to immigration; and that individual Soviet Jews would be allowed in special cases to leave for Israel.

(c) The Czechoslovak Consul had met with him and stressed Czechoslovakia's positive attitude toward immigration.

(d) Three of Israel's emissaries in Rumania had been released.

(e) About 700 people would be allowed to leave Poland monthly.

479. Meeting of the Conciliation Commission with the Prime Minister and Ministry for Foreign Affairs Staff (Tel Aviv, 7 April 1949)

The meeting followed the Commission's return from Beirut where they had met with representatives of the Arab countries. The Arabs had agreed to convene with Israeli delegates in a neutral city, through the offices of the Commission. In other words, there would be no direct talks, but the Commission would deliberate with each party separately. Yalçin, the Turkish representative, regarded this arrangement as a great stride forward since it too had heretofore been rejected by the Arabs. Furthermore, the Arabs were prepared to discuss all issues and had not set any preconditions.

Ben-Gurion said that he thought the government would consent to this form of talks, though it would take a few days before an official reply was given.

Discussion opened on the site and date of the talks, and the rank of the delegations. It was decided that they would begin at the end of April, in a neutral country, and the delegates would be senior civil servants.

Attention turned to the function of the Conciliation Commission. Yalçin pointed out two chief problems: the refugee question, and the internationalization of Jerusalem. Prior to the Beirut conference, the Arabs had demanded the repatriation and resettlement of the refugees in Israel as a prerequisite for their participation in the deliberations of the Conciliation Commission. Following the meeting, they had withdrawn this demand, in

a gesture of good will. Yalçin recalled that Israel had refused to make a similar gesture, and asked that she clarify her position on the refugee problem.

In response, Ben-Gurion dealt briefly with the refugee question, and at length with the question of Jerusalem. Regarding the former, Israel was aware that the U.N. resolution called for the repatriation of those refugees "who desired to live in peace with their neighbours". However, Israel had no guarantee that the refugees indeed wished to do so. Consequently, the refugee problem could only be solved within the framework of a peace settlement.

With respect to Jerusalem, Israel could not accept the General Assembly resolution of December 11. The internationalization resolution of November 1947 had been misguided, and the U.N. had failed in its task to protect the city. Israel would resubmit the question to the U.N., and attempt to convince it of the justice of her claims. In any event, Israel was fully prepared to consign the Holy Places to international supervision or control.

Yalçin returned to the refugee problem, stressing its humanitarian aspect, and the possibility that, as a result of her attitude to the refugees, Israel might well lose the international sympathy she had thus far enjoyed.

Ben-Gurion replied that Israel was bound by the humanitarian considerations, and was prepared to contribute her share towards solving the refugee problem. This, however, was contingent on a number of factors, including the Arab countries, and international assistance. Israel had not expelled the refugees; their flight had been organized as part of the Arab offensive worked out by Arab leaders and British agents. Their exodus had begun prior to the establishment of the State. They had been advised to leave in order to facilitate the Arab plans of attack. In Tiberias, for instance, the Arabs had been asked to stay, but had chosen to leave. The responsibility for the refugee problem, therefore, rested with the Arab states and their leaders. Nevertheless, Israel was willing to help solve the problem, but from the humanitarian point of view he felt it would be preferable to settle them in an Arab country rather than have them return to Israel.

Ethridge, the American representative on the Conciliation Commission, joined the discussion. He felt that the key to peace between Israel and the Arabs lay in a solution to the refugee problem. He did not wish to get involved in a discussion as to why the refugees had fled. For his purposes, it was enough that the problem existed and had to be resolved. He noted that public opinion all over, particularly in the United States, pinned the blame on Israel. And he thought that many refugees would return if they could be assured of security in person and property, of fair treatment and a normal life. Ethridge related also to the ongoing Arab exodus which, he claimed, was caused by irresponsible elements in Israel.

Ben-Gurion replied that though Israel valued world opinion, given the choice between a sympathetic international attitude towards her, and her very existence, she would have to forgo the former. The key to peace in Palestine was not in a solution to the refugee problem, but vice versa: peace was the key to solving the refugee problem. The U.N. resolution did not call for the return of *all* refugees, but only those who wished to live *in peace* with their neighbours. No one could compel Israel to accept people who were hostile to her, and no one could guarantee that the refugees would not constitute a fifth column in the event of an Arab attack from outside. Israel needed a real and contractual peace. When that existed, it would be possible to solve the refugee problem. For political, economic, and humanitarians reasons, he thought it best to settle them in Arab countries.

In response to further questions from the Commission members, Ben-Gurion summed up his conclusions.

Jerusalem: Israel did not object to international rule over the Holy Places, but to U.N. supervision over the entire city.

The refugees: A solution was possible only within the framework of a peace agreement and, in his view, it was better to settle the majority of the refugees in Arab countries. Israel would do her share in settling the refugees as part of the overall peace arrangements.

490. Ben-Gurion Speaking at a Political Consultation in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. [Tel Aviv], 12 April 1949

Ben-Gurion noted that the central interests of the State of Israel had undergone a major and essential change. Whereas in the past, the chief focus had been the very existence of the Jewish community in Palestine, and consequently, the vital concerns were the establishment and defence of the state, now the state's existence was assured, and the focus had shifted to the absorption of immigration. This was a long-term interest, over an extended period which could not be determined in advance. More so than any other factor, more so than territorial expansion, immigration could considerably enhance Israel's strength. Israel could perhaps conquer the Triangle, the Golan, and the entire Galilee, but none of these conquests would be as significant in consolidating Israel as would increased immigration. There was another aspect as well. Immigration saved Jewry from possible extinction in the future. Take Rumanian Jewry, for instance. Israel had managed to save many of these, those however who remained behind faced an uncertain future. In addition, many Jews were seriously threatened by annihilation and Israel had to spare no effort in rescuing them. On immigration hung also the fate of Israel. All our conquests, whether in the Negev, the Galilee or Jerusalem, were meaningless without settlements. *Settlement was the true conquest.*

If we were to consider the three foundations on which the State was built — the ingathering of the exiles, the settlement of the land, and the security of the country — we would find that all three depended on a single factor: the absorption of immigration. It stood above all, and should it ever conflict with other interests, it had to take precedence. It had to be the criterion in determining the state's economic program, her political policy, her military policy, and her policy in the negotiations with the Arabs.

Every course of action had its drawbacks. It could, for example, be shown that Israel should not have signed the armistice agreements but would have done better to seize more territory. However, this was not conducive to the absorption of immigration. The absorption of immigration was the central issue and it obliged to Israel to achieve peace with the Arabs.

Two conclusions derived from the centrality of this issue: (1) the need to decrease the State's military burden, which far exceeded her economic capacity, and (2) the need to guarantee a minimum of security on the routes both to the country, and within it. There had to be no interference with immigration *en route* to Israel, and the safety of the borders and settlements had to be asured. These two conclusions were mutually contradictory, but that was a matter to be resolved by Israel's military and economic leaders.

If his assumptions were correct, Ben-Gurion continued, Israel had to strive unflaggingly to attain peace with all her neighbours or, if unfeasible, at least with some. Peace with the Arabs served another purpose as well — it would reduce the interference of foreign powers in Middle Eastern affairs, which was one of the dangers lurking for Israel in the future. As the Arabs gained in independence, so they would accept the State of Israel more readily. Israel had to do all she could to reinforce the independence of the Arab states and make them realize that, through a common alliance, they could cast off their subjugation to foreign powers. Unlike the Arabs, Israel herself could not identify with either of the two blocs competing for world hegemony and therefore, she too was vitally interested in diminishing the involvement of the superpowers in the Middle East.

These were the problems and functions at work in Israel's Arab policy. Her chief interest obliged her to spare no effort in achieving peace. She could not rely exclusively on the negotiations under the aegis of the Conciliation Commission and had to strive towards direct and separate negotiations with each and every state, perhaps even without the knowledge of the others.

496. G. Meyerson (Moscow) to W. Eytan. 16 April 1949

G. Meyerson took leave of Vyshinsky, the Soviet Foreign Minister, and in the ensuing discussion, which lasted about an hour, clarified the following:

(1) Israel would remain neutral *vis-à-vis* both blocs. She would neither join an anti-Soviet alliance, nor permit the establishment of bases on her soil. She aimed at forging mutual friendships. Vyshinsky voiced his complete satisfaction with this declaration and said that it was entirely compatible with Soviet intentions.

(2) Israel had close ties with American Jewry, and was interested in America's friendship, but she would guard her independence closely. Vyshisky agreed that a realistic policy was necessary.

(3) Meyerson explained the vital necessity for immigration from Rumania and Hungary, and asked for his assistance. Vyshinsky replied that he understood Israel's immigration needs, but Rumania and Hungary also needed their Jews, both as an economic factor in the upbuilding of their respective countries, and because they constituted the element most loyal to the new regimes which were still forced to contend with reactionism from within. He added that his statement was not to be interpreted as an utter rejection of immigration, nor as an official government announcement. Nevertheless, he thought it exceedingly difficult to intercede here. Meyerson requested that he review the question once again.

(4) She mentioned the purchase of arms from the Soviet Union, and officer training courses. He promised to look into the matter.

(5) She told him of the American loan, and stressed that there were no political conditions attached to it. She suggested that trade relations be expanded on the basis of long-term credit. He promised to get in touch with the Minister for External Trade.

The talk was unhampered by diplomatic formality, and relaxed in atmosphere. Vyshinsky impressed her as friendly, well-informed, intelligent, and inspired.

498. Sasson's Report on his Meeting with Abdallah (Tel Aviv, 19 April 1949)

Israel had called the meeting with Abdallah, and Eytan and Dayan participated along with Sasson.

Sasson's impression was that Abdallah had been prepared for the meeting. He arrived with a proposal to finalize a number of issues between Israel and Jordan prior to the opening of the talks in Lausanne. His interest in an agreement stemmed from the fact that his delegation would be isolated in Lausanne and he would require Israel's support.

Eytan and Dayan had asked Sasson, before the meeting, not to disclose Israel's opposition to the idea of a Greater Syria. Sasson had endeavoured to comply, but Abdallah, himself, had resorted to the subject, noting that the British were interfering with him and Syria and attempting to impose their authority there in various ways. It seemed to Sasson that Abdallah coveted Syria most particularly, partly because of the fear of a Turkish take-over in Northern Syria.

Abdallah suggested an agenda for a joint meeting to be held within a few days: the refugee problem; an outlet to the sea for Jordan; borders; the Dead Sea and Naharayim. With respect to the borders, he referred chiefly to the Triangle. He did not mention border changes in this area, but spoke only of guarantees for the Arab inhabitants of the villages which would be transferred to Israel.

He returned to the question of an outlet to the sea several times, demanding that this be either in Gaza or Acre, and stating his preference for Gaza. He insisted on this, even after the Israelis pointed out that neither of the two locations had a good port, that building a port was a costly undertaking, and that Israel was prepared to grant Jordan port facilities in Haifa. He understood the expense involved, however, he thought that the construction could be managed together. The Israelis did not ascertain how the port was to link up with Jordan — whether through a corridor or otherwise — because Abdallah did not wish to go into detail.

Regarding the Arab part of Palestine, the Israeli representatives gave no commitments, though they said that Israel's position would be determined by the nature of the agreement between Jordan and Britain. Abdallah said that he was not concerned with this aspect of the question, but with the fate of Syria. Sasson thought that if Israel decided to support the annexation of this part of the country to Jordan, she would be able to demand a commitment from Jordan that their treaty with Britain would not apply to the sectors in Palestine.

Abdallah did not explicitly say that he wished Israel to repatriate the refugees, only that the problem weighed down on him, and a solution had to be found. He did not specify what sort of solution. He simply asked that the question be tabled on the agenda in the talks between Israel and Jordan.

The Jordanian delegation to Lausanne, Abdallah said, would comprise six Palestinian Arabs, two officers from the Arab Legion headquarters, a legal advisor, a delegation head, and perhaps a minister as well as secretaries — all in all, about ten people. It seemed to Sasson that Abdallah had included so many Palestinians in the delegation because he wanted them to appear before the world on their own behalf, and declare their desire to join Jordan. The fact that the majority of the delegation was to be Palestinian would place added emphasis on the refugee problem. In Sasson's opinion, Israel too, might be able to benefit from the composition of the group, since the very appearance of the Palestinians was an acknowledgement of partition, and of the establishment of the State of Israel. Nevertheless, he would have preferred not to have them participate.

Abdallah several times stressed the exceedingly poor relations between Jordan and Egypt, and complained that Israel had handed over the Gaza Strip to Egypt, despite his recommendations to the contrary.

500. S. Friedman (Tel Aviv) to the Israeli Legation in Moscow. 19 April 1949

Friedman reports a sharply anti-Zionist reversal in Poland. There had been accusations that the immigration propaganda escalated the panic of war, and threats that the government itself was to manage propaganda for the members of the Zionist parties. The leadership of the Jewish Committee had also undergone a change — A. Berman had been deposed and replaced by a communist. The head of Jewish affairs of the Polish Communist Party had announced that only active Zionists would be allowed to immigrate to Israel, whereas the Jewish masses were necessary in Poland. The Israeli Legation feared that a decision had been taken to intensify the campaign against Zionism.

505. Ben-Gurion and Sharett Speaking at a Political Consultation at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Tel Aviv, 22 April 1949)

Sharett began with the question of Jerusalem. Israel had to adopt a clear position: Jerusalem was not negotiable with all the Arab countries which had no standing in the matter, but only with the U.N. and the one Arab state which held the city — Jordan. This, in any case, had to be Israel's starting point. She had to strive for direct negotiations with the Jordanians. Any agreement reached through direct negotiations was preferable to one imposed on her by the U.N.

To the heart of the matter itself, there had obviously been some retreat from the principle of internationalization. Britain's attitude was explicit — only partition. The Scandinavian countries sought the establishment of an inter-faith committee, while the Americans were still toying with the idea of a trusteeship. The Pope did not demand an international regime, merely juridical status, without however specifying its nature (see Editorial Note, p. 207). The U.N. Secretariat was orally waging a vigorous propaganda campaign against the U.N.'s assuming additional responsibility for the city, because it was not equipped to do so. In conclusion, an Israeli–Jordanian agreement, in conjunction with the abovementioned factors, would cause the plan to be dropped from the agenda.

The question was whether to accept partition of the city. If Israel was not prepared to hand over part of the city to the Arabs, she would have to take the Old City by force, putting herself in the position of an aggressor. This was unthinkable. Israel had to be realistic. There was no alternative but to find a solution together with Abdallah and divide the city. He did not wish to dwell on the matter here, though it was clear that Israel would still come up against it in other forums, at the next session of the U.N. General Assembly, for instance, and the United States might well continue to insist on a trusteeship.

Ben-Gurion said that it was impossible to instruct the delegation fully at the present time, since many issues depended on the development of the Lausanne talks themselves. Regarding the *refugees,* he had told Ethridge during their latest discussion (see No. 474) that Israel was prepared to do three things:

(1) to compensate the refugees who had actually cultivated their land;
(2) to reunify families, i.e., to repatriate the refugees who had left part of their family behind;
(3) to cooperate with other countries in the resettlement of the refugees in Arab countries.

With respect to Jerusalem, he supported Sharett's view. There was also the problem of securing the route to Mount Scopus. It was vital that all the territory up to Mount Scopus remain in Israeli hands, perhaps through an exchange (or, in the event of renewed hostilities — through conquest). It was equally important that the whole of the western bank of the Dead Sea remain under Israel's control. It should not be difficult for Abdallah to concede this area, since it was uninhabited. If Israel obtained these concessions — well and good; if not, plans would have to be made.

Sharett asked for a clarification on the question of reparations for the refugees. Ben-Gurion explained that landowners who had worked their land had to be compensated, as opposed to landowners who had not done so. If the Arabs were to decide to transfer the compensation monies to a general fund, Israel would have no objection.

On the question of meeting with the Syrian delegation in Lausanne, Ben-Gurion was opposed until an armistice agreement had been signed between the two countries. This could only be done here, through the respective officers of the two armies, and with reliance on maps. Israel regarded Syria's conduct as a flagrant violation of the U.N. Security Council resolution, and she reserved the right to act. The Conciliation Commission had to be unequivocally advised to this effect.

The chief objective was to achieve peace with two countries — Egypt and Jordan. Israel did not have to offer Egypt what she had to offer Jordan. Nevertheless, she could proffer assistance towards Egypt's reducing her dependence on Britain and attaining true independence, and she could invite economic cooperation. There was no urgency with regard to the Gaza Strip. Various possibilities existed, and there was time enough. With Jordan, on the other hand, Israel shared common interests, and it would be a good idea to reach some sort of agreement, even if only for a limited period.

Shiloah noted that the Gaza question might crop up both in the talks with Egypt and with Jordan, and Israel might have to be ready with a decision during the preliminary stage of the Lausanne deliberations. Ben-Gurion made it clear that Israel would not object to receiving the Gaza Strip with all its inhabitants, should this be given to her. Shiloah added

that Israel could find herself in a difficult position in the event of an Egyptian–Jordanian agreement awarding Gaza to Jordan. She would not be able to oppose such an agreement, and this meant that the southern Negev would be isolated.

In summation, Sharett had three concluding remarks:

(1) *Territory and Population:* In the past, Israel had not been concerned with territory. Her major interest had been the Jewish community in Palestine, the birth-rate, and the relations between the various ethnic groups in the country. With the establishment of the State, this had changed, and the emphasis had shifted from population to territory. Israel was intoxicated by her territorial conquests, but she had to keep sight of the demographic problem. At this point, he objected to any form of condominium over the Gaza Strip, which would mean assuming the authority over 150,000 Arabs. As long as there was any chance of the Gaza population dispersing into neighbouring countries, Israel was not to rush into joint rule over Gaza. Joint rule entailed responsibility for the population. Furthermore, the lands of these people were in Israeli hands, and there could be pressure to return them to their former homes. In principle, any discussion of territory had to take into consideration the inhabitants of that territory. Israel had no desire to settle Arabs in areas currently uninhabited by them.

(2) *The Gaza Strip and Greater Syria:* The pros and cons of varying situations had to be appraised with flexibility. For example, Israel had to oppose the idea of a Greater Syria, for her own reasons. But if the idea materialized nonetheless, despite her objections, she had to be able to use the new circumstances to her advantage. Thus, if Abdallah received the whole of Syria, it would be easier for Israel to obtain the entire western shore of the Dead Sea. The same was true of the Gaza Strip. Abdallah might possibly gain the Strip, as mentioned above, in which case Israel had to demand a fair exchange. Jordan would require a land bridge to Gaza, and Israel could not afford to miss the opportunities thus involved.

(3) *A General Comment on Priorities:* The arrangements to be entered into should not be permanent, but fixed in time. Israel's most pressing need at the moment was to see that the territorial agreements concerning Palestine ceased to be a topic of U.N. debate and became instead a subject of negotation between sovereign states. At present, the problem of Palestine was tossed about at the U.N. and numerous member states permitted a situation in which Israel was the object of constant extortion. This situtation had to be brought to an end, even if it cost Israel dearly.

This same period had to see a solution to the refugee problem, the problems of immigrant absorption, and the reduction of the army. There was no need to regard the decisions now taken as ever-binding, but as temporary arrangements.

515. G. Hirsch (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 27 April 1949

Hirsch reports on the first meeting with the Conciliation Commission. Ethridge asked Israel to state her position regarding: (1) the refugees; (2) Jerusalem; (3) the borders. The Israeli delegation made the following points: (1) Israel sought a durable peace, and the refugee problem could not be solved until peace was achieved; (2) duplication had to be avoided in the ongoing talks in Lausanne and at Lake Success lest the statements issued there prove harmful to the Lausanne talks. The Commission replied that it would examine the question. (3) Israel was not prepared to discuss peace with Syria until the two countries had signed an armistice agreement. The Commission showed understanding for this position and asked to be kept informed of any developments in the negotiations between Israel and Syria.

N.B. (1) The Commission planned to meet separately with each of the Arab delegations and (2) was prepared to assist Israel in meeting with them, either in its presence, or otherwise.

516. L. Kohn [Tel Aviv] to M. Sharett. 28 April 1949

Kohn attempts to sum up his views on the question of Jerusalem. Israel had succeeded in demonstrating to the world that internationalization of the entire city was unfeasible. She had suggested, instead, partitioning the city and linking up the Jewish sector to the State of Israel. With respect to the Old City and the Arab quarters of the New City, she had proposed that the former be placed under international rule and that certain parts of the latter be perhaps attached to an Arab state. She had also hinted at some form of exchange in order to gain Sheikh Jarrah and secure the route to the university on Mount Scopus.

For tactical purposes, he thought Israel had to pursue this course, bearing in mind, however, that partition, too, might prove unfeasible. The experience of other nations had shown that this type of partition was workable only if friendly relations existed between the two states involved. Such was not the case with respect to Jerusalem, and he was hard put to envision how the safety of the Israeli sector was to be ensured, when the other sector was in Arab hands. The dangers he foresaw were that crime and smuggling would reign in the city, making it impossible to transfer the government apparatus, whether fully or in part, to Jerusalem; and that an irredentist movement would flourish in the hotbed of partition, poisoning the political life in Israel.

For these reasons, and for lack of an alternative, he was inclined to believe that Israel had to act even now to make certain that she receive the entire city. Under her sovereignty, special dispensations could be granted for the Old City and the Holy Places, as well as for the Arab quarters of the New City. The Old City might be consigned to unique rule, similar to

that of the Vatican city, with its own guard, exceptional privileges, and perhaps even some form of legal authority for the various ethnic courts. The Arab quarters outside the Old City could perhaps be granted their own municipality, while the Moslems in the Old City would, of course, enjoy authority over their holy sites.

In order to attain this goal, Israel had to win over two parties: the churches, and King Abdallah. There was some basis for assuming that the churches were more flexible than was generally supposed. Their chief concern was to preserve the Holy Places intact, to permit free access to them, and to ensure peace and stability in Jerusalem. They were beginning to realize that, in the present circumstances, only Israel could guarantee this. An international regime, isolated from the world and dependent on the goodwill of Israel and Jordan, could not sufficiently safeguard the peace of the city. An international regime would of necessity have to include also the Russians, who owned a good deal of property in the city. These considerations helped explain the Vatican's positive response to Weizmann's address in New York (see No. 510, n. 3). In Kohn's opinion, if Israel could convince the President of the United States to accept her position, the Pope and the other churches would be compelled to acquiesce in the annexation of Jerusalem to Israel.

The question was how to elicit Abdallah's consent. He thought that the hope lay in Abdallah's ardent desire to gain control of Syria. To Abdallah, Damascus was more important than Jerusalem. In Damascus he would be a natural and accepted ruler, whereas in Jerusalem he would have to contend with the incessant interference of the Jewish and Christian worlds. Abdallah thus had to be encouraged in his plans for a Greater Syria at the cost of conceding Jerusalem.

Kohn was aware that his proposal contradicted the policy of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Their objection to a Greater Syria stemmed, on the one hand, from the danger of a powerful Arab state to Israel's north and east, and on the other, from the fear that Abdallah's rule would in fact be British rule. The first concern, he felt, was unfounded, because the new state would be weak and torn by conflict for many years and much time would have to elapse before Jordan could absorb Syria. As for the second concern, it was the assessment of the Foreign Ministry's Middle East Division that the greater the territory Abdallah controlled, the less dependent he would be on the British. The explicit statements which had been issued in Abdallah's name, to the effect that he did not wish to extend British influence to the western bank of the Jordan, applied also to his northward expansion.

518. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to W. Eytan (Lausanne). 28 April 1949

Sharett is responding to Hirsch's telegram, No. 515. It had to be made clear to the Chairman of the Conciliation Commission that Israel would

not negotiate on Jerusalem with any Arab country other than Jordan, and with her she preferred first to negotiate directly, under the auspices of the Special Armistice Commission. Yesterday's meeting of the Commission had been marked by deadlock, and previous assurances (see No. 508) had been retracted. Firstly, the Jordanians apparently regretted the agreement to abolish the U.N. zone around the High Commissioner's residence; secondly, they still seemed to hold to their commitment regarding access to Mount Scopus and to Bethlehem, the issue however had not been conclusively decided; thirdly, they had extended their demand for territory in exchange for Latrun. No follow-up meeting had been arranged, because they claimed to be leaving for Lausanne. Dayan, who had conducted the talks, said that Israel would not discuss Jerusalem in Lausanne, and it was even doubtful whether she would confer with them there unless an agreement was reached in the Commission, especially as regarded Mount Scopus and Latrun. Sharett asked for the reaction of the Israeli delegation in Lausanne to these developments. Meanwhile, progress had been reported concerning the resumption of the train service to Jerusalem, and the Jordanians had declared themselves ready to meet Israel towards this end.

President Weizmann denied the report that Israel agreed to the return of 100,000 refugees — see No. 513, n. 1.

519. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 28 April 1949

Sasson reports on a private conversation with Boisanger. The latter supported Syria's demands with regard to the source of the Jordan river, and an outlet to the sea via western Galilee. He revealed that the Lebanese were prepared to sign a peace treaty, but were unwilling to be the first country to do so. He was concentrating on three avenues: Jerusalem; concessions to the Syrians; and the evacuation of the refugees from Lebanon and Syria. He intimated throughout that a rigid atttude on Israel's part in Lausanne would hinder her admission to the U.N., and he demanded that Israel make an immediate gesture towards the refugees, at least as far as property was concerned, otherwise the Arabs would not budge from their position.

520. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 28 April 1949

Sasson reports on private conversations with members of the Conciliation Commission. The following had been agreed upon: to stop focusing on the refugee problem; to refrain, meanwhile, from official meetings; to exert pressure on the Arabs to meet directly with Israel; to drop the idea of a uniform agenda for all the Arab countries, but rather to limit the agenda of each country to matters directly concerning it; and to lay down

peace and security in the Middle East as the condition and starting point for all the discussions.

523. G. Hirsch (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 29 April 1949

The Israeli delegation had spoken at length with Ethridge, and found him friendly and agreeable on most matters. He complained that Israel had made no gesture on behalf of the refugees, nor replied to his letter concerning the property abandoned by them (see No. 485). He thought such a gesture would not cost Israel much, and would mean a great deal to the Arabs. He had left his last meeting with Ben-Gurion in anger because he had realized that Israel was not prepared to meet the Arabs half-way on any issue. Hirsch asked if some reply could be made to Ethridge's letter, the exact contents of which were unknown to the delegation.

Ethridge spoke of a comprehensive plan, prepared by McGhee, to develop the Middle East. The plan included a solution to the refugee problem and was based on the U.N. authority vested in the Conciliation Commission to establish the necessary apparatus for its solution. He awaited the decisions of the President and the State Department, which would be forthcoming within two weeks. However, the Commission had already agreed to support any plan approved by the government of the United States. Investment in the countries of the Middle East, including Israel, was to come from the governments of the United States, France and Britain, as well as from international organizations and private firms, such as oil companies. He did not yet know the details of the proposed solution to the refugee problem, and he agreed to postpone discussion of the problem, pending clarification. Nevertheless, this did not obviate the need for an Israeli gesture which, he hinted, would have a favourable effect in the United States and at Lake Success.

In the talk with Yalçin, the latter spoke enthusiastically of the need for a regional alliance, comprising Turkey, the Arab states, and Israel, based on mutual respect for borders and the commitment to transfer all disputes to an international court.

NOTES

The internal references (e.g., "See No. 42") direct the reader to the serial numbers of the documents in the main volume. Serial numbers of Hebrew documents in the references are printed in italics. For English summaries of these documents see this volume.
All map references are to the main volume.
Notes to Hebrew documents are included in this translation.

No. 1

(1) Aubrey Eban, the Permanent Representative of Israel at the U.N. (2) Walter Eytan, Director-General, Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (3) Dean Rusk, Director of the Office of U.N. Affairs in the Department of State; member of the U.S. delegation to the Third Session of the U.N. General Assembly. (4) See also No. 390. (5) In his last report the Mediator recommended that the Negev be excluded from and the whole of Galilee be incorporated in the State of Israel. These recommendations were endorsed by the Department of State. (See Vol. I, Companion Volume, Editorial Note, p. 164; *ibid.*, No. 530, n. 1.) (6) Untraced. (7) The elections to the Constituent Assembly of Israel which were to take place on 25 January 1948.

No. 2

(1) Eliahu Elath (Epstein), Special Representative of Israel in Washington. (2) The Democratic Party's plank on Israel pledged support for the boundaries of the 29 November resolution, stating that any modifications in these boundaries must be acceptable to Israel. See Vol. I, No. 322. (3) George C. Marshall, U.S. Secretary of State. (4) See No. 1, n. 5. (5) A loan from the Export–Import Bank of the United States — see Vol. I, No. 539. (6) Original faulty. Corrected in accordance with the version sent to Paris (file 93.02/181/8). (7) A.H. Silver, Chairman of the American Section of the Jewish Agency Executive, Chairman of the American Zionist Emergency Council. (8) John Hilldring, member of the U.S. delegation to the Second Session of the U.N. General Assembly, 1947. See also *Documents, December 1947 – May 1948,* No. 75, n. 1, and No. 439, n. 2. (9) Oscar R. Ewing, Federal Security Agency Administrator.

No. 3 (Hebrew)

(1) Israel Barzilai, Israeli Minister in Warsaw. (2) Shmuel Friedman (Eliashiv), Director of the East European Division in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (3) Jacob Peterzeil, Israeli Press Attaché in War-

saw. (4) See several telegrams by Peterzeil relating to Barzilai's presentation of credentials and first ceremonial visits in file 130.11/2492/20. (5) Enclosures untraced.

No. 4 (Hebrew)

(1) The Political Advisory Committee — see *Documents, December 1947–May 1948,* No. 1, n. 1. (2) For Bernadotte's Report see Vol. I, Companion Volume, Editorial Note, p. 164. (3) See Provisional State Council, 20th Session, 27 September 1948 (Hebrew). The general tenor of the discussion indicated rejection of the Mediator's proposals. (4) The Palestine Potash Company. (5) The Arab Government of Palestine, established in Gaza on 22 September 1948 under the aegis of the Arab Higher Committee. See Vol. I, No. 537, n. 2. (6) The Biltmore Programme was adopted by an Extraordinary Conference of American Zionists in May 1942. It called for the establishment of Palestine as a Jewish Commonwealth. The Biltmore Programme was subsequently adopted as the official policy of the Zionist Organization. (7) See No. 1. (8) Juliusz Katz-Suchy, member of the Polish delegation to the U.N. General Assembly. (9) Speaking in the General Assembly, Secretary of State Marshall called for the admission to the U.N. of both Israel and Transjordan as a part of the settlement of the Palestine problem. See *GAOR, 3rd Sess.,* Pt. 1, 139th Meeting, 23 September 1948, p. 41. (10) Reference to the postponement of the discussion on the Palestine problem in the U.N. General Assembly — see Vol. I, Companion Volume, Editorial Note, p. 173. (11) David Liwszyc, Political Adviser to the Israeli delegation to the U.N. General Assembly.

No. 5 (Hebrew)

(1) Moshe A. Toff, Director of the Latin American Division in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (2) Oswaldo Aranha, member of the Brazilian delegation to the U.N.; President of the Second Session of the U.N. General Assembly. (3) Juan A. Bramuglia, Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs; Head of the Argentine delegation to the first part of the Third Session of the U.N. General Assembly. (4) Jorge García Granados, Vice-Chairman of the Guatemalan delegation to the Third Session of the U.N. General Assembly; formerly member of UNSCOP, 1947. (5) Maurice Fischer, Israeli Representative in France. (6) Robert Schuman, French Minister of Foreign Affairs. (7) Last part of the sentence omitted here. (8) Henri Queuille, French Prime Minister, September 1948–October 1949. (9) Charles de Gaulle, French Prime Minister, 1944–1946. (10) Michel Weissman (Amir), Special Diplomatic Representative of Israel in the Benelux countries. (11) Paul-Henri Spaak, Belgian Prime Minister and Minis-

ter of Foreign Affairs. (12) See Vol. I, No. 501. (13) Eliahu Sasson, Director of the Middle East Division in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs; member of the Israeli delegation to the U.N. General Assembly. (14) Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the U.N. (15) Mahmud Fawzi, Egyptian Permanent Representative at the U.N. (16) Mahmud F. Nuqrashi Pasha, Egyptian Prime Minister.

No. 6

(1) Michael S. Comay, Director of the British Commonwealth Division in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (2) A.D. McIntosh, New Zealand Secretary of External Affairs, member of the New Zealand delegation to the U.N. General Assembly. (3) Peter Fraser, New Zealand Prime Minister, Head of the New Zealand delegation to the U.N. General Assembly. (4) "The importance of the Negev to the State of Israel", [end of September 1948], 93.02/186/10. (5) Untraced. (6) Reference is presumably to a map showing the distribution of various grades of arable lands in Palestine. Map in file 93.02/186/16. (7) A plan for the division of Palestine into four districts: one Jewish, one Arab and two under British administration, with limited autonomy for the Arab and Jewish districts (July 1946). (See *Documents, November 1947 – May 1948,* No. 45, n. 7.) (8) The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, appointed in May 1947 by the U.N. General Assembly to devise a political solution for the Palestine problem. (See *ibid.,* Companion Volume, p. XV.) (9) The Royal ("Peel") Commission, which in 1937 recommended the partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states and a British mandate area. (10) See No. *4,* n. 5. (11) The conversation actually took place on 16 July 1948 — see Vol. I, No. 338. (12) A similar letter was sent to the Canadian delegation, see Comay to Riddell, 11 October 1948, 93.02/186/10.

No. 7

(1) Jacob Robinson, Legal Adviser to the Israeli delegation to the U.N. General Assembly in Paris. (2) See No. *45,* n. 11.

No. 8 (partly in Hebrew)

(1) See Vol. I, No 541. (2) Reuven Shiloah, Director of the Political Division and Adviser on Special Affairs in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (3) Yaacov Shimoni, Acting Director of the Middle East Division in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (4) In original appears, here and below, the code name of the Egyptian Court's emissary. (5) Gideon Rafael, Counsellor in the Israeli delegation to the U.N. (6) Appendix A. (7) Appendix B. (8) The Palestine Arab Government

("Gaza Government") — see No. *4*, n. 5. (9) The Israeli–Egyptian negotiations were discussed informally in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the main lines of the negotiations were approved. (See Eytan to Sharett, 8 October 1948, 93.02/186/17; Shiloah to Sharett, MH1547, 8 October 1948, 93.02/185/2.) For Ben-Gurion's views — see No. 17. (10) Appendix B.

No. 9 (Hebrew)

(1) Yohanan Ratner, Israeli Military Attaché in Moscow. (2) Marshal Alexander M. Vasilevsky, Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Army, First Deputy of the Minister of the Armed Forces. (3) For further details on the meeting see Y. Ratner, *My Life and Myself* (Hebrew), pp. 394–401. The reply to Ratner's telegram was delayed and did not go into details. On Golda Meyerson's insistence, Ratner was eventually given a detailed list of munitions needed by the Israeli army. (See C.G.S. to Ratner, IP20, 25 October 1948; Meyerson to Sharett, PI34, 26 October 1948; Ben-Gurion to Ratner, IP34–36, 7 November 1948, files 130.09/2325/1, 2.)

No. 10 (Hebrew)

(1) Ehud Avriel, Israeli Minister in Prague. (2) John C. Ross, Deputy United States Representative at the Security Council. (3) Fraser Wilkins, official in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State; member of the U.S. delegation to the U.N. General Assembly. For a full report of this conversation see "Note of a conversation with members of the United States delegation, Wednesday, October 6th, 1948", 130.02/2425/2. (4) The Truce ("Consular") Commission was established on 23 April 1948 in order to assist the Security Council in supervising the implementation of its cease-fire resolution of 17 April 1948. (See *Documents, December 1947–May 1948,* Companion Volume, Editorial Note, pp. 136–7; Volume 1, Companion Volume, pp. XXIII–XXIV.) Eytan and Rosenne, in a telegram to Sharett, suggested that Israel urge the abolition or reconstitution of the commission in view of the dubious legal status of its members, who had been accredited as consuls to the British Mandatory administration. (See telegram MH1525, 6 October 1948, 93.02/185/2.) (5) See No. 1. (6) Alexandre Parodi, French Permanent Representative at the U.N., member of the French delegation to the U.N. General Assembly. (7) Gabriel Bonneau, Director of the Africa–Levant Department in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (8) See Vol. I, No. 478. After an exchange of correspondence between Sharett and Shiloah it was resolved to accept the French offer for a trial period of three months to be reviewed on its expiration. (See Sharett to Shiloah, 7 October 1948, 130.02/2413/8; Shiloah to Sharett, 14 October,

15 October 1948, MH1599, MH1611, 93.02/185/3.). (9) Juan Perón, President of Argentina. (10) Menachem Kahany, Israeli Representative at the U.N. offices in Geneva; adviser to the Israeli delegation to the U.N. General Assembly. (11) Ernest Bevin, British Foreign Secretary. (12) General Pierre Benouville, ex-member of the French Résistance, a supporter of de Gaulle. (13) John Foster Dulles, member of the U.S. delegation to the U.N. General Assembly. (14) Isaiah L. Kenen, Director of Information Services in the Israeli delegation to the U.N. (15) Emile Najar, Political Adviser in the Israeli Mission in France; member of the Israeli delegation to the U.N. General Assembly. (16) Haim Berman (Raday), Secretary-General of the Israeli Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

No. 11

(1) Elath to Eytan, for Ben-Gurion, 5 October 1948, 93.01/2220/1. Elath reported that at a meeting with the editorial board of the *New York Times,* he encountered sympathetic understanding for Israel's position on the Negev, the problem of the refugees, and Haifa, but not so as regards the problem of Jerusalem.

No. 12

(1) Dov Bernard Joseph, Military Governor of Jerusalem. (2) John J. MacDonald, U.S. Consul-General in Jerusalem, Chairman of the Palestine Truce Commission. (3) MacDonald referred to an Israeli official press release blaming the United Nations authorities for negligence with respect to security measures taken for Count Bernadotte. MacDonald took strong exception to this release, pointing out that "as long as Jewish officials pretend to exercise governmental authority in Jerusalem, they must bear sole responsibility for assuring [that] adequate measures are taken in Jerusalem for the safety of United Nations personnel". (See J. MacDonald to Joseph, 1 October 1948, 130.02/2427/10.) See also Vol. I, No. 527.

No. 13 (Hebrew)

(1) Jacob Herzog, Director of the Department for Christian Communities in the Ministry of Religious Affairs. He was on a mission to the Vatican. (2) Pietro Sigismondi, of the Vatican Secretariat of State. (3) Gustavo Testa, Apostolic Delegate to Palestine. (4) Antonio Vergani, Vicar-General of the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem for Galilee.

No. 14

(1) For this letter and other correspondence relating to Israel's application for admission to UNESCO see files 93.02/183/10,11. (2) Leo Ary Mayer, Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. (3) Contrary to the advice of senior officials in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Israel accepted the invitation, but the Lebanese refused to grant visas to the Israeli delegation. (See correspondence in files 93.02/183/10, 11.)

No. 15

(1) See Vol. I, No. 422. (2) Actually on 13 July. (See *SCOR, Third Year,* 333rd Meeting, 13 July 1948, p. 2.) (3) Actually a telegram from the President of the Security Council to the Mediator dated 13 August 1948, requesting the latter to make all efforts to ensure water supply to the population of Jerusalem. (See *SCOR, Third Year,* 349th Meeting, 13 August 1948, p. 45.) (4) See Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 619–20. Dates given there are at variance with the dates mentioned in this letter. (5) Hill 223. (6) See Vol. I, No. 262.

No. 16

(1) Dulles wrote that Marshall's declaration that the U.S. regarded Bernadotte's recommendations as a fair basis for the settlement of the Palestine question had been made without previous consultation with him and before he himself had seen the recommendations. He had not had the opportunity to form an opinion, but the impression within the American delegation was that both Arabs and Jews regarded these recommendations as more satisfactory than the 29 November resolution, in spite of *pro forma* objections voiced by them. (See Dulles to Silver, 30 September 1948, 93.08/376/6.) See also No. 19. (2) David Niles, Administrative Assistant to the President of the U.S.A., in charge of relations with Jews and other minorities. (3) See No. 2. Clark M. Clifford, Special Counsel to the President of the U.S.A. (4) Joseph M. Proskauer, President of the American Jewish Committee. (5) Proskauer wrote in this vein to Lovett, U.S. Undersecretary of State, bringing up one by one all the usual Israeli contentions about the Negev. He suggested, however, that some compromise solution with the British be found, whereby Israel would be given most of the Negev and the British given limited rights according with their legitimate interests in the Negev. (See Proskauer to Lovett, 8 October 1948, 93.08/364/10.) (6) Arthur Hays Sulzberger, publisher of the *New York Times*. (7) Reference is to a *New York Times* editorial of 5 October which supported Israel's claim to the Negev

and urged the Secretary of State to reconsider his unconditional support of Bernadotte's proposals concerning the Negev. (8) See No. 2. (9) *Ibid.*, n. 5.

No. 17

(1) See No. *8*. (2) *Ibid.*, Appendix A, para. 12. (3) See Editorial Note, pp. 114–5 below.

No. 18

(1) Shiloah's telegram on this matter untraced but reference is to several skirmishes between the Israeli and the Egyptian forces around Khirbeth Mahaz, south of Faluja, between 29 September and 6 October.

No. 19

(1) See No. 16. (2) For Dulles' special standing in the American delegation, see No. *21*. (3) Thomas Dewey, Republican candidate for the Presidency of the U.S.A.

No. 20

(1) Andrei Vyshinsky, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.; Head of the Russian delegation to the U.N. General Assembly. (2) Yakov A. Malik, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.; Permanent Representative at the U.N. (3) According to the General Assembly's resolution of 29 November 1947, the Trusteeship Council was to formulate and approve a Statute of the City of Jerusalem within five months after the approval of the resolution. (See *Documents, December 1947–May 1948,* Main Volume, Appendix A, p. 816.) In February–March and again in July 1948, the Trusteeship Council debated a draft statute prepared by a working committee, but on the latter occasion it decided to adjourn the discussion *sine die.* (See *ibid., passim;* Vol. I, No. 200, notes.) (4) See No. 1. (5) The Conciliation Commission (words in brackets appear only in the incoming text). (6) See also No. *21*.

No. 21 (Hebrew)

(1) The meeting with Marshall took place on 5 October. (See Eban to Elath, UN159, 5 October 1948, 93.02/182/4.) (2) See *Documents, December 1947–May 1948,* No. 483. The meeting actually took place on 8 May. (3) See No. 19. (4) See No. 20. (5) Reference is evidently to the joint trusteeship plan put forward by the United States — see

No. 1.   (6) Ralph Bunche, Acting U.N. Mediator for Palestine. (7) Sir John Troutbeck (Head of the Middle East Office in Cairo) and Robert McClintock (of the U.S. Department of State) visited Rhodes in the middle of September in order to discuss with Bernadotte his report to the U.N. General Assembly. Bernadotte had already finished the draft of the first part and was working on the completion of the report. Information in the possession of Israeli officials indicated that Troutbeck and McClintock took an active part in the preparation of the first part of the report. According to that information, Bernadotte proposed in the first draft that Israel's southern boundary should run along the 31st parallel, but eventually recommended that the boundary be moved further to the north, along the Majdal–Faluja line, since the British would not endorse a recommendation leaving any part of the Negev to Israel. McClintock, on his part, reported to the Department of State that there had been complete unanimity between Bernadotte and Troutbeck as far as the Majdal–Faluja line was concerned. Although holding a less pronounced opinion, McClintock promised to recommend to the Department of State that it support the report in its entirety. (See Sharett to Eytan, 8 October 1948, 93.02/182/7; U.S. Ambassador in Egypt to the Secretary of State, 15 September 1948, *FRUS,* 1948, V, pp. 1398 ff.) (8) John Reedman, Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General in Palestine; on the staff of the U.N. Mediator.   (9) Untraced. For a previous draft by M. Comay, see No. 7. See also Robinson's memorandum: "Legal problems in connection with the Mediator's report before the General Assembly", 8 October 1948, 93.02/186/16.

No. 22

(1) No. 17.   (2) Mohammad Hussein Haykal Pasha, President of the Egyptian Senate.

No. 23

(1) David Horowitz, Director-General, Ministry of Finance.   (2) See No. *21,* n. 7.

Editorial Note preceding No. 25 (Main Volume, p. 55)

Operation *Yo'av*

Following Egypt's non-compliance with the Central Truce Supervision Board decision No. 12, which provided for joint use of the Hatta–Karatiya road by Egypt and Israel (see Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 619–20), the Israeli settlements and military forces in the Negev remained virtually besieged. On 6 October, the Israeli Cabinet discussed the situation in the Negev. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion insisted that the siege on the Negev must be lifted and the Egyptian army within the boundaries of Israel must

be dislodged. Some Ministers voiced reservations, in particular with reference to the possible effects of the resumption of hostilities on Israel's position in the U.N. Ben-Gurion's opinion prevailed.

On the morning of 15 October 1948, after notification of the U.N. authorities, a supply convoy attempted to reach the besieged Negev settlements. The convoy was fired upon from the Egyptian positions near Karatiya and was forced to return to base. In the early evening hours of the same day, Israeli forces, previously deployed, launched an offensive against the Egyptian line with the aim of opening a line of communications to the Negev settlements and strengthening the Israeli hold on the area. Hostilities ceased on 22 October 1948, when the Security Council's cease-fire resolution of 19 October went into effect. By that time the Israeli forces had succeeded in winning additional territory and had opened the way to the northern Negev. The Egyptians suffered heavy casualties and an Egyptian brigade remained besieged in what came to be known as the "Faluja pocket".

No. 26

(1) Words in square brackets, here and elsewhere in this document, have been added in accordance with a similar telegram addressed to Paris (in file 93.02/181/8). (2) Refers to President Truman's intention to send the Chief Justice of the U.S. on a peace mission to Moscow. Truman abandoned this plan because of the opposition of Secretary of State Marshall and the Department of State. (3) Cf. No. 19.

No. 27

(1) Eliezer Kaplan, Minister of Finance. (2) Jean Bénard, First Secretary in the French Embassy in Washington. (3) See No. *10.*

No. 28 (Hebrew)

(1) Constantine Tsaldaris, Greek Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Head of the Greek delegation to the U.N. General Assembly. (2) See also Vol. I, Companion Volume, Editorial Note, p. 173. (3) Reference is to an interview with Ben-Gurion published in *Time* of 16 August. (4) "General Markos", commander of the Communist rebel forces in Greece. See e.g. the sympathetic article in *Al Hamishmar* of 25 August 1948. (5) Taki Pipinelis, Greek Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs. (6) *Sic ("ma'arav"),* but should probably read: "[pro] Arab *("'arav")* orientation". (7) Bo Östen Undén, Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs. (8) Sharett's inquiries of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs revealed that U.N. Chief of Staff Lundström had reported to Trygve Lie that the Israeli liaison officer had done everything possible to rush the Mediator and his escort to hospital.

(See Eytan to Sharett, MH1619, 17 October 1948, 93.02/185/3.) (9) See Vol. I, No. 527. (10) Semen K. Tsarapkin, U.S.S.R. Representative on the U.N. Trusteeship Council. (11) Vijaya L. Pandit, Indian Ambassador to Moscow; Head of the Indian delegation to the U.N. General Assembly. (12) Jawaharlal Nehru, Indian Prime Minister. (13) Half a line missing in original. (14) Golda Meyerson, Israeli Minister in Moscow. (15) Arkady Sobolev, U.N. Assistant Secretary-General, in charge of Security Council affairs. (16) The Security Council, at its meeting on 14 October 1948, discussed the maintenance of the cease-fire in Palestine and the progress of the investigation of the assassination of Count Bernadotte. The Council considered a telegram from the Acting Mediator, dated 30 September 1948 (U.N. Document S/1022), describing the deterioration in the situation in Palestine as highlighted by the assassination, as well as a report by the Acting Mediator on the assassination itself (dated 27 September, U.N. Document S/1018). The Acting Mediator also made an oral statement on the situation in Palestine, and the Israeli representative, in reply to questions, reported on progress made in the investigation of the assassination. Discussion was resumed on 19 October 1948, at the end of which the Council unanimously adopted an Anglo-Chinese draft resolution. The resolution noted with concern that the Government of Israel had not yet submitted a report on the progress in the investigation, requested Israel to submit a report indicating the measures that had been taken "with regard to negligence on the part of officials or other factors affecting the crime" and reminded the parties of their obligation to observe the cease-fire, to cooperate with the U.N. observers, allow them freedom of movement and ensure their safety. (See *SCOR, Third year,* 365th Meeting, 14 October 1948; 367th Meeting, 19 October 1948.) (17) The First (Political) Committee of the U.N. General Assembly discussed the Palestine problem for the first time on 15 October. The Chairman read communications from the Governments of Transjordan and Israel requesting permission to attend the Committee's deliberations on the question of Palestine. After discussion, it was resolved to invite representatives of the two governments to attend, with the status of observers. The Committee adjourned after hearing a report of the Acting Mediator. The Palestine problem was discussed again on 23 October — see No. 51. (See *GAOR, 3rd Sess.,* Pt. 1, First Committee, 161st Meeting, 15 October 1948, pp. 160–168.) (18) The United Nations Palestine Commission ("Implementation Commission") was established in accordance with the General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947. It was composed of representatives of five member-states and its assignment was to assume control over the temporary authorities in Palestine pending the establishment of the Arab and Jewish states. (19) See No. 12, n. 3. (20) Alexander Cadogan, British Permanent Representative at the U.N. (21) Illegible word in original.

No. 29

(1) Report untraced in Ministry for Foreign Affairs files, but see No. *13*. (2) Chaim Vardi, Adviser to the Department for Christian Communities in the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

No. 30

(1) Wilhelm Iversen, Acting U.N. Representative in Palestine. (2) See telegram from U.N. Chief of Staff to Senior U.N. Observer, Tel Aviv and Gaza, 16 October 1948, for transmission to the Israeli and Egyptian governments. The Chief of Staff stated that events in the Negev constituted a grave breach of the truce, requested that all hostilities cease until 16 October, 16.00 GMT, and ordered the retreat of all forces to the lines occupied on 14 October 1948. (Telegram in file 130.02/2426/12.) (3) Henri Vigier, Acting U.N. Representative in Palestine. (4) See Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 619–20. (5) Iversen replied that in view of Israel's refusal to cease fire, the matter had been referred to the Acting Mediator. (See Eytan to Sharett, MH1618, 16 October 1948, 93.02/185/3.) The Egyptian Government accepted the cease-fire on condition that the Israelis withdrew to the lines held on 14 October and ceased all acts of war. (See Iversen to Eytan, 16 October 1948, 130.02/2426/12.)

No. 31

(1) See Editorial Note, pp. 114–5, No. 30. (2) See No. 30, n 5. (3) Michael Hanegbi, liaison officer with the U.N.; from 21 October 1948 — Military Governor of the Negev. (4) See No. 18, n. 1.

No. 32 (Hebrew)

(1) Herbert Evatt, Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs, President of the Third Session of the U.N. General Assembly. For full report on the meeting with Evatt, see M.S. Comay, Note on talk with Dr. Evatt, 15 October 1948, 130.02/2425/2. (2) For the conversation with Sobolev — see No. *28*. (3) Nahum Goldmann, member of the Jewish Agency Executive, Chairman of the Executive Board of the World Jewish Congress. (4) See No. 1. (5) No. 31.

No. 33

(1) See No. 31.

No. 34

(1) No. 31. (2) Letter in file 130.02/2426/6. (3) Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 619–20. (4) See No. 31. (5) The contents of this telegram were conveyed to Bunche. (See Eban to Bunche, 18 October 1948, 93.02/186/15.) Referring to point 5, Sharett replied that Bunche's proposal should be considered as an official approach and therefore an immediate reply was mandatory, as in its absence the Security Council would be convened on 19 October. (See Sharett to Shiloah, SUN584, 18 October 1948, 93.02/181/10.) See also No. 35.

No. 35

(1) See Nos. 31, 34. (2) The Government of Israel replied that it was ready to meet the representatives of Egypt at any time, at any such place as might be agreed on, in order to settle peacefully all the difficulties which had arisen between Israel and Egypt in the Negev. (See Shiloah to Iversen, 18 October 1948, 130.02/2426/12.)

Editorial Note preceding No. 36 (Main Volume, p. 72)

The Security Council discussed the situation in the Negev at its meeting on 19 October 1948. The Acting Mediator reported on events in the Negev, noting that while Egypt had accepted his appeal for a temporary cease-fire on the sole condition that Israel would do the same, Israel had agreed only to negotiate with the Egyptians and had ignored the cease-fire appeal (see No. 30, n. 5; No. 35, n. 2). On the suggestion of the Syrian representative it was resolved to adopt paragraph 18 of the Acting Mediator's report with certain modifications as a Security Council decision. Its text reads:

> The present situation in the Negeb is complicated by the fluid nature of military dispositions making the demarcation of truce lines difficult, the problem of the convoys to the Jewish settlements, as well as the problems of the dislocation of large numbers of Arabs and their inability to harvest their crops. In the circumstances, the indispensable condition to a restoration of the situation is an immediate and effective cease-fire. After the cease-fire, the following conditions might well be considered as the basis for further negotiations looking toward insurance that similar outbreaks will not again occur and that the truce will be fully observed in this area:
>
> (a) Withdrawal of both parties from any positions not occupied at the time of the outbreak;
>
> (b) Acceptance by both parties of the condition set forth in the

Central Truce Supervision Board decision No. 12[1] affecting convoys;

(c) Agreement by both parties to undertake negotiations through United Nations intermediaries or directly as regards outstanding problems in the Negeb and the permanent stationing of United Nations observers throughout the area.

The first part of the decision was adopted unanimously, while the second part (paragraphs a–c) was adopted by a majority of the members, the Russian and the Ukrainian representatives abstaining. At the request of the Israeli representative, the President of the Security Council stated that the three conditions mentioned in the resolution were only guidelines for further negotiations, and would not prejudice their outcome. (See *SCOR, Third Year,* 367th Meeting, 19 October 1948.)

No. 36

(1) See Editorial Note above. (2) Error in original ("Soviet"). (3) See No. 42.

No. 37

(1) See No. 1. (2) See No. *32.* In a further telegram Sharett explained that he did not intend to give publicity to the position outlined above, but would confine it to private conversations. He added that the line followed by the Israeli delegation was that the problem of Jerusalem need not be settled during that session but might preferably be left for later consideration by a special committee which would probably be appointed. (See Sharett to Eytan, SUN586, 19 October 1948, 93.02/186/7.)

No. 38

(1) Sharett instructed Elath to concentrate his efforts on securing Israel's admission to the U.N. That would be the surest step towards peace, as it would provide the Arabs with a face-saver to end hostilities. However, should Israel be turned down by the U.N., public opinion in Israel would put the blame on the Americans with damaging consequences in the forthcoming Israeli elections. As for *de jure* recognition by the U.S.A., he advised that all efforts in this regard be postponed until mid-December. (See Sharett to Elath, SUN597, 21 October 1948, 93.08/377/1.) See also No. 51.

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(1) Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 619–20.

No. 39

(1) Arthur Lourie, Israeli Consul-General in New York. (2) See No. 40. (3) Charles Fahy, American lawyer, formerly Legal Adviser in the Department of State. Fahy was asked to assist the Israeli delegation at Paris in contacts with the American delegation. (See Silver to Lie, 20 October 1948, 93.03/126/10.)

No. 40

(1) See No. 36. (2) Reference is presumably to the Bernadotte plan. See also No. *45*.

No. 41

(1) Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, member of the Canadian delegation to the U.N. General Assembly.

No. 42

(1) See Editorial Note, pp. 118–9 above. (2) Meaning obscure.

No. 43

(1) See Editorial Note, pp. 118–9 above. The Security Council's decision actually called for an "immediate and *effective* cease-fire". (2) See No. 44.

No. 44

(1) In this letter Eytan informed Mohn that a special meeting of the Cabinet would take place on the same day to decide on the exact date and hour on which the cease-fire in the Negev would come into effect. (Letter in file 130.02/2426/12.) See also No. 43. (2) See No. 46.

No. 45 (Hebrew)

(1) No. 44. See also No. 46. (2) The telegram describes the military situation on the morning of 20 October: the siege of the Negev has been lifted, the Egyptians have suffered severe setbacks, their communications have been cut and their morale is low. Other fronts are quiet and there are good prospects for further successes if time allows. (See Shiloah to Sharett, 20 October 1948, 130.09/2344/1.) (3) See No. *21,* n. 7. (4) See No. 1. (5) See No. *10,* n. 8. (6) Cf. No. 38, n. 1. (7) See No. 40. (8) See No. *32.* (9) See No. 57. (10) Halvard M.

Lange, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Head of the Norwegian delegation to the U.N. General Assembly. (11) On 20 October 1948 the Third Committee of the U.N. General Assembly discussed for the first time the question of Arab refugees. The Acting Mediator reported on the situation of the refugees, laying emphasis on the urgent need for immediate relief. Discussion continued in the Third and Fifth Committees until 19 November, when the General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for the establishment of a U.N. fund to provide relief until August 1949. For details of the discussion and text of the resolution see *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1948–49,* pp. 199–203. (12) See Appendix B, Main Volume, pp. 621–3; No. 57.

No. 46

(1) See No. 44.

No. 47

(1) A platoon of 35 Haganah men despatched on 15 January 1948 to reinforce the besieged Etzion Bloc settlements. The platoon was attacked by Arab villagers and completely wiped out. (2) Added in accordance with the incoming text.

No. 48

(1) Cf. Lovett's telegram to Marshall, 18 October 1948, *FRUS,* 1948, V, pp. 1489–90. (2) See No. 38, n. 1.

No. 49

(1) Insertions in square brackets, here and below, were telegraphed separately in code. (2) Date of U.S. presidential elections. (3) See No. 38, n. 1. (4) No. 1. (5) See also Comay's "Some comments on the talk with Rusk and Ross on 21st October 1948", 25 October 1948, 130.02/2425/2.

No. 50

(1) No. 44. (2) Eytan informed Mohn that the Provisional Government of Israel had ordered all its forces in the Negev to cease fire as from 12.00 GMT (3.00 p.m. local time), 22 October 1948, on the assumption that the Egyptian Government had issued a similar cease-fire order to its forces, including irregulars. (See Eytan to Mohn, 22 October 1948, 130.02/2425/2.)

No. 51

(1) The First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly resumed discussion of the Palestine issue on 23 October 1948. The Chairman drew the attention of the members to two documents: (1) a letter from the Arab Higher Committee requesting the privilege of an audience before the First Committee and notifying the Secretary-General that as soon as it received authorization to represent the All-Palestine ("Gaza") Government, it would advise the Secretary to that effect; (2) a telegram from the All-Palestine Government authorizing the Arab Higher Committee to represent it at the United Nations. A procedural and legalistic discussion ensued, in the course of which the Iranian delegate proposed to adjourn the discussion on the Palestine problem for a week in order to afford the delegates sufficient time to study its legal aspects. This proposal was carried by 19 to 16. (See *GAOR, 3rd Sess.,* Pt. 1, First Committee, 169th Meeting, 23 October 1948.) See also No. 58. (2) See Elath to Sharett, 22 October 1948, 93.02/181/8 — same as No. 48 despatched to Tel Aviv.

No. 52

(1) See No. 51, n. 1. (2) See No. 49.

No. 53

(1) Lt.-Colonel Moshe Dayan, O.C. Jerusalem District.

No. 54

(1) On 24 October 1948 President Truman issued a statement on his Palestine policy. He reiterated his full support of the Palestine provisions in the Democratic platform (see Vol. I, No. 322), adding that he considered the Bernadotte report "as a basis for a renewed effort to bring about a peaceful adjustment of differences". He further declared that he had instructed the departments and agencies concerned to expedite consideration of Israel's applications for loans. For full text of the statement see file 93.03/73/4. (2) Error in original ("Commission"). (3) See No. 52.

No. 56

(1) See No. 54, n. 1. (2) See No. 57; Appendix B, Main Volume, pp. 621–3. (3) Harold Beeley, member of the British delegation to the U.N. General Assembly. (4) See Appendix B, para 6 (Main Volume, p. 622). (5) Article 41 of the U.N. Charter deals with the imposition of nonmilitary sanctions by the Security Council, including economic mea-

sures. (6) Apparently David Liwszyc of the Israeli delegation, who maintained contacts with representatives of the Eastern Bloc countries in the General Assembly.

No. 57

(1) British Draft Resolution on Palestine — see Appendix B, Main Volume, pp. 621–3. (2) Reference is presumably to Robinson's memorandum "Legal problems in connection with the Mediator's report before the General Assembly", 8 October 1948, 93.02/186/16.

No. 58

(1) See No. 51, n. 1. (2) See No. *21,* n. 7. (3) Untraced, but reference is presumably to a telegram identical with No. 60. (4) See No. 26, n. 2. (5) Four last paragraphs omitted here.

No. 60

(1) See No. 57, Appendix B, Main Volume, pp. 621–3. (2) See No. 48. (3) Two words missing in original. (4) Bernard Baruch, American Jewish financier, economic adviser to various departments of the U.S. government from World War I to World War II and afterwards. (5) Samuel Rosenman, formerly Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York; Special Counsel to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, 1943–1946. (6) Edmund I. Kaufman, President of the Zionist Organization of America, 1940–1941. (7) Original illegible, but reference is presumably to telegram WP10 (No. 38). (8) See No. 54, n. 1. (9) Truman's message followed upon the publication, on 22 October 1948, of the Dewey–Dean Alfange exchange of letters. In his letter to Alfange, Chairman of the American Christian Palestine Committee of New York, Dewey repeated his previous pro-Israel pronouncements and reiterated his support of the U.N. partition borders. (See *New York Herald Tribune,* 23 October 1948.) (10) See No. 73. (11) William M. Martin, President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Export–Import Bank.

No. 61

(1) See Editorial Note, pp. 118–9 above. (2) See No. 50, n. 2. (3) See Editorial Note, pp. 114–5 above; Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 619–20. (4) Map untraced, but see map facing p. 80, Main Volume. (5) I.e., the southern sector of the Jerusalem corridor. (6) See No. *28,* n. 16. (7) For Israel's reply — see Nos. 62–64.

Editorial Note preceding No. 62 (Main Volume, p. 99)

On the request of the Egyptian Government, the Security Council held an emergency meeting on 26 October 1948, to discuss the situation in the Negev. Members were presented with a letter from the Egyptian Government concerning alleged violations of the truce in the Negev (U.N. Document S/1052). A report from the Acting Mediator enumerating various truce violations in the Negev and Galilee was also read. The Council reconvened on 28 October 1948, when the Acting Mediator rendered an updated report on the situation in Palestine. He described the truce in Palestine as precarious and warned that a fresh major outbreak might occur at any moment. He advised the Council to induce the Parties to conduct negotiations with a view to replacing the truce with either a formal peace or, at least, an armistice. In the course of the discussion, the British and Chinese representatives submitted a draft resolution. (For text of resolution see Main Volume, p. 99.)

This draft was subsequently amended but no vote was taken and the discussion was adjourned until 29 October. (See *SCOR, Third Year*, 373rd, 374th Meetings, 26, 28 October 1948.)

No. 62

(1) See No. 61. (2) See Editorial Note, pp. 118–9 above. (3) Sharett conveyed the gist of Bunche's communication (No. 61) and instructed Eban to draw the attention of Bunche to his mistaken interpretation of the Security Council's resolution of 19 October 1948. (See Sharett to Eban, 26 October 1948, 93.02/185/4.) (4) See No. 64.

No. 63

(1) See No. 62, n. 3. (2) See Eban to Bunche, 27 October 1948, 93.08/377/8. This telegram (No. 63) crossed Sharett's telegram MH1733 of 26 October 1948 (93.02/184/5), conveying the text of an answer to Bunche formulated in similar terms — see No. 64.

No. 64

(1) See No. 61.

No. 65

(1) Wells Stabler, U.S. Vice-Consul in Amman. (2) Cf. *Documents, December 1947–May 1948,* No. 506. (3) See *ibid.,* Companion Volume, Editorial Note, p. 126. (4) See No. 49. (5) Abd al-Majid Haydar, Transjordanian Minister in Great Britain. (6) See Nos. 79, 126.

No. 66

(1) See No. 15. (2) A complaint regarding the breach of the Mount Scopus agreement was also submitted to the Chairman of the U.N. Truce Commission in Jerusalem. (See Joseph to Neuville, 26 October 1948, 42/285/0684.) See also Nos. 68, 74.

No. 67

(1) No. 62. (2) No. 64. (3) This communication was conveyed to the members of the Security Council and published as U.N. Document S/1060. It was also conveyed to the Egyptian Government. (See Bunche to Khashaba Pasha, 3 November 1948, 93.02/186/15.)

No. 68

(1) No. 34. (2) Plan for the demilitarization of Jerusalem.

No. 69 (Hebrew)

(1) See telegram U62 of 11 October 1948 and telegram QP9 of 20 October 1948. In the first telegram, Eytan conveyed the suggestion of the Middle East Division in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that Israel put out feelers to the Turkish delegation in Paris in order to ascertain whether Turkey was willing to receive either an official or an unofficial representative of Israel. In the second telegram, Eytan reported that Turkey had co-operated closely with the U.S.A. and Britain in persuading the Arabs to accept the second truce. Turkey had also advised Abdallah to conduct direct negotiations with Israel. (Both telegrams in file 130.09/2344/1.)

No. 70

(1) See Editorial Note, p. 124 above. (2) See No. 71. (3) President Chaim Weizmann. (4) President Truman.

No. 71

(1) See No. 70. (2) See Eban to Lourie, UN314, 28 October 1948, 93.03/73/4. (3) Herbert Bayard Swope, American journalist, formerly Counsel to the Secretary of War. (4) William O'Dwyer, Mayor of New York. (5) Edward Flynn, Democratic Party leader in New York. (6) See Appendix B, Main Volume, pp. 621–3. Eban's letter is in file 93.03/130/5. (7) See No. 77. (8) Jon Kimche, Anglo-Jewish journalist, formerly editor of the *Tribune* weekly.

No. 73

(1) Oscar Gass, Economic Adviser to the Israeli Mission in Washington. (2) Loan by the Export–Import Bank of the U.S.A. — see Vol. I, Nos. 485, 539. (3) Robert Nathan, American Jewish businessman, formerly Economic Adviser to the Jewish Agency in Washington. (4) Untraced. (5) Charles F. Brannan, Secretary of Agriculture, U.S.A. (6) John W. Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury, U.S.A. (7) See No. 54, n. 1. (8) David Charles Ginsburg, American lawyer, formerly Adviser to the Department of State. (9) Hawthorne Arey, Executive Vice-President of the Export–Import Bank. (10) See also No. 82, para. 1.

No. 74

(1) See No. 66. (2) The reply received from Amman stated that the arrangements concerning the passage of supplies to Mount Scopus were still in force and the authorities concerned had been instructed to implement them. (See the Secretary, Amman, to Sasson, 30 October 1948, 93.03/86/15.)

No. 75

(1) See Editorial Note, p. 124 above.

No. 76

(1) See Editorial Note, p. 124 above; No. 71. (2) Herbert Lehman, formerly Governor of the State of New York, member of the National Council of Americans for the Haganah. (3) Jacob S. Potofsky, American Labour leader, General President of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America. (4) Silver cabled Dewey several days before the presidential elections, congratulating him on his recent statement on Israel (see No. 60, n. 9). Silver declared that the statement proved Dewey's sincerity and forthrightness on the Israeli issue and must not be seen as a last-minute political manoeuvre. (See *New York Herald Tribune*, 29 October 1948.)

Editorial Note preceding No. 77 (Main Volume, pp. 111–112)

The Security Council resumed discussion of the Egyptian complaint on 29 October 1948 (see Editorial Note, p. 124 above). The representatives of Britain and China introduced a revised version of their joint draft resolution (S/1059/Rev. 2). Before taking action on this draft, however, the Council adopted without vote the following resolution submitted by the representative of Canada:

The Security Council

Resolves that a Sub-Committee be established, consisting of the representatives of the United Kingdom, China, France, Belgium and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, to consider all the amendments and revisions which have been or may be suggested to the second revised draft resolution (S/1059/Rev. 2), and in consultation with the Acting Mediator to prepare a revised draft resolution.

See *SCOR, Third Year,* 375th Meeting, 29 October 1948.

No. 77

(1) The additions in square brackets, here and below, were telegraphed separately in code. (See Eban to Sharett, U21, 29 October 1948, 130.09/2344/4.) (2) See No. 76.

No. 78

(1) Sharett to Eban, 29 October 1948, 93.02/185/4. Sharett conveyed suggestions and instructions for the Security Council meeting of the same day. (2) See Editorial Note, pp. 126–7 above.

No. 79

(1) No. 65. Words in square brackets, missing in outgoing copy, have been added in accordance with incoming copy. (2) No. 74.

No. 80

(1) Samuel J. Zacks, President of the Zionist Organization of Canada. (2) See Editorial Notes, pp. 124, 126–7 above. (3) Marvin Gelber, Canadian business executive, an active Zionist. (4) Ivan C. Rand, Judge of the Supreme Court, Canada. Member of UNSCOP, 1947. (5) Alec Skelton, Deputy Minister and Economist in the Department of Trade and Commerce, Canada. (6) See Zacks to Lourie, 29 October 1948, 93.03/69/16. (7) See No. 76.

No. 81

(1) See No. 79 (despatched on 29 October).

No. 82

(1) See No. 73. (2) Herbert E. Gaston, Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Export–Import Bank, Washington. (3) Clarence E.

Gauss, member of the Board of Directors of the Export–Import Bank. (4) See Gass to Kaplan, telegram 428, conveying the text of a memorandum received from the Export–Import Bank. The memorandum, as quoted in the telegram, reads:

> In the judgement of the Bank's staff, it has not received sufficient information from the Provisional Government of Israel to reach a decision on the economic merits of any loan application. Among other things, although the Provisional State [*sic*] has indicated that the loan will be used for investment purposes and although it has listed the types of goods that will be purchased, it has not attempted a demonstration of the effects of the investment program: first, what it will mean in new agricultural and manufacturing facilities; second, by how much and in what directions it will increase Israel's national income; third, what its contribution to Israel's foreign exchange earnings will be; and fourth, the approximate rate over time at which the investment will yield fruit. Equally important, no satisfactory demonstration has been received of Israel's ability to service a loan in dollars. Such a demonstration is especially important in view of: first, the large numbers of non-working-age immigrants that Israel anticipates during the next several years and the limitations of her food producing capacity; second, the almost complete lack of raw materials in the new state; and third, the obvious difficulties of inaugurating new lines of manufacturing and expanding market outlets. Aside from the impossibility of making an economic evaluation of the proposed development, the Bank has received virtually no technical information for study by its engineering staff.

Gass advised Kaplan to submit answers as soon as possible, especially to the first four questions. Failing this, the Bank would not proceed further with Israel's loan application. (See Gass to Kaplan, 29 October 1948, 93.01/2220/1.) See also Gass to Kaplan, W31T, 30 October 1948, 130.09/2308/7.

No. 83

(1) See Editorial Note, pp. 126–7 above. (2) See Nos. 61–64 and No. 96. (3) See Editorial Note, pp. 118–9 above.

No. 84

(1) Telegram dated 31 October 1948, in file 130.09/2344/1. Eytan reported that as a result of mopping-up operations, the whole of Galilee was in Israeli hands. He asked for Eban's opinion concerning likely Security

Council reactions to similar operations planned in the near future. See also Editorial Note, pp. 131–2 below. (2) No. 81.

No. 85

(1) See No. 74, n. 2. (2) Eytan endorsed Eban's proposal provided Sasson agreed. (See Eytan to Eban, MH1842, 2 November 1948, 93.02/182/1.)

No. 86 (Hebrew)

(1) See Vol. I, No. 25. (2) Waclaw Barcikowski, Deputy Speaker of the Polish Sejm. (3) Isaac Gruenstein (Shamir), Commercial Attaché in the Israeli Legation in Warsaw.

No. 87

(1) See also Editorial Note, pp. 126–7; No. 83. (2) For Bunche's reply — see No. 96.

Editorial Note preceding No. 88 (Main Volume, pp. 122–123)

The Sub-Committee elected by the Security Council at its meeting on 29 October in order to review the Anglo-Chinese draft resolution (see Editorial Note, pp. 126–7) held four meetings between 29 October and 2 November 1948. It formulated a draft resolution in which the main points of the original resolution were retained. (For text of resolution see Main Volume, pp. 122–3.)

The reference to the Security Council's resolution of 19 October was suggested by the French and Ukrainian representatives. The former informed the Sub-Committee that he reserved his right to restate his arguments in favour of the deletion of the sanctions clause at the meeting of the Security Council. The Ukrainian representative opposed the draft resolution as a whole and reserved his right to submit a different resolution. (See U.N. Document S/1064.)

No. 88

(1) See Editorial Note, pp. 118–9 above. (2) Elath replied that "friends had been active" along Eban's suggestions but "due to [presidential] election boom" he had not yet received a report on the results. (See Elath to Eban, 3 November 1948, 93.02/185/4.) See also No. 94; Lourie to Eban, 2 November 1948, 93.03/131/8.

No. 89

(1) Refers to an exchange of telegrams between Sharett and Eban concerning Sharett's telegram to the Secretary of State (No. 75). In reply to Sharett's query whether there had been any repercussions to his telegram, Eban stated that it had been withheld from most of the members of the American delegation; he promised to explore reactions. Eban argued that Israel should raise objections against the proposal to establish demilitarized zones rather than against the proposal that the Egyptians should return to areas previously held by them — a proposal "which nobody raises seriously now". (See Sharett to Eban, MH1814, 31 October 1948; Eban to Sharett, UN350, 1 November 1948, 93.02/186/4.) (2) See No. 100.

No. 90

(1) Henry Morgenthau, Chairman of the United Jewish Appeal, made this statement on his return to the United States from a visit to Israel.

No. 91

(1) In the original appears the code name of the emissary of the Egyptian Court — see No. *8*. (2) King Faruq. (3) Cf. No. *8*. (4) See No. 101.

No. 92 (Hebrew)

(1) In the original appear code names of two Arab personalities. (2) Gad Machness, citrus grower and farmer. (3) Sheikh Tawfiq Abu Kishk, Bedouin chief from the vicinity of Petah Tiqva. (4) Untraced. (5) Last part of letter omitted here.

No. 93

(1) Hector McNeil, Minister of State in the Foreign Office; member of the British delegation to the U.N. General Assembly. (2) In May 1948. (3) Eban telegraphed Elath on the same day, suggesting that "McNeil's comment ... that our withdrawal Negev necessary in order that Negev be awarded Arabs under Bernadotte plan" be brought to President Truman's attention "as explaining solid grounds for our refusal and inability withdraw". (Telegram UN371, 3 November 1948, 93.02/186/5.)

No. 94

(1) *Moledet* — homeland (Eban's wife, Susie, was born in Egypt). See Eban to Elath, 2 November 1948, 93.08/377/8. Eban reported on the direct contacts with the Egyptians (see No. 91) and suggested that Elath inform the Department of State that this promising prospect might be ruined if the Security Council deviated from the 19 October resolution. (2) See Editorial Note, p. 129 above. (3) See No. 100.

No. 95

(1) No. 79. Reference number of telegram missing in outgoing copy; it has been added in accordance with incoming copy. (2) See No. 91. (3) See No. 88. (4) See No. 93.

No. 96

(1) No. 87.

No. 97

(1) R.G. Riddell, member of the Canadian delegation to the U.N. General Assembly. (2) See Editorial Note, p. 129 above. (3) See Robinson's memorandum "Draft resolution of the Security Council as formulated by the Sub-Committee on the Palestine Problem", 8 November 1948, 130.02/2425/3. The main contention of this document was that according to the U.N. Charter, the Security Council is not empowered to apply sanctions in the case of non-compliance with injunctions that are of a provisional or recommendatory nature. (4) See No. 93. (5) Eleanor Roosevelt, member of the United States delegation to the U.N. General Assembly. (6) Document untraced.

Editorial Note preceding No. 98 (Main Volume, pp. 133–134)

The Security Council convened on 4 November 1948 to discuss the Sub-Committee's report and the Anglo-Chinese draft resolution (see Editorial Note, p. 129 above). The U.S. representative submitted a number of amendments to the draft resolution, the most important of which involved the substitution of a reference to the whole of Chapter VII of the Charter for the reference to Article 41, which explicitly provided for sanctions. (See also No. 103.) The French representative reiterated his objections to sanctions, even by reference to Chapter VII. The Ukrainian representative presented a draft resolution invoking the 19 October reso-

lution and calling upon both parties to negotiate on the basis of that resolution. His resolution received only his own vote and that of the U.S.S.R. representative. Towards the end of the discussion, the British representative suggested that the scope of the draft resolution be expanded to include the Galilee region, but the Council decided to postpone discussion of this suggestion. An attempt initiated by Israel to postpone the conclusion of the discussion and the voting by one day was rejected. The Council adopted the Sub-Committee's draft with the American amendments. The Ukraine voted against and the U.S.S.R. abstained. (See *SCOR, Third Year,* 376th, 377th Meetings, 4 November 1948.) For text of resolution — see Appendix C, Main Volume, pp. 623–4.

No. 98

(1) See Eban to Lourie, SUN625, 4 November 1948, 93.02/186/7. (2) This proposal was put forward by the Lebanese representative, who attended the meeting, and was taken up formally by the British representative. The Ukrainian representative, however, intervened, saying that the Security Council had no information on the situation in the Galilee, and the Council resolved to postpone discussion on this matter. (See *SCOR, Third Year,* 377th Meeting, 4 November 1948, pp. 47–62.) (3) See No. 104. (4) See Nos. 102, 103.

No. 99

(1) See No. 98. (2) See No. 76. (3) Stephen S. Wise, President of the American Jewish Congress.

No. 100

(1) See No. 91. (2) See No. 65. (3) See No. 75. See also No. 122, n. 1. (4) See No. 93.

No. 101

(1) See No. 91. (2) In original appears the code name of the Egyptian Court's emissary.

No. 102

(1) See Editorial Note, pp. 131–2 above. (2) Eytan acknowledged receipt of the text of the Security Council's resolution, adding that its contents

had been brought to the notice of the Government. (See Eytan to President of the Security Council, MH1915, 7 November 1948, 93.02/182/1.)

No. 103

(1) See Editorial Note, pp. 131–2 above. (2) See Editorial Note, p. 129 above. (3) These Articles deal with military measures which may be taken by the Security Council. (4) See No. 97, n. 3.

No. 104

(1) Sharett approved Eban's line with regard to action in the U.S.A. (see No. 98). He asked for clarifications regarding Cadogan's interpretation concerning the impracticability of a return to the lines of 14 October, mentioned in the same telegram. (See Sharett to Eban, 5 November 1948, 93.02/185/4.)

No. 105

(1) General W.E. Riley, Chief of Staff of the U.N. Observers in Palestine. (2) Riley's report, dated 3 November 1948, is summarized in *FRUS*, 1948, V, pp. 1541–2. Riley reported that the truce supervision had become ineffective and that the Jews, "emboldened by their recent successes in military operations and evading U.N. retaliatory action . . . obviously intend to ignore the truce mission in carrying out their plans and policies". Riley stated that the Jews were capable of driving the Arab forces out of Palestine within a relatively short time.

No. 107 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *21*, n. 7. (2) For the meeting with Vyshinsky, see Nos. 20, *21*; for the meeting with Tsarapkin, see No. *28*. (3) See No. 1. (4) See Nos. *32, 45*. (5) See No. 91. (6) Oscar Lange, Polish Permanent Representative at the U.N.

No. 108

(1) See Vol. I, No. 431. (2) Resolution of 4 November — see Editorial Note, pp. 131–2 above. (3) The meeting took place on 19 November 1947. See Chaim Weizmann, *Trial and Error*, pp. 561–563; *FRUS*, 1947, V, p. 1271.

No. 109

(1) See Editorial Note, pp. 131–2 above. (2) See No. 94, n. 1. (3) See No. 93. (4) Oscar L. Chapman, U.S. Undersecretary of the Interior. (5) Harold Ickes, formerly (1933–1946) U.S. Secretary of the Interior. (6) James McDonald, Special Representative of the U.S.A. in Israel.

No. 110

(1) In original appears the code name of the Egyptian Court's emissary — see No. 91.

No. 111

(1) Letter in file 130.02/2426/9.

No. 112

(1) Joseph Satterthwaite, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Department of State. (2) Stuart W. Rockwell, of the Department of State's Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, in charge of Israel and Transjordan affairs. (3) See No. 91. (4) No. 93. (5) Eban replied that he saw no reason for conveying the required information to the Department of State, although Dean Rusk of the American delegation had all the details, except the name of Sasson's contact. He asked Elath to inform the Department of State confidentially that the Egyptian desire to pursue the negotiations was unmistakable, though it had been weakened by the Security Council's resolution of 4 November. (See Eban to Elath, UN395, 8 November 1948, 93.01/2220/8.)

No. 113

(1) No. 109. (2) No. 93. (3) See Editorial Note, pp. 131–2 above.

Editorial Note preceding No. 114 (Main Volume, p. 150)

Operation *Hiram*

On 29 October 1948, Israeli forces started an offensive against the Arab Liberation Army, led by Qawuqji, in the central part of Upper Galilee. This Arab force did not recognize the authority of the U.N. and the truce had never been honoured in this area. Qawuqji's forces were defeated and retreated to the Lebanon. The Israeli units crossed the border and occupied a narrow strip of Lebanese territory, including fourteen villages. The operation was concluded on 31 October.

No. 114

(1) In his reply, Eban warned Eytan of serious repercussions if Israel accepted the surrender of Lebanese villages. He pointed out the surrender of the Negev villages was "no precedent for events beyond boundaries" and that Bunche's report on Galilee laid more emphasis on Israel's penetration into Lebanon than on the conquest of Galilee itself. He suggested that Israel relinquish her positions in Lebanon unless they were (militarily) important. (See Eban to Eytan, UN394, U29, 8 November 1948, 93.02/181/8, 130.09/2344/4.)

Editorial Note preceding No. 115 (Main Volume, p. 151)

At the request of the Acting Mediator, the Security Council held two closed meetings on 9 and 10 November 1948 to hear his views on the situation in Palestine and to discuss his proposals for the substitution of the cease-fire by a more permanent arrangement — an armistice. The Acting Mediator presented his proposals in the form of a draft resolution (for text see Editorial Note, Main Volume, p. 151).

At the meeting of 10 November, the representative of the U.S.S.R. presented amendments to this draft resolution. He proposed to delete the provision calling for the establishment of demilitarized zones and the withdrawal and reduction of the armed forces of the parties, and suggested direct negotiations between the parties as well as negotiations through the U.N. with the purpose of establishing a formal peace rather than an armistice. (See *SCOR, Third Year,* 378th, 379th Meetings, 9, 10 November 1948.)

No. 115

(1) See Editorial Note, above. (2) A similar letter was sent to José Arce, Argentina's representative in the Security Council and the Council's President in November 1948 — see letter in file 93.02/186/10. Eban informed Elath on the same day that Sharett, who had just arrived in Paris, "confirms our complete opposition to demilitarized zones . . .". Eban asked Elath to inform the Department of State of Israel's views on this issue. (Telegram of 8 November 1948, 93.02/186/5.)

No. 116

(1) On 9 and 10 November, Israeli forces operated against the Egyptians in the Faluja pocket. The attack was aimed at reducing the size of the pocket, and in its course the Israelis occupied the village and police station of Iraq Suweidan. (2) In these telegrams, both dated 9 November 1948, Sharett reported that Bunche had been informed of the

shelling of Iraq Suweidan; he urged that, in view of the extremely delicate situation in the Security Council, Israel should desist from "any such action view forcing surrender" and generally exercise "utmost caution". (Telegram in files 93.02/186/7 and 93.02/182/7.) (3) In a further telegram Sharett added that unless the Faluja pocket liquidated itself, Israel could not have it both ways and would have to agree to the passage of convoys to the pocket. (See Sharett to Eytan, U31, 9 November 1948, 93.02/182/7.)

No. 117

(1) See also Sharett to Lourie, E42, 6 November 1948, 93.08/364/14.

No. 118

(1) See No. 74, n. 2. (2) Bypass of the Tel Aviv–Jerusalem road constructed in June 1948. (3) See also No. *126*. (4) See Vol. I, Companion Volume, Editorial Note, p. 145. (5) See No. 168.

No. 119 (Hebrew)

(1) No. *107*. (2) On 7 October, 31st anniversary of the Russian Revolution. (3) Vyacheslav Molotov, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs. (4) Temporary residence of the Israeli Legation in Moscow. (5) Congratulatory telegram from Prime Minister Ben-Gurion to Marshal Stalin on the occasion of the Russian Revolution day. (6) Sarah — Golda Meyerson's daughter; Yael — Namir's daughter. (7) Nina Vasilevna Popova, Chairwoman of the Committee of Soviet Women, Vice-Chairwoman of the Women's International Democratic Federation, 1945–1968. (8) S. Mikhalkov, Soviet poet, co-author of the words of the Soviet national anthem. (9) Ilya G. Ehrenburg, Soviet (Jewish) author and journalist. (10) Lt.-General Nikolai Vasilevich Slavin, senior officer on the Soviet General Staff.

No. 120

(1) Colonel Yigael Yadin, Chief of Operations and Planning, G.H.Q., I.D.F. (2) No reply to this telegram has been traced.

No. 121

(1) See Editorial Note, p. 135 above.

No. 122

(1) See No. 116.

No. 123

(1) In this connection see Editorial Note, p. 135 above. For the meeting with Jessup — see also No. 124.

No. 124

(1) See also No. 123. (2) No. 125. (3) See No. 105, n. 2.

No. 125

(1) Conversation with Lovett, Undersecretary of State. (2) See No. 123. (3) Sub-Committee of the Security Council to supervise the implementation of the 4 November resolution — see Appendix C, Main Volume, pp. 623–4. (4) See No. 130.

No. 126 (Hebrew)

(1) Abd al-Ghani al-Karmi, member of King Abdallah's entourage. (2) Yoav Zuckerman, real-estate agent. (3) Jean Nieuwenhuys, Belgian Consul-General in Jerusalem. (4) One sentence omitted here. (5) Fawzi al-Mulqi, Transjordan Minister of Defence. (6) See No. 118. (7) Ezra Danin, of the Middle East Division in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

No. 127 (Hebrew)

(1) At the beginning of November the international press reported that the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia were supplying Israel with large quantities of munitions. Answering questions, the spokesman of the Government of Israel said that Israel had received neither munitions nor personnel from the U.S.S.R. The policy of Israel, he said, was to purchase arms wherever it could, including Czechoslovakia. (See *New York Herald Tribune,* 8 November 1948.)

No. 128 (Hebrew)

(1) Moshe Agami, Counsellor in the Israeli Legation in Rumania. (2) Ana Toma, Secretary-General of the Rumanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (3) See Vol. I, No. 549. (4) Ana Pauker, Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

No. 129

(1) See Editorial Note, p. 134 above; No. 114.

No. 130

(1) See No. 93. (2) See No. 90. (3) See Editorial Note, pp. 114–5 above. (4) Cf. Lovett's report of this conversation in *FRUS*, 1948, V, pp. 1562–3.

No. 131 (Hebrew)

(1) Five words omitted here. (2) See No. *128*. (3) Zeev (Venia) Hadari (Pomeranz), emissary of the Mosad le-Aliya (Haganah and later Jewish Agency immigration organization) in Rumania. (4) Reuven Rubin, Minister-designate to Rumania. He assumed his office in mid-December. (5) See No. *127*. (6) A volunteer Jewish contingent of 2600, including dependents, mobilized in Czechoslovakia in the latter part of 1948 and reached Israel at the turn of the year. Some of the men were drafted individually and the rest settled in Israel as immigrants.

No. 132

(1) See No. *131*. (2) See No. *249*.

No. 133

(1) Ross' draft untraced, but see No. 123.

No. 134

(1) See No. 133.

No. 135

(1) Sharett to Eytan, 14 November 1948, 93.02/182/4. Sharett telegraphed that the Security Council would discuss the situation in Galilee on the following day and that the crux of the discussion would be Israel's occupation of Lebanese territory. (2) Sharett's position was upheld by Colonel Yadin who was in Paris on a short visit. (See Yadin to Ben-Gurion, U41, 14 November 1948, 93.02/182/3.) See also No. *201*.

No. 136 (Hebrew)

(1) Sharett met Marshall previously on 5 October but the meeting had been cut short owing to Marshall's other engagements and it was then

agreed to meet again. (2) In the course of World War II some 30,000 Jewish refugees, chiefly of Russian origin, settled in China, mainly in Shanghai. After the establishment of the state, the Government endeavoured to bring those refugees to Israel. (3) See No. *131*. (4) Ben Dunkelman, O.C. 7th Brigade. (5) For information concerning British arms supplies to Iraq, Jordan and Egypt, see Herlitz to Elath, T38W, 10 November 1948, 130.02/2779/1. A report from Amman stated that the Jordanian air force now had 50 aircraft and that the pilots were mostly British with some Iraqis. (See Eytan to Eban, 11 [?] November 1948, 93.02/181/8.) See also No. 159. (6) For further details on the meeting with Marshall see No. 164. (7) See No. 130. (8) See No. 125, n. 3. (9) See No. 137. (10) At the meeting with Malik, Permanent Representative of the U.S.S.R. at the U.N., Sharett updated him on various current affairs. (See Sharett to Eytan, U39, 11 November 1948, 93.02/181/8.) (11) See No. 130.

No. 137

(1) See Appendix C, Main Volume, pp. 623–4. (2) See Nos. 148, 160.

No. 138

(1) See in No. 137. (2) Harry Zinder, Press Adviser to the Israeli Mission in Washington. (3) Reference is presumably to Eban's speech in the Security Council on 4 November. (See *SCOR, Third year,* 376th Meeting, 4 November 1948, pp. 10–20.)

No. 139

(1) See No. 134. (2) President Truman was vacationing in Key West. (3) John Hohenberg, chief United Nations correspondent of the *Washington Post.* See *Washington Post,* 12 November 1948.

No. 140

(1) See No. 137. (2) See Editorial Note, pp. 131–2 above.

Editorial Note preceding No. 141 (Main Volume, pp. 179–180)

The Security Council resumed discussion of the Palestine problem on 15 and 16 November 1948. The representative of Canada, supported by the representatives of France and Belgium, submitted a joint draft resolution, based on the previous draft of the Acting Mediator (see Editorial Note, p.

135 above), calling for the establishment of an armistice in Palestine either through direct negotiations between the parties or through the offices of the Acting Mediator. From the point of view of Israel, this draft was an improvement on the previous one in that it explicitly mentioned the possibility of direct negotiations and because of the substitution of the concept of demilitarized zones by that of permanent armistice demarcation lines. On the other hand, Israel objected emphatically to the addition of a paragraph invoking the resolution of 4 November. The joint draft resolution was adopted by the majority of the Council members. The U.S.S.R. and the Ukraine abstained, while the Syrian representative voted against the operative parts of the resolution. (See *SCOR, Third Year,* 380th, 381st Meetings, 15, 16 November 1948.) For the text of the resolution see Editorial Note, Main Volume, pp. 179–180.

No. 141

(1) Elath approached in this matter D. Niles, who was accompanying President Truman on his vacation in Florida (see telegram of 16 November 1948, 93.08/377/11).

No. 142

(1) Security Council resolution of 4 November. (2) Freda Kirchwey, editor and publisher of *The Nation* weekly. (3) Theodore O. Thackrey, editor and publisher of the *New York Post Home News*. (4) George G. Backer, American publisher, owner of the *New York Post*. (5) David Dubinsky, President of the Ladies Garments Workers Union. (6) For the meeting with Lovett — see No. 130; the meeting with Marshall took place in Paris — see No. *136*. (7) See editorial in the *New York Herald Tribune* of 8 November 1948.

No. 143

(1) See No. 137. (2) Moshe Pearlman, Chief Army Spokesman and Director of the Press Division in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (3) Pearlman described Bunche's proposals as unrealistic, illogical and devoid of elementary justice. He laid particular stress on the injunction that Israel must evacuate Beersheba, saying that the Egyptians, who had invaded the Negev in contravention of a U.N. decision and in violation of the Charter, now insisted on returning to the scene of their military defeat under the aegis of the U.N. (See *Davar,* 15 November 1948.)

No. 144 (Hebrew)

(1) Azriel Ukhmani, Counsellor at the Israeli Legation in Warsaw. (2) See No. *86*. (3) The Palestine Office in Poland was affiliated to the Jewish Agency and dealt mainly with immigration matters.

No. 145

(1) Vladimir Clementis, Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs. (2) A similar letter was despatched to the Hungarian Minister in Prague. (See Avriel to Bolgár, 18 November 1948, 130.11/2502/15.)

No. 146 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *128*.

No. 147

(1) See Editorial Note, pp. 139–40 above. (2) No. 148.

No. 148

(1) See No. 137. (2) 19 November 1948 — see *ibid*. (3) See also Nos. 150, 155. No answer has been traced to this telegram but for Israel's reply to the Acting Mediator's approach see No. 160.

No. 149

(1) See Editorial Note, pp. 139–40 above; José Arce to the Provisional Government of Israel, 16 November 1948, 93.02/182/1. (2) Sharett suggested that the Israeli Government in reply should declare its preference for direct negotiations, but should agree to negotiate also through the Acting Mediator. (See Sharett to Eytan, SUN673, 18 November 1948, 93.02/181/10.) See also No. 160.

No. 150

(1) A spring and a police post about 30 kilometres south of the Dead Sea, on the road to Elath. (2) The 31st parallel. (3) A village, about 20 kilometres west of Hebron. (4) No. 148.

No. 151

(1) See No. *28*, n. 17; No. 51, n. 1. The First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly held three meetings on 15, 16 and 17 November 1948 in order to

discuss the Acting Mediator's progress report. The Committee resolved to grant a hearing to the Arab Higher Committee, which had applied for permission to present the views of the Arabs of Palestine. (The Committee did not go into the matter of the credentials of the Arab Higher Committee as representing the All-Palestine ("Gaza") Govenment.) The ensuing discussion was opened by the representatives of Israel and the Arab states, who all rejected the conclusions of the Mediator's progress report. The discussion was due to resume on 18 November. (See *GAOR, 3rd Sess.,* Pt. 1, First Committee, 200th, 201st, 202nd Meetings, 15, 16 and 17th November 1948; *Yearbook of the United Nations 1948–49,* p. 168.) (2) Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948 — see Editorial Note, pp. 139–40 above. (3) Security Council resolution of 4 November 1948 — see Editorial Note, pp. 131–2 above. (4) See No. 152.

No. 152

(1) No. 151.

No. 153 (Hebrew)

(1) See Editorial Note, pp. 139–40 above. (2) See Editorial Note, pp. 131–2 above. (3) See No. 148. (4) Sharett also telegraphed in the same veins to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (see his telegram U570, 17 November 1948, 130.02/2426/6.) (5) See No. 151, n. 1. (6) Paul-Henri Spaak, Chairman of the First Committee. (7) Ahmad Shuqairi, Representative of the Arab Higher Committee. (8) Emir Adil Arslan, member of the Syrian delegation to the U.N. General Assembly. (9) Ahmad Khasheba Pasha, Egyptian Foreign Minister, Head of the Egyptian delegation to the U.N. General Assembly.

No. 154 (Hebrew)

(1) See Nos. *128, 146.* (2) Itzhak Raphael (Werfel), Director of the Immigration Department of the Jewish Agency. (3) See No. 145, n. 2. (4) See Vol. I, No. 339. Shmuel Bentsur (Peterfy) assumed his office in mid-December 1948. (5) The last paragraph, dealing with appointments to the staff of the Israeli Mission in Prague, has been omitted.

No. 155

(1) Sharett to Eytan, 18 November 1948, 93.02/182/1. Sharett advised not to give a concrete reply to the Acting Mediator's approach of 14 November (No. 137) and the Security Council's resolution of 16 November, but merely to notify him of the appointment of officers to negotiate with the U.N. Chief of Staff. These officers would later inform the Chief of

Staff of the Government's opinion on each matter. For the Cabinet's response to Sharett's suggestion — see No. 160, n. 1. (2) William Epstein, U.N. senior official, formerly Senior Political Affairs Officer in the U.N. Palestine Commission.

No. 158

(1) Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

No. 159

(1) See also No. *136,* n. 5.

Editorial Note preceding No. 160 (Main Volume, p. 198)

The Cabinet discussed Israel's reply to the Security Council resolution of 16 November and the Acting Mediator's communication of 14 November (No. 137) on 17 and 18 November. Shiloah, who had come recently from Paris, reported on the situation in the U.N. Assembly and in the Security Council. His opinion was, that Israel's position in the U.N. called for a moderate and concrete reply and that in no way should Israel appear as flouting the authority of the U.N. In the course of the discussion, Sharett's proposal of a brief reply appointing officers to negotiate with the U.N. authorities (see No. 155, n. 1) was rejected, as being too short, not concrete and liable to be interpreted as an overall consent to the Security Council resolution. At the end of the discussion, No. 160 was adopted as Israel's reply.

No. 160

(1) No. 137. (2) *Ibid.* (3) An earlier draft of this letter included here the following paragraph: "The Provisional Government is prepared to agree to the evacuation to Gaza of the Egyptian forces at present cut-off in the Faluja 'pocket'. This evacuation would enable the Provisional Government to order the withdrawal of those of its own forces which are at present obliged to contain this sector". This paragraph had been struck-out in the draft and not included in the final version. (See draft, 18 November 1948, Ben-Gurion Archives, 1509.)

Editorial Note preceding No. 161 (Main Volume, p. 201)

The general debate in the General Assembly's First Committee on the Mediator's progress report was resumed on 18 November and concluded on 25 November (cf. No. 151, n. 1). Several draft resolutions and amend-

ments were tabled, the most important of which was the British draft resolution of 18 November (A/C.1/394 — see Appendix D (1), Main Volume, pp. 625–7) calling for the full endorsement of the Mediator's conclusions and the establishment of a conciliation commission. The American representative, on the other hand, emphasized the principle of mutual consent with respect to territorial revisions, and proposed amendments to the British draft resolution, in particular the deletion of the paragraph endorsing the Mediator's specific conclusions (see Appendix D (2), Main Volume, pp. 628–9). The representatives of the U.S.S.R. and its allies rejected the Mediator's proposals and demanded the implementation of the 29 November 1947 resolution and the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Palestine. The discussion was wound up by the Acting Mediator, who suggested the following six-point programme:

> (1) An affirmation of the existence of the State of Israel, in accordance with the General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947, and its right to a seat in the family of nations;
>
> (2) A strong appeal to the parties to undertake to resolve their outstanding differences by negotiations, direct or indirect;
>
> (3) The establishment of a conciliation commission to assist them in doing so and to undertake such other functions as might prove advisable;
>
> (4) Clear guidance for that commission in the form of an expression of what the General Assembly would consider reasonable as regards maximum and minimum allocations of territory to Jews and Arabs respectively — subject to any and all modifications on which the parties themselves might agree — that was essential for the success of the efforts of the conciliation commission;
>
> (5) Affirmation of the right of Arab refugees to return to their homes if they chose to do so, with just compensation for those who could not or would not return, or whose homes had been destroyed; and,
>
> (6) Determination of the future of the Jerusalem area, as defined in the resolution of 29 November 1947, which should be accorded special international status under United Nations supervision, but with maximum local autonomy for the Jewish and Arab communities.

The Committee finally adopted a proposal of the Canadian representative to set up a working party, comprising the authors of the various draft resolutions and amendments, to draw up a comprehensive table of the several proposed versions for the consideration of the Committee. (See *GAOR, 3rd Sess.*, Pt. 1, First Committee, 203rd to 213th Sessions, 18 November – 25 November 1948; *Yearbook of the United Nations 1948–49*, pp. 168–9.)

No. 161

(1) See Editorial Note, above; Appendix D, Main Volume, pp. 625–629. (2) See also draft resolution drawn up by the Israeli delegation along exactly these lines in Eban's telegram to Elath, UN1012, 21 November 1948, 93.02/186/5.

No. 162

(1) Reference is presumably to Israel's reply to the Security Council resolution — see No. 160. See also No. *165*. (2) See Editorial Note, pp. 143–4 above.

No. 163

(1) In a further telegram Sharett instructed Elath to concentrate in his discussions in the U.S.A. on the elimination of any reference to territorial exchange from resolutions concerning the Conciliation Commission. (See Sharett to Elath, PW15, 19 November 1948, 93.02/182/7.)

No. 164

(1) See No. *136*.

No. 165 (Hebrew)

(1) Sharett addressed the First Committee on 15 November. After paying tribute to the late Mediator and expressing Israel's determination to stamp out terrorism, he criticized severely the Mediator's recommendations, especially those dealing with the Negev and Jerusalem. He renewed Israel's offer to treat directly with the Arab states (see Vol. I, No. 431) and called for the admission of Israel to the United Nations. (See *GAOR, 3rd Sess.,* Pt. 1, First Committee, 200th Meeting, 15 November 1948, pp. 640–647.) (2) See No. 1. (3) Not identified, but see No. 166, para 2. (4) See No. 162, n. 1. (5) See No. 161, n. 1. (6) *Ibid.* (7) John D.L. Hood, Australian Representative at the U.N.

No. 166

(1) Eytan to Sharett, 19 November 1948, conveying the contents of No. 160. (Telegram in file 93.02/185/6.) (2) See No. *165*. (3) See No. 118. (4) Al-Dawayima, a village 20 kilometres west of Hebron. For Shiloah's reply — see No. 168.

No. 167

(1)) See Editorial Note, pp. 143–4 above. The American representative Jessup defined his statement as "preliminary" see *GAOR, 3rd Sess.*, Pt. 1, First Committee, 205th Meeting, 20 November 1948, pp. 680–683.

No. 168

(1) No. 118. (2) L. Allon to Sharett, 19 November 1948, 93.02/182/3. The telegram informed Sharett of an impending meeting between M. Dayan and Abdallah al-Tall to discuss a local cease-fire in Jerusalem.

No. 170

(1) 22 November 1948. (2) Sharett strongly advised against military action to eliminate the Faluja pocket, particularly in view of the growing trend in support of Israel's admission to the U.N. (See his telegram to Eytan, for Ben-Gurion, 21 November 1948, 93.02/182/1.) Independently of Sharett's advice, it was decided to refrain from military action against the pocket; the decision on food shipments was deferred. (See Shiloah to Eytan, MH2088, 21 November 1948, 93.02/185/6.)

No. 171 (Hebrew)

(1) G. Meyerson came to Paris from Moscow for consultations. (2) Pavel I. Yershov, the Soviet Minister in Israel. (3) See Friedman to Meyerson, 15 November 1948, 130.11/2514/1. (4) See Editorial Note, p. 134 above. (5) See No. *136*, n. 5. (6) Gershon Meron (Muenzner), Director of the Economic Division in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (7) Reference is to a party held by the U.S.S.R.-Israel Friendship League (formerly — "League V"), on the occasion of October Revolution day. Before the party, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was notified by the League's secretary that the presence of cabinet ministers was desirable. In the course of the party, the Soviet Minister read a speech which did not include a single reference to the State of Israel. (See Friedman to Meyerson, 15 November 1948, 130.11/2514/1.) (8) See No. 160. (9) See No. 132.

No. 172

(1) Sasson approached the Jordanian Prime Minister on behalf of the Palestine Electric Corporation with the suggestion that measures be taken to regulate the flow of water through the sluice gates of the Corporation plant in Naharayim, in anticipation of impending winter floods. He proposed that a meeting be arranged between a Jordanian representative and

a representative of the Electric Corporation. In a second telegram he also referred to disquieting information in his possession concerning Jordanian preparations to resume hostilities on Mount Scopus. (See Sasson to Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, 10 November 1948, 130.02/2408/13; 19 November 1948, 93.03/64/15.)

No. 173

(1) See Editorial Note, pp. 143–4 above; Appendix D, Main Volume, pp. 628–9. (2) No. 167. (3) Cf. No. 170, n. 2.

No. 174

(1) See No. 179, probably a reply to this telegram. (2) See No. 175.

No. 175

(1) No. 174. (2) See No. 180.

No. 176

(1) Ben-Gurion approved Sharett's reply to Bunche's inquiry. (See Eytan to Sharett, MH2117, 24 November 1948, 93.02/185/6.)

No. 177

(1) See Editorial Note, pp. 143–4 above; Appendix D, Main Volume, pp. 625–9. (2) See U.N. Document A/C.1/396. For further details on the Australian draft resolution see No. *191*. (3) See *GAOR, 3rd Sess.*, Pt. 1, First Committee, 209th Meeting, 23 November 1948, pp. 724–8. (4) See No. 1. (5) See *GAOR, 3rd Sess.*, Pt. 1, First Committee, 209th Meeting, 23 November 1948, pp. 724–8. (6) See also Israel delegation memorandum "Observations on the United Kingdom draft resolution as amended by the United States", 25 November 1948, 130.02/2424/22.

No. 178

(1) See No. 208.

No. 179

(1) See No. 174. (2) See No. 61; Editorial Note, pp. 139–40 above. Security Council resolution of 4 November called on the parties to withdraw

their forces to the lines occupied on October and prohibited the movement of troops within the evacuated areas. The Egyptians insisted particularly on the evacuation of Beersheba; Israel insisted on maintaining garrisons in and guaranteeing supplies to its Negev settlements.

No. 180

(1) See No. 175.

No. 181 (Hebrew)

(1) The arrest of the directors of the Zionist Funds in Rumania — see No. *131*. (2) The Jewish Democratic Committee — see Vol. I, No. 549, n. 2. (3) Eliahu Dobkin, Member of the Jewish Agency Executive, Head of the Organization Department of the World Zionist Organization. (4) S. Adler-Rudel, Director of the Section for Relations with International Organizations in the London office of the Jewish Agency, intended to go to Rumania on the instructions of the Jewish Agency Executive in order to negotiate with the Rumanian authorities concerning the arrested directors of the Funds and the situation of Rumanian Jewry in general. (See S. Eisenberg to the East European Division, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 11 November 1948, 130.11/2499/11.) (5) Aharon Cohen, member of the Mapam (United Workers' Party) Executive Commitee, was on a mission on behalf of his party to Rumania during and after the Second World War. (6) Sharett stated that the Adler-Ruder mission was unnecessary. (See Sharett to Friedman, 30 November 1948, 130.11/2503/1.) Attempts to organize a Zionist mission to Rumania were kept alive well into February 1949, but the matter was finally dropped owing to the Rumanian Government's refusal to receive such a mission. (See Friedman to Hestrin, 25 February 1949, *ibid.*) See also Nos. *236, 398*. (7) See No. *154*. (8) Ya'akov Maius, emissary of Hashomer Hatzair in Czechoslovakia. (9) See No. *86*. (10) One sentence ommitted here. (11 (See Ben-Zion to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 22 November 1948, 93.02/186/1. (12) Moshe Weinberger (Carmeli), Immigration Officer and Cultural Attaché in Hungary from mid-December 1948. (13) Eliahu K. Livneh (Liebstein), Immigration Officer in Berlin. (14) Chaim Hoffmann (Yahil), Consul in Munich. (15) See No. *131*, para. e. (16) D. Krstić, Yugoslav Consul-General in Jerusalem.

No. 182 (Hebrew)

(1) The Palestine Office in Warsaw dealing with immigration to Israel. See also No. *181*. (2) Moshe Shapira, Minister of Immigration and Health.

No. 183

(1) Lewis W. Douglas, U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain. (2) Telegram from Sharett to Elath conveying an analysis of the American amendments to the British draft resolution (23 November 1948, 93.01/2220/8). (3) Sol Bloom, member of the U.S. House of Representatives (Democrat). (4) In *Foreign Relations of the United States* there is no record of direct instructions by President Truman to the U.S. delegation in anticipation of Jessup's speech in the First Committee on 20 November, but see Lovett's telegram to the delegation, 18 November 1948, repeating previous instructions of the President (*FRUS*, 1948, V, pp. 1608–10). (5) See Elath to Niles, 18 November 1948, 93.08/377/11. (6) Edward Jacobson, President Truman's former business partner.

No. 184

(1) Reference is to the Chinese representative's speech in the First Committee on 20 November 1948, in which he supported adoption of the Mediator's proposals. The general tenor of his speech implied that China resigned itself to the facts of the situation in Palestine. Up to that time, the Chinese had supported a federal solution or conciliation in Palestine. (See *GAOR, 3rd Sess.*, Pt. 1, First Committee, 205th Meeting, 20.11.1948, pp. 684–6.) (2) Wellington V.K. Koo, Chinese Ambassador to the U.S.A.

No. 185

(1) See "Note envoyée par Maurice Fischer à diverses personnalités politiques amies", 24 November 1948, 93.02/186/11. (2) René Mayer, member of the Radical Socialist Party; Minister of Finance — November 1947 - July 1948. (3) See Editorial Note, pp. 143–4 above. (4) Two paragraphs omitted here.

No. 186 (Hebrew)

(1) See Editorial Note, pp. 143–4 above. (2) For a fuller report of this meeting see Sharett's telegrams to Eytan, SUN721, 730, 740, 25 November 1948, 93.02/182/7. (3) Members of the Western Union — Great Britain, France and the Benelux countries.

No. 187 (Hebrew)

(1) Eban's telegram to Shiloah of 24 November: "Can only imagine Faluja is most vital issue in two millennia of Jewish history. Cannot otherwise understand its interference with immediate prospects of international re-

cognition". (Telegram in file 93.02/186/6.) (2) Ben-Gurion added that if Sharett disagreed, he would put the matter before the Government (see Eytan to Sharett, F2, 25 November 1948, 130.09/2344/1). See also No. 188.

No. 188

(1) No. 180. See also No. *187*. (2) The Cabinet did not discuss this matter, but see No. *194*.

No. 189

(1) About 11,000 persons were still being held in the Cyprus detention camps for Jewish "illegal" immigrants — men of military age and dependents who refused to leave for Israel without them; see Vol. I, No. 442. On 25 November Eytan telegraphed that the situation in Cyprus was getting desperate and inquired whether the time was not opportune for American or other pressure on the British to release the detainees. (See Eytan to Sharett, F1, 25 November 1948, 130.09/2344/1.) (2) The detainees were released eventually only at the end of January 1949, several days before the British recognition of Israel.

No. 190 (Hebrew)

(1) No. 188. (2) Sub-Committee of the Security Council elected to supervise the implementation of the resolution of 4th November. (3) No. *187*.

No. 191 (Hebrew)

(1) See Editorial Note, pp. 143–4; No. 177.

No. 192

(1) Sub-Committee of the Security Council elected to supervise the implementation of the resolution of 4th November. See also No. 179, n. 2.

No. 193

(1) No. 192. (2) For Sharett's position on the Faluja problem see Nos. 175, *187*, *190*. (3) Meeting of the Sub-Committee of the Security Council elected to supervise the implementation of the resolution of 4th November. The Committee was due to convene on the same day. (4) See Nos. *194*, 195.

No. 194 (Hebrew)

(1) No. *190.* (2) The first Egyptian supply convoy under the above-mentioned agreement was sent to Faluja on 1 December. It was searched by Israeli soldiers and found to carry spare parts for rifles and machine-guns. The convoy was therefore not allowed to proceed.

No. 196 (Hebrew)

(1) No. *194.*

No. 197

(1) Original reads "support", corrected in a later telegram (Elath to Sharett, N39, 29 November 1948, 93.02/185/7). (2) Cf. No. 183.

No. 198

(1) See Nos. 212, 213.

No. 199

(1) See No. 185. (2) Claude de Boisanger, senior official in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; expert on Palestine affairs. Subsequently — French Representative on the Conciliation Commission. (3) Jules Moch, French Minister of Interior. (4) Daniel Mayer, French Minister of Labour. (5) Christian Pineau, French Minister of Public Works, Transport and Tourism.

No. 200 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. 178. (2) Reference is to the speech of Roberto Urdaneta Arbeláez, Head of the Colombian delegation to the U.N. General Assembly, in the First Committee on 23 November 1948 (See *GAOR, 3rd Sess.,* Pt. 1, First Committee, 209th Meeting, 23 November 1948, pp. 723–4). (3) See No. 199. (4) Cf. No. 184.

No. 201 (Hebrew)

(1) Shimoni wrote that he had learnt that in the internal discussions of the Israeli delegation in Paris, Yadin had contended that the Israeli incursion into Lebanon had been undertaken on the instructions and advice of the Middle East Division of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Shimoni refuted this assertion. (Letter in file 130.15/2570/11.) See also No. 135. (2) See Shimoni's memorandum to Eytan "On political problems

in the Galilee and on the northern border and on the liaison between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Army General Staff", 18 November 1948, 93.02/186/17. (3) The Political Division in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was responsible for the gathering and evaluation of information and for the establishment of contacts with Arabs in Israel and abroad.

No. 202

(1) See No. *196.*

No. 203

(1) Constantin E. Zinchenko, adviser to the Soviet delegation to the U.N. General Assembly.

Editorial Note preceding No. 204 (Main Volume, pp. 244–5)

According to Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations, membership in the organization is open to all peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations. The admission of new states is effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

The procedure of admission of an applicant state is governed by rules 58 and 60 of the Rules of Procedure of the Security Council. For full text see Main Volume, Editorial Note, pp. 244–5.

No. 204

(1) The declaration was enclosed but has been omitted here.

No. 205

(1) The matter was raised several times in the Cabinet but the discussion was inconclusive. Finally on 20 December the Cabinet approved in principle the idea to transfer several Ministries and government departments to Jerusalem. The implementation of this resolution was delegated to a committee of the Cabinet. (2) Sharett replied that such a step should certainly not be undertaken during the session of the U.N. General Assembly, apart, perhaps, from the transfer of institutions such as the Supreme Court (see Sharett to Eytan, U790, 1 December 1948, 93.02/182/7).

No. 206

(1) No. 108. (2) See Jessup's speech in the First Committee of the General Assembly on 23 November 1949, *GAOR, 3rd Sess.*, Pt. 1, First Committee, 209th Meeting, 23 November 1948, p. 727. (3) See Nos. 73, 82.

No. 207

(1) No. 176. (1) Abdallah al-Tall (alternative spelling: Tell), Jordanian Military Governor of the Arab part of Jerusalem. (3) See No. 215.

No. 208

(1) In a telegram dated 3 December, Ben-Gurion rebuked Sharett for having given this undertaking without prior approval from Israel. In reply, Sharett maintained that only after receiving Ben-Gurion's telegram he had discovered that his own telegram composed on 24 November (i.e. No. 178) had been sent only on 30 November, and that in the absence of a negative reaction he had repeated the undertaking on 1 December (*sic!*). Sharett added that he considered Ben-Gurion's apprehensions to be unfounded because the undertaking was valid only for the short period between the voting in the Security Council and the voting in the General Assembly. (See Ben-Gurion to Sharett, F13/28, 3 December 1948, 93.02/182/3; Sharett to Ben-Gurion, SUN877, 4 December 1948, 93.02/181/10.) See also No. 229.

No. 209

(1) Colonel Roger T. Carleson, Senior United Nations Military Observer, Jerusalem. (2) See Vol. I, No. 262; Appendix E (1), Main Volume, pp. 629–30. (3) See Appendix E (2, 3). Main Volume, pp. 631–2. (4) See Nos. 118, 168.

No. 210

(1) Riyad al-Sulh, Prime Minister of Lebanon and Head of the Lebanese delegation to the Third Session of the U.N. General Assembly.

Editorial Note preceding No. 211 (Main Volume, p. 251)

The working group of the First Committee (see Editorial Note, pp. 143–4 above) presented a comprehensive tabulation of the various draft resolutions and amendments to the 215th meeting of the Committee on 29 November 1948 (see U.N. Document A/C.1/403). In the course of the

discussions that ensued, the British delegation presented a new revised draft resolution (U.N. Document A/C.1/394/Rev. 2 — see Appendix F (1), Main Volume, pp. 632–6), which embodied most of the American amendments and in particular eliminated the paragraph endorsing the specific conclusions of the Mediator's report. The British draft was discussed and put to the vote paragraph by paragraph. In the course of the discussion, several amendments were suggested and agreed upon. The most important were the elimination of paragraphs 4 and 5 of the original British draft, invoking the November 29th partition resolution and the territorial recommendations of the Mediator, and certain other changes in the clauses relating to Jerusalem. Finally the amended draft resolution was put to the vote as a whole and adopted by 25 votes to 21 with 9 abstentions. (See Appendix F (2), Main Volume, pp. 636–9.) A Russian draft resolution calling for the withdrawal of all foreign troops and military personnel from Palestine was defeated, as were two Syrian draft resolutions providing, respectively, for the establishment of a federal state in Palestine and for the submission of a request to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the international status of Palestine upon the termination of the British Mandate and on the authority the General Assembly had to partition Palestine. (See *GAOR, 3rd Sess.,* Pt. 1, First Committee, 215th to 228th Meetings, 29 November to 4 December 1948.) See also Nos. 217, 218, 223.

No. 211

(1) See Editorial Note, above.

No. 212

(1) Madame Chiang Kai-Shek was then staying in the U.S.A. (2) No record of a meeting with Madame Chiang Kai-Shek has been traced, but Sol Bloom, formerly Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, met Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador to the U.S.A., on 2 December 1948, and aksed him to convey to President Chiang Kai-Shek an urgent request that China vote in favour of Israel's admission to the U.N. (See Elath to Sharett, WP41, 3 December 1948, 93.02/191/8.)

No. 213

(1) Henri Bonnet, French Ambassador in Washington. (2) In the matter of Israel's admission to the U.N. See also No. 212.

No. 214 (Hebrew)

(1) See Editorial Note, pp. 153–4 above. (2) Cf. No. *200.* (3) See also No. 217.

Editorial Note preceding No. 215 (Main Volume, p. 254)

Israel's application for admission to the United Nations was considered by the Security Council on 2 December 1948. The U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. supported the application. The Syrian representative opposed it. The British representative stated that the application was premature since the First Committee was at that time still discussing the Palestine problem and Israel had to prove compliance with recent resolutions of the Security Council. The French and Canadian representatives held that it was advisable to await the outcome of the First Committee's discussion on the Palestine question. The Council decided to refer Israel's application to the Security Council Committee on the Admission of New Members. (See *SCOR, Third Year,* 383rd Meeting, 2 December 1948.) See also Editorial Note, pp. 163–4 above.

No. 215

(1) See No. 207.

No. 216 (Hebrew)

(1) See Vol. I, No. 535. (2) For further details see Namir, *Israeli Mission to Moscow* (Hebrew), pp. 88–91.

No. 217

(1) See Editorial Note, pp. 153–4 above; see also No. *214.* (2) See No. 212. (3) See No. 177.

No. 218

(1) No. 217. (2) See Vol. I, No. 530, n. 1. (3) Telegram from Sharett to Eytan, 25 November 1948, 130.02/2414/22, analysing the American amendments to the first British draft resolution; see also No. 177. (4) Original has in error "3c". (5) See Appendix F, Main Volume, pp. 632–9. (6) No. 210. (7) See below, No. 223. (8) See Eban's telegram to the Israeli Mission to the U.N. in New York, 2 December 1948, 93.03/72/16. Eban reported on the attitudes of members of the Security Council to Israel's application for admission to the United Nations. See also No. *214*. (9) Argentina. (10) Columbia. (11) France. (12) Canada. (13) Belgium.

No. 220

(1) Albert Vanthier, Chargé d'Affaires in the French Consulate, and from February 1949 — French Counsellor in Tel Aviv. (2) Refers to a declaration by Israel's Representative in Paris, M. Fischer, in a letter addressed to the Africa–Levant Department in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Fischer stated that Israel would honour the vested rights and privileges of the French institutions. (Letter dated 6 September 1948 in file 130.04/1835/14.) (3) In a further telegram Hirsch informed Sharett that the General Staff was ready to consider the evacuation of the Notre-Dame convent if an effective and lasting armistice was achieved. The French Consul response was that a more definite assurance was not necessary, adding that in the matter of Notre-Dame and the Holy Places the reaffirmation of assurances previously given would be sufficient. (See F23, 8 December 1948, 130.09/2344/1.) See also Nos. 254, 261.

No. 221

(1) Matthew J. Connelly, Secretary to the President of the U.S.A. (2) See No. 217, n. 3. (3) Sharett to Elath, 24 November 1948, 93.02/182/7. Sharett instructed Elath that in countering British pressure he should argue that the British have blundered "at every single stage [of the] Palestine proceeding" and all their predictions had proved wrong. There was therefore no justification for the Americans to follow their lead. He added that Dulles was using the same line of argument in internal discussions.

No. 223

(1) In the discussions of the First Committee — see No. 218. (2) Allusion to a Jewish anecdote concerning a Rabbi who was asked by a member of his community to advise him how to deal with his domestic troubles. The Rabbi told him to take his goats into his home and later instructed him to take them out again, with the result that the man felt much better, though his real problems had not been solved. (3) See Appendix F, part 2, para. 5, Main Volume, p. 637. (4) *Ibid.,* part 1, para. 5. (5) See a note by the U.S. delegation to Eban and a draft answer, written in the course of the First Committee's discussions, [3 December 1948], 93.02/186/10. (6) See Appendix F, part 2, para. 8, Main Volume, pp. 637–8. (7) See Rusk to Eban, 3 December 1948, 93.02/186/10. (8) See Appendix F, part 2, para. 9, Main Volume, p. 638. (9) *Ibid.,* part 1, para. 10. (10) *Ibid.,* part 2, para. 11. (11) *Ibid.,* para. 12, second section.

No. 224

(1) See No. 202.

No. 225 (Hebrew)

(1) See Editorial Note, pp. 153–4 above; Appendix F, Main Volume, pp. 632–639. (2) See *ibid.*

No. 226 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *194*, n. 3.

No. 227

(1) No. 209. (2) Cease-fire agreement of 30 November 1948 — see Appendix E (3), Main Volume, pp. 631–2. (3) South of Budrus the line was held by the Iraqi troops. (4) See No. 172, n. 1.

No. 228

(1) See No. *225*. (2) See No. 229.

No. 229

(1) No. 228. (2) See No. 224. (3) Security Council resolution of 4 November 1948. (4) Investigation of Count Bernadotte's assassination. A few days earlier Sharett had asked Eytan for urgent information on progress made in the investigation. (See telegram U810, 3 December 1948, 130.09/2344/4.) (5) See Editorial Note, p. 134 above; No. 114. (6) Refers to press reports on the trial of two Lehi leaders, Nathan Friedman-Yellin and Matithiahu Shmuelevitz. They were indicted on charge of membership and activities in a terrorist organization. The prosecution failed to find evidence implicating the defendants in the assassination of Count Bernadotte. In the telegram to Eytan mentioned in note 4 above, Sharett maintained that it was essential to include in the indictment a count charging the defendants with incitement to murder U.N. personnel and Count Bernadotte in particular. (7) See No. *194*, n. 2. (8) See No. 208, n. 1. (9) See No. 238.

No. 230

(1) No. 229. (2) In a telegram to Elath, Sharett informed him that the American delegation's line was to try to secure an affirmative vote in the Security Council in the course of the current session of the Assembly and

to defer the Assembly's final approval until February. He asked Elath to secure definitive instructions from Washington to complete the whole process during the current session. (See Sharett to Elath, PW28, 6 December 1948, 93.02/182/7.) See also No. 237. (3) See No. 208, n. 1. (4) See No. 238.

No. 231

(1) Of the Conciliation Commission. (2) In an additional telegram Sharett added that he and his colleagues in Paris were definitely against the participation of France in the Conciliation Commission, especially in view of its proposed composition (Sharett to Eytan, SUN891, 6 December 1948, 93.02/2344/4). (3) See No. 238.

No. 232

(1) See No. 179, n. 2. (2) See No. 234. MH2226 — Eytan's telegram to Sharett of 6 December 1948, conveying the contents of No. 234 (telegram in file 93.02/182/2). (3) See No. 229, para. 3. (4) No. 233.

No. 233

(1) See No. 227.

No. 234

(1) See No. 232.

No. 235 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. 24. (2) Reference is to the Encyclical Letter *In multiplicibus curis* published on 24 October, which called to give an international character to Jerusalem and its vicinity in order to afford a better guarantee for the safety of the Holy Places.

No. 236 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *181.* (2) Jacob Zerubavel, Head of the Department of Oriental Jewry in the Zionist Executive. (3) Mordechai Oren, member of the European Executive of the World Jewish Congress. (4) Berl Locker, Chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive in Jerusalem. (5) Yona Kossoy (Kesseh), Secretary of Mapai World Union. (6) See No. *181,* n. 6. M. Oren arrived in Rumania in March 1949 on behalf of the World Jewish Congress. See also No. *398.*

(7) Sharett consulted Ehud Avriel in Prague. The latter was in favour of a delegation made up of representatives of Mapai and Mapam but objected to Mapam's proposal (that the two labour parties be recognized by Rumania as representing the Zionist Organization) because its negative aspects would not be offset by any positive results. (See Sharett to Friedman, 10 December 1948, SUN916, 93.02/186/7.) The problem was discussed by the Mapai secretariat, which objected to Mapam's proposal and to the despatch of a bi-partisan delegation. It was suggested that a Jewish Agency delegation be despatched instead. (See Friedman to Sharett, MH2290, 13 December 1948, 93.02/185/8.) (8) See Vol. I, No. 549. (9) See No. *249.*

No. 237

(1) See No. 230, n. 2.

No. 238

(1) Nos. 229, 230, 228. (2) Reference is to the Palestine Conciliation Commission. See also No. 228. (3) See No. 230; No. 271, n. 1. See also No. 247, last paragraph. (4) Word in brackets — in accordance with the incoming text. (5) No. 231.

No. 239

(1) Eytan's telegram to Sharett of 6 December 1948 (93.02/182/2), conveying the contents of No. 234. (2) See No. *190.* Eytan replied that Ben-Gurion had explained to Bunche that Israel's refusal to give a binding undertaking to let through food convoys to Faluja did not mean that it would never permit such a convoy. (See Eytan to Sharett, MH2232, 7 December 1948, 93.02/182/2.)

No. 240

(1) See No. 241.

No. 241

(1) See No. 240. (2) See Nos. 242, 244.

No. 242

(1) See Nos. 240, 241. (2) See No. 160. (3) This draft was discussed and approved by the Provisional Government (see L. Allon to Sharett, MH2258, 9 December 1948, 93.02/185/8). See also No. 244.

No. 244

(1) No. 241. (2) See No. 232.

No. 245

(1) Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the U.S.A. (2) James Forrestal, U.S. Secretary of Defence. (3) Averell Harriman, Special Representative in Europe of the European Recovery Program Administration.

No. 246 (Hebrew)

(1) The date 24 January 1949 appears below the text. At that time the French demands were being discussed in connection with the negotiations relating to French recognition of Israel. (2) See Editorial Note, pp. 180–1 above.

Editorial Note preceding No. 247 (Main Volume, pp. 282–3)

On 11 December, the General Assembly discussed the First Committee's draft resolution of 4 December (see Editorial Note, pp. 153–4 above; Appendix F(2), Main Volume, pp. 636–9). Several amendments were submitted, the most important of which, introduced jointly by Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, France and New Zealand (U.N. Document A/789), involved the deletion of the preamble, which referred to the Assembly's resolutions of 29 November 1947 and 14 May 1948, the Mediator's Progress Report and the Security Council's cease-fire resolutions. It also provided for the deletion of paragraph 2(c), instructing the Conciliation Commission to promote good relations between "the State of Israel, the Arabs of Palestine, and the neighbouring Arab States", and of the preamble to para. 11, recalling the part of the Mediator's report dealing with the Palestinian refugees. Three amendments related to the composition of the Conciliation Commission: the first, submitted by France (U.N. Document A/800/Rev. 1), proposed that a committee of the General Assembly, consisting of the five permanent members of the Security Council, should present proposals regarding membership of the Conciliation Commission for approval by the current session of the Assembly; the other two, submitted by Poland (U.N. Documents A/804, A/805), proposed that the Conciliation Commission consist of five members instead of three and provided for the necessary changes in the wording of the resolution. The Assembly approved the joint amendment, the French amendment concerning the setting up of the Conciliation Commission and a number of minor amendments. The Polish amendments were rejected. The resolution as a whole was adopted with 35 votes

in favour, 15 against and 8 abstentions. The Arab and Moslem states and the Soviet bloc voted against; the abstainers included five Latin American and three Asian countries. (See *GAOR, 3rd Sess.*, Pt. 1, 184–186th Meetings, 11 December 1948; *Yearbook of the United Nations 1948–49*, pp. 172–6. For the text of the resolution see Appendix G, Main Volume, pp. 639–41.)

No. 247

(1) See No. 238. (2) See Editorial Note above. (3) See Sharett's telegram to Eytan about attempts to amend the paragraph concerning the demilitarization of Jerusalem. The intention was to change the text inviting the Conciliation Commission "to take further steps to secure the demilitarization of Jerusalem" to an instruction to the Commission to "investigate the possibilities of the demilitarization of Jerusalem". (Telegram SUN901 of 8 December 1948, 93.02/186/7.) (4) On the same day, Sharett and Fischer had a long and inconclusive meeting with French Foreign Minister Schuman. Fischer held that the French hesitations originated in their attempt to ensure Arab support for the Palestine resolution under discussion in the General Assembly and Arab cooperation with the Conciliation Commission, of which France was a prospective member. (See Fischer to Hirsch, 10 December 1948, 130.10/2516/9.) (5) Of the Conciliation Commission.

No. 248

(1) Linton reported on a telephone conversation with B. Burrows, head of the Foreign Office's Eastern Department, with regard to the Cyprus detainees (eleven thousand Jewish detainees — former "illegal immigrants" — were still being held by the British in Cyprus. They were men of military age, whose immigration to Israel was banned by the British, and their families). According to Burrows, the rules applying to the Cyprus detainees were the same as those in force in the British occupation zone in Germany, though there the rules might not have been strictly applied in certain cases. To Linton's appeal that "this sore spot should be removed", Burrows replied that the whole question of the Cyprus detainees was under consideration. (See Linton to Sharett, 8 December 1948, 130.02/2398/10.). (2) Joseph Rosensaft, Chairman of the Central Committee for Displaced Persons in the British Zone in Germany.

No. 249 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. 20. (2) One sentence omitted here. (3) See No. *181*. (4) Iuliu Maniu, leader of the Rumanian National Peasant Party, former Prime Minister. Arrested in 1947, he was convicted of treason and sent-

enced to life imprisonment. (5) Abraham Leib Zissu, former Head of the Zionist Executive in Rumania and representative of the Jewish Agency there. He resigned in 1946 and was arrested in May 1950.

No. 250

(1) See No. 247, n. 4. (2) On the following day Elath saw J. Satterthwaite, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs in the Department of State. Satterthwaite informed him, and later told Bonnet, that the U.S. desired France to support Israel's admission to the U.N. as an important step towards the pacification of Palestine. Bonnet himself promised Elath to cable Paris immediately. (See Elath to Eytan, telegram 579, 14 December 1948, 93.01/2220/23.)

Editorial Note preceding No. 251 (Main Volume, p. 292)

Following the adoption of the Palestine resolution by the General Assembly, the permanent members of the Security Council met in order to formulate a proposal concerning the constitution of the Conciliation Commission. After a short discussion, it was resolved, against the Soviet delegate's opposition, to propose France, the United States and Turkey. This proposal was approved on the same day by the General Assembly. (See *GAOR, 3rd Sess.,* Pt. 1, 186th Meeting, 11 December 1948, pp. 1004–5.)

No. 251

(1) See Editorial Note, above. (2) Elath answered that the White House was determined not to nominate a member of the Government service and especially not a State Department official; two candidates were being considered: John Hilldring and Edward G. Buxton (businessman, formerly Assistant Director of the Office of Strategic Services). Lovett of the Department of State had suggested Eisenhower. (See Elath to Sharett, WP46, 14 December 1948, 93.02/181/8.) (3) See No. 250.

No. 253

(1) See Vol. I, No. *201*. (2) Cyril H.A. Marriott, British Consul-General in Haifa. See also Vol. I, Nos. 545; 550, para. 6. (3) Sir Hugh Dow, British Consul-General in the part of Jerusalem occupied by Transjordan. (4) Ben-Gurion's opinion was that the British offer was acceptable, provided the establishment of the Consulate-General in Tel Aviv explicitly included *de facto* recognition by Britain and the recognition of Israeli passports and visas. Eytan concurred with Ben-Gurion's

view, adding that it would be desirable to start with entirely new British personnel. (See Eytan to Sharett, F29, 14 December 1948; F33, 15 December 1948, 130.09/2344/1.)

No. 254

(1) President Chaim Weizmann. (2) Cf. Vol. I, No. 235, p. 228. (3) See telegram from Weizmann to Sharett, reporting on a meeting with the French Consul in Tel Aviv — Felix Vanthier. Weizmann asked Vanthier to support Israel's application for admission to the U.N. The Consul promised to send a message to Schuman, but suggested that it would be effective if Israel gave public assurances regarding the internationalization of Jerusalem and the safeguarding of the Holy Places. (Telegram, dated 15 December 1948, in file 105/52/1886.) Sharett expressed his astonishment that Weizmann had been discussing political matters with the French Consul. With regard to the actual problem he noted that he had explained to Schuman that Israel accepted in principle an international authority in Jerusalem, provided the Jewish part of the city was integrated in Israel. The Jerusalem issue, however, was not an obstacle to French support for Israel's admission. (See Sharett to Eytan, U990, 15 December 1948, 93.02/182/7.)

No. 255

(1) President of the General Assembly. (2) Lillie Shultz, Director of the Nation Associates — sponsors of the periodical *The Nation*. (3) Jorge García Granados, member of the delegation of Guatemala to the U.N. General Assembly. (4) John Hohenberg, U.N. Correspondent of the *Washington Post*. (5) See No. 253. (6) Letter in file 130.02/2391/35.

No. 256

(1) Incoming text, here and below, reads *representatives*. (2) Cf. No. 227. (3) See Editorial Note, p. 134 above.

Editorial Note before No. 257 (Main Volume, pp. 298–9)

Israel's application for admission to the United Nations was again discussed by the Security Council on 15 December (See Editorial Note, p. 155 above). The Council had before it the report of the Committee on Admission of New Members (U.N. Document S/1100), stating that the Committee did not possess the information necessary to enable it to come to a decision, and referring the question back to the Security Council. In the course of the discussion in the Security Council the American and

Soviet representatives reiterated their support for Israel's admission. The American representative argued *inter alia* that an early admission would facilitate the work of the Conciliation Commission. The British representative called for a postponement of the discussion since two major issues involved, namely the question of Israel's borders and her attitude to various Security Council resolutions, had not yet been clarified. Throughout the meeting, the French representative employed delaying tactics. At first he proposed that the whole problem be referred back to the Committee on the Admission of New Members. Then he tabled a resolution calling for the postponement of the discussion for one month. This resolution was voted down. The Security Council voted on Israel's application on 17 December. It failed to gain the seven votes required. Five voted in favour (Argentina, Colombia, the Ukraine, U.S.A., U.S.S.R.); one against (Syria), and five abstained (Belgium, Canada, China, France, United Kingdom). (See *SCOR, Third Year,* 384th–386th Meetings, 15–17 December 1948.)

No. 257

(1) See Editorial Note above. (2) See also No. 260.

No. 258

(1) Sharett's reply to Eytan with regard to the British offer to establish a Consulate-General in Tel Aviv — see No. 253, n. 4. Sharett stated that he accepted Ben-Gurion's judgement, though he would have been content with the implication of recognition and would not have insisted on explicitness. (Telegram dated 15 December 1948, in file 93.02/181/10.) (2) France.

No. 259

(1) See Nos. 253, 258.

No. 260

(1) In his short speech, Schuman dwelt mainly on the issues of the Arab refugees and the Holy Places. He called for the establishment of an international status for Jerusalem and for international protection to be accorded to the Holy Places. He accused Israel of perpetrating on the Arabs the horrors committed against the Jews during the World War. (See *GAOR, 3rd Sess.,* Pt. 1, 184th Meeting, 11 December 1948, pp. 945–7.) (2) See Editorial Note, pp. 163–4 above; No. 271, n. 2.

No. 261

(1) See No. 220. (2) Ben-Gurion received the French Consul on the same day and promised him that all French institutions not situated near the front lines would be evacuated immediately (see Hirsch to Fischer, telegram 59, 16 December 1948, 130.09/2344/1). (3) Paragraph 15 (2) reads: "Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired. The liberty of access, visit and transit to Holy Places shall be guaranteed, in conformity with existing rights, to all without distinction, subject to the requirements of national security, public order and decorum." (See Leo Kohn, A Constitution for Israel, Draft and Explanatory Statement, October 1948, 93.03/66/5.) (4) Reference is presumably to a declaration made by Fischer at the beginning of September — see No. 220, n. 2.

No. 262 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. 254, n. 3.

No. 263 (Hebrew)

(1) Political weekly, published in Moscow in several languages. (2) Reference is to an article by Harry Schwartz, "How Russia Solved the Jewish Problem", which appeared in *Beterem,* Vol. 6, Sept. 1948, pp. 14–19 (Hebrew). (3) On 8 November, Tel Aviv was under a curfew owing to the census. The Soviet Minister, who had appropriate documents, was stopped by soldiers but was allowed to proceed after a short checkup. See *Hamashkif,* 9 November 1948. (4) See article by "Kolmos", *Haboker,* 30 November 1948. (5) See Namir to Friedman, ZM147, 16 December 1948, 130.11/2513/15. (6) Arye Levavi, First Secretary and Press Attaché in the Israeli Mission in Moscow. (7) Friedman replied that the above-mentioned press reports had been discussed in the course of a meeting he had had at the Soviet Legation before the publication of the Moscow article. He therefore assumed that the article was based on information received from the Legation. In the course of the discussion at the Legation he had pointed out that newspapers were eager to publish sensations and that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs did not take a serious view of such publications. Following the receipt of Namir's earlier telegram (see n. 5 above), the Ministry had published a *démenti* in the press. (See Friedman to the Israeli Legation in Moscow, telegram 53, 24 December 1948, 130.09/2325/3.)

No. 264

(1) See No. 248, n. 1. (2) Concerning Israel's admission to the U.N. (3) John G.S. Beith, official in the Eastern Department of the Foreign

Office. (4) See No. 253. (5) Lewis G. Jones, First Secretary in the American Embassy in London.

No. 265 (Hebrew)

(1) Letter in file 130.11/2514/7.

No. 266

(1) Sasson left Paris at the beginning of December for a short home visit in Israel. In the course of his stay he contacted King Abdallah and had two conversations with Abdallah al-Tall, Military Governor of Jordanian-held Jerusalem. In these conversations al-Tall intimated, on behalf of the King, Jordan's willingness to hold peace talks with Israel and the King's firm determination to annex the Jordanian-held parts of Palestine. (See Sasson to Sharett, F35, 17 December 1948, 130.09/2344/1; Vol. 3, Nos. 120, 181.) (2) Sharett's opinion also was that it would be unwise to agree too hastily to Abdallah's annexation scheme (see his telegram U4, 23 December 1948, 93.02/182/7). (3) See Editorial Note, p. 167 below. (4) Mohammad Hussein Haykal, President of the Egyptian Senate.

No. 267

(1) No. 253. (2) On being informed that Ben-Gurion's original opinion remained unchanged, Sharett cabled that unless Ben-Gurion considered that the matter should await his return to Israel, Linton should be instructed to reply in accordance with Ben-Gurion's line, since a delay might be interpreted as implying hesitation or internal difficulties. On the following day Linton was instructed to inform the Foreign Office that Israel was not interested in the British proposal unless the opening of the consulate was accompanied by an explicit public statement to the effect that it constituted *de facto* recognition. (See Eytan to Sharett, MH2369, 19 December 1948, 93.02/182/8; Sharett to Eytan, UN1255, 23 December 1948, *ibid.;* Eytan to Linton, telegram 55, 24 December 1948, 130.09/2318/1.)

No. 268

(1) See Editorial Note, pp. 163–4 above; No. 260. (2) See No. 260, n. 1. (3) Untraced. (4) See *SCOR, Third Year,* 385th Meeting, 17 December 1948, pp. 15–16. (5) See No. 273, n. 2.

No. 269

(1) See No. 41. (2) See Nos. 318, 327.

No. 270

(1) See No. 82.

No. 271

(1) See No. 270. (2) In a last-minute effort and on the President's instructions, Lovett approached the French Ambassador in Washington on 15 December urging French support for Israel's admission to the U.N. (see Elath to the Israeli Mission in Paris, NP15, 16 December 1948). (3) Cf. No. 268. (4) See No. 251, n. 2. (5) See also Elath to Lovett, 22 December 1948, 93.08/374/1.

Editorial Note preceding No. 272 (Main Volume, pp. 312–3)

Operation *Horev*

The Security Council's resolutions of 4 and 16 November concerning the withdrawal of forces and armistice negotiations between Israel and Egypt (see Editorial Note, pp. 131–2, 179–80 above) were not implemented in their entirety. The Egyptians insisted on the fulfilment of the withdrawal clauses only and on the release of their forces besieged in the Faluja pocket and showed no readiness to enter into negotiations for an armistice. To break the deadlock, Israel decided to renew hostilities and to drive the Egyptian forces outside the international borders of Palestine. Hostilities began on 22 December 1948, and resulted in the complete defeat of the Egyptians in the southeastern sector of the Negev (Bir Asluj–Auja al-Hafir sector); Egyptian forces in the Gaza strip were brought under heavy pressure, but the Faluja pocket held fast. In the course of the hostilities, Israeli forces penetrated into the Sinai Peninsula, attacking Abu-Agheila and Al-Arish. Following American and British pressure and the Security Council's resolution of 29 December 1948 (see Editorial Note, pp. 168–9), a cease-fire was instituted on 7 January 1949 and the Israeli forces withdrew to the international boundary. Before that, on 4 January 1949, the Egyptians communicated their readiness to enter into negotiations for an armistice. (See Vol. 3, No. 1).

No. 272

(1) See No. 244.

No. 273

(1) See Editorial Note, p. 167. (2) With the termination of the discussion on Israel's admission to the U.N., the Israeli delegation to the

General Assembly dispersed; Sharett himself took a short vacation in France. M. Fischer, Israel's Representative in France, was left the senior Israeli diplomat in Paris. (See No. 274; Robinson to Eytan, UN1259, 24 December 1948, 93.02/186/6.)

No. 274

(1) See No. 273.

No. 275

(1) Untraced, but obviously concerned Canada's recognition of Israel. On 24 December 1948, Canada accorded *de facto* recognition to the State of Israel. It was stated that the recognition was accorded "in the knowledge that the boundaries of the new State have not as yet been precisely defined, and in the hope that it may be possible to settle these and all other outstanding questions in the spirit of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 11, 1948." (See Pearson to Sharett, 24 December 1948, 130.02/2391/41.) (2) Comay inquired whether Canada's recognition meant that she would support Israel's admission to the United Nations when Israel's application came up for renewed discussion. (See Comay's telegram to Lourie, 24 December 1948, 93.03/86/15.) (3) See Pearson's letter to Sharett mentioned in note 1 above.

No. 276 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *249*. (2) See No. 278. (3) Walter Bedell Smith, the American Ambassador in Moscow.

Editorial Note preceding No. 277 (Main Volume, p. 317)

At Egypt's request, the Security Council convened on 28 December 1948 to discuss the situation in the Negev (see Editorial Note, p. 167 above). The Council had before it two reports by the Acting Mediator (U.N. Documents S/1152, S/1153) blaming Israel for the situation in the Negev, and stressing its "intransigent attitude" with regard to the Faluja pocket issue. In the course of the discussion, the British representative proposed a draft resolution calling for the implementation of the Security Council's resolution of 4 November 1948. This draft resolution, with certain amendments, was voted upon and adopted on 29 December. The U.S.A., U.S.S.R. and Ukrainian S.S.R. abstained. The resolution reads as follows:

> *"The Security Council,*
> *Having considered* the report of the Acting Mediator (S/1152) on

the hostilities which broke out in Southern Palestine on the 22 December,

Calls upon the Governments concerned:

(i) to order an immediate cease-fire;

(ii) to implement without further delay the resolution of 4 November and the instructions issued by the Acting Mediator in accordance with sub-paragraph (1) of the fifth paragraph of that resolution;

(iii) To allow and facilitate the complete supervision of the truce by the United Nations observers;

Instructs the Committee of the Council appointed on 4 November to meet at Lake Success on 7 January to consider the situation in Southern Palestine and to report to the Council on the extent to which the Governments concerned have by that date complied with the present resolution and with the resolutions of 4 and 16 November;

Invites Cuba and Norway to replace as from 1 January the two retiring members of the Committee (Belgium and Colombia);

Expresses the hope that the members of the Conciliation Commission appointed by the General Assembly on 11 December will nominate their representatives and establish the Commission with as little delay as possible."

(See *SCOR, Third Year,* 394th–396th Meetings, 28–29 December 1948.)

No. 277

(1) See Editorial Note, above. (2) The date fixed in the draft resolution for the convening of the Security Council's committee on the implementation of the 4 November resolution. In the final version of the resolution the date was changed to 7 January — see Editorial Note, above.

No. 278

(1) The meeting had not materialized — see No. *284*. See also No. 279.

No. 279

(1) No. 278.

No. 280

(1) Telegram from Eytan to Elath (22 December 1948, 130.09/2308/1), informing him of the launching of Operation *Horev* and giving guidelines

for the presentation of Israel's case in the United States. (2) See No. 287.

No. 281

(1) See Nos. 278, 279. (2) Eytan replied that Israel regarded the evacuation of Lebanese territory as a purely strategic question and would evacuate it — probably within a few weeks — once assured of the safety of the Jewish settlements in the north. Therefore, this issue had no connection with French–Israeli relations and should not be linked with the question of recognition. (See Eytan to Fischer, telegram 68, 2 January 1949, 130.09/2344/2.)

No. 282 (Hebrew)

(1) In the first part of the consultation, Sasson reviewed the recent developments in the Arab states. (2) One sentence omitted here. (3) Moshe Dayan intended to meet on the same day Abdallah al-Tall, Military Governor of Jordanian-held Jerusalem, to discuss cease-fire arrangements between Jordan and Israel — see Vol. 3, No. 183. (4) Several paragraphs from Horowitz's speech, dealing with forecasts of social and economic developments in the Middle East, omitted here. (5) Suleiman Abd al-Razzaq Touqan, Mayor of Nablus, 1925–1948; supporter of King Abdallah in Palestine. (6) Apparently should read: [D. Ben-Gurion:] did I say to establish a Government [?]. (7) The northern part of the Triangle, beginning at Budrus, was held by the Iraqi army — see Vol. 3, map facing p. 346. (8) See Vol. 3, No. 183. (9) See Editorial Note, pp. 168–9 above. (10) Budrus — see note 7 above. (11) Abdallah al-Tall. (12) For the "sincere" cease-fire agreement of 30 November 1948 for the Jerusalem area see Appendix E(3), Main Volume, pp. 631–2. (13) The Faluja pocket. (14) Roger T. Carlson, Senior United Nations Observer in Jerusalem. (15) The "sincere" cease-fire agreement — see Appendix E(3), Main Volume, pp. 631–2.

No. 283

(1) This statement was read personally by McDonald to Sharett in the former's office. Later, McDonald delivered this message to Ben-Gurion who was spending his vacation in Tiberias. (See *FRUS,* 1948, V, pp. 1705–6.) (2) See No. 286.

No. 284 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. 278. (2) See No. 272. (3) Reference is presumably to a statement by Harold Beeley in the Security Council's Sub-Committee on 8 December, that according to his information, Israeli forces were advancing south towards the Red Sea and had made incursions over the Transjordan border. Beeley warned that if that information were confirmed, Great Britain might be obliged to take action under her treaty with Transjordan. (See *Times*, 9 December 1948.) (4) See No. *276*.

No. 285

(1) Cf. *FRUS*, 1948, V, pp. 1701–3. (2) See Linton to Elath, telegram 82, 1 January 1949, 93.01/2180/31.

No. 286

(1) See No. 283.

No. 287

(1) See Nos. 283, 286. (2) See No. 329; President Truman to President Weizmann, no date, *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 670–1.

No. 288

(1) Oliver S. Franks, the British Ambassador in Washington. (2) Date of Security Council's meeting to discuss the implementation of its 29 December resolution — see Editorial Note, pp. 168–9 above. (3) Joseph B. Keenan, American Representative on the Conciliation Commission. (4) Cf. report on Keenan's meeting with Fraser Wilkins of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs in the Department of State, *FRUS*, 1949, VI, p. 599. (5) Following a serious deterioration in the relations between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia, the Dutch withdrew from the Good Offices Committee established by the U.N., and on 19 December commenced a large-scale "police action" against the Indonesians. (6) Sharett replied that he shared Ginsburg's anxieties, and had read his message at the Cabinet meeting. Already before receipt of his message, steps had been taken to ease the tension, and the press blackout had been lifted. (See Sharett to Ginsburg, T31, 6 January 1949, 130.09/2308/2.)

No. 289

(1) See No. 288, n. 5.

No. 290

(1) No. 283. (2) During the night of 31 December – 1 January 1949 Egyptian ships shelled Tel Aviv. There were no casualties. (3) On the evening of 2 January an unidentified aeroplane dropped bombs over Jerusalem. Four persons were lightly injured. (4) See Lovett's telegram to the American Embassy in Cairo, 3 January 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 602–3.

No. 291

(1) See No. 281, n. 2. (2) Gabriel Bonneau, Director of the Africa–Levant Department in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (3) Sharett's telegram to Fischer, supplementing his telegram No. 68 and stating that Israel would evacuate the Lebanese villages as soon as the Lebanese signify their readiness to enter into armistice talks. (Telegram, dated 1 January 1949, in file 130.09/2344/2.) (4) Sharett replied that Israel had shown readiness to make concessions to France where direct French interests were at stake but this was not the case in the Lebanese villages issue. An Israeli declaration of readiness to evacuate the villages provided armistice negotiations begin should be a sufficient indication of good will on Israel's part. (See Sharett to Fischer, telegram 70, 6 January 1949, 130.09/2344/2.)

No. 292

(1) See No. 267. (2) German: "Do not greet me in public". (Unter den Linden — Berlin's main street.) (3) See No. 275. (4) Original reads, erroneously, "*Secretary* of State". (5) See *SCOR, Third Year*, 396th Meeting, 29 December 1948, p. 13. (6) Error in original ("4 November"). (7) General Assembly resolution of 11 December 1948 — See Appendix F, Main Volume, pp. 632–9.

No. 293

(1) See No. 296.

No. 294

(1) Lourie's telegram to Sharett of 5 January 1949, requesting authorization to appear before the Security Council Committee (see Editorial Note, pp. 168–9 above) on 7 January 1949 in view of Eban's absence. (Telegram in file 93.03/79/17.) (2) See Vol. 3, No. 1. (3) The cease-fire came into effect on 7 January, 14.00 hrs. local time, 12.00 hrs. G.M.T.

No. 295

(1) See No. 294. (2) The Security Council Committee convened on 7 January 1949 to review the situation in the Negev. The Committee considered the Acting Mediator's report (U.N. Document S/1187) and heard statements from the Chief of Staff of the U.N. Observers and the representatives of Egypt and Israel. The committee decided that, in view of the cease-fire that had been achieved, no further action was required at the moment. (See U.N. Document S/1191.)

No. 296

(1) No. 293.

Editorial Note preceding No. 298 (Main Volume, p. 348)

On the morning of 7 January 1949 British aircraft conducted reconnaissance flights over northern Sinai and the western Negev in order to verify the I.D.F.'s retreat. I.D.F. planes intercepted the British formations and in three skirmishes shot down five planes, two of them within Israel's international boundary. Following this incident, the British reinforced their troops at Aqaba.

No. 298

(1) Harry Beilin, Representative of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Haifa. (2) Handed personally by Marriott at 1.00 a.m., 9 January 1949. A similar document had been delivered on the afternoon of 8 January 1949 by representatives of the British delegation to the U.N. to A. Lourie, Acting Representative of Israel at the U.N. (3) Originally, the document read "Jewish authorities" but the text was changed to "your Government" following Israel's refusal to accept the document in the original version. Israel rejected the document again in the revised form in view of the inclusion of the appellation "Jewish authorities" in the Memorandum below. Finally, the document was transmitted through the good offices of the U.N. Secretary-General but Israel took cognizance only of the "Statement" part of the document, which did not include the appellation "Jewish authorities". See *Davar,* 11 January 1949; No. 339. (4) Thus in the original. The incident actually took place on 7 January 1949. (5) For Israel's reply — see No. 339.

No. 299

(1) Untraced, but presumably a telegram from Eytan to Elath similar to No. 300.

No. 300

(1) See No. 299.

No. 301

(1) See Vol. I, Appendix E. (2) See Editorial Note, p. 173 above. (3) See No. 302.

No. 302

(1) Article 34 empowers the Security Council to investigate any dispute or any situation that might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. (2) See No. 301. (3) Kellogg-Briand pact of 1928 renouncing the recourse to war for the solution of international controversies. (4) Eytan's telegram to Eban conveying information on British supply of arms to the Arabs. (Telegram, dated 7 January 1949, in file 130.09/2329/3.) (5) See No. 304.

No. 303

(1) Armistice talks with Egypt set to be opened in Rhodes on 13 January.

No. 304

(1) See No. 302. (2) See No. 308.

No. 306

(1) Untraced, but see Memorandum of Conversation by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, January 10, 1949, *FRUS,* 1949, VI, pp. 633–5.

No. 307

(1) See No. 308. (2) Cf. Nos. 302, 315.

No. 308

(1) No. 298. (2) See No. 302, n. 1.

No. 311

(1) Claude B. de Boisanger.

No. 312 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. 302, n. 4. (2) Several newspapers in Israel and abroad published on 10 January a news item about a meeting between Yershov — Soviet Minister in Israel — and Sharett, in which the former reportedly offered Soviet aid to Israel. This was denied the following day. (See *Al Hamishmar,* 10–11 January 1949; *New York Herald Tribune,* 11 January 1949.) (3) See No. 298, n. 3.

No. 313 (Hebrew)

(1) In the course of the incidents in the Negev, the British Foreign Office published officially many details on Czechslovak arms supply to Israel. (See *Davar,* 7 January 1949; *New York Herald Tribune,* 7 January 1949.) (2) Vladimir Houdek, Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia at the U.N. (3) See No. *363*.

No. 314 (Hebrew)

(1) Kurt Daniel Lewin, Israeli Vice-Consul and Immigration Officer in Austria. (2) First part of letter omitted. (3) Correspondence untraced. (4) John G. Erhardt, U.S. Minister to Austria. (5) One sentence omitted. (6) Hirsch instructed Lewin not to press for recognition. If it came — fine, but one should not appear eager to be recognized. (See Hirsch to Levin, MH2917, 3 February 1949, 93.06/486/8.) (7) See Lewin to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 24 December 1948, 130.10/2517/10.

No. 315

(1) No. 304. (2) Eban's telegram to Sharett reporting on his intention to file a request for the convocation of the Security Council. (Telegram, dated 10 January 1949, in file 2180/31.) (3) Eban replied that following very emphatic advice on the part of the Americans he decided not to request the convocation of the Security Council. The Americans asserted that they had managed to relieve the tension and a Security Council meeting could only revive it. He would discuss the matter again in Washington and report to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs after his meeting with Lovett. If no agreement were reached — the Ministry would have to decide how to proceed. (See Eban to Sharett, telegram 1117, 12 January 1949, 130.09/2328/5.) See also No. 320.

No. 316

(1) See No. 317.

No. 317

(1) See No. 316. (2) See No. 337; Lester B. Pearson to M. Sharett, 20 January 1949, 130.02/2414/19.

No. 318

(1) The year 1949 brought changes in the composition of the Security Council: Norway, Cuba and Egypt replaced Belgium, Colombia and Syria as non-permanent members of the Security Council. (2) See No. 327.

No. 319

(1) On 13 January the Israeli–Egyptian armistice talks opened in Rhodes — see Vol. 3.

No. 320

(1) See No. 315, n. 3. (2) See No. 319. (3) No. 308. (4) See No. 321, n. 1; Nos. 322, 334.

No. 321

(1) No. 320. Sharett's telegram untraced, but presumably he endorsed Elath's and Eban's actions.

No. 322

(1) See No. 300.

No. 323

(1) Untraced. (2) See No. 320.

No. 324

(1) Keith C.O. Shann, member of the Australian delegation to the U.N.

No. 326

(1) Andrew J.L. McNaughton, member of the Canadian delegation to the U.N., President of the Security Council for January 1949. (2) George Ignatieff, Chief Political Adviser to the Canadian delegation. (3) See No. 275.

No. 327

(1) Untraced. (2) Finn Moe, Permanent Representative of Norway at the U.N. Name included in first draft of telegram but deleted later.

No. 328

(1) Jean M.H. Chauvel, Secretary-General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2) Following the events in the Negev, France had decided to postpone its recognition of Israel. (See Fischer to Sharett, telegram 48, 8 January 1949, 130.09/2344/5.)

No. 329

(1) No. 287.

No. 330

(1) See No. 329. (2) In Elath's opinion, as well as that of his friends, it was undesirable to apply for an audience at that moment. (See Elath to Sharett, telegram 682, 15 January 1949, 93.08/369/21.)

No. 332 (Hebrew)

(1) Raphael Benshalom, First Secretary and Consul of Israel in Prague. (2) Enclosures untraced.

No. 333

(1) Selim Sarper, Permanent Representative of Turkey at the U.N. (2) Hüseyin Çahit Yalçin, Turkish journalist, Turkish Representative on the Conciliation Commission.

No. 334

(1) No. 320.

No. 335

(1) William C. Burdett, U.S. Consul in Jerusalem.

No. 336

(1) Jean A. Binoche, Deputy Director (in charge of Levant Affairs) of the Africa-Levant Department in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2) See No. 291. (3) See Vol. 3, No. 158.

No. 337

(1) See No. 317.

No. 338

(1) Eliahu Ben-Horin, adviser on Middle Eastern affairs to the American Zionist Emergency Council. (2) Thomas McMahon, National Secretary of the Catholic Near East Welfare Association, visited the Christian Holy Places in Israel during December. He was accompanied by Antonio Vergani, Vicar-General of the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem for Galilee, and Ben-Horin. (3) Cf. Vol. I, No. 554. (4) Cardinal Francis Joseph Spellman, Archbishop of New York, President of the Catholic Near East Welfare Association.

No. 339

(1) No. 298.

No. 340

(1) On Norway's position — see No. 327. (2) Sharett instructed Eban to keep exploring prospects of a favourable vote. (See Sharett to Eban, LS/63, 21 January 1949, 93.01/2180/31.)

No. 341

(1) On 18 January 1949 Foreign Secretary Bevin was replying to questions in the House of Commons concerning Israeli–British relations. He told the House that Britain had been considering the matter of *de-facto* recognition of Israel and announced that Britain was willing to release all the Jewish detainees in Cyprus.

No. 342

(1) See No. 341, n. 1. (2) Cf. *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 675–7.

Editorial Note preceding No. 343 (Main Volume, p. 384)

On 19 January the Export–Import Bank of the United States released to the press its final decision to grant a $100,000,000 loan to Israel. The Bank stated that $35,000,000 would be made available immediately for several agricultural projects in Israel; the remaining $65,000,000 would be granted within the year for various projects of communications, transport, manufacturing and public works to be negotiated between Israel and the Bank.

No. 343

(1) First paragraph omitted here. (2) Cf. No. 328, n. 2. (3) See No. 341, n. 1. (4) See No. 281. (5) See No. 348 — Sharett's reply to this letter and to No. 344. (6) Cf. Vol. 3, No. 183.

No. 344

(1) First part of letter omitted here. (2) See No. 343. (3) Fischer advised Eytan to treat with reserve all news in the press concerning impending French recognition of Israel, this being dependent on certain conditions and negotiations. (Telegram of 19 January 1949, file 93.02/168/16.) (4) Fischer asked Hirsch to initiate press comments explaining French non-recognition on 15 January despite promises. Fischer's telegram arrived garbled and his reasoning was not clear to Hirsch. (See Fischer to Hirsch, telegram 49, 11 January 1949, 130.09/2344/5; Hirsch to Fischer, telegram 73, 17 January 1949, 130.09/2344/2.)

No. 345

(1) See Nos. 341, 342.

No. 346

(1) On 20 January 1949 there were personal changes in the Department of State: Dean Acheson replaced Marshall as Secretary of State and James E. Webb replaced Lovett as Undersecretary of State. On the significance of these changes for Israel — see Elath to Sharett, W71, 7 January 1949, 93.01/2180/32. (2) See No. 167. President Truman reaffirmed Jessup's statement in a press conference on 12 January after his meeting with British Ambassador Franks. See also No. *388*. (3) See Editorial Note, p. 178 above.

No. 347

(1) See Vol. I, No. 191, n. 2; *ibid.*, No. 208. (2) Sharett instructed Eban to work for a postponement of the discussion on the Middle East Commission, adding that if this was not practicable, to try to include in the regulations of the Commission a clause opening the way for cooptation of other states in the Middle East that would be admitted to the United Nations in the future. (See Sharett to Eban, LS73, 23 January 1949, 93.03/75/8.) See also No. 352.

No. 348

(1) See No. 336. (2) See Nos. 343, 344.

No. 350 (Hebrew)

(1) For full report of this meeting see R. Rubin, Report on a meeting with the Foreign Minister of R.P.R., Madame Ana Pauker, 21 January 1949, 130.11/2493/4. (2) See Nos. *146, 154*. (3) On the following day, Rubin cabled that the Rumanian authorities began liquidating the Zionist training farms; one of the reasons given — no prospect of immigration to Israel. (See Rubin to Friedman, Ri3, 28 January 1949, 130.09/2296/9.) (4) Directors of the Zionist National Funds who had been arrested in Rumania — see Nos. *131, 181*.

No. 352

(1) See No. 347. (2) See *ibid.,* n. 2. (3) Elath replied that he discussed the matter with Satterthwaite and McClintock who promised to do what they could. (See Elath to Eban, 1 February 1949, 93.08/375/4.) See also No. 357.

No. 353

(1) Menachem Begin, leader of the Herut (Irgun Zevai Leumi) Party.

Editorial Note preceding No. 354 (Main Volume, pp. 395–6)

France recognized Israel *de facto* on 24 January 1949, following protracted negotiations over the privileges of the French institutions in Israel and over Israel's stand on the Jerusalem issue. Prior to the recognition Israel undertook (1) to evacuate the premises of the French institutions occupied by the I.D.F., and (2) to indemnify these institutions for damages sustained during the war as a result of Israeli operations. Israel also agreed to come to terms with the French government regarding the status of these institutions, with the understanding that in any event it would not be inferior to the status awarded the institutions of any other country. As to Jerusalem, Israel recapitulated in writing her position on this issue as presented by Sharett in his speech before the First Committee of the U.N. on 15 January 1949, namely, that Israel demands the establishment of an international regime in the Old City of Jerusalem, in which most of the Holy Places important to the three religions are located, but insists on the inclusion in Israel of the New City, together with the corridor connecting it with the rest of the country — these being in any case occupied by Israeli forces.

Italy recognized Israel *de facto* on 7 February 1949, following a similar understanding regarding her institutions in Israel.

No. 355 (Hebrew)

(1) Yehuda Gaulan, Representative of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem. (2) Pablo de Azcarate, Personal Representative of the Acting Mediator in Cairo; from mid-January 1949 — Principal Secretary to the Conciliation Commission. (3) The Conciliation Commission met for the first time in Geneva in the middle of January 1949 and held several meetings to discuss procedural matters. The Commission arrived in Jerusalem on 24 January. (4) Reference is to a temporary cease-fire agreement between Egypt and Israel designed to assure the peace until the conclusion of the armistice talks in Rhodes — see Vol. 3, No. 48. (5) See Appendix G, para. 12, Main Volume, p. 641. (6) Fraser Wilkins, Assistant Chief, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State. (7) René Neuville, French Consul-General in Jerusalem.

Editorial Note preceding No. 356 (Main Volume, p. 396)

On 25 January 1949 Israel held its elections to the Constituent Assembly. The Israel Labour Party (Mapai) — moderate left — emerged as the leading party, winning 35.82 per cent of the votes; the United Workers' Party (Mapam) — leftist — polled 14.77 per cent; the United Religious Party — 12.35 per cent; the Freedom Movement (Herut — formerly I.Z.L.) — 11.52 per cent; the General Zionists (right centre) — 5.27 per cent; the Progressive Party (liberal) — 4.14 per cent; the Communists — 3.51 per cent; the Sephardic Party (Jews of oriental descent) — 3.51 per cent. The balance of less than 10% was shared among various minor parties.

On 8 March 1949 Prime Minister Ben-Gurion presented his new Government to the Constituent Assembly. It was a coalition government, made up of representatives of Mapai, the United Religious Party, the Progressive Party and the Sephardic Party. The main ministerial posts remained unchanged — D. Ben-Gurion, M. Sharett and E. Kaplan remained respectively as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Finance.

No. 356 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. 319. (2) See Vol. 3, No. 21. (3) See No. 348; Vol. 3, No. 158. (4) See No. 302; Vol. 3, No. 185. (5) See Editorial Note, p. 178 above. (6) See No. 291. (7) See No. 341, n. 1.

No. 357

(1) On 26 January the House of Commons held a general debate on Palestine. Foreign Secretary Bevin defended past British actions in Palestine, and while dwelling on the lack of coordination between British and American policies hitherto, called for more cooperation in the future, in view of the mounting international tension. He announced his intention to recognize Israel when his policy was approved by the Dominions; he added, however, that Britain would not stand by if hostilities were resumed in the area. At the conclusion of the debate, which was tense and acrimonious, the Government's past policy in Palestine was approved, but with a largely reduced majority, many Labourite members abstaining. (2) See also Nos. 347, 352.

No. 358

(1) Joza Vilfan, Yugoslav Permanent Representative at the U.N. (2) See No. 359. (3) See No. 347.

No. 359

(1) See also No. 358. (2) Sharett cabled that he fully and emphatically agreed with Eban. He had already instructed Elath on the same matter and asked Eban to explain Israel's viewpoint to the Jewish Telegraphic Agency and to the press. (Telegram LS/111, dated 2 Febraury 1949, in file 93.01/2130/31.)

No. 360

(1) See Editorial Note, p. 181 above.

No. 361

(1) Linton's meeting with Bevin on 29 January 1949 in which Linton was informed of Britain's recognition of Israel — see No. 367. (2) See No. 340, n. 2.

No. 362 (Hebrew)

(1) Date on which the document was copied at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (2) See Vol. I, Companion Volume, Editorial Note, p. 136. (3) Salim (Shlomo) Bechor (Bechori), official in the Middle East Division of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (4) Thus in the original; reference is to the talks with Egypt and Transjordan. (5) Main opposition party in Egypt; its leader was Mustafa Nahhas. (6) Mohammad Mahadi al

Jawahiry, Iraqi poet and journalist, an opposition activist. Member of the National Unity Party.

No. 364

(1) Military government functioned in Jewish-held Jerusalem since the end of July 1948. The Military Governor was Dov Bernard Joseph.

No. 365 (Hebrew)

(1) Avraham Bergman (Biran), Chief Assistant of the Military Governor of Jerusalem; from February 1949 — District Commissioner for Jerusalem, representing the Ministry of the Interior. (2) Britain recognized Israel on 29 January 1949 — see No. 367. (3) Reference is presumably to Fraser Wilkins — see No. 364, n. 6; the second American has not been identified.

No. 367

(1) British diplomat, Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet, 1916–1919; helped bring about the Balfour Declaration. (2) See No. 422. (3) See No. 341, n. 1. (4) In the course of the debate on Palestine in the House of Commons on 26 January, one of the Members raised the problem of the Jews in Aden, claiming that some 4000 Jews were being denied exit visas for Israel. The Under-Secretary of State, Christopher Mayhew, promised immediately that all Aden Jews would be permitted to leave. (See *460 H.C. Deb.* 5s., col. 1012.) (5) Reference is to the negotiations between the Jewish Agency Executive and the British Government which took place in February 1947.

No. 368

(1) Esther Herlitz, Acting Director of the U.S. Division in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (2) Herlitz reported on difficulties in the emigration of men of military age from the Displaced Persons camps in Austria and suggested raising the subject in the Department of State, in view of Britain's recognition and the release of the Cyprus detainees. (See Herlitz to Elath, 31 January 1949, 130.09/2308/8.) (3) Kurt Daniel Lewin, Vice-Consul and Immigration Officer of Israel in Austria. (4) Geoffrey Keyes, Commanding Officer and U.S. High Commissioner in Austria. (5) On the formal and actual situation in the emigration of Jewish Displaced Persons from the American and British zones in Germany see No. 248; Vol. I, No. 528. (6) William Haber, Adviser on Jewish Affairs to the American military administration in Germany and Austria. (7) See No. 341, n. 1. (8) Herlitz replied that Bevin released the Cy-

prus detainees without previous consultation with the Mediator. As things stood then, the U.S.A. was the only country still imposing restrictions on the emigration of D.P.s. In her opinion, Israel could not tolerate this situation and she suggested bringing the facts to the knowledge of the public. As far as the Mediator was concerned, he had stated several times that he had neither an interest nor any say in that issue. (See her cable to Heyd, T9W, 4 February 1949, 130.09/2308/2.) See also No. 376.

No. 369

(1) See No. 364. (2) Sharett replied that the abolition of the Military Government was a purely formal step intended to adjust the formal to the actual situation. (See Sharett to Eban, LS/117, 3 February 1949, 93.01/2180/33.)

No. 370 (Hebrew)

(1) Around the turn of the year, and especially after the elections in Israel, the grant of the American loan and the recognition by many Western countries, Israel became the subject of many critical publications in the U.S.S.R. Ganin's (spelling uncertain) brochure, *The Palestinian Problem,* portrayed Israel as a bourgeois state with a nationalistic ideology. The publication in *Trud* following the elections was unfriendly, describing the ruling Israel Labour Party (Mapai) as a bourgeois party and quoting Mikunis, leader of the Israeli Communist party, as saying that the elections had not been free, many thousands not having been included in the voting register. (See Namir to Sharett, Pi72, 13 January 1949; G. Meyerson to Sharett, Pi80, 27 January 1949, 130.09/2325/4. Both telegrams in Hebrew.) (2) See Vol. I, No. 535, n. 1. (3) See No. *263*. (4) Original has a line missing. (5) I. Grünbaum, Minister of Interior in the Provisional Government, and D. Auster, Mayor of Jerusalem, ran unsuccessfully in the election on personal tickets. (6) Russian property in Israel was divided between the Palestine Orthodox Society and the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission; legally, the property was owned by various bodies, including the former Russian Imperial Government. The Russian Ecclesiastical Mission itself was divided into two factions, one of which acknowledged the Moscow Patriarch and thus the Soviet Government. For details of the protracted negotiations between Israel and the Soviet Mission on the subject of the Russian property, see files 130.11/2501/16–20.

No. 371

(1) In the matter of Israel's admission to the U.N. (2) Sharett expressed his thanks for the recognition and his readiness to discuss the

exchange of representatives. (See Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Press Release No. 2, 1 February 1949, 130.02/2391/22.) (3) See No. 374.

No. 372 (Hebrew)

(1) See Nos. 366, 373. Cf. also No. *370*. (2) The Israeli press carried the news that the Soviet Minister intended to depart for Moscow to report on the results of the elections in Israel. (See, e.g., *Davar,* 2 February 1949.) (3) Golda Meyerson returned to Israel in the middle of February and at the beginning of March assumed the position of Minister of Labour and Social Security in the newly formed cabinet. M. Namir, Counsellor in the Israeli Mission in Moscow, replaced Mrs. Meyerson as Minister to the U.S.S.R. at the beginning of May.

No. 373

(1) See No. 366. (2) See No. *372.*

No. 374

(1) See No. 371. (2) I.e., the simultaneous admission of both Israel and Transjordan to the U.N.

No. 375

(1) See No. 364. (2) Israel's decision to convene the opening session of the Constituent Assembly in Jerusalem. (3) The Conciliation Commission's intention to connect Government House — venue of the Commission — with the Old City by a paved road passing through the village of Silwan, in order to facilitate contacts with Arab leaders. The Commission gave up this idea in view of Israel's opposition.

No. 376

(1) See No. 368, n. 2. (2) Reference is actually to Herbert Fierst, a former Department of State official dealing with the problem of the refugees in Europe. (3) See No. 385, last paragraph. In his reply Sharett described as fantastic the State Department's contention that removal of restrictions on emigration to Israel might affect the Rhodes talks. He added that the British decision to release the Cyprus detainees had been taken unilaterally, the Mediator serving only as a channel of communication between Britain and Israel. (See his cable T24W to Elath, 13 February 1949, 130.09/2308/2.) Later Heyd notified Sharett that with the Mediator's approval it had been resolved to remove all restrictions on

emigration as from 18 February 1949. (See Heyd to Sharett, 16 February 1949, 93.01/2180/32.)

No. 377 (Hebrew)

(1) No. *370*. (2) One paragraph omitted here. (3) No. *372*.

No. 378

(1) Admission of Israel to the U.N. (2) Eban, Lourie, Robinson and Rafael — representatives of Israel at the U.N., and Elath — Special Representative in Washington. (3) See also No. 381.

No. 379

(1) See No. 375, n. 2. (2) See No. 443.

No. 380

(1) Alexander S. Panyushkin, Soviet Ambassador in Washington. (2) See Nos. 358, 359.

No. 381

(1) See No. *378*. (2) Procedurally, Ross suggested that Eban write to the Security Council referring to the previous debate on Israel's application in Paris and requesting a renewed consideration. Following that letter, the U.S. delegation would arrange for the convening of the Security Council when a maximum number of votes were assured. See Eban to Sharett, NI15, 11 February 1949, 93.01/2180/33.) (3) See No. 374.

No. 382

(1) See No. 375, n. 2. (2) See No. 384.

No. 383

(1) No. 379.

No. 384

(1) No. 382. (2) See No. 385.

No. 385

(1) See Nos. 382, 384. (2) Charles F. Knox, Counsellor in the U.S. Mission to Israel. (3) See No. 383. (4) See Nos. 368, 376.

No. 386

(1) Friedman replied on 19 February 1949: "Read with emotion. After consulting the [Foreign] Minister, decided to discuss your suggestion with Golda [Meyerson], who is returning today". (Telegram IR14 in file 130.09/2296/8.) See also Nos. *392, 393.*

No. 387

(1) Sharett inquired whether Israel's decision to hold the opening session of the Constituent Assembly in Jerusalem might have an adverse effect on Israel's application to be admitted to the U.N. (See Sharett to Eban, 13 February 1949, 93.01/2180/33.)

No. 388 (Hebrew)

(1) See Report No. 1, 22 December 1948, in file 130.20/2460/9 (Hebrew). (2) The Executive Committee of the International Refugee Organization met at Geneva in late January. The agenda included, *inter alia,* the question of the Organization's contribution to the cost of D.P.s' immigration to Israel. At the conclusion it was resolved to allot 4 million dollars as the Organization's contribution to the transportation of D.P.s to Israel. (See correspondence in file 130.03/1976/8.) (3) The International Wheat Conference convened in Washington at the end of January to discuss the signing of an international wheat agreement. Israel had been invited to send an unofficial observer; the Israeli Mission in Washington attempted to raise the status of its representative. (See correspondence in file 93.08/375/22.) See also No. 405. (4) See No. 167, n. 1. (5) Four last paragraphs of this report omitted here.

No. 389

(1) Sharett instructed Elath not to meet the Spanish Envoy. (See Sharett to Elath, LS/156, 20 February 1949, 93.08/369/27.) (2) Remainder of telegram, which deals with developments in the Rhodes talks, is omitted here.

No. 390

(1) The American Representative's absence from the opening session of the Constituent Assembly in Jerusalem — see No. 385. (2) See No. 1. (3) See No. 381. (4) See No. 387.

No. 391

(1) No. 390. (2) Untraced. See No. 394.

No. 392 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *386*. (2) See No. *393*.

No. 393 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *392*. (2) See also No. *398*.

No. 394

(1) No. 390.

No. 395 (Hebrew)

(1) Mátyás Rákosi, Secretary-General of the Hungarian Communist Party and Deputy Prime Minister. For full report of this meeting see Avriel to Sharett, Report No. 2, 2 March 1949, 130.11/2502/15 (Hebrew). (2) Emigration from Hungary had been stopped and there was much pressure on the part of many prospective immigrants, some of whom had already commenced immigration processes — see No. *181*. (3) See Avriel to László Rajk, Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 17 February 1949, 130.11/2492/22. (4) Cf. also No. *386*. Friedman endorsed Avriel's suggestion, observing, however, that top-level negotiations between Sharett and Soviet bloc leaders should take place only in the last resort, after negotiations at a lower level had failed. (See Friedman's minutes on this telegram, 25 February 1949, 130.09/2344/12.) See also No. *398*.

No. 396

(1) Sergei Nekrasov, Adviser in the Soviet delegation to the U.N. (2) See Vol. 3, No. 145. (3) U.N. General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947 on the partition of Palestine. (4) Security Council resolution of 4 November 1948. (5) See No. 379. (6) See No. 397. (7) Mahmud Fawzi, Permanent Representative of Egypt at the U.N. (8) See No. 380.

No. 397

(1) See Robinson's memorandum: "Application of Israel for admission to membership in the United Nations", 22 February 1949, 130.02/2403/25. See also No. 381, n. 2. (2) See Eban to Sharett, telegram 1304, 23 February 1949, 93.01/2180/33.

No. 398 (Hebrew)

(1) Untraced, but see Nos. *386, 392, 393*. (2) See Nos. *181, 236*. (3) Bercu Feldman, Secretary-General of the Jewish Democratic Committee in Rumania. (4) Cf. No. *395*, n. 4. (5) See Nos. *86, 144*. (6) Sneier Levenberg, member of Poalei Zion (Jewish Socialist Party) in Great Britain, correspondent of *Davar* in London. (7) See *Davar*, 20 February 1949. (8) See exchange of telegrams Friedman–Barzilai, 20–27 February 1949, 130.11/2514/5. (9) See No. *86;* Barzilai to Friedman, 31 October 1948, 130.11/2502/18 (Hebrew). (10) See Friedman to Namir, IP52, 21 December 1948, 130.09/2325/3. Friedman reported on negotiations concerning the emigration of 20,000 Jews to Israel; prospects were good and the emigration would be accompanied by a property transfer arrangement. See also No. *332*. (11) Moshe Ishai, Israeli Minister-designate in Belgrade, presented his credentials at the beginning of July 1949. (12) See No. *395*. (13) See No. *181*. (14) Rafael Loc, Polish Consul-General in Tel Aviv. (15) The nomination did not materialize. The Polish Consulate-General in Israel was raised to the rank of Legation only at the end of 1954. (16) Nikola Brozina, Yuguslav Minister-designate to Israel. (17) D. Krstić, Yugoslav Consul-General in Jerusalem. (18) Albert Lieberman, Hungarian Commercial Attaché in Israel. (19) Zoltán Vas, President of the Hungarian National Planning Bureau.

No. 399 (Hebrew)

(1) First part of the letter, dealing with administrative matters, omitted here.

No. 400

(1) The first part of the meeting was devoted to exchange of courtesies, introduction of Ministry for Foreign Affairs staff, and general conversation about the armistice agreement between Israel and Egypt which was signed the same day. (2) No details of this meeting have been traced. (3) See No. 379. (4) General Assembly resolution of 11 December 1948 — see Appendix G, Main Volume, pp. 639–41. (5) Boisanger's words here and below, in French, are not in the record. (6) See No.

379. (7) See No. 443. (8) See note 4 above. (9) Quotation is from the Egyptian–Israeli General Armistice Agreement — see Vol. 3, Appendix F, p. 688. (10) *Ibid.*, pp. 689, 697. (11) See note 2 above. (12) John W. Halderman, Adviser to the U.S. Representative on the Conciliation Commission, Chairman of the Jerusalem Sub-Committee. (13) See No. *445*.

No. 401

(1) Jean Benard, First Secretary in the French Embassy in Washington. (2) See No. 400, Main Volume, p. 452.

No. 402

(1) Terence A. Shone, Deputy United Kingdom Representative at the U.N. (2) In the matter of Israel's application to be admitted to the U.N. (3) See Eban to T. Lie, 24 February 1949, 93.03/72/17. (4) Linton replied that according to his information, the Foreign Office still had no definitive attitude towards Israel's application. His feelings, however, were that the British would not campaign against Israel, but he was not sure that they would vote in the affirmative. (See Linton to Eban, telegram 96, 27 February 1949, 93.01/2180/33.) See also No. 414.

No. 403

(1) Tingfu Tsiang, Chinese Permanent Representative at the U.N. (2) Sharett approved Eban's suggested procedure, requesting him, however, to compare notes with Elath in Washington, whose information coming from the Chinese Ambassador in Washington — Wellington Koo, said that China would recognize Israel only after Israel's admission to the United Nations. (See Sharett to Eban, LS/188, 27 February 1949, 93.01/2180/33; Elath to Sharett, W140, 25 February 1949, 130.09/2308/8.) See also No. 408.

No. 404

(1) Ezra Danin, official in the Middle East Division of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (2) See James McDonald to the Secretary of State, 22 February 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 761–4. (3) Zalman Lifshitz (Liff), land-surveying expert and cartographer, adviser to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (4) Joseph Weitz, Director of the Land Development and Afforestation Division in the Jewish National Fund. (5) For main lines of report see No. 406. (6) The Middle East Supply Centre

operated in Cairo during the War; its functions were to procure, distribute and supervise the use of basic consumer goods and raw materials in the countries of that region. (7) See No. 406.

No. 405

(1) See No. 402. (2) See "Note on the admission of Israel to membership in the United Nations", 24 February 1949, 93.03/72/17. (3) See No. *388*, n. 3.

No. 406

(1) See No. 404. (2) Asher Goren, official in the Middle East Division of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. [Dunam — land measure of 1000 sq.m., about ¼ acre].

No. 407 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *398*. (2) Emissaries of the Jewish National Fund and the Palestine Foundation Fund (A. Granovsky — Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Jewish National Fund) — see No. *398*. (3) *Ibid*. (4) Rubin cabled that no contact with the detained emissaries had been permitted; their fate was unknown and a direct approach by the Government of Israel to the Rumanian Ministry for Foreign Affairs was imperative. (Telegram Ri31 in file 130.09/2296/9.) (5) Friedman replied that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs had held consultations over the situation in Rumania and the decisions would be transmitted to him shortly. With regard to the emissaries — a direct approach, to be delivered by himself to the Rumanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was being drafted. (See Friedman to Rubin, telegram 17, 1 March 1949, 130.09/2296/8.) See also No. *412*.

No. 408

(1) See No. 403. (2) *Ibid.*, n. 2. (3) Israel–Egypt armistice agreement signed in Rhodes on 24 February.

No. 410

(1) 3 March 1949. (2) See No. 408. (3) Christopher Mayhew, British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Alternate Representative at the U.N. (4) See No. 415.

No. 411

(1) See No. 408. (2) See also exchange of telegrams China–Israel, Press Release No. 1, 2 March 1949, 93.03/70/23.

No. 412 (Hebrew)

(1) Grigore Preotease, Rumanian Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs. See also Rubin's full report of this meeting, 1 March 1949, 130.02/2457/19. (2) See No. *407*. (3) See Nos. *416, 423*.

No. 413 (Hebrew)

(1) Arie Oron (Stern), Israeli Consul in Rome. (2) Professor Guido Mendes, lung specialist, formerly director of a pulmonary diseases hospital in Rome; classmate of Pope Pius XII. In Israel since 1939. (3) Letter, omitted here, is filed under 130.10/2523/17. (4) See Vol. I, No. 502.

Editorial Note preceding No. 414 (Main Volume, p. 466)

Israel's application to be admitted to the United Nations was debated again by the Security Council in its 413th and 414th meetings on 3–4 March 1949. Britain and Egypt, supported by the Chinese and the Norwegian representatives, attempted to postpone the discussion by having the application referred to the Council's Committee on the Admission of New Members. This motion failed to get the necessary votes. On 4 March, the American representative submitted a draft resolution (U.N. Document S/1276) recommending to the General Assembly that Israel be admitted to the United Nations. This resolution was adopted by nine votes to one (Egypt), the British abstaining. (See *SCOR, Fourth Year,* 413–414th Meetings, 3–4 March 1949.)

No. 414

(1) See No. 402. (2) See No. 408. (3) The Sterling balances of the Mandate retained and frozen by Britain after leaving Palestine; they were being released piecemeal mainly to finance purchases of food by Israel.

No. 415

(1) See Editorial Note, above. Selection Committee — Security Council's Committee on the Admission of New Members. (2) See No. 419.

No. 416 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *412.*

No. 417 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *412.*

No. 418 (Hebrew)

(1) This letter is part of correspondence incorporated in the Israeli–Egyptian Armistice Agreement — see Vol. 3, Appendix F (the letter is dated 24 February). See also No. 108. (2) See Vol. 3, No. 246, n. 5.

No. 419

(1) See Editorial Note, p. 192 above; No. 415. (2) I.e., the Israeli Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (3) Valentine G. Lawford, member of the British delegation to the U.N. (4) Alberto I. Alvarez, Permanent Representative of Cuba at the U.N.; President of the Security Council for March 1949. (5) Finn Moe, Permanent Representative of Norway at the U.N. (6) A.T. Sunde, Norwegian diplomat, was about to succeed Moe. (7) Rudolfo Muñoz, alternate Representative of Argentine at the U.N. (8) See No. 408. (9) Untraced. (10) Mahmud Fawzi, Permanent Representative of Egypt at the U.N.

No. 420

(1) The second part of the third session of the U.N. General Assembly set to be opened at the beginning of April. (2) Untraced. See also No. 460.

No. 421 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *395*. On 2 March the Secretary of State in the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Ivan Boldizsár, announced at a press conference that the rumours concerning impending emigration from Hungary were without foundation and that the Israeli Minister had not met with an authorized member of the Hungarian Government on that matter. The Hungarian Minister of Prague told Avriel that Boldizsár's statement had not been cleared with the Hungarian Government and advised him to clarify the matter in Budapest. Boldizsar himself later retracted his statement and apologized. (See Avriel to Friedman, telegram 40, 3 March 1949; telegram 45, 14 March 1949, 130.09/2392/12.) (2) See No.

417. (3) Aviezer Chelouche, Second Secretary in the Israeli Legation in Bucharest. (4) President Weizmann was scheduled to arrive in the U.S.A. at the beginning of April for a private visit connected with the Weizmann Institute. Sharett intended to arrive in the U.S.A. towards the end of March to take part in the U.N. General Assembly. (5) Friedman's minute on this telegram: "M[oshe] Sh[arett], strictly personal question: I know the importance of your visit to the U.S.A., but are you not concerned about the repercussions in my sphere to a simultaneous visit of both the President and the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the same country? . . . S. F[riedman], 9.3.49". See also Nos. 428, *461*.

No. 422

(1) See No. 367. (2) Fred William Pollack, businessman, resident of Bombay from 1939; Israeli Consular Agent and Immigration Officer from June 1951. Letter dated 8 January 1949 in file 93.08/369/27. (3) Kavalam M. Pannikar, Indian Ambassador in China, member of the Indian delegation to the Second Session of the U.N. General Assembly. (4) Shiva B. Rao, Indian journalist, member of the Indian delegation to the Third Session of the U.N. General Assembly. (5) Elath replied that he shared Comay's opinion on the importance of relations with India and he would try to take advantage of the forthcoming session of the U.N. General Assembly for informal talks with Indian delegates on this subject. (See his letter to Comay, 24 March 1949, 93.08/369/27.)

No. 423 (Hebrew)

(1) See Nos. *407, 412, 417.* Other telegrams — in file 130.09/2296/9. (2) See No. *407,* n. 5. (3) Agami reported to the Cabinet on the situation in Rumania on 2 March. A short and inconclusive discussion followed his report. (4) The situation in Rumania was discussed by the Jewish Agency Executive on 7 March 1949. Agami reported on the situation and after a short discussion it was resolved to allot IL 12,300 to legal aid and compensation to National Funds' employees in Rumania. (See Jewish Agency Executive meeting, 7 March 1949, C.Z.A.) (5) No. *412.* (6) No. *416.* (7) See No. 433. (8) The Zionist Organization's news agency.

No. 424

(1) Armistice talks with Transjordan, began in Rhodes on 28 February. (2) Armistice talks with Lebanon, began at Rosh Ha-Niqra (Naqura) on 1 March. (3) See No. 430.

Editorial Note preceding No. 425 (Main Volume, p. 481)

Operation *Uvda*

Operation *Uvda* for the occupation of the southern Negev took place on 5–10 March.

According to the U.N. partition resolution of 29 November 1947, the Negev was to have been included in the Jewish state, but its ultimate fate depended in practice on actual occupation, and the Jordanians on several occasions put forward claims for its partition and partial annexation to Jordan.

Operation *Uvda* was planned under a severe military and political handicap. According to the armistice agreement with Egypt only defensive forces were permitted in the western Negev, therefore the forces had to move east of the Beersheba–Aqaba line. The operation was planned as a two-pronged advance: the Negev Brigade crossed the mountain massif of the central Negev, while the Golani Brigade advanced south along Wadi Araba, west of the Jordanian border. Only the latter force was involved in a number of incidents with Jordanian forces, which tried to check the Israeli advance.

The Jordanians also tried to stop the advance by diplomatic means. They submitted complaints to the Acting Mediator, and King Abdallah sent several personal messages to Sharett. (See Vol. 3, Nos. 204; 207, n. 1; 208–211, 215.)

No. 425

(1) Operation *Uvda,* see Editorial Note above. (2) A similarly worded message was transmitted by C. Marriott, the British Consul-General in Haifa, to Eytan on 10 March. (See minute by Eytan, 10.3.1949, 93.03/64/1.) (3) See Eytan to Eban, MH3435, 9 March 1949, 93.01/2205/1. See also No. 432, n. 4. (4) See No. 432.

No. 426

(1) Vice-Consul in the American Consulate in Jerusalem, resident in Amman. (2) See No. 425. (3) See Vol. 3, No. 210. (4) See No. 434.

No. 427

(1) See "Report on a meeting between Dr. Eytan and Mr. Knox . . . on 10 March 1949", Ben-Gurion Archives, 532/73/169 (Hebrew). At the same meeting Knox observed that the matter had been raised by the Iraqis, who were trying to find an avenue to cease-fire negotiations with Israel. See also No. 436. (2) No reply by Elath has been traced.

No. 428

(1) See No. *421*. Meeting with Vyshinsky — No. *249*.

No. 430

(1) See No. 424. (2) Sharett cabled later that, according to information in his possession, the Mediator was about to apply to the Security Council on his own initiative, proposing that the Council enjoin Syria and Iraq to enter into armistice negotiations with Israel. (See Sharett to Eban, LS291, 12 March 1949, 93.01/2180/34.) (3) See No. 431.

No. 431

(1) No. 430.

No. 432

(1) See No. 425. (2) See Vol. 3, No. 211. (3) See No. 425, n. 3. The Jordanian note is brought *in extenso* in Vol. 3, No. 210. (4) This message was transmitted also to the British Consul-General in Haifa. (See Eytan to Marriott, 11 March 1949, 130.02/2412/26.)

No. 433

(1) See No. *423*.

No. 434

(1) See Editorial Note, p. 195 above; Nos. 425, 432. (2) No. 426. (3) See McDonald's report to the Secretary of State, 11 March 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 821–3.

No. 435

(1) The report that the Mufti had been invited by the Conciliation Commission was denied. (See Azcarate to Eytan, 17 March 1949, 130.02/2441/1.)

No. 436

(1) See Editorial Note, p. 195 above; No. 439. (Part of sentence in square brackets in accordance with the incoming version.) (2) See No. 427. (3) Eytan's telegram to Eban of 13 March 1949 reporting on Israel's complaint to the U.N. staff about troop dispositions on the Iraqi

front: the Iraqis were vacating the front line which was then taken over by Jordanian forces. These troop dispositions were in disregard of various resolutions of the Security Council and the U.N. Mediator. (Telegram in file 93.01/2205/5.) (4) See Nos. 437, 438, 441.

No. 437

(1) See No. 436. (2) See No. 438.

No. 438

(1) See Nos. 436, 437. (2) Cf. the version of this sentence in No. 436. Eban later requested that the last part of this telegram, beginning with this sentence, be disregarded, as it was based on a misreading of No. 436. (See Eban to Eytan, telegram 1418, 15 March 1949, 130.09/2329/5.)

No. 439

(1) See No. 436.

No. 440

(1) Lewis W. Douglas, American Ambassador to Britain. (2) See No. 426. (3) The downing of 5 British planes in the northern Negev — see Editorial Note, p. 173 above.

No. 441

(1) No. 436. (2) Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948 — see Editorial Note, pp. 139–40 above. (3) See No. 453. (4) This declaration was made by Ben-Gurion when introducing his new Government to the Knesseth on 8 March 1949. (5) Sharett came to the U.S. to take part in the forthcoming session of the U.N. General Assembly.

No. 442

(1) Eytan asked for Elath's appraisal of the situation in Washington following Operation *Uvda*, whether he anticipated difficulties on the part of the Department of State and whether the British were exerting pressure. (See Eytan's telegram to Elath, 14 March 1949, 130.09/2308/3.) (2) The downing of 5 British planes in the northern Negev — see Editorial Note, p. 173 above. (3) At the end of 1948, Henry Morgenthau, Chairman of the United Jewish Appeal, resigned following a controversy over the policy and management of the organization.

No. 443

(1) See No. 400. The memorandum, composed by Zalman Lifshitz and Michael Comay, was submitted to the Conciliation Commission on 17 March 1949. The covering letter said that in spite of the fact that the memorandum did not deal with the question of compensation to the refugees, the Israeli Government was ready to discuss some measure of compensation, but the matter involved complex issues the detailed discussion of which should be postponed to a later stage. (See Comay to Azcarate, 17 March 1949, 130.02/2441/9; Comay to Eban, 21 March 1949, 130.02/2441/9.) (2) Table untraced. (3) The Conciliation Commission's reaction to this memorandum was that it did not consider the contents of the memorandum to be in conformity with the letter and the spirit of para. 11 of the General Assembly's resolution of 11 December 1948. (See Azcarate to Comay, 29 May 1949, 130.02/2441/12.)

No. 444

(1) See No. 452, n. 1.

No. 445

(1) A special sub-committee of the Conciliation Commission set up to deal with the problem of Jerusalem and the Holy Places — see No. 400, Main Volume, p. 452. (2) Cf. The American Consul-General's report on this meeting in *FRUS,* 1949, VI, pp. 842–3. (3) See No. 435.

No. 447

(1) Sir Alec Kirkbride, British Minister in Transjordan. (2) See No. 436. (3) *Ibid.*, n. 3.

Editorial Note preceding No. 448 (Main Volume, p. 512)

Before leaving for the United States, Sharett informed Ethridge that he would refer to the Arab refugees problem in his planned press conference in Washington. He told him, however, not to expect too much. After his departure, Sharett wanted to clarify Ben-Gurion's opinion on two important questions: compensation for landed property abandoned by refugees; reunion of split families. (See Sharett to Eytan, 15 March 1949, 93.02/174/2.)

No. 448

(1) See Editorial Note, above.

No. 449 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *450*. (2) See No. 433. (3) In an attempt to change the Rumanian Government's attitude on immigration, it had been decided to initiate a vigorous press campaign in the Israeli and foreign media. On 18 March 1948, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs held a press conference, divulging detailed information on the situation in Rumania. (See Friedman to Rubin, IR22, 16 March 1949 (Hebrew); Press Conference in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 18 March 1949, 130.02/2399/13 (Hebrew). See also No. *456*. (4) Encouragement of Israeli purchases in Rumania —see No. *451*. (5) See No. *423*. (6) See No. *451*.

No. 450 (Hebrew)

(1) No. 433. (2) See No. *461*. (3) Avram Bunaciu, Rumanian Minister of Justice. (4) Gheorghe Gheorgiu-Dej, Secretary-General of the Rumanian Workers' (Communist) Party, Vice Prime Minister. (5) Emil I. Bodnaras, Rumanian Minister of National Defence. (6) Vasile Luca, Rumanian Minister of Finance. (7) Iosif Chisinevschi, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' (Communist) Party, in charge of propaganda. (8) Miron Constantinescu, Rumanian Minister of Petroleum and Mines. (9) Teohari Georgescu, Rumanian Minister of the Interior.

No. 451 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *412*, n. 1. (2) Petru Groza, Rumanian Prime Minister. See Report of a meeting of the Israeli Minister in Bucharest with the Prime Minister, Dr. Petru Groza, 18 March 1949, 130.11/2513/10 (Hebrew). (3) See R. Rubin, Meeting with the Secretary for Foreign Trade, H. Giali [. . .], 24 February 1949, 130.11/2503/1 (Hebrew). (4) See No. *450*. (5) Yehouda Ariel, Israeli Commercial Attaché in Rumania. (6) See n. 3 above. (7) One sentence omitted here. (8) See No. *449*. (9) The last part of this letter omitted here.

No. 452

(1) No. 444. The Foreign Office replied that Britain had already explained its position but it would consider whether further elucidations would be given. In Linton's opinion, the Foreign Office was testing public opinion to see how far they could go with commitments in Transjordan which might be connected with further withdrawal from Egypt and with supporting Transjordan against Israel. (See Eytan to Sharett, Y156, 23 March 1949, 93.01/2180/34.) (2) See No. 454.

No. 453

(1) See No. 441. (2) Presumably Eytan's telegram to Eban, Y145, 20 March 1949, 93.01/2180/34. Eytan reported on the successful outcome of a meeting between Harkabi, Dayan and Abdallah involving a peaceful settlement of the outstanding problems in the Triangle. For this meeting and the understanding between Israel and Transjordan, see Vol. 3, No. 242. (3) Sharett congratulated Eytan on the understanding with Transjordan, adding that in view of the imminent conclusion of an armistice between Israel and Transjordan, Israel should reconsider the idea of applying to the Security Council in the matter of British reinforcements in Aqaba. (See Sharett to Eytan, X252, 22 March 1949, 93.01/2180/34.)

No. 454

(1) See No. 452. (2) See No. 453, n. 3. (3) See No. 455.

No. 455

(1) See No. 452. (2) No. 425. (3) See No. 462.

No. 456 (Hebrew)

(1) Letter in file 93.05/523/4. Friedman reported on Sharett's note to Ana Pauker (see No. *450*) and on a meeting between Sharett and the Soviet Minister in Israel on the situation in Rumania. The Minister's attitude in that meeting was cool and reserved and throughout the conversation he did not utter even one helpful word. Friedman also conveyed Namir's arguments against the proposal that Sharett visit Moscow to treat directly with the Soviets on emigration from Rumania — see No. 428. (2) See No. *421*. (3) In March 1949, Andrey Vyshinsky replaced Molotov as Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs. (4) Isabelle Blume, Socialist Member of the Belgian Parliament, left-wing activist, awarded Stalin's peace prize, 1953. (5) Konni Zilliacus, British Member of Parliament, leftist, expelled from the Labour Party in May 1949 following his criticism of the Labour Government's policy. (6) Henry A. Wallace, American journalist and statesman, Editor of the *New Republic;* Progressive Party Presidential candidate, 1948. (7) Albert Einstein, Jewish American physicist and Nobelist, pacifist. (8) See No. *449,* n. 3. (9) See Sharett to Eytan, 15 March 1949, 93.02/174/2. (10) See Friedman to Namir, 20 March 1949, 130.11/2513/13. (11) Zeev Shek, in charge of the Czechoslovak desk in the Eastern European division at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (12) See Shek to the Israeli Mission in Prague, 23 March 1949, 93.05/523/4 (Hebrew). (13) See No. *449*. (14) See

Report of a meeting of the Israeli Minister in Bucharest with the Prime Minister, Dr. Petru Groza, 18 March 1949, 130.11/2513/10 (Hebrew).

No. 457 (Hebrew)

(1) No. *449*. (2) See No. *456*. (3) No. *450*. (4) The sailing of the *Pan York* and *Pan Crescent* to Palestine in December 1948 with 15,000 immigrants on board. (See *Documents, November 1947–May 1948,* Companion Volume, Editorial Note, p. 40).

No. 458

(1) The meeting took place on 22 March. Cf. also "Memorandum of conversation, by Secretary of State", *FRUS,* 1949, pp. 853–6. (2) See Editorial Note, p. 198.

No. 461 (Hebrew)

(1) Filed under 130.11/2502/15. For main points of that meeting see No. *395*. (2) *Ibid*. (3) Untraced. (4) Haim Raday (Berman), Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (5) See No. *456*. (6) *Ibid.,* n. 1. (7) See No. *421*. (8) František Nečas, Czechoslovak Consul in Jerusalem. (9) See S. Friedman, Meeting with the Czechoslovak Consul on 28 March 1949, 130.11/2514/11 (Hebrew.) See also No. *464*.

No. 462

(1) Mordecai Eliash, Israeli Minister-designate to Great Britain. (2) Alexander Knox Helm, British Minister-designate to Israel. (3) See No. 455. (4) Mayhew stated that the British forces in Aqaba were reinforced at the request of the Jordanian Government in view of the advance of Israeli forces to the Gulf of Aqaba. He added that the presence of these forces had stabilised the situation and helped the Israel–Jordan negotiations. (See *463 H.C. Deb.* 5s. col. 10–11.) (5) Eliash was an orthodox practising Jew. (6) See note 4 above; copy appended, but omitted here. (7) The debate took place on 29 March. The Archbishop of York described the situation of the Arab refugees and inquired what the Government was doing to relieve their immediate plight and what was its policy for a long-term solution of the problem. Lord Henderson, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who answered for the Government, said that Britain was working for a short-term solution of the problem by contributing to the U.N. and other bodies which were taking care of the refugees. In the long run, however, the problem of the refugees who would not be able to return to their former places should be solved by schemes of

absorption and resettlement in Syria, Jordan and Iraq, and Britain would cooperate with the U.N. Conciliation Commission for that purpose. (See *161 H.L. Deb.* 5s, col. 818–23, 834–9.) (8) See Editorial Note, p. 198 above; No. 448.

No. 463

(1) See Editorial Note, pp. 180–1 above. (2) Filed under 93.02/183/2. (3) Boris Eliacheff, French Commercial Attaché in Israel. (4) Filed under 93.02/183/2. (5) See No. 435.

No. 464 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *456*. (2) The Jewish Democratic Committee — the Jewish Communist Party organization in Rumania, established in 1945. (3) In January 1949 the Hungarian Communist Party resolved to liquidate the Zionist activities in that country. The emissaries of the Zionist parties were requested to leave Hungary, the Palestine Office (dealing with immigration to Israel) was closed, the Zionist National Funds ceased their activities and the Zionist Organization in Hungary declared publicly that following the establishment of the State of Israel and of diplomatic ties between Israel and Hungary, the Zionist Organization had accomplished its main tasks and had thus decided to dissolve. (See Bentsur to East European Division, 28 March 1949, 130.11/2447/6.) (4) Bercu Feldman, Secretary-General of the Jewish Democratic Committee in Rumania. (5) See No. *461*, n. 8. (6) See No. *456*, n. 10. (7) See No. *421*. (8) See No. *465*.

No. 465 (Hebrew)

(1) No. *86*. (2) Untraced. (3) Zygmunt Modzelewski, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs. (4) The Polish United Workers' Party was established in December 1949 by union of the Socialist and Communist parties. Majority and leadership of the united party were retained by former Communist members. (5) See No. *464*. (6) On 18 March 1949, U.S.A., Canada, the Western Union states (Great Britain, France, Holland, Belgium and Luxemburg) and Norway gave notice of their intention to enter a mutual defence alliance — the North Atlantic Treaty. Other West European countries were negotiating with the U.S.A. to join the treaty. (7) An international congress of leftist intellectuals from the east and the west scheduled to meet in Paris in mid-April. (8) In the course of March 1949, the Israeli and the foreign press carried many news items concerning the forming of a Mediterranean defence alliance attached to the North Atlantic Treaty and the possibility of Israel joining this alliance. (9) See No. 441, n. 4. (10) Before leaving Israel, Sha-

rett told a newspaperman that Israel would not join any bloc aimed against any member of the United Nations. Concerning the Mediterranean Alliance, he said that Israel would join that alliance only if it were established within the framework of the United Nations. (See *Al Hamishmar,* 16 March 1949.) (11) Reference is to a press conference held in Washington on 18 March 1949. Sharett reiterated what he had said before leaving Israel — see n. 10 above. (12) Isaac Shamir (Gruenstein), Israeli Commercial Attaché in Warsaw. (13) Gershon Meron, Director of the Economic Division in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

No. 466

(1) See Nos. 402, 414. (2) See No. 476.

No. 467 (Hebrew)

(1) Russian: "Westerner". (2) See Nos. *464, 465.* (3) See S. Friedman, Meeting with the Czechoslovak Consul on 28 March 1949, 130.11/2514/11 (Hebrew). (4) See No. *449.*

No. 468

(1) See No. 364. (2) See No. 477. (3) The armistice agreement with Jordan was signed on 3 April 1949.

No. 469

(1) Eytan's telegram to Eban, dated 2 April 1949, requesting him to give an estimated time-table of the proceedings towards Israel's admission to the U.N. (telegram in 130.09/2329/12). (2) Presumably the meeting with the Conciliation Commission on 7 April 1949 — see No. *479.* (3) See No. 468.

No. 470

(1) See No. 435. (2) On 29 March 1949 a military *coup d'état* took place in Syria. Husni Za'im, the Syrian Chief of Staff, seized power and deposed the Syrian President Shukri al-Quwwatli. There followed rumours of British-Transjordanian connivance in the *coup.* (See Eytan to Sharett, telegram 110, 1 April 1949, 130.09/2344/2.) See also No. 475.

No. 471

(1) Turkey recognized Israel *de facto* on 30 March 1949. (2) Necmettin Sadak, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs.

No. 473

(1) Untraced. (2) See Appendix G, Main Volume, pp. 639–41. (3) See No. *479.* (4) Azcarate replied that since Ben-Gurion confirmed the information which had appeared in the press, namely, that a number of Israeli ministries and other governmental agencies had been moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, the Conciliation Commission considered itself bound to communicate to the Secretary-General of the U.N. that that act of of the Government of Israel was incompatible with the letter and the spirit of para. 8 of the General Assembly's resolution of 11 December 1948. As regards Israel's complaint against the Conciliation Commission's press report of 1 April, Azcarate stated that that press report had been of a purely informative character, making known the action the Conciliation Commission proposed to take in that matter. (See Azcarate to Eytan, 5 April 1949, 130.02/2442/2.)

No. 475

(1) Untraced. (2) King Abdallah. (3) Armistice negotiations between Israel and Syria. (4) See Eytan to Sasson, telegram 112, 2 April 1949, 130.09/2344/2. (5) See Sasson to Eytan, telegrams 38–39, 3 April 1949, 130.09/2344/5. (6) This exchange of telegrams untraced.

No. 476

(1) Names in brackets were telegraphed separately in code. (2) British Commonwealth countries. (3) London. (4) Carlos Romulo, Head of the Philippine delegation to the U.N. (5) The Philippines recognized Israel on 1 April 1949. (6) See No. 470, n. 2. (7) Opening session of the Constituent Assembly in Jerusalem on 14 February 1949. (8) Eban's telegram to Eytan, conveying in code the names of the participants in the meeting (5 April 1949, file 93.01/2180/25).

No. 477

(1) See No. 458. (2) See Nos. 379, 435. (3) See No. 473. (4) See No. 476. (5) Cf. also "Memorandum of conversation, by the Secretary of State", *FRUS,* 1949, VI, pp. 890–4, and No. 482.

No. 478

(1) Untraced. (2) This exchange of telegrams has not been traced. (3) Zalman (Shmuel) Zelikson (Divon), official in the Middle Eastern Division of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, assisted E. Sasson in contacts

with Arab representatives in Paris. (4) Concluding part of letter omitted here.

No. 479 (Hebrew)

(1) U.N. General Assembly resolution of 11 December 1948 — Appendix G, Main Volume, pp. 639–41. (2) As the capital of Turkey. (3) See United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Second Progress Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Part 1) 5 April 1949, U.N. Document A/AC.25.PR.2 (Part 1).

No. 480

(1) For stenographic minutes of this meeting — see No. *479.*

No. 481

(1) Mohammad Hussein Haykal Pasha, President of the Egyptian Senate. (2) Untraced. (3) Ahmad Khashebah Pasha, Egyptian Minis ter of Foreign Affairs, Head of the Egyptian delegation to the Third Session of the U.N. General Assembly.

No. 482

(1) See No. 477, n. 5. (2) Sharett confirmed McDonald's version of the second and third points. As for the first point, Sharett insisted that the word "exchange" had not been uttered in the course of the conversation. In the matter of the repatriation of refugees to areas not allotted to Israel in the 29 November resolution, Sharett explained that that idea had been raised at the beginning of the meeting but dropped later after his expostulation. (See Sharett to Eytan, X298, 11 April 1949, 93.01/2180/35.) (3) Added according to the incoming text. (4) U.N. General Assembly resolution of 11 December 1948 — see Appendix G, Main Volume, pp. 639–41. (5) Reference is to an Israeli incursion into Syrian territory in the vicinity of Kibbutz Shamir — see Vol. 3, Nos. 279, 280 and notes there. (6) Cf. McDonald's report of this meeting in *FRUS,* 1949, VI, pp. 899–900.

No. 483

(1) See No. *490.*

No. 485

(1) This version was rejected by Israel — see Nos. *523,* 525.

No. 487

(1) Richard Ford, Counselor in the U.S. Embassy in Israel. (2) Article 6 of the Israeli–Jordanian Armistice Agreement deals with border demarcation in sectors occupied by the Iraqi Army and with safeguarding of the rights of villagers residing in these sectors — see Vol. 3, Appendix H. (3) See No. *418.*

No. 489

(1) See No. 462, n. 7. (2) See No. 466.

No. 491

(1) For full report of this meeting — see No. *490.* (2) The Special Committee was established in accordance with the Israel–Jordan Armistice Agreement to deal with outstanding problems between the two countries, such as the reactivation of the potash works north and south of the Dead Sea, the Naharayim power station, access to Mount Scopus, the operation of the Jerusalem railway line, etc. (3) See No. *498.*

Editorial Note preceding No. 492 (Main Volume, p. 573)

Israel's admission to the United Nations was discussed by the General Assembly on 13 April. The Assembly had before it a letter from the President of the Security Council, transmitting the Council's recommendation that Israel be admitted to the United Nations. (See Editorial Note, p. 192 above.) After a short discussion, it was resolved to put the question of Israel's admission on the General Assembly's agenda. The General Assembly decided, however, not to accept the Security Council's recommendation to discuss the question outright in a plenary meeting of the Assembly and decided to refer it, according to the normal procedure, to the General Assembly's First Committee.

Owing to the crowded agenda of the First Committee, the question of Israel's admission was referred to an Ad Hoc Committee of the First Committee. The Ad Hoc Committee devoted 10 meetings of tedious and uninspiring discussion to the question of Israel's admission. The discussion was wound up by a recommendation that Israel be admitted to the U.N.

The General Assembly resumed discussion of the question on 11 May. After a short debate, it resolved to accept the Ad Hoc Political Committee's recommendation to admit Israel to the U.N. Thirty seven countries voted for, twelve against and nine countries abstained. (See *GAOR, 3rd Sess.,* Pt. 2, 191th, 207th Meetings, 13 April, 11 May, pp. 36–47; 306–336; *GAOR, 3rd Sess.,* Pt. 2, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 42nd–51st Meetings, 3–9 May, pp. 179–360.)

No. 492

(1) See No. 493.

No. 493

(1) See Editorial Note, p. 206 above. (2) See also No. 495.

No. 494

(1) See No. 486. (2) See also No. 525.

No. 495

(1) See No. 493. (2) In a separate coded telegram, Sharett explained that the purpose of the suggested communication was to put pressure upon the U.S.A. and to expedite Israel's admission to the U.N. in order to avoid reopening tiresome questions at that stage of discussions in Lake Success. (See Sharett to Eytan, X304, 16 April 1949, 93.01/2180/35.) (3) Eytan replied that he doubted the wisdom and usefulness of the written communication suggested by Sharett; Comay, however, would meet Ethridge and convey to him the gist of Sharett's arguments. Eytan also suggested similar action in Washington. (See Eytan to Sharett, Y116, 17 April 1949, 130.09/2329/12.) At the meeting with Comay, Ethridge insisted that the Israeli position would either postpone the discussion on admission until September or initiate a vigorous debate at the U.N. that would create an unfavourable atmosphere at Lausanne. (See Comay to Eban, Y122, 20 April 1949, 130.09/2329/12.)

No. 496 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *249*. (2) See No. *9*. (3) For a full report of this meeting see M. Namir, *Israeli Mission to Moscow*, pp. 116–121 (Hebrew).

Editorial Note preceding No. 497 (Main Volume, p. 578)

On 15 April, Good Friday, the Pope published an encyclical letter about the Holy Places in Palestine — *De Sacris Palaestinae Locis.* In it he urged that a regime constituted and stabilized by international law be established in Jerusalem and its vicinity, to guarantee the security of the Holy Places and to safeguard the rights of the Catholic institutions. He also expressed his concern over the fate of the refugees and urged an immediate relief of their misery. (See English translation of the encyclical letter, 15 April 1949, 130.02/2396/15.)

No. 497

(1) Israel's reaction to the Pope's encyclical letter followed these suggested lines — see draft, 17 April 1949, 130.02/2396/15.

No. 498 (Hebrew)

(1) The report was made in the course of a political consultation in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

No. 499

(1) See No. 495, n. 3.

No. 500 (Hebrew)

(1) Hersch Smolar, author and journalist, editor of the Yiddish paper *Folksshtimme,* member of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party. (2) Antoni Alster, member of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party, in charge of Jewish affairs and immigration to Israel. (3) For further details see Ukhmani's telegram to Friedman, No. 17, 13 April 1949, 130.09/2306/4.

No. 501

(1) See also No. 525.

No. 503

(1) Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, Jordanian Prime Minister. (2) Following the Egyptian invasion of Palestine, the Egyptian authorities detained about 600 Egyptian Jews, mostly on the charge of Zionist activities. For attempts to release those detainees see correspondence in file 130.02/2387/7. (3) Untraced.

No. 504

(1) Answering a question on Jerusalem before his departure from the U.S.A. on 19 April, Sharett said: "If the world is prepared to recognize the significance of Jerusalem to the Jewish people to the same extent that the Jewish people are prepared to recognize the importance of Jerusalem to the world, then there is a chance for a harmonious solution". (See *Davar,* 21 April 1949.) (2) Reference is to the discussion on the future of the former Italian colonies (Libya, Somaliland and Eritrea) which took a good part of the time of the second part of the Third Session of the U.N.

General Assembly. The Latin-American bloc was very active on this issue, endeavouring to secure a compromise resolution favouring an international trusteeship. (See also Vol. I, No. 415, n. 2.)

No. 505 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. 489. (2) See Editorial Note, p. 207 above. (3) The meeting took place on 18 april 1949 in Tiberias — see *FRUS,* 1949, VI, pp. 925–7.

No. 507

(1) A telegram from Eban to Sharett reporting on a meeting with the American delegation to the U.N. which suggested a speedy procedure on Israel's application for admission to the U.N. (Telegram, dated 25 April 1949, in file 93.01/2180/35.) (2) Sharett replied in the affirmative. (See Sharett to Eban, 26 April 1949, 93.01/2180/35.) For the meeting with Acheson, see Nos. 510, 511. (3) On 24 April Israel presented to Sweden the official report on the assassination of Count Bernadotte. (See Sharett to Undén, 24 April 1949, 93.03/72/23.) (4) Armistice talks with Syria. (5) See Vol. 3, No. 289.

No. 508

(1) The Special Committee to be established according to Article VIII(1) of the armistice agreement with Jordan, with the purpose of discussing and solving the outstanding problems between Israel and Jordan. (See Vol. 3, Appendix H.) (2) See No. *518.*

Editorial Note preceding No. 509 (Main Volume, p. 591)

On 25 April, President Weizmann lunched with President Truman. Among the subjects discussed were Israel's admission to the U.N., the internationalization of Jerusalem, the repatriation of Arab refugees, and the settlement of boundaries between Israel and the Arab states. See Elath to Sharett, W199, 25 April 1949, 130.09/2308/9; Memorandum of a conversation, by the Secretary of State, *FRUS,* 1949, VI, pp. 943–4.

No. 509

(1) President Truman voiced this demand repeatedly since assuming office in mid-1945.

No. 510

(1) See No. 477. (2) See No. 507. (3) On 23 April, Weizmann delivered a speech at a well-attended meeting in New York. He dwelt espe-

cially on the Jerusalem issue, saying that no real incompatibility existed between the interests and concerns of Christianity and the aspirations of the people of Jerusalem, and that with a genuine desire on both sides, a harmonious solution could speedily be attained, to be bolstered by an international consensus. (See *New York Times*, 24 April 1949.) (4) Cardinal Francis Spellman, Archbishop of New York, president of the Catholic Near East Welfare Association. (5) Cf. No. 514. See also Memorandum of a conversation, by the Secretarty of State, 26 April 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 944–7.

No. 511

(1) See No. 510.

No. 512

(1) See No. 514.

No. 513

(1) No. 514. (2) See also Nos. 510, 512.

No. 514

(1) No. 513. (2) Cf. also No. 517.

No. 515 (Hebrew)

(1) After Weizmann's meeting with President Truman (see Editorial Note, p. 209 above), the press reported that Weizmann had proposed that Israel repatriate 100,000 Arab refugees. This report was denied later. (See Sharett to Eban, Y128, 25 April 1949, 130.09/2329/12.)

No. 516 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. *505*. (2) See No. 510, n. 3. (3) I.e., the Middle East Division. (4) Refers, presumably, to the visit of the Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Sa'id in Damascus and to the discussions on mutual military cooperation that were held on that occasion.

No. 517

(1) Cf. No. 514. (2) See No. *515*. (3) See No. 524, n. 1.

No. 518 (Hebrew)

(1) No. *515*. (2) See No. 508. (3) See No. *515*, n. 1. (4) Robert John Graham Boothby, British Member of Parliament, Conservative; author and journalist. (5) No reply to this telegram has been traced.

No. 522

(1) See Nos. 514, 517. (2) See Nos. 507, 510.

No. 523 (Hebrew)

(1) See No. 517. Eytan on his part considered the text cabled to him as disappointing in tone as well as in contents and as emasculating Israel's policy to the point of meaninglessness. (See his telegram to Sharett, SL1, 30 April 1949, 130.02/2442/5.) See also No. 526, Main Volume, pp. 615–6. (2) See No. 485. (3) See No. *505*, n. 3. (4) See no. 494.

No. 524

(1) See No. 510. (2) No. 510. (3) See Vol. 3, No. 288.

No. 525

(1) Thus in the original, but reference is presumably to the Old City. (2) Appendix G. (3) See No. *479*. (4) George Barnes, Political Officer of the Conciliation Commission in Jerusalem. (5) See No. 1. (6) See Eban's conversation with Mgr McMahon, Secretary of the Catholic Near East Welfare Association. (See Eban to Sharett, X329, 28 April 1949, 130.09/2329/6.) (7) See No. 508, n. 1. (8) Cf. No. *518*. (9) See United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Second Progress Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Part 1), 5 April 1949, U.N. Document A/AC.25.PR2 (Part 1). (10) See No. 509; No. 510, n. 3. (11) See No. 494. (12) See Nos. 494, 501. (13) See No. 485. (14) See Sharett to Eliash, IL13, 28 April 1949, 130.09/2318/2 —identical with No. 289, Vol. 3.

No. 526

(1) Two paragraphs, dealing with the situation of Egyptian Jewry and with immigration from North Africa, omitted here. (2) See Nos. *523*, 525, Main Volume, p. 612. (3) See No. 525, Main Volume, p. 612. (4) See No. 494. (5) See No. 517; No. *523*, n. 1.

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TO MAIN VOLUME AND COMPANION VOLUME

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References to the principal addressees in this volume — Ben-Gurion, Eban, Eytan and Sharett — are brought only when they are the authors of documents or when they are mentioned in them.

* *Abbreviations*
b. — born
n — note
edn — editorial note
CV — Companion Volume
IDF — Israel Defence Forces